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The thesis proposes a new account of laws of nature and token causation within
the Humean tradition. After a brief introduction in §1, I specify and defend in
§2 a Humean approach to the question of laws and causation. In §3 I defend
the view that laws are conditional generalisations which concern ’systems’
and detail further issues concerning the scope, content and universality of
laws. On the basis of the discussion concerning laws’ logical form, I argue
in §4 against a view of laws as mirroring the structure of causal relations.
Moreover, I show how this conception is implicit in the best system account
of laws, thereby giving us reason to reject that account too. §5 presents an
alternative ‘causal-junctions conception’ of laws in terms of four causal features
often associated with laws: component-level and law-level dispositionality, and
variable-level and law-level causal asymmetry. These causal features combine
to demarcate a central class of laws called ‘robust causal junction laws’ from
which other laws can be accounted for. §6 provides a Humean analysis of the
causal features used to characterise robust causal junction laws. This is done
first by providing an analysis of dispositions in terms of systems and laws, and
second, by providing an analysis of causal asymmetry in terms of relations
of probabilistic independence. In §7, I then provide a nomological analysis
of token causation by showing how the causal junctions described by robust
causal junction laws can be chained together in a particular context.
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12 CHAPTER 0.
1 Introduction
In comparison with the concept of ‘causation’, the concept of a ‘law of nature’
is a relatively new one. Although precursors to it can be found in works
dating back at least to the ancient Greeks (Giere 1995), its coinage is generally
attributed to Descartes, picked up soon after by Newton in his works on Optics
(Zilsel 1942, Needham 1951). In contrast, causation has been a perennial topic
of enquiry for natural philosophers dating back to the earliest proto-scientific
endeavours (Hulswit 2002, ch.1).
Despite being relatively new to the conceptual repertoire of natural
philosophers, the discovery of a law of nature is widely considered one of the
most highly prized scientific achievements. Consider the following from
Feynman:
From a long view of the history of mankind—seen from, say, ten
thousand years from now—there can be little doubt that the most
significant event of the 19th century will be judged as Maxwell’s
discovery of the laws of electrodynamics. (2011, §6)
What, then, is the relationship between causation and laws of nature? Here,
things become controversial. Some have thought the relationship to be very
close indeed. Helmholtz, for example, claimed that,
Our demand to understand natural phenomena, that is, to discover
13
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their laws, is a different way of expressing the demand that we are
to search for the forces that are the causes of the phenomena. The
lawfulness of nature is conceived of as causal relationship. (1896,
40, translation in Frisch 2014, 1)
Helmholtz seems here to be drawing a very close relationship between laws
and causation. To change the emphasis a little: understanding the world is a
process of discovering laws of nature, knowledge of which is given to us through
the search for causal relationships. Others have been less sympathetic to such
a close association. For instance, some have believed that causation is not the
right concept to use in current-day science, and physics in particular (Kirchhoff
1876, Mach 1900, 1905, Russell 1912, Hempel 1965, Norton 2009, Price and
Weslake 2009; see Frisch 2014 for a discussion); while others have believed it is
rather laws which are of limited value Beatty (1980), Giere (1995), Mumford
(1998), Machamer et al. (2000), Woodward and Hitchcock (2003).
I, for one, am on Helmholtz’s side. More specifically, I believe that laws of
nature are conceived of in terms of certain specific type-level causal relations.
This result may seem to disappoint those of a Humean-empiricist bent who
so desperately seek to rid science from worrying metaphysical notions like
causation (e.g. Hume 1738 [1978], 1777 [1993], Russell 1912, Carnap 1928,
Hempel 1965), but I will argue that it need not. Laws may be conceived of in
causal terms, but we can still remain believers in a non-causal analysis of
both laws and causation. In fact, I will use the observations about the causal
conception of laws to inform a number of issues which have been raised
among those influenced by Hume concerning how best to conceive of both
phenomena. The result is an account of laws in terms of specific and
independently analysable type-level causal relations which can then be put to
use in a competitive and comprehensive analysis of token causal relations.
The analysis I have in mind here is metaphysical. It need not accurately
capture aspects of the epistemology or conceptual role of causation, but it
15
must provide conditions which are at least extensionally adequate.1 Although
I will refrain from using the term, many Humeans would consider such an
analysis a ‘reduction’ of causation to something more basic or fundamental.
This process of reasoning is at odds with many standard approaches to
questions of causation and laws. The contemporary philosophical literature
acknowledges a deep divide between Humeans and non-Humeans.
Traditionally, Humean theorists start with a limited set of non-causal facts
from which the laws are derived. With the laws in place, a metaphysical
analysis of causation is then sought typically drawing on laws in some
manner. Regularity analyses (e.g. Hume 1777 [1993], Mackie 1980, Grasshoff
and May 2001, Strevens 2007, Baumgartner 2008, 2013a), counterfactual
dependency analyses (e.g. Lewis 1973a, Hitchcock 2001b, Halpern and Pearl
2001), probabilistic analyses (e.g. Reichenbach 1956, Suppes 1970, Lewis
1986a, Menzies 1989, Kvart 2004, Fenton-Glynn 2011, 2016) and some
conserved quantity theories (e.g. Salmon 1977, 1994, 1998a, Dowe 2000) all
seem to be ‘off the shelf’ theories of causation readily available for Humeans.
The only problem—a big problem—is picking one which is extensionally
adequate.
In contrast, the non-Humean theorists often start with the assumption that
the former approach is hopeless. Causation is simply too basic to be analysed
in the way the Humean wants. Instead, non-Humeans begin with a set of
explicitly causal facts and derive an openly circular analysis of causation (or
else provide no analysis at all (see Anscombe 1971). Interventionist analyses
(e.g. Woodward 2003), certain mechanist analyses (e.g. Machamer et al.
2000, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007, Illari and Williamson
2013), dispositionalists and powers-based analyses (e.g. Mumford 1998,
Molnar 2003, Heil 2005, Bird 2010) are all developed from this starting
assumption (although strength of belief in it varies). Only with such analyses
1Presumably mere extensional adequacy is insufficient. The conditions must be
informative, general and exhibit some degree of modal robustness.
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in place—and depending on their fondness for the concept—do non-Humean
theorists consider developing an account laws too (e.g. compare Bird’s 2007a
tolerance of laws with Mumford’s 2004 rejection of them).
In such terms, this division is not sufficiently refined to capture all the available
views. Indeed, the view presented below falls through the cracks. Going by
tradition, then epistemically my sympathies lie with the non-Humean. I think
we have good reason to believe causal relations are basic to our perceptual
experience of the world (see Michotte 1963, Anscombe 1971, Menzies 1998,
Carey 2009) and I also suspect that causation is conceptually basic too (as have,
for various other reasons Tooley 1987, Kant 1998, Edgington 2011). Moreover,
I think that an adequate account of laws should pay attention to this fact.
Ultimately, laws are generalisations we deem important because they capture
particularly useful and salient causal information. However, metaphysically,
my sympathies lie with the Humean, since I think there are also good reasons
for expecting causation to admit of metaphysical analysis in terms of non-
causal facts. A crucial point I want to capitalise on is that siding with the idea
that causation is conceptually and/or epistemically basic does not preclude a
Humean metaphysical analysis of it (simplified to ‘analysis’ from hereon). More
significantly, if we embrace the epistemic and conceptual priority of causation
we open ourselves to a more plausible and penetrating Humean account of
both laws and causation.
But things are still more nuanced than that. As indicated, it is typical among
Humeans to treat both type-level and token-level causation as metaphysically
downstream of the laws (ignoring so-called ‘causal laws’ Cartwright 1979).
The Humean typically relies on an independent analysis of laws (even if only
implicitly) in order to develop an account of both token-level causation (e.g.
Lewis 1973a, 2000, Salmon 1977, 1998c,a, Dowe 2000), and type-level causation
(e.g. Reichenbach 1956) or both (e.g. Suppes 1970, Baumgartner 2008).
My Humean account of laws and causation will not work quite like this. In
17
§5 I will propose four type-level causal features which I think can be put to
use in accounting for a certain class of laws, what I call the ‘robust causal
junction laws’. Other laws are then to be accounted for derivatively. But
where causation is invoked in order to ascend to an account of laws, it will
then be thrown away (like the ladder spoken of in Wittgenstein 1961, §6.5.4),
in order that a non-causal account of it in terms of laws can then be provided.
This is carried out in §6 where I will provide a Humean analysis of these
features. Crucially, these analyses will not themselves draw on the laws in
their own metaphysical analyses. Once laws have been accounted for in this
way, I then use them to provide a nomological analysis of token causation in
§7. Consequently, the new Humean picture orders the direction of analysis
rather differently than before.
This constructive work only emerges from §5 onward. Before that I intend to
make some methodological and critical remarks and lay a significant amount
of groundwork concerning laws’ logical form. In §2, I defend Humeanism as a
methodological position interpreted as an abstinance of reference to three
kinds of ‘necessary connection’. I then move on to §3, which discusses laws’
logical form. Laws, I will argue, have the form of a conditional with an
antecedent predicate clause satisfied by instances of a system-type; hence all
laws are ‘system-laws’. In §4, I explore and criticise what I take to be a
dominant conception of laws as mirroring the structural form of causal
relationships. Showing why this is problematic will also allow me to comment
on and ultimately reject the ‘best system account’ of laws which dominates
much of the discussion on Humean approaches to laws.
The positive spin on the relationship between causation and laws comes in §5
when I consider more carefully how laws are causally conceived offering two
pairs of causal features I believe to be inferentially tied to laws: two of
‘dispositionality’ and two of ‘causal asymmetry’. With these causal features
in mind I am then able to offer my own distinct proposal for a
‘causal-junctions conception’ of laws defined in terms of robust causal
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junction laws, a particular class of law which exhibit all of the described
features. In §6 I then set about providing an analysis of the causal features
drawn on in the new account in Humean terms. §6.1 argues for a purely
extensional conditional analysis of laws’ dispositionality and §6.2 argues for a
probabilistic analysis of laws’ causal asymmetries. In combination, these
analyses support a Causal-Junctions Account of laws presented in §6.3. With
a fully Humean account of laws in hand, I then show in §7 how we might
(metaphysically) analyse all token causation using the idea that some
causation occurs within systems described by robust causal junction laws
(i.e. is ‘intra-system causation’) all other causation is a chaining of the former
kind (i.e. is ‘inter-system causation’) achieved via some observations about
event-identity. Since the former is a limiting case of the latter, the result is
an account of causation which interprets all causation as ‘inter-system
causation’. Hence, the thesis will have provided both a Humean account of
laws as system-laws and of token causation as inter-system causation. §8,
provides a brief summary.
Figure 1.1 (p.19) represents the direction of reasoning that this thesis aims to
establish from §5 onwards. The arrows indicate the direction of analysis and
the numbers indicate the sections in which the respective analysis or account
is developed. The result of the proposed accounts of laws and token causation
is a more nuanced Humean position which avoids the brash rejection of what
I take to be salient and crucial connections between the two. By adopting this
new position I hope the Humean can respect many of the intuitions which have




































Figure 1.1: Thesis structure from §5 onwards
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2 Humean methodology
In contemporary terms, I am no committed Humean. It seems to me that there
are a number of arguments which should at least remain open as to whether
the sort of necessary connections eschewed by a thoroughgoing Humean really
exist. Nonetheless, when it comes to laws and causation, I do not see any
benefit to introducing unHumean posits. In this chapter I will argue for a
form of methodological Humeanism. This is a methodological approach to
philosophising which restricts the available materials which can form the source
or explanation of certain phenomena—in our case, laws and token causation—
to the contents of the so-called ‘Humean mosaic’ (defined below).
According to Hume (1738 [1978], 1777 [1993]), he could observe neither the
exercise of powers, nor necessary relations. In general, Hume thought that,
all events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows
another; but we never can observe any tye between them. They
seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea
of any thing, which never appeared to our outward sense or
inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we
have no idea of connexion or power at all. (1777 [1993], ch.7, part
II)
For Hume, discussion of causation and necessary connections were conflated
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into a singular path of reasoning: we can’t perceive a worldly instance of
the relation and so we can’t conceive clearly of one, so we’re better off not
assuming one. Beebee has suggested that Hume was ‘so sure of the connection
between experimental reasoning [i.e. concerning, e.g., our inferential habits]
and causation that it does not even occur to him that experience might reveal
events to be connected in a way that does not enable one to infer the second
from the first’ (2006b, 80; see also Mackie 1980). But whatever the reason
for Hume’s lack of demarcation, it is clearly one we can nowadays make. For
instance, one might coherently accept primitive causal connections but reject
primitive modal connections or vice versa.
Nor should we stop here in demarcating types of connection Hume was
dissatisfied with. For nowadays, sympathisers with Hume take it as
incumbent to defend a position opposed to primitivism about causal
connections (e.g. Anscombe 1971, Edgington 2011), subjunctive conditional
connections (e.g. Lange 2009), higher-order connections between universals
(e.g. Armstrong 1983, Bird 2007a, Swoyer 1982, Tooley 1987) and lawlike
connections (e.g. Carroll 1994, Maudlin 2007).
Of course, it is common to think that these various connections are closely
related. So the saying goes, laws support counterfactuals (a kind of subjunctive
conditional), causation is often justified by drawing attention to corresponding
counterfactual dependencies, and higher-order connections are often considered
in discussion of laws. Nonetheless, it seems logically coherent to consider the
denial or acceptance of each of these independently of any other. One could,
for instance, be an error theorist about any of the connections whilst defending
a nontrivial account of the others.
Even when taking the Humean position to be one which denies all these
connections as primitive, the influence of Hume’s sceptical attitude has been
pervasive. For example, his distaste for metaphysical posits which go beyond
the empirically accessible was a characteristic feature of the entire
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positivist-empiricist movement (e.g. Mach 1900, 1905, Carnap 1928, Hempel
1965). The positivist programme, perhaps best exemplified in Carnap (1928),
was an attempt to build up an account for all rationally justifiable theory in
terms of a basic set of constituent claims which made reference only to those
aspects of reality which could be directly perceived (or, later, were the basic
constituents of a rational physics). For the positivists, some aspects of theory
would be necessary, by virtue of their analyticity. However, the necessity that
comes with analyticity arguably does not conflict with the general Humean
denial of primitive causal, subjunctive, higher-order or lawlike connections.
Indeed these were all connections the positivists denied. Either they could be
defined in terms of more epistemically reasonable connections (e.g. constant
conjunction) or they were to be rejected from theory.
The positivists were motivated by epistemological concerns, but in recent times
Humeanism as a philosophical stance has taken on a more metaphysical flavour,
most notably in the works of (Lewis 1986g, 1994). Lewis admitted that many
of the papers which contribute to his Philosophical papers,
fall into place within a prolonged campaign on behalf of the thesis I
call “Humean supervenience.” [...] Humean supervenience is named
in honor of the greater denier of necessary connections. It is the
doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another
(1986e, ix).
It is fair to treat the ‘necessary connections’ Lewis denied as including all the
various disambiguated types of connection Hume was concerned with. This
lead Lewis to attempt to provide Humean treatments of causation Lewis
(1973a), of subjunctives Lewis (1986b), and laws (Lewis 1973b). Lewis also
expressed a distaste for higher-order connections (see Lewis 1983) and was at
pains to show how the ‘work’ such connections could do might be done
drawing only on the resources of the mosaic.
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Seeing the world as a Humean mosaic led Lewis to believe not only that
there were no primitive necessary connections, but that there were no strictly
necessary relations between spatiotemporally distinct entities at all. For
Lewis, the world’s facts could be recombined in any possible combination
(provided there is enough spacetime). More precisely, ‘the principle is that
anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy
distinct spatiotemporal positions’ (Lewis 1986f, 88).
This Principle of Recombination is one of the central principles of Lewis’s
Humeanism and reflects Hume’s own commentary on necessity. For Hume
reasoned that ‘’tis an established maxim in metaphysics that whatever the
mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words,
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible’ (1738 [1978], Book I, part II,
section II), where, ‘in order to know whether any objects, which are joined in
impression, be separable in idea, we need only reconsider if they be different
from each other; in which case it is plain they may be conceived apart” (Book
I, part II, section III). From such extant conceivability of separation Hume
surmised that ‘there is no object which implies the existence of any other’
(Book I, part II, section IV).
However, at least since Kripke (1980), we know better than to assume that
conceivability can be used conclusively to justify reasoning about possibility.
Lewis accordingly avoided grounding his view on such evidence. We might
expect Lewis to replace the original evidence for Humeanism with something
else, but as MacBride notes, ‘it is a curious fact that the proponents of the
contemporary Humean programme—Lewis included—having abandoned the
empiricist theory of thought that underwrites Hume’s rejection of necessary
connections provide precious little by way of motivation for the view’ (2005,
127). In fact one might wonder what reasons there could be for denying the
existence of the sorts of necessary connections which would prevent an
unrestricted principle of recombination (see, e.g. Wilson 2010).
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It’s worth pointing out that the principle of recombination is not essential to
a view in the spirit of Hume which denies primitive causal, subjunctive or
higher-order connections. One might, for example, reject the primitive
connections and yet also reject recombination because one holds an error
theory of modal talk. Or one might think that certain necessary
mathematical facts which are neither worldly nor analytic must be
considered when modalising about laws (see McKenzie 2013). We must,
therefore, separate the presumption of recombination from the desire to
restrict the available solutions to philosophical problems of law, causation
and counterfactuals to those which base their accounts solely on the mosaic.
In order to avoid falsely aligning directly with any existing philosophical
tradition or giving a misleading interpretation of Hume, I will define my own
approach in terms of the content of the mosaic directly. The ‘Humean
methodology’ is the method of limiting oneself to reference to the materials
in the mosaic in order to account for certain phenomenon of interest—in the
case of the current text, laws and causation. Anyone following this
methodology I will call a ‘Humean’. As it turns out, Lewis and other
supporters of Humean supervenience are Humean in this sense, and I will
draw heavily on their discussions of laws. But crucially, there are other ways
to be Humean which may be preferable in light of certain issues.
If we are Humean, what are we precluding from the mosaic? Based on the
disambiguation I provided above, we have at least the following three distinct
kinds of necessary connections to consider.
1. Primitive causal connections: a connection between particular causes
and their particular effects.
2. Primitive subjunctive connections: a connection of modal dependence,
e.g. between states of affairs or events.
3. Primitive higher-order connections: a connection between entities which
can have instances (e.g. universals).
26 CHAPTER 2. HUMEAN METHODOLOGY
We could add to this list a fourth primitive connection of ‘lawhood’. Primitive
laws have been advocated on occasion as an exasperation with the progress of
the philosophical debate over laws (see Carroll 1994, Maudlin 2007). I have no
principled arguments that such primitive connections are unreasonable. My
only reason for denying them is that I believe there is an account available
which doesn’t make reference to them (see §5 and §6).
Each of the three connections listed above have been posited for distinct
reasons and as far as I’m concerned each should be denied from the mosaic
when laws are under scrutiny. In the following sections I will explain why I
think this is justifiable. Three points are worth mentioning beforehand.
First, what is denied in each case is not the existence of the connections
altogether. What is to be denied is rather the presence of these connections
in the mosaic, which is to form the raw materials (quite literally) with which
laws and causation are to be accounted for. Essentially, the Humean at least
wants to avoid taking such connections as a primitive in their analysis.
Second, it is typical for Humeans to consider the mosaic to exhaust the
fundamental, either because it is conceptually prior (as the
positivist-empiricists thought) or because it metaphysically grounds
everything else (as Lewis seemed to think). However, I do not take this to be
a requisite for being a methodological Humean. Although I will not argue for
it here, there seems to me the logical space to deny the fundamentality claim
and still believe that building an account of laws and causation which are
limited to the mosaic is methodologically advisable. What I aim to show in
§2.1, §2.2 and §2.3 is that there are good reasons to avoid referring to these
connections when trying to provide an account of laws and causation—this is
what I mean by not taking such connections as primitive. One might think
these arguments are sufficient to infer the lack of fundamentality of such
primitives. Nonetheless, the space seems there to defend the more nuanced
claim that there exist such fundamental connections despite Humean analysis
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being available.1
Third, the methodology has been defined in terms of reference to a limited class
of phenomena, namely, those which appear in the mosaic. Of course, I’ve made
reference many times already to causal relations and I will be discussing them
further along with the other connections which don’t appear in the mosaic.
Does this mean I’m not adhering to the methodology? No. The point is not to
avoid reference to such connections altogether, but only in the final analysis.
This would render such connections primitive. My final account of laws and
their type-level causal features is provided in §6 and of token causation in §7.
2.1 Against primitive causal connections
There are good reasons to adopt a methodology which avoids reference to
primitive causal connections over and above the relata in causal relations.
Although saying what they are is a delicate issue. Traditionally, this
Hume-inspired attitude is motivated by the belief that we don’t observe
causation, rendering it at best a theoretical posit. But this is controversial.
In the introduction I admitted that my sympathies concerning the epistemic
priority of causation in perception lay with the non-Humean: I think we
observe causation all around us and that it plays an important role in how
we conceptualise the world. If one has sympathies with Anscombe (1971), for
instance, we might believe that one can observe the cat is lapping up the
milk (understood as a causal fact) as well as anything else in the perceivable
world. Moreover, citing experiments by Michotte (1963), Leslie and Keeble
(1987), Schlottman and Shanks (1992), Peter Menzies (1998) concludes that,
to the extent that there is a prevailing orthodoxy among cognitive
1One might, for example, suspect causation must be fundamental in order to have any
hope of an informative solution to Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments against a non-trivial
interpretation of our language (see Putnam 1977, 1980). Even so, one might also think—
along Humean lines—that an analysis of causation is possible in which causal talk can be
removed from the analysans (hence not primitive). Despite the controversy which would
surround such a view, it seems to me logically coherent.
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psychologists, it is that there is a modular, informationally encap-
sulated system that is responsible for the perception of causal re-
lations in special circumstances. (1998, 354)
But notice that to deny that causal connections are observed is not the same
as denying that we can come to know of the existence of a causal relationship
via direct perception. One can agree, for example, with Anscombe (1971, 137)
that someone can see that the cat drank up the milk or that the dog made a
funny noise or that things were cut or broken by whatever we saw cut or break
them. But this does not commit one to claiming that they see the causal tie—a
thing in and of itself—between the cat’s drinking and the milk’s being drunk
up, or the dog’s movement and the noise, etc. As Armstrong (1968) pointed
out, seeing that some fact Fa is the case, need not imply seeing the particular
a. Similarly, we might think that seeing that there is a causal relation does
not imply seeing the causal relation as a distinct entity.
Moreover, one can consistently distinguish perception (whether veridical or
not) interpreted as impacting on perceivers’ inferential states, from observation
interpreted as the process whereby information about the world is transferred
(via distribution of photons across the retina or airwaves on the eardrum,
chemical reactions in the olfactory receptors, etc.) to the brain. This latter
interpretation of observation may be philosophically limited when it comes to
making sense of how we form perceptual beliefs, but it is nonetheless helpful
to make sense of the limitations on the physical process which mediates our
mind and the world. We know, for instance, that certain inert chemicals will
have no observable odour because they do not react with our olfactory glands,
and that objects in a vacuum make no observable sound because they cannot
transmit sound waves. When it comes to the causal relation, it seems highly
plausible that Hume’s claim, interpreted as one about observability in this
sense, remains correct. For there appears to be nothing more than the cause
and the effect which are suitable candidates for impacting on our sense-organs
in a relevant way. No extra tie between them will be observable. If this is
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correct, then while there may be a sense in which we perceive causal relations,
we can still agree that there is no observable connection between causes and
effects.
In defense of this last point, it’s worth considering some of the ties that have
been mooted to exist between causes and effects. On the one hand we have
those ties suggested to be metaphysically motivated, such as Tooley’s (1987)
primitive causal relation C or Armstrong’s (1983, 1997, 2004a) nomic
necessitation relation N . On the other hand, we have those ties suggested to
be physically motivated, such as Aronson (1971) and Fair’s (1979) transfer of
energy/momentum. Even if one countenances these connections, the question
remains whether they are able to impact on our sense-organs independently
of the relata which they connect. I, for one, cannot bring myself to entertain
the idea that a transfer of energy or momentum or a universal of nomic
necessitation is observable in this sense.
It seems to me, therefore, that Hume-inspired scepticism concerning the
observation of causal connections can be maintained in conjunction with
some fairly liberal attitudes towards our epistemic access to causation. But a
final point is that even if causal connections were observable (or acceptable
for some other reason) there is still practical benefit in a methodology which
prohibits making use of reference to them. This is because the existence of a
primitive causal tie between causes and their effects is neither sufficient nor
necessary for making use of causation.
Notice that if causal relations weren’t able to be conceptualised under
generalisation then we would be severely limited in what use we could make
of them. Even if a causal tie in each token case were observable, this would
limit us to being able to tell when some causal event had happened. We
would have no ability to foresee causation or engineer anything to behave
predictably. It is only once we allow our causal knowledge to fall under
explicit generalisation that we are able to do these things, by providing us
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with the knowledge that instances of a general consequent property will
accompany instances of a general antecedent property. The causal tie is,
therefore, insufficient to render causation a practically useful aspect of reality.
For a related reason, a causal tie is also unnecessary to make use of causation.
When we intervene on the world to change it, we want to change what events
are taking place (or what facts are true). It is irrelevant to such an intervention
whether or not our world is one in which the interventions which are performed
are ones mediated by some real primitive causal tie. All we need to know is
that the intervention will result in the desired outcome. But this is something
which could feasibly take place in a Humean world; if our world were really just
the mosaic void of primitive causal connections it could nonetheless be the case
that the same actions are predictably accompanied by the same results as any
of the unHumean worlds dreamt of by those in favour of primitive causation.
The Humean methodologist sees the insufficiency and lack of necessity of
causal ties in the practical utility of causation as further motivation to look
for ways to analyse causation in non-causal terms, i.e. in the terms of the
mosaic. Ultimately, I will suggest this can be done when we have a Humean
account of laws.
2.2 Against primitive subjunctive
connections
Another connection the Humean denies from the mosaic are primitive
subjunctive connections, specifically, modal relations of dependency which
ground conditionals of the form ‘if it were the case that [...] then it would
have been the case that’, such as counterfactuals. Many have pointed out
that laws of nature are counterfactually stable in a way that accidental
generalisations are not (e.g. Hempel 1965, Lewis 1973a, Armstrong 1983,
Carroll 1994). More specifically, a criterion of ‘nomic preservation’ (NP) is
often proposed (see Carroll 1994, Goodman 1947, 1954 [1983] for some early
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versions; Lewis 1973a, from p.72 considers and rejects counterfactual stability
in this form). The specific version of this which I am happy to endorse owes a
lot to the work of Lange (2009) and Roberts (2008) and can be presented as
follows (where ‘’ indicates the subjunctive conditional).
(NP) A proposition l is a law only if it is a member of the largest
nonmaximal set Λ of sub-nomic propositions such that all nested
counterfactuals q  l, r  (q  l), ..., for antecedents q, r, ...
logically consistent with Λ, remain true in any scientific context.
I say ‘I endorse’ NP, but that is not to say that I think we should take
counterfactual conditionals (a kind of subjunctive) as primitive. For it does
not seem to be the subjunctive nature of laws which is doing the explanatory
work of telling us why the propositions among Λ count as a law. What
follows in this section is a discussion of why this Humean view is reasonable.
First some clarifications. In NP, ‘nonmaximal set of sub-nomic propositions’
means that the set doesn’t contain every sub-nomic proposition there is, and a
proposition is ‘sub-nomic’ so long as it makes no claims of lawhood (‘no inertial
body moves faster than the speed of light’ is sub-nomic, ‘that no inertial body
moves faster than the speed of light is a law’ is not sub-nomic’; see Lange
2009). That laws satisfy NP is motivated firstly from the idea that it is only
under a counterfactual supposition which conflicts with some law or other that
it would be correct to infer that some (possibly distinct) law is no longer true
in that context. The world can change in myriad ways and it still be true
that copper is conductive. Only if we counterfactually suppose that copper
is not conductive, or that electrons are neutrally charged, or that some other
of a related group of laws is false would it be true to infer that copper is
not conductive. The laws are the set of all such groupings, hence the largest
nonmaximal set.
NP requires not only that laws remain true under consistent counterfactual
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suppositions, but also that they remain counterfactually stable under any
number of nestings of consistent suppositions. Not only is it the case that
had I worn different socks today then copper would still have been
conductive, but also that had I eaten a different breakfast then had I worn
different socks then copper would have been conductive. The idea behind
this extra criterion is that laws should remain laws under consistent
suppositions rather than merely true. To be explanatory, one might think, a
proposition should be counterfactually robust. Hence, even under
counterfactual suppositions, it must be the case that laws are true under
counterfactual suppositions, and so on.
Although I accept the forgoing point about laws’ stability, I doubt (and
suspect Lange also doubts) that there is any proposition which is a member
of the largest nonmaximal set of propositions which remains true under
counterfactual suppositions consistent with the set but fails to remain true
under further counterfactual nestings of suppositions consistent with the set.
If NP is suitable test for lawhood at all, I will assume it suffices to simply
check whether a proposition remains true under the relevant suppositions
rather than entertaining infinite nestings of suppositions as well.
Lange (1993b, 2009) has argued that there is no context in which laws do not
remain true under consistent counterfactual suppositions. But a series of
examples from Roberts (2008) should, I think, persuade us otherwise.
Roberts points out that in cases where there are some particularly salient
‘extra-scientific truths’ in a conversational context, then we should not
always expect the laws to remain true in all logically consistent
counterfactual suppositions. For example, assume that we are in a world in
which there is a god who created the universe and that we are concerned
with the god’s decision to make ours a world which supports life. In such a
context, we are likely to endorse a counterfactual conditional like, ‘had the
world been 500oK hotter, there would still be intelligent life’, since we would
assume that God would have made the laws differently to how they are in the
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context in order for life to remain supported.
If Roberts’ reasoning is correct, we should not expect preservation across
modal space to capture a feature of laws which holds in every context.
Roberts proposes instead that we limit the contexts in which laws are
nomically preserved to the ‘scientific contexts’, i.e. those in which ‘the point
of the conversation is to exposit, apply, or expand empirical-scientific
knowledge’ (p.198). I will assume the Roberts strategy here is the right one
(see Roberts 2008, ch.7 for more detail on what a scientific context is).
Another feature of NP is the claim that laws form the largest nonmaximal
set. The idea here is that the set that contains every proposition whatsoever,
viz. the maximal set, will trivially be one whose members remain true under
counterfactual suppositions logically consistent with it. Any counterfactual
supposition will be inconsistent with some member of the maximal set so any
counterfactual supposition which isn’t inconsistent (of which there are none)
will be one in which the members of the maximal set remain true.
Lange has suggested, and I am happy to agree, that what distinguishes the
set containing laws is that it is the only nonmaximal set which exhibits this
characteristic. Take the proposition ‘all the pears in this basket are sweet’,
abbreviated ‘p’. Let us assume p is true (i.e. there is a basket being referred
to and the pears in it are all sweet). So p is actually true, but nonetheless
it is not true under any counterfactual supposition logically consistent with
it. E.g. had I placed an unripe pear in the basket, p would not be true.
Nor would it clearly remain true under any supposition ¬q ∨ ¬p, for some
arbitrary true proposition q, e.g. ‘the number of this page is 33’. Although
consistent with p’s truth, there are presumably some scientific contexts under
which the supposition of ¬q ∨ ¬p would lead us to infer p’s falsity, e.g. in a
context where I am poised over the basket with an unripe pear. But since q
was arbitrary, for p to be a member of that set whose members remain true
under logically consistent suppositions, the set will have to also contain all true
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propositions whatsoever and hence will be maximal. Laws don’t work like this.
For any arbitrary true proposition q and law l we know that within scientific
contexts, the supposition that ¬q ∨ ¬l is going to allow us to infer ¬q unless
¬q itself is inconsistent with some law. The laws eke out an intermediate level
of necessity between pure contingency and metaphysical necessity by virtue
of being the only nonmaximal set of propositions which remain true under
(nontrivial) counterfactual suppositions consistent with the set.
I for one am happy to agree with Lange that NP defines a necessary condition
for being a law, viz. being a member of Λ.2 But what I don’t agree with,
and this is where the Humean claim appears, is that the subjunctive truths
which place this condition on laws actually explain why laws are special. For
the supporter of the Humean methodology, such subjunctives are something
the laws explain, not vice versa. To make that Humean attitude plausible it
is of prime importance to show how a Humean methodology can determine
the laws. This is the task of §6. However, this might seem an unproductive
exercise if one is entrenched within the view that NP does all the explanatory
work one could desire for laws. In the rest of this section, I want to undermine
this view by pointing to both to its insufficiency and irrelevance in making
sense of laws.
Notice that the way NP is expressed, it says only what laws must be like, not
what must be laws. This is because there are further categories of proposition
which fall into Λ and yet do not contain only laws. One such category is that
of the ‘broadly logical truths’, including logical laws, e.g. the law of excluded
middle; purely mathematical truths, e.g. ‘1+1=2’; definitions, e.g. ‘all vixens
are female foxes’; and identities between the referents of logical constants,
e.g. ‘Eric Blair is George Orwell’. All broadly logical truths are metaphysically
necessary, i.e. they are propositions which remain true under any supposition
2Notice that NP is inconsistent with the typical Humean view of laws popularised by
Lewis (1986b) in which laws are typically broken by small ‘miracles’ under counterfactual
supposition, even if the supposition is logically consistent with every law. This divergence
from the norm has repercussions for views about backtracking, etc., which I cannot explore
here. But see (Roberts 2008, especially ch.6) for a useful discussion.
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whatsoever. Because of this, they are counted among the laws according to
NP. However, I assume it is implausible that such examples are laws of nature.
In order to get a sufficient condition for laws, it might be thought that we can
stipulate that the laws are the contingent propositions of Lambda. However,
as tidy as this response is it faces some challenges.
One challenge emerges with a common form of argument that all laws are
broadly logical truths. Despite their differences, Armstrong (2004b), Bird
(2007a), Sellars (1948), Shoemaker (1997) and Swoyer (1982) all motivate their
belief in the strongest necessity for laws on the grounds that the very identity of
properties depends on it. In brief, since categorical properties are implausible
(because they imply ‘quiddities’ see, e.g. Black 2000) properties must be non-
categorical, i.e. get their identities through relationships with other properties
(in the case of Bird, Shoemaker and Swoyer) or particulars (in the case of
Armstrong and Sellars). But since the relationships concern identity, they
must be metaphysically necessary.
In defence of laws’ contingency, the complaints with categorical properties
which motivate these metaphysical positions can definitely be challenged (see
Schaffer 2005b, Roberts 2008). And the argument from property-identity to
laws being broadly logical truths is also dubious given the apparent contingent
status of physical constants (Hendry and Rowbottom 2009, Keina¨nen 2011).
Moreover, some have pointed out that certain features of theorising in scientific
practice lends credence to the view that laws are contingent, as for example
when different force-laws or Newtonian-worlds are considered (Lange 2004,
Hendry and Rowbottom 2009; see also §2.4-§2.5 Roberts 2008).
Still, a different reason one might worry about the condition of contingency
is if one had specific examples of propositions which were plausibly both laws
and broadly logical. After all, there only needs to be one law in Λ which
isn’t contingent to render the added condition on laws’ contingency false. For
example, one such argument put forward by Bird (2001) aims to show that
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salt’s ability to dissolve in water is both lawlike and metaphysically necessary
by virtue of the natures of the two materials (although a series of responses
may have blunted Bird’s original argument; see Beebee 2002, Psillos 2002, Bird
2002). A more historically motivated argument for particular noncontingent
laws comes from (Hanson 1958, ch.5) who pointed to a number of places where
the total force law (i.e. Newton’s second law of motion) has been treated and
even explicitly referred to as a definition in scientific practice.3
One might argue that the definitional status of a proposition ultimately
undermines its status as a law. Take the example of Atwood’s machine,
referenced by Hanson, in which two masses are suspended by either end of
the same massless thread hanging over a frictionless pulley. A well-known
textbook of Hanson’s time claims ‘Newton’s second law is a definition and
hence incapable of proof [...] the Atwood machine is essentially a device for
measuring the acceleration of gravity g by determiniation of [acceleration] a
rather than a set-up for the verification of Newton’s second law’ (Kolin 1950,
46-7). By treating the total force law as a definition, force is eliminated from
any essential role in making sense of empirical enquiry. This might lead us to
wonder whether it is really appropriately called a law in these circumstances.
Perhaps this is why the authors Hanson cites who support a definitional
reading draw various caveats over its being titled a law. Poincare´ said that
‘the [second] law of motion [...] ceases to be regarded as an experimental law,
it is now only a definition’ (1905, 100) and Humphreys and Beringer (1950,
38-9) claim that ‘Newton’s laws are not physical laws [...] but are definitions
of the basic concepts of physics’.4
3Admittedly, Hanson also points towards a number of other uses of the total force law
which are not definitional. In various contexts the law may not be a definition but a
prerequisite for scientific thought, a core component of a particular world-view or a summary
of a large body of experience (pp.99-100). In none of these latter cases is the law as necessary
as the broadly logical truths. Nonetheless, if there are definitional uses of laws, it seems
plausible that some law could exclusively have such a use, or at least, exclusively have those
uses in scientific contexts.
4The reality of forces is still today a controversial issue (see Creary 1981, Cartwright
1983, Ward 2009). I will, however, continue to assume the realist position. If this turns
out to be untenable then I suppose my use of force laws as examples in what follows may
ultimately be poor choices, but the general points should hold nonetheless. The key point
2.2. AGAINST PRIMITIVE SUBJUNCTIVE CONNECTIONS 37
I don’t think we should be so quick to reject some laws being definitions.
Whatever we think of the total force law, a different example which seems to
be definitionally true in any context is the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium law.
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium: For any x, if x is a population
of reproducing organisms, the allele and genotype frequencies will
remain constant in the absence of other evolutionary pressures.
This law was originally proved mathematically and so is arguably true by
virtue of the meanings of the terms and (an extension of) logic alone. It’s
not clear to me, however, that the relationships described by the law could be
removed from reasoning so easily as force seems to be (see also the discussion
of the symmetry principles in McKenzie 2013).
Regardless of the outcome of this debtate, it’s important to notice that the
discussion of whether or not definitions can be laws does not seem to concern
any modal feature, but rather something about the status of our knowledge
of them. One might argue, as Poincare` did, that definitions are not empirical
or experimental enough to count as a law since they are too easily removed
from reasoning. But the point has little to do with the modal profile of the
propositions themselves. This suggests that what explains the status of
definitions as laws is not a fact about necessity but rather about the
knowledge we have of how to manipulate them in reasoning. Insofar as we
explain why definitions are or are not laws, there does not seem to be any
direct need to call upon subjunctive facts.
Another category whose propositions fall within Λ but which are plausibly not
all laws is that of laws’ logical entailments. Since NP is deductively closed,
any proposition p is true under any counterfactual supposition in which a
proposition which entails p is true. Hence, NP entails that any proposition
entailed by a law is in Λ. If it is a law (and so in Λ) that copper is conductive,
is whether or not we should treat definitional readings of laws as compatible with those in
which the proposition’s status as a law remains.
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then the proposition that any copper statue of a cat made by a sculptor with
hazel eyes is conductive on a Tuesday is in Λ as well. Similarly, if it is a law
that copper is conductive, then the proposition that copper is conductive or it
is not conductive will be in Λ. Although controversial, I take it that our pre-
theoretical inclination will be to consider neither of these consequences to be
plausible candidates for laws. For one thing, unlike the laws from which they
are derived, these consequences do not seem to provide suitable explanations
of, say, the conductivity of a copper statue of a cat by a hazel-eyed sculptor
on a Tuesday (see Roberts 2008, §2.4 and Lange 2009, 16 for a discussion of
this issue).
We should not let the long shadow cast by certain approaches to laws (e.g.
Ramsey 1950 (2nd edition, Lewis 1973a) incline us to accept that laws are
closed under deductive entailment in this unintuitive way. As far as I know,
this feature of laws has never been argued for directly but only as a
consequence of accounts which entail it being proven otherwise plausible. In
fact, given that there is a strong inclination to deny deductive closure from
direct considerations, I am tempted to take this as a reductio on such
accounts.
In order to weed out unwanted propositions from the class of laws, we could
hope to stipulate that laws should not be overly specific or too disjunctive
(perhaps according to Gricean conversational maxims of informativeness).
Another option is to require that laws only cover relationships between
natural kinds (e.g. Harre´ 1993). Further still, one might suggest that it is the
relationships themselves which are natural (e.g. Armstrong 1983, 1997).
Finally, there is the option I will myself be suggesting in §5, that laws are
demarcated by the particular causal information they are associated with.
But whatever our choice at this stage, whether it be a constraint on logical
form, naturalness or something causal, notice again that it does not seem to
be the subjunctive nature of laws which is doing the explanatory work of
telling us which of the propositions among Λ counts as a law.
2.3. AGAINST PRIMITIVE HIGHER-ORDER CONNECTIONS 39
Lange’s attempt to determine the laws with subjunctives is limited by the
fact that many non-laws appear to have the same subjunctive features that
laws do. In terms of NP, once we have Λ, it appears we still require some
further method of individuation to separate the laws from the non-laws. But
even when we consider responses to this apparent insufficiency, it does not
seem to be subjunctive facts which play a role in deliberation over lawhood.
This should, I think, lead us to suspect that the counterfactual stability which
gives laws their subjunctive flavour is derivative of some other property of laws
which may be specifiable in Humean terms.
2.3 Against primitive higher-order
connections
I now move on to consider primitive higher-order connections, which a
Humean methodology precludes from among the determinants of an account
of laws along with primitive causal and subjunctive connections. A
higher-order connection relates entities which can have instances. In
particular and I will focus mainly on higher-order connections between
universals (n-adic for any n), entities referred to (if they exist) by
nominalisations of relational property terms, e.g. ‘proximity’, ‘resemblance’,
etc. Although I also aim to critique here so-called dispositional essentialist
views which bear significant similarities.
The need for a higher-order connection in accounting for laws has long been
mooted on the grounds that without it, the laws must be grounded in the
very regularities they aim to explain (Armstrong 1983, Bird 2007a, Maudlin
2007, Mumford 2004, Swoyer 1982). Many Humeans, particularly those of a
metaphysical stripe, can be interpreted as understanding laws to be
metaphysically explained by, exist ‘in virue of’, or be grounded in, the
first-order regularities which exist in the mosaic (e.g. Beebee 2006a, Lewis
1986g, Loewer 1996, 2012). But prima facie, it is laws which explain why the
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world is as it is including the mosaic itself. So it is that Maudlin argues,
if the laws are nothing but generic features of the Humean Mosaic,
then there is a sense in which one cannot appeal to those very laws
to explain the particular features of the Mosaic itself: the laws are
what they are in virtue of the Mosaic rather than vice versa. (2007,
172)
The problem posed to the Humean is, therefore, one of circularity: for the
Humean, facts in the mosaic explain why the laws are as they are, but the
laws are also supposed to explain why the material world is as it is and for the
Humean that is precisely the mosaic. In §2.4 I will present what I think is the
right Humean response to this problem drawing, in part, on recent work by
Loewer (2012). However, here I want to consider whether or not being non-
Humean actually avoids the problem of laws’ explanatory circularity. Since
this problem is what I take to be the main motivation for positing primitive
higher-order connections it will be my main focus. But it’s also worth saying
why I don’t think the previously considered primitive connections will help
either.
Accepting a primitive causal tie might explain why certain features of the
mosaic are the way they are (in conjunction with reference to other features).
But they could not alone provide a ground for the laws. The laws at least
require a regularity to hold, and the mere fact that causal connections exist
between events is not sufficient to entail that any of those exist. After all, the
connections could exist between thoroughly random pairs of
property-instantiations, with no generalisable manner at all. But if the
regularity is what we are citing as further grounds for laws beyond primitive
causal connections, then the circularity problem has not been removed by
positing such connections.
Lange’s understanding is, as we have seen, that the laws are grounded in
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primitive subjunctive facts. But can we explain why the mosaic is as it is
without risk of circularity by reference to those subjunctives? I for one cannot
see how this would work. If the mosaic is different to how we think it is, then
surely the subjunctives will be too. For example, if, unknown to us, the mosaic
actually contains magnetic monopoles, then it may not be the case that if a
magnetic field had existed at the centre of this page then it would have been
dipolar (i.e. we might be mistaken in reasoning counterfactually in accordance
with Gauss’s law of magnetism). The fact that we are led to posit different
subjunctives under different assumptions about how the mosaic is suggests
that the state of the mosaic partly explains what subjunctives are true. So,
even if subjunctives have an element of irreducibility about them, at least part
of the explanation for them is that the world is as it is. If that’s the case, even
Lange’s own view won’t get him out of the circularity.
The alternative and popular direction taken by many who are concerned
about these explanatory problems concerning laws is to posit higher-order
connections between universals. One philosopher well-known for doing this is
Armstrong (1983, 1997). As he put it, ‘we need to put some “distance”
between the law and its manifestation if the law is to explain the
manifestation’ (Armstrong 1983, 41). Consequently, Amstrong posited a
contingent relation of ‘nomic necessitation’ N(F,G) which would ‘add to the
first-order facts’ (Bird 2007a, 91) by relating properties F and G whose
instances’ constant conjunction is understood to be lawlike. According to
Armstrong, the relation of nomic necessitation N is a universal itself of a
higher-order than those it relates. Moreover, the nomic necessitation relation
is a primitive and so cannot be analysed in terms of its relata or its relatas’
instances. According to the view, laws are made true by instances of this
nomic relation, thereby distinguishing them from purely accidental
regularities.5 It is this move which is supposed to establish the much desired
‘gap’ between laws and regularities and so open up a space for showing how
5In fact, Armstrong thought we should refer to the atomic fact N(F,G) as the law itself.
I ignore this complication, hopefully at no cost to the argument.
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laws can explain the particular features of the laws’ ‘manifestation’ in the
mosaic.
Armstrong’s view has come under considerable criticism and Armstrong
eventually abandoned it in this form (see Armstrong 2004b, 2005). Lewis was
one of the first to express concern:
N deserves the name of ‘necessitation’ only if, somehow, it really
can enter into the requisite necessary connections. It can’t enter
into them just by bearing a name, any more than one can have
mighty biceps just by being called ‘Armstrong’. (Lewis 1983, 366)
In other words, by simply naming the relation one of ‘necessitation’, we don’t
thereby come to see why it should play a necessitating role. A more carefully
worked out expression of this problem was presented by (see Van Fraassen
1989, pp.96-8) in the form of a dilemma between available solutions to an
‘identity problem’ and an ‘inference problem’. If N(F,G) necessitates first-
order regularities ∀x(Fx → Gx) by definition then at best it puts a name
to whatever it is we are trying to explain and at worse simply misidentifies
the relation as one satisfied by any accidental regularity (e.g. the relation
of extensional inclusion). Assuming the relation is not merely extensional
inclusion, then we have a problem of identifying it. But if, on the other hand,
the N(F,G) does not necessitate by definition, then there is the problem of
saying why it should be the case that we are able to infer the regularity from
N(F,G).
In response, Armstrong argued that a regularity in the mosaic, say between
things being F and being G, is explained ‘because something’s being F brings
it about that that same something becomes G’. In this context ‘brings it
about’ is supposed to be understood causally: ‘the required relation is a
causal relation, the very same relation that is actually experienced in the
experience of singular causal relations, now hypothesized to relate types not
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tokens’ (Armstrong 1993, 422; see also Armstrong and Heathcote 1991,
Armstrong 2005). For Armstrong, this solves the identity problem because
the necessitation relation is not understood as a mere ad hoc posit but a real
natural feature of the world which holds between universals rather than
particulars, viz. causation.
Despite being posed to him as a dilemma between identity and inference
problems, Armstrong presented this response as a solution to both problems.
As he remarks,
if a certain type of state of affairs has certain causal effects, how
can it not be that the tokens of this type cause tokens of that type
of effect? The inference is analytic or conceptual.’ (Ibid.)
Assuming that the token instances of the first-order regularities which we wish
to explain simply are such causal relations (something to be queried anyway,
in§4), then Armstrong is here taking the inference problem to be solved too.
We might wonder, however, whether this really has made the problem go
away. More recently, Bird has shown that since, for Armstrong, universals are
categorical (i.e. they have no non-trivial modal properties) he is committed
to it being metaphysically possible that N(F,G) holds (for some universals F
and G), and yet also that ¬∀x(Fx→ Gx). Hence it is not possible to deduce
the regularity—i.e. ∀x(Fx → Gx)—from N(F,G) alone. What is needed, it
seems, is some sort of even-higher-order connection N ′ between the regularity
and the nomic necessitation relation in order to support the inference. But if
we stick to categorical relations only, then Bird argues we will only have the
same problem at a higher level and a vicious regress ensues.
Bird then offers his own solution to the inference problem. Talking of
Armstrong and other philosophers who have taken a similar approach to laws
(e.g. Dretske 1977, Tooley 1987), Bird remarks that they,
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take nomic necessitation to be soft, a contingent relation, because
of which they cannot answer the Inference Problem. The Inference
Problem is solved only if necessitation has an essence (essentially,
if N(F,G) then R(F,G)), (2007a, 97)
In this context, R(F,G) is the “extensional inclusion relation” ‘between F and
G that holds whenever ∀x(Fx→ Gx)’ (Ibid.).
One could be forgiven for admitting some confusion over this response. First,
the contingency Bird refers to cannot be that of N(F,G) itself. For it is not
in itself problematic if N(F,G) does not hold in all worlds, only that it can
apparently hold at worlds where the regularity doesn’t hold. Therefore, it
would seem more appropriate to attribute the failure to answer the inference
problem to the categorical nature of N rather than the contingency of its
instances. Second, is R(F,G) a reasonable posit on behalf of Armstrong’s
account? After all, if R is a genuine categorical universal (as they all are for
Armstrong), then if there is an inference problem from N(F,G) to the
regularity ∀x(Fx → Gx) there will be one between R(F,G) and the same
regularity for the same reason. Therefore, introducing R(F,G) into the
discussion does not appear to be very helpful and we should interpret Bird’s
solution as the suggestion that essentially if N(F,G) then ∀x(Fx→ Gx).
Given these observations, Bird’s solution to the inference problem (put
simply) aims to provide a justification for rejecting the categorical nature of
the necessitation relation. I will come to consider the details of this
justification shortly. But before that I want to consider whether such a
rejection (justified or otherwise) even addresses the problem we should be at
pains to solve. For the initial problem with Humean approaches to laws
concerned explanation: specifically, how the laws can both be grounded in
regularities in the mosaic and also explain instances of those regularities.
Armstrong wanted to try to ground laws in something other than regularities
so that an informative explanatory relationship could be reinstated. On the
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one hand, if the inference problem which faces Armstrong’s account is
understood in terms of a failure of explanatory inference, then we can start to
see how its conclusion would seem particularly troubling. For the account
was supposed to improve on the Humean view by showing how explanations
of regularities in terms of laws were to be possible. But on the other hand, if
the inference problem is interpreted as one concerning a failure of logical
inference, i.e. entailment, we may wonder whether it’s even a problem worth
solving.
Indeed, I’m tempted to think that solving the inference problem interpreted
as one of logical entailment is completely orthogonal to what’s really at
stake, namely, an inference problem interpreted as one of explanation. No
doubt much of the confusion has stemmed from the repeated use of the term
‘necessitation’. But if I am right, whether the grounds of a law necessarily
implies the regularity is irrelevant to whether or not it explains the
regularity. After all, entailment is certainly not sufficient for explanation.
From the fact that we know the cat is on the mat we can infer (because it is
entailed) that the cat is on the mat, but the fact that something is known
doesn’t explain what is known. This should lead us to wonder whether Bird’s
closure of the logical gap by positing an essence to laws, or the properties
therein, is sufficient to close the explanatory gap. Certainly it is not a
rejection of the categorical nature of properties alone which confers
explanation. And notice also that it is far from obvious that entailment is
necessary for explanation. If there is something in the world like primitive
causation (as Armstrong appears to think), we might be open to
explanations which don’t license a logical entailment to what they explain.
What might explain that the cat is on the mat is the presence of sunshine on
the mat (the mat is nice and warm), but such a fact need not support in any
obvious way an entailment that the cat will be on the mat.
We would, I think, do well to restate the issue with Armstrong’s account in
terms of explanation directly. In these terms, the dilemma posed by Van
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Fraassen amounts to the difficulty in avoiding triviality through simply
identifying N(F,G) with whatever explains instances of lawlike regularities in
the mosaic while at the same time enabling whatever account of N(F,G) we
do provide to inform us of why those instances are happening.
Posed in these terms, is Armstrong’s account successful? I think the answer
is still ‘no’. But the reason why will help us see why the response of rejecting
categoricalism is no improvement. Recall that Armstrong’s response to the
explanatory dilemma is to identify N with the causal relation holding
between universals. With such a move Armstrong appears to both avoid
trivially identifying the nomic relation N(F,G) with whatever explains why
any F is a G and avoid misidentifying the relation with the extension of all
token causal relations. But now it is incumbent to say why such an
identification avoids an inference problem. For let us grant that causes
explain their effects, and even that the existence of a causal relation between
cause and effect explains why the cause explains the effect. None of these
concessions serve to explain why a causal relation which exists between two
entities, in particular between one universal and another, should explain a
causal relation between any other two entities, specifically an instance of the
first universal and an instance of the other.
Here, it might be pointed out that actively looking for such an explanation is
not required. As Armstrong exclaimed, ‘if a certain type of state of affairs
has certain causal effects, how can it not be that the tokens of this type cause
tokens of that type of effect? The inference is analytic or conceptual’ (1993,
422). Personally, I do not share Armstrong’s intuition of analytic or
conceptual inference. Moreover, I’m concerned that if it is analytic or
conceptually true that causal relations at the type-level (i.e. at the level of
universals) entail causal relations at the token level (i.e. at the level of the
first-order regularities) then the response is simply making the very mistake
of triviality that the identity problem picks up on. But regardless, now we
know that it is explanation we want and not mere entailment, such a
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response will seem anyway unhelpful. For even assuming Armstrong’s
conceptual intuitions, why should we grant that the existence of a causal
relationship between types of state of affairs explains why the tokens of these
types exhibit causal relationships. For all that has been said, couldn’t it be
the other way around or couldn’t they share a common explanation or
couldn’t they be logically related in a way completely distinct from
explanation altogether?
To make the point more salient, consider briefly a different view of laws: that
laws are definitions (proposed by Le Roy 1901; see also Sellars 1948). If that
were the case, then two predicates which feature in the expression of a law
will be related conceptually: part of what ‘being F ’ means is what ‘being G’
means. In §2.2 I gave the example of the total force law, which has been argued
to be true by definition: the value of force is defined to be equal the value for
change in momentum. For the sake of argument, let’s grant that this is indeed
the case with the total force law. Let’s also assume that like all analytic
truths, definitional truths are true of necessity (even though there appear to
be counterexamples to this; see Williamson 2007). It follows by necessity that
the regularity between force and change in momentum must hold, hence the
inference problem interpreted as one of entailment is thereby solved. But what
about the inference problem interpreted as one of explanation?
I claim that it is not thereby solved (the following discussion is inspired by
Williamson 2007, ch.3). Say we have a number of definitions at our disposal
including that the value of force is by definition equal to the value of change in
momentum. Now there must be some process by which these definitions come
about, be it by convention, by expert executive decision or by God’s decree.
But suppose this process were to have been different, would we thereby expect
any difference in the way objects behave? For instance, suppose we decided
tomorrow to redefine force to be merely a change in mass. Apart from changing
our naming conventions, would we have to radically revise the way we live in
the world, reengineering all our vehicles, recalculating the trajectories of all
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known projectiles, etc.? Presumably not. When we change a definition, we
change what part of the world our words refer to, not the world itself. Just as
whatever it is that explains why each bachelor is unmarried is not that being
a bachelor entails being unmarried, what makes it the case that the value of
force is equal to the value of change in momentum is not the fact that it is
true by definition (though it may in fact be), but something about the way
the world is.
Consideration of such a conception of laws shows that merely assuring a logical
entailment from law to regularity (or a regularity’s instances) is not enough to
solve the inference problem interpreted as one of explanation. So why should
one expect to solve such an inference problem by rendering an unexplanatory
higher-order connection non-categorical, as Bird advises?
Take for instance the view Armstrong eventually came to accept (Armstrong
2004b, 2005) in which universals are identified partly by the particulars
which instantiate them (the details are remarkably similar to an under-cited
paper by Sellars 1948 who argues for an individuation of properties on
Leibnizian grounds). Armstrong therefore ended up denying his earlier
assertion that universals should be categorical admitting that ‘if one thinks
of nomic connection as a higher-order relation holding between first-order
universals, and one extends the partial identity idea to this predication, then
laws of nature become (strictly) necessary—an unexpected result, but not
unwelcome to me’ (2004b, fn.8). Nonetheless, securing the entailment of
regularities from laws makes no improvement on the earlier account when it
comes to solving the inference problem interpreted as one of explanation. In
fact, it can seem quite the opposite. After all, according to the new view,
universals are partly identified by particulars, so that first-order facts are once
again playing a very key explanatory role in higher-order universals’
(including nomic relations’) individuation.
Bird’s own solution may seem to go beyond merely assuring a necessary
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entailment of regularity from law. For his position concerns the essence of
universals. The idea seems to be that laws should be grounded in the natures
of the properties themselves (see also Swoyer 1982). Although Bird is not
explicit about it, it is popular now to consider essential truths to be rather
different from necessary truths (e.g. Fine 1994, 2012, Gorman 2005). On this
understanding, the essence of some nomic relation is just the sort of thing
which would indeed explain its consequences. For instance, if being H2O is
the essence of being water, then being H2O should explain why water does
the things it does (e.g. boiling at certain temperatures, beading, forming
hexagonal crystal lattices, etc.).
But even under this plausible interpretation of essence, it’s hard to see how
Bird’s solution is supposed to help us see how N(F,G) would thereby come
to explain the first-order regularity.6 For if it part of the essence of the nomic
relation N(F,G) that the regularity ∀x(Fx → Gx) follows, then we have the
very same explanatory problem posed to Armstrong’s contingent
necessitation relation. If the essence of a nomic relation or property is simply
to be identified as an entailment of regularity then at best the description of
the essence simply puts a name to the very explanatory mechanism which
higher-order theorists are trying to describe and at worse the description of
essence picks out something higher-order theorists are explicitly trying to
avoid, viz. the regularity itself.
Clearly the essentialist wants to avoid this, perhaps by deeming the essence of
higher-order nomic relations to be something like a genuine natural relation
between universals. But if that’s the case, we once again have the problem
of saying why it is relevant to the regularity. Bird’s fully considered account
effectively places the higher-order connections in the identity relations between
universals (see esp. Bird 2007b).7 Via analogy with graph-theory (similar to
6Bird’s more developed suggestion is that we in fact do away with the N relation and
consider the essence of the first-order properties themselves; I don’t see how this affects my
point here and ignore the complication for the current discussion.
7Perhaps this stretches the suitability of the term ‘higher-order’, but the identity relations
exist between universals all the same.
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Dipert 1997), a structure of such identity relations may indeed be sufficient to
individuate the properties (although see Barker 2013). But now the problem
becomes one of saying how we are supposed to make sense of the explanatory
relevance of these universals to the regularities which fall under them. I can
see no reason to suspect that simply by finding a relational way to individuate
the universals we thereby entail, let alone explain why the regularity occurs.
To provide an esoteric example, perhaps the natural relation between
universals which individuates them according to the graph-theoretic
approach is the ordering God has given them in her Platonic heaven. There
does not appear to be any reason to think that given that fact alone the
natural relations between universals will entail that any kind of ordering
between the instantiations of those universals. And even if some case can be
made for an entailment between relations among universals to relations
among particulars, there is still the requirement that the entailment be an
explanatory one. Given the assumptions, I see no reason to prefer one
direction of explanation over the other. After all, couldn’t it be the case that
God orders the universals in that way because of the way the particulars are
distributed in the mosaic?
Perhaps much about the complaints I’m leveling at the utility of higher-order
connections boils down to the long-argued for complaints from nominalists
about metaphysical realist positions (e.g. Quine 1948, Daly 2005, Devitt
2009). The general feeling is that these further metaphysical entities are not
posited in the right kind of way to warrant any belief in them as explanatory
of the phenomena we set out to explain. Ultimately, if metaphysical devices
like higher-order connections between universals are to do the explanatory
work for which they have been posited, they require an explanatory basis
entirely distinct from mundane first-order phenomena and yet be able to
explain that phenomena. If there’s a moral to draw, it’s that when
metaphysicians like Armstrong claim there needs to be some ‘distance’ put
between what’s explained and what’s doing the explaining, metaphysical
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realists are liable to posit so much distance in searching for the explanans
that they can’t then chart an explanatory relationship back again. And if
they can’t do this, it’s unclear why one should feel compelled to abandon the
Humean approach to which they are opposed.
Of course, it might be argued that assuring a ‘distance’ between laws and what
they are supposed to explain is an insufficient but nonetheless necessary step in
accounting for the explanatory relationship. Perhaps that is correct. In which
case, if there is explanation to be had, we’d better adopt some more exotic
metaphysical position than Humeanism. But to push back on this sort of
way of arguing, one might simply question the very motivation. For instance,
nominalists and property-realists will dispute, whether or not resemblance is
something which requires explaining (see the discussion in Pereyra 2002). For
the realist this is something strange which demands an expanded ontology. The
nominalist can object to this on the grounds that real properties are mysterious
and that the explanatory relationship is not obvious simply given the posit, but
they may also object that resemblance is simply not something which requires
explaining. After all, why should we be surprised that some things resemble
each other and others don’t? Would it be less strange if nothing resembled
anything else? Similarly, the Humean might respond not only that it is far
from obvious how higher-order connections explain their instances, but also
that instances are not something which really need explaining in such a deep
metaphysical way anyway.
This last idea becomes key, I think, in giving the Humean’s best response to
the circularity issue we started the section with, to which I know turn.
2.4 Getting mosaical about laws and
causation
I advocate a Humean methodology. That is, I believe an account of laws
and causation should be given which makes no reference to primitive causal,
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subjunctive and higher-order connections. Being Humean about causation has
been motivated in two ways. First, by a defence of the Humean idea that
a causal tie or connection cannot be observed in instances of causation, and
second, by pointing out the irrelevance of primitive causation in providing us
with the kinds of utility we typically take causal knowledge to provide us with.
It is noteworthy that neither of these arguments entail the non-existence of a
primitive causal relationship. It remains logically possible that a causal tie
really does exist between all and only causally related events. (This is why
my Humeanism is only methodological rather than existential or reductive.)
Nonetheless, I have argued that a posit of primitive causal tie would bear no
use to us in making use of causal knowledge in prediction and intervention
nor for making sense of how laws come to be. Such ties should, therefore, be
considered as good as non-existent for the sake of discussion of laws.
Being Humean about laws was motivated as a result of dissatisfaction with
the alternative proposals, in particular, those employing primitive
subjunctives and primitive higher-order connections. In §2.3 I discussed an
argument which aims to show that if one accepts a Humean methodology,
one cannot thereby explain the on-goings of the mosaic in terms of laws.
Whether or not that is true, it seems to me that no alternative philosophical
account of laws has persuasively offered a way to do this either. Given this
result, we lose the impetus to invoke metaphysical posits like higher-order
connections of necessitation (as Armstrong has suggested) or individuative
higher-order manifestation relations between properties (as Bird has
suggested). So, while I think the arguments presented in §2.3 are more
careful than some of the passing complaints launched at non-Humean
approaches (e.g. Lewis 1983, Van Fraassen 1989, Braddon-Mitchell 2001,
Ward 2002), they amount to much the same conclusion.
But what of the intuition that laws can explain the mosaic? Here I want to
discuss a number of answers the Humean might provide and some potential
problems with them. While I consider the verdicts on all of these to be
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inconclusive, I will suggest that a promising response is to accept some
degree of failure for laws to explain the mosaic whilst showing how laws can
nonetheless be explanatorily useful in other ways.
One good place to start is with a distinction drawn by Loewer (2012) between
‘metaphysical explanation’ and ‘scientific explanation’. According to Loewer,
metaphysical explanation is an atemporal determination relation of some kind,
often considered to be a relation of grounding of the explained fact in a more
fundamental fact (e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, Schaffer 2012, Fine 2012).
Scientific explanation is different. It need not explain by drawing attention to
more fundamental facts but, ‘typically, shows why an event occurred in terms of
prior events and laws’ (Loewer 2012, 131). By drawing this distinction Loewer
hoped to cast doubt on whether there really is a circularity worry for Humeans.
The mosaic metaphysically explains the laws and the laws scientifically explain
the mosaic; two different relations, hence no circularity.
A recent argument from Lange aims to bring the relevance of this kind of
distinction into question. Lange begins by positing a prima facie plausible
‘transitivity principle’, that the metaphysical grounds of any entity
scientifically explains whatever that entity scientifically explains. He then
shows that if laws are grounded the mosaic, it will lead to the commitment
that the mosaic scientifically explains itself or laws do not explain at
all—ultimately, a no better position for the Humean than before Loewer’s
distinction.
[I]f the law that all sodium salts burn with yellow flames helps to
scientifically explain why a given flame is yellow, but this law is
grounded in the Humean mosaic, then [...] the Humean mosaic
would have to help scientifically explain why the given flame is
yellow. The Humean mosaic, in turn, consists of the fact that the
given flame is yellow [...] together with a host of other such facts;
a giant fact capturing the complete Humean mosaic holds in virtue
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of various local Humean facts, one of which is the fact that the
given flame is yellow. Hence, [...] it follows that the flame’s being
yellow helps to scientifically explain itself. That cannot be. (2013,
258)
I will assume that reasonable criticisms of Lange’s argument will not gain
purchase by querying the grounding relation itself. For although Lange’s
transitivity principle and subsequent examples are given in terms grounding,
it doesn’t seem to rely on any particularly metaphysically contentious
relation (a ‘big-“G”-grounding’ in Wilson’s 2014 terms). All that is needed
from the relation referred to as ‘grounding’ by Lange is that there is an
explanatory relationship between regularities in the mosaic and the laws (in
that order). That is certainly something Loewer seems to accept. In
Salmon’s 1984b terms, the explanatory relationship must obviously be
ontological rather than epistemic. But granting that, the principle would be
no less plausible if we read ‘grounds’ as ‘causally explains’ or ‘constitutively
explains’. In fact, it seems a limit-case of the transitivity principle holds also
if we interpret grounding simply as identity. After all, surely anything
identical with an explainer of X is also an (ontological) explainer of X.
A more productive line of criticism grants the grounding relation but queries
the transitivity principle. Hicks and van Elswyk (2015), Miller (2015) argue
that in cases where a multiply-realisable entity, e.g. a lion, is grounded in
some realiser, e.g. the lion’s particular token atomic composition, the realised
entity may scientifically explain facts which the realiser does not, e.g. the
number of prey animals in a given region. But by amending the transitivity
principle to be contrastive (something Lange considers independently
motivated) Lange (forthcoming) shows that the relations of explanation in
apparent counterexamples to the transitivity principle have a structural
difference to that which exists between laws and the mosaic for Humeans.
Whereas it is the lion’s presence rather than absence which helps scientifically
explains the number of prey in the area, it is not the case that the electron’s
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presence rather than absence helps metaphysically explain the lion’s presence
rather than absence. But according to Humeanism it seems to be the case
both that a generalisations’ lawhood rather than non-lawhood helps explain
the presence of confirming instances in the mosaic rather than disconfirming
instances and that the presence confirming instances in the mosaic rather
than disconfirming instances explains those generalisations being laws rather
than non-laws.
Another objection to the transitivity principle from Hicks and van Elswyk is
that it ‘summarily dismisses the anti-reductionism of Fodor (1974)’ (2015).
Their reasoning is that since grounded entities may not be reducible to what
they are grounded in, what they are grounded in cannot help scientifically
explain what the grounded entities help scientifically explain. Lange concedes
the irreducibility of some grounded entities but denies that this supplies a
reason to reject the transitivity principle. It is possible, Lange argues, that a
grounded entity might scientific explain some other phenomenon because it
unifies the latter in a way which the grounding entities cannot. But this only
serves to show that the grounded entity can scientifically explain the
phenomenon in a non-superfluous way, and does not entail that a ‘sufficiently
full and complex account’ in terms of the grounded entities might serve to
provide some scientific explanation of the phenomenon as well. It seems,
therefore, that the objection is insufficient to motivate a denial of the
transitivity principle.
A different sort of a query with the transitivity principle aims not to cite
examples or types of example which disobey it but rather asks for a reason
to assert it. Clearly instances of transitivity exist in explanation between
grounding explanations and scientific explanations. But why should we think
they always do? In private conversation, Luke Fenton-Glynn has expressed this
thought suggesting we might rather opt for ‘transitivity principle lite’ which
stipulates that if a helps metaphysically explain b and b helps scientifically
explain c, and a, b and c are all distinct, then a helps scientifically explain
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c. If we accepted this principle rather than Lange’s stronger principle, we
could argue that laws’ grounding in the mosaic renders the two indistinct,
hence the transitivity cannot be established in this case. This sort of response
to Lange seems coherent to me, although I suspect some argument for the
modified principle is required in order to persuade those who already accept
what I take to be the more immediately intuitive version of the principle that
Lange provides. And presumably merely reiterating the merits of Humeanism
is unlikely to be sufficient.
Ultimately, I suspect that Humeans will have to accept the force of Lange’s
argument. Laws cannot be both grounded in the mosaic and explain it.
Assuming that Humeans cannot avoid the grounding claim (which need not
require invoking any metaphysically loaded relation beyond that which exists
between universally quantified facts and facts about their instances) then it
seems the Humean may have to avoid trying to show why laws explain the
mosaic. But I don’t think this should pose a major threat. After all, in the
foregoing section I suggested that non-Humean accounts have also failed to
provide any convincing account of such explanation. Moreover, the Humean
can incorporate a dismissal of the idea of explanation along with a
well-rehearsed complaint that non-Humeans cling too heavily to the outdated
metaphor of laws laid down by God to govern the procession of nature
(Loewer 1996, Beebee 2000). Very few metaphysicians accept this in any
literal sense today, a fact which entitles Humeans to legitimately ask whether
there is value in clinging to any vestige of it as mere metaphor. As with the
idea of laws as God’s decrees, the Humean might also deem as misguided the
idea that laws are the sorts of things which explain why nature’s mosaic
behaves as it does.
But a Humean might want to say something more conciliatory about where
the idea that laws explain comes from. If this is the aim, a better position
for the Humean to take might be to shift the focus away from trying to show
why laws explain the mosaic and instead point towards a different explanatory
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relationship in the vicinity. I will propose my own suggestion shortly, but
before that I should mention one attempt which I think ultimately fails from
Skow (2016). His suggestion is that when we cite a law in an explanation
of some fact or occurrence, the law itself does not provide the explanation,
but rather citing the law ‘implicates that some of the reasons why’ (p.22) a
particular phenomenon occurred are the same as those of other instances of
the laws’ antecedent type.
If it does not just happen to be true that all sodium salts burn
yellow, if it is a law of nature that they do, then by citing this
law in response to the question why this powder burns yellow one
implicates that some of the reasons why this powder burns yellow
are the same as the reasons why all sodium salts in the actual, and
also in other physically possible worlds, burn yellow. (2016, 22)
Obviously, unless being sodium has something to do with burning with a yellow
flame, the reference to the law will seem irrelevant in such an explanation. So
then what makes being sodium relevant? Here Skow is not clear. Drawing on
Lange (forthcoming) I think we can undermine the possible options. Skow’s
ultimate concern is (roughly) to defend the claim that all explanation is either
causal or grounding explanation. On the first option, the law that all sodium
salts burn with a yellow flame implicates the fact that all sodium salts have
something in common—a certain electron structure—which causes a yellow
flame upon burning. But here it looks like we have simply resorted to another
(more fundamental) law to explain the yellow flame, viz. that all salts with
that electron structure burn with a yellow flame. This is exactly what Skow
(and the Humean approach under consideration) was trying to avoid!
A different tack offered by Skow is to suggest that ‘facts about the laws help
ground facts about causation’ (p.28). Rather than laws explaining facts about
the mosaic, they are higher-level explainers, metaphysically explaining why
causes explain their effects. So, for example, the law that sodium salts (or
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salts with a certain electron structure) burn with a yellow flame grounds the
fact that each sodium salt causes a yellow flame when burnt (see Marshall
2015, for a similar view). But this is dubious. Just as we might be suspicious
of someone inferring a rule on the basis of some premises by making use of that
very rule, similarly we should be suspicious about explaining some fact on the
basis of certain explanans by making use of the explained fact. If the Humean
accepts that laws help ground facts about why one event in the mosaic causes
another, and that those causal events ground the laws, then they seem to be
once more in an undesireable circle.
Perhaps there is a way out of this worry. Taking inspiration from Papineau’s
(1992) discussion of inductive inference we might aim to distinguish
‘rule-circularity’ from ‘premise-circularity’ in the case of explanation noting
that there may be reasons to mitigate the former despite problems with the
latter. Regardless, in what remains of this section I want to discuss a
different approach which moves away from trying to explain the mosaic
entirely. My hope is that it will still resonate to a sufficient degree with the
intuitions which drive the Humean’s circularity worries.
The idea is that independently of whether or not laws can explain the
first-order on-goings of the mosaic, they can nonetheless explain our
epistemic status regarding those on-goings. Begin with the idea, accepted by
many Humeans and non-Humeans alike, that the world is one in which
inductive inferences can be performed. Based on observed data, we are able
to come to know, via inference, generalisations which hold in unobserved
cases as well. For Humeans, there is no particularly deep reason for this, the
world just turned out facilitate such inferences. This has been a bone of
contention with Humeanism in the past, but I take it that recent responses
have undermined the idea that there is anything particularly problematic
about Humeanism when it comes to justifying inductive inference (see
especially Beebee 2011).
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If inductive inference weren’t a justified form of reasoning, we would not be
able to come to know what was going to happen in the future, distant past
or very far away. Of course, we might predict some outcome and get it right
by mere coincidence, but I take it for some inductive inference to count as
knowledge, the circumstances must be such that the inference is justified. Since
Gettier (1963), we now know that such justification cannot be a mere matter
of internal reasoning. In the case of inductive inference, the regularity must
actually hold in general across observed and unobserved data and be lawlike.
An induction that the ten coins in my pocket are silver as a result of me
testing two may turn out right, but it will not be justified and so not count
as knowledge. An induction that light has the same speed in all reference
frames as a result of me testing a small portion of light sources (e.g. with the
Michelson-Morley setup) may indeed be justified and so count as knowledge.
This is because the regularity concerning the coints is not lawlike, whereas the
regularity concerning light is.
So, for the Humean, the fact that the mosaic grounds inductively inferable
laws is part of the reason we are able to make knowledgeable predictions. If
laws weren’t grounded in the mosaic, we would have a significantly reduced
capacity (if not entirely eradicated!) to perform knowledgeable inductions and
consequently also to knowingly predict events beyond the data readily available
to us.
Consider an example. Humeans will typically accept that there are many ways
the world could have been such that if I had let go just now of my pen held
in my outstretched arm it would accelerate (roughly) in the direction of the
centre of the earth’s mass. Some of those ways are such that nothing has ever
accelerated in the direction of the centre of the earth’s mass before or ever will
again, other ways things do so only rarely. Some ways the world comprises
nothing at all through spacetime but for a single event in which the earth, me
and the pen come into existence for a brief enough time for me to let go of the
pen and it accelerate towards the earth. I take it that in such ways the world
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could have been, it would be incorrect to attribute knowledge to me that if I
were to drop my pen it would accelerate (roughly) in the direction of the centre
of the earth’s mass. The Humean might plausibly attribute this to the mosaic
in each case. The mosaic has insufficient facts to support the kind of inductive
inference required to confer on me knowledge of the pen’s acceleration, even if
it will so accelerate.
Now compare these ways the world might have been with the way the world
actually is. The mosaic of this world is such that every uncharged object
accelerates towards the centre of mass of the collection of objects whose
gravitational field it is in. More specifically, in the way the world actually is,
this generalisation is a law. Because of this, I am able to come to know it via
inductive inference (though not necessarily my inductive inference!).
Consequently, I know that if I let go of the pen held in my outstretched arm,
it will accelerate (roughly) in the direction of the centre of the earth’s mass.
Notice that there is no circularity here. The mosaic (let’s say) includes the fact
that I dropped my pen which helps metaphysically explain the gravitational
regularity by constituting an instance of it. Indeed, for the Humean the mosaic
will explain more than that, for it will explain why the regularity is a law (the
details on why this is are the subject of §4.2, §5 and §6). The fact that the
gravitational regularity is a law explains why I am justified in inductively
inferring instances based on other knowledge. By transitivity, this ultimately
means that the mosaic explains my knowledge. But this isn’t circular. The
mosaic doesn’t explain why things occur in it (which would be circular) but it
explains why we know things occur in it.
It’s important to be careful with this alternative story about laws’ explanatory
power. For a typical Humean, people with inductive knowledge are themselves
part of the mosaic and so (in a sense) is our being in such a knowledgeable state.
But the fact a mental state is one of knowledge (rather than justified belief)
is grounded in facts which extend beyond the internal features of the knower.
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For instance, to be knowledge that some inductively supported prediction will
actually occur it must in fact occur, and this is not only because knowing
p entails p. For the Humean, inductively supported predictive knowledge is
justified on the basis that what is predicted is inferred from a law which will
be grounded partly in the occurrence of that very prediction. Therefore, the
Humean will say that knowledge that an outcome is going to occur on the
basis of induction is justified partly by virtue of the fact that it does occur.
Is this circular? I can see no reason to think so. Notice that the kind of
justification being considered here is external to the knower. Classic
externalist accounts of knowledge have often included criteria for justification
grounded in the truth of what is known. For example, the criterion of a
causal relationship between the knower’s belief and what is known (Goldman
1967) and the criterion of truth-tracking conditions between the knower’s
belief and what is known Nozick (1981). The requirement that there be a law
according to which some knowledge-conferring inductive inference is
performed is no different in this respect. Of course, the suggestion that the
justificatory component of knowledge also grounds the truth of what is
known would be problematic if it required the knower to justify to themselves
(i.e. internally) what is known on the basis of that very knowledge. But that
is not what is being suggested. The knower who makes an inductive inference
to an unobserved case justifies this to themselves by reference to observed
data. But whether or not they know in this case has partly to do with
whether or not they are inferring on the basis of a law grounded in the very
unobserved case they are predicting.
If the above reasoning is correct, laws do explain something—not facts about
the mosaic itself but rather why we are able to know via prediction facts about
the mosaic. Knowledge of what to predict is certainly a paradigm epistemic
status that laws help provide us with. But it will also be important for the sake
of the account of laws developed below to keep in mind that laws also provide
us with knowledge about how to act. After all, we are not like Dummett’s
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trees, unable to manipulate the world around us. And much of our ability to
do so intentionally and successfully is supported by our knowledge of the kinds
of generalisations we can inductively infer (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003). I
know that letting go of the pen will (in the context) lead to its acceleration
out of my hand. I know this partly because of my knowledge (albeit, perhaps,
in ‘folk’ terms) of the law of gravity. Contrast this with a case in which I drop
the pen on the blind faith that it will fall or as a spontaneous reaction (as
a child might) or mere caprice. Knowledge of the laws not only allows us to
make informed predictions but informed goal-directed actions as well.
As with justified prediction, for the Humean a goal-directed action motivated
by the laws and their consequences partly ground the very generalisations
one acts on the assumption of. This means that the justification for the
knowledge of how to act to achieve one’s ends is partly grounded in the
action and its consequence. But as with prediction, such justification is
external to the knower, and there is no subsequent risk of justificatory
circularity.
In sum, the sort of explanatory issues discussed in §2.3 can be sidestepped if we
no longer aim to support the premise that laws explain their instances. This
seemed to lead to trouble whatever account of laws we took. The suggestion I
have just given is that we treat laws as instead explanatory of our knowledge
of the mosaic. This includes the kind of knowledge we can have when we
make predictions on the basis of laws and the kind of knowledge we have when
we consider a goal-directed action. Obviously this won’t satisfy those who
consider it of paradigm importance for the Humean to explain the ongoings of
the mosaic directly, but it seems to go some considerable way to placating the
concern that laws for the Humean are explanatorily impotent.8
8One might wish to reflect at this stage on whether any of this impacts what we can
say about the governing role of laws. Humeans have generally been dismissive of this
characteristic of laws (see Loewer 1996, Beebee 2000), citing the intuition that laws govern
as residual of a misguided theological metaphysics. A more nuanced position has been put
forward by Roberts (2008), who suggests that we can be Humeans and accept the governing
role of laws so long as we take it to merely be the characteristic defined by NP (see §2.2.
If that’s all there is to governing then I am happy to go along with Roberts and accept
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2.5 Humean methodology and the rest of
this thesis
With the Humean methodology established, I can move on to develop an
account of laws and, subsequently, of token causation. Having said that, it is
worth drawing attention to those conclusions drawn in what follows which do
not require the acceptance of a Humean methodology or else can be
accommodated by non-Humeans without too much adaptation. One obvious
conclusions is that drawn in §3.1 which explores the logical form of laws.
While I have the Humean position in mind when characterising laws’ logic
(for instance, as a conditional concerning first-order particulars), the general
argument that laws are conditionals does not require this. Nor is this
required by the discussion of the individuation of system-types in §3.2.1.
Also, §5 itself will not attempt to make any Humean analysis of the causal
features associated with laws (a task left to §6). As I will point out, the
conclusions of §5 might therefore be used to formulate a non-Humean
account of laws with type-level causation as a primitive. Similarly, I will
avoid framing the analysis of token causation presented in §7 in any explicit
Humean light, although I openly remark that the success of the Humean
analysis of laws in §6 would render the analysis in §7 Humean also.
In general, since Humean methodology is defined negatively, in terms of the
prohibition of certain primitives from the analysans of phenomena of interest,
views which reject Humeanism by introducing the prohibited entities will not
obviously come into conflict with the accounts developed here. Indeed, one
might suspect that if the accounts I provide are satisfactory with the minimal
resources of the mosaic, they will fare just as well under any richer ontology.
that laws govern, since I accept NP. However, I suspect this form of governance will not be
enough to satisfy everyone’s conception.
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3 The logical form of laws
This chapter explores the logical form of laws which will help us to put some
constraints on and frame questions for what’s to follow. §3.1 argues that laws
are conditionals with a particular form (the vast majority is published in
Friend 2016). One aspect of this conditional form is that the antecedent
predicate denotes a ‘system-type’. I subsequently move on, in §3.2, to discuss
the nature of system-types and their relation to laws. Another aspect of laws’
logical form is their universality. In §3.3 I discuss a number of ways to save
the truth of laws interpreted as universally quantified by what I take as a
traditional modification of the ‘system-predicate’ and my own preferred
method of modifying the consequent ‘behaviour-predicate’. I end in §3.4 with
a discussion of what further work needs to be done to get a philosophical
account of laws given their logical form.
3.1 Laws are conditionals
An often assumed, but rarely argued for, view of laws of nature is that they
are quantified conditionals. The ubiquitous schema ‘All Fs are Gs’ dominates
much philosophical discussion on laws but rarely is it shown how actual laws
mentioned and used in science are supposed to fit it. Instead, what can seem
embarrassingly toy examples like ‘all ravens are black’ are employed for
discussion. Ignoring the complexity of real cases has some value, but it also
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comes at a price, and today there is increasing literature arguing that laws
have been misrepresented: either we have been wrong about their logical
form or else we are misguided in supposing them to be important features of
science (see, e.g. Cartwright 1983, Dupre´ 1993, Giere 1988, 1995, Mumford
2004, Maudlin 2007).
My project in this section will be to offer some argument for the view that laws
do indeed have a quantified conditional form. Throughout the discussion, I will
be drawing on examples from science. Picking examples is a tricky business.
Philosophers tend to have their favourite laws (often either toy examples or else
the most strict laws of physics) and disregard many of the statements called
‘law’ across the whole of the sciences. My approach is consciously opposed
to this: cast the net wide and remove unwanted catch afterwards. For case-
studies, I attempt to pick a wide variety of statements referred to as ‘law’ from
a variety of sciences. Philosophers (and some scientists) may balk at some of
the examples, if they are obviously ridden with counter-instances, not general
enough, not from an austere enough science, etc. While I am happy to accept
that a full account of laws may see fit to disregard some of my examples my
feeling is that to make such a move before an exploration of logical form has
returned its conclusions would be arbitrary or a result of unjustified bias.
Having said that, there are clearly some statements we call laws which scientists
themselves would disregard as important objects of philosophical or scientific
enquiry. For instance,
Bode’s law: All planets 1 to m orbit the sun in an ellipse with
a semi-major axis α = 0.3 × 2n + 0.4 astronomical units, where
n = −∞ when m = 1 and n = m− 2 for all m > 1.
Bode’s law is largely discredited from capturing any generality worth
investigating. First, it is false. Many planets do not satisfy its prediction;
second, there are no known plausible explanations as to why such a law
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would hold even approximately. While I take it that there may be numerous
such statements in science, I will assume its fairly clear which they are. In
what follows I will choose examples partly based on what scientists call laws,
but also filtering for those which are actually employed in scientific practice.
Bode’s law, so far as I know, is not employed in that capacity and never was
to any significant degree.
A separate issue regarding picking examples concerns representational
phenomena in science which are not accorded the honorific ‘law’ but
nonetheless seem, philosophically speaking, to be of similar interest,
e.g. mathematical models, principles, rules, theorems, equations basic to
scientific theory. One telling example is the Schro¨dinger wave-equation,
which I argue below is associated closely with a law. In §3.2.2 I will also
discuss specifically the notion of models in science and their connection with
laws. I leave it as implicit in what follows that similar remarks can be carried
over to many other representational phenomena.
Laws have long been described in philosophical literature as conditionals
stating that if anything has some quality, then it has another. Typically, this
is more formally represented by the following famous schema.
∀x(Fx→ Gx) (Schema 1)
Some past employments of Schema 1 can be found in Hempel and Oppenheim
1948, Sellars 1948, Kneale 1950, Ayer 1999 [1956], Fodor 1991, Harre´ 1993;
more recently, the schema can be found in, e.g., Cohen and Callender 2009,
Mitchell 2000, Nickel 2010, Beebee 2011, Carroll 2012.
Schema 1 characterises the logical form of laws as universally quantified
conditionals where F and G are replaced by predicate clauses. Traditionally,
the domain is understood broadly and the conditional ‘→’ is taken to be
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material. By arguing that we should schematise laws in the form of Schema 1
that is not to deny that there are distinct logical forms which are equivalent
to them (e.g. that obtained by conjoining a law with a logical truth). What
follows is a discussion of the appropriateness of Schema 1 as a natural way of
rendering laws which reveals the particular type of inference they license
(i.e. from antecedent to consequent).
Today Schema 1 is often the go-to shorthand for philosophers’ general
discussion concerning laws’ logical form, purporting to capture the most
famous of examples of pseudo-law as ‘all ravens are black’ and ‘all emeralds
are green’. But though ubiquitous, the schema has become the focus of
ridicule from scientists and more practice-focused philosophers of science.
After all, the pseudo-laws just provided are not laws in any sense in which a
working scientist would consider and Schema 1 can seem at best an
oversimplified philosopher’s caricature.
Along these lines, Maudlin (2007) has complained that,
the fundamental law of Newtonian mechanics, the mathematical
consequence of Newton’s first two laws, is F = ma or
F = md2x/dt2 or, most precisely, F = md(mv)/dt [sic1]. The
fundamental law of non-relativistic quantum mechanics,
Schro¨dinger’s equation, is i~∂Ψ/∂t = HˆΨ. No doubt these can be
tortured into a form similar to ∀x(Fx → Gx), but it is hard to
see what the purpose of the exercise would be. (2007, 11)
Certainly, it is not immediately obvious why we should expect equations—the
mainstay of representations of law in many areas of science—to be representing
information most appropriately captured by Schema 1. But if I am right, there
must be some way to do so. Furthermore, if the defence is to count for a
significant proportion of laws it had better not be too torturous a procedure.
1There are too many variables for mass here. Presumably Maudlin intended F =
d(mv)/dt.
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It is clear, however, that there has been almost no justification of the repeated
use of this schema to represent laws in the philosophy of science literature, and
since ubiquity doesn’t entail correctness, the time has come to provide some.
There are a number of features of Schema 1 which require defending. One
feature of logical renderings of laws in general which has invited a lot of
discussion and criticism is their universality or ‘strictness’ (see, for a brief
sample, Anscombe 1971, Cartwright 1979, 1989, Harre´ 1993, Giere 1995,
Hu¨ttemann 2007). As a consequence, the use of the universal quantifier ‘∀’ in
Schema 1 is a legitimate point of concern (see Fodor 1991, Pietroski and Rey
1995, Schurz 2002, Spohn 2002, Nickel 2010, Reutlinger 2011, Hu¨ttemann
2014, for some responses). In §3.3 I will have something to say about this.
The immediate task, however, is to argue for what comes after the quantifier:
the conditional with antecedent and consequent predications of the same
variable.
My argument for the conditional feature of the schema of laws aims to show
that a conditional is implicit in our very understanding of laws even when
they do not appear to explicitly have that form. But before providing such
an argument, I must pause again to further qualify the project. For even
granting that laws are conditionals, we may yet wonder what conditionals
they are. Typically, when laws have been represented with Schema 1 the
conditional is interpreted as material. Hence, the conditional is
truth-functional: it is true so long as nothing which satisfies the antecedent
also fails to satisfy the consequent. This interpretation has raised concern
even with those sold on the conditionality of laws. When the ‘→’ is
understood as a material conditional, schematising laws with Schema 1
renders them structurally equivalent to trivial universal conditionals which
are true because nothing satisfies the antecedent (e.g. ‘all unicorns are
purple’) or true because everything satisfies the consequent (e.g. ‘all electrons
are actual’). Furthermore, all material conditionals are logically equivalent to
their contraposition, which can intuitively seem less worthy of the title ‘law’
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(see Hempel’s 1945 ravens paradox). These characteristics can seem to
indicate the material conditional as being too liberal to capture the form of
laws of nature.
Other interpretations of the conditional in lawlike statements have been
provided which are more restrictive. Some have treated laws as inferences
about kinds (proposed in Lowe 2009), or as inferences about abstract models
(proposed in Giere 1988), or as an assertion of the existence of a relation of
necessitation between two first-order universals (as we have seen, Armstrong
1983, understood laws to be identified with such existences). There have also
been more logically exotic suggestions that laws should be understood as
non-truth-functional conditionals (along the lines suggested by Stalnaker
1968) or under a suppositional theory (suggested, e.g., in Mackie 1973, ch.4).
Still other renderings employ an even more liberal conditional than the
material conditional, such as those which treat laws as generics in which the
inference from antecedent to consequent is qualified to hold only in ‘normal’
circumstances (e.g. Schurz 2002, Drewery 2006, Nickel 2010).
I have yet to be persuaded that the material conditional is not appropriate for
laws, although I will refrain from arguing this here. For those of us who believe
laws to have the form of some conditional or other, a more pressing concern
is to justify that. Of course, it might be the opinion of some who believe
that laws are conditionals that there is no way to show this until we have the
logic exactly right. I disagree, and although I will write with the material
conditional in mind, I intend my comments to be support the conclusion that
laws are conditionals regardless of which particular version of conditional this
may turn out to be.
3.1.1 The look of laws
Certainly some of the statements titled ‘law’ in science very clearly have the
form of a quantified conditional. Take the following examples (many of my
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examples throughout are drawn from Lange 2000, 30-33),
Farr’s law: All epidemics follow a positive, symmetrical curve of
infected population over time.
Werner’s law: Geological strata are ordered with the older
under the newer.
Wallace’s law: Every species has come into existence coincident
both in time and space with a preexisting closely allied species.
Although none of the above expressions contain explicit ‘if’ and ‘then’
clauses, they can clearly be understood as telling us that for all things, if
they are of a certain type then they will be a certain way, i.e. there is an
antecedent classificatory predication of the kind of system the law is about
(e.g. an epidemic, a stratum, a species), and a consequent predication of the
kind of behaviour (understood broadly) systems of the antecedent type are
expected to exhibit (e.g. a certain dynamics of size over time, a directionality
with respect to the centre of the earth, a relationship with other species at
certain times in the species’ history). They can thus be rendered into the
form of Schema 1, e.g.,
∀x(Geological-stratum(x)→ not-inverted(x))
Despite laws like the above, which clearly are available to a conditional
interpretation, many do not look, at first glance, to have this form at all.
The above quote from Maudlin draws our attention to two laws often
represented by equations. Consider also the following (allowing the variables
to be defined in their usual way):
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Equation for Ideal gas law: PV = nRT .
Equation for Newton’s law of gravitation: F = GMm
r2 .
Equation for Ohm’s law: V = IR.








Moreover, there are laws which are neither characteristically represented by
equations nor in the form of a conditional, such as,
Gresham’s law: Overvalued currency replaces undervalued
currency in economic circulation.
Buys Ballot’s law: Low pressure in the northern [southern]
hemisphere is on the left [right] hand when facing downwind.
Faraday’s first law of electrolysis: The mass of an element
liberated or deposited on entering into reaction at an electrode
during electrolysis is proportional to the quantity of electricity
passing through it.
We may feel uncomfortable admitting all the above into a philosophical
discussion of laws of nature. After all, Gresham’s law seems dangerously
close to counting as a ‘causal law’ in Cartwright’s (1979) sense; this would be
more perspicuous if, as is often the case, ‘drives out’ is substituted for
‘replaces’.2 Also, Buys Ballot’s law might seem unduly singular to count as
2I assume throughout this work that the laws under enquiry are more appropriately
captured by Cartright’s contrasting category ‘laws of association’, which ‘tell how two
qualities or quantities are co-associated’ (1979, 419).
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an instance of a law, if considered implicitly restricted in application to
Earth. Moreover, we might expect that many of the laws above admit of a
mechanistic explanation or reduction to simpler laws. For instance, we
explain the Buys Ballot law in terms of the Coriolis effect. It is conceivable
that certain metaphysical motivations might lead one to demand the full
generality and non-derivability of laws, in which case one could complain
that some or all the above statements fail to count as proper Laws of Nature.
Nonetheless, all these generalisations do seem earnestly called ‘law’ by
scientists working in their respective fields (they are not like Bode’s law in
that respect). Consequently, the project will be to see how far we get without
taking action on the basis of such complaints. I will assume that the above
examples are all as good examples of scientific law as each other, although I
will be arguing that they are represented in a misleading way.
If the reader is happy to follow my lead in treating the above
non-conditionally represented statements as prima facie examples of laws,
why should we think that laws ultimately have the form of a conditional? My
argument is really very simple. These laws describe how things behave. But
none describe how everything behaves, so the characterisation of behaviour
must be restricted to some antecedent ‘system-type’. Hence the conditional.
While I take this brief summary to sound plausible up to a point, it clearly
needs some more developed exegesis. The argument is perhaps most
forcefully applied to those laws typically represented by (and misinterpreted
as) equations. So I recommend we start by looking there.
3.1.2 Equations and their laws
What do the symbols either side of the ‘=’ sign in the ideal gas law represent? If
the symbols were interpreted as naming determinate properties, the expression
might appear like an ill-formed identity (since identities are dyadic) rather than
an equation. Anyway, it is hard to conceive how the gas constant R could be
a property, after all what kind of a thing would instantiate it? P, V, n and
74 CHAPTER 3. THE LOGICAL FORM OF LAWS
T are not obviously determinate properties either, because they are variables
taking any non-negative real number as their values. However, the meaning
of the gas law cannot be simply the algebraic statement that the product of
any two numbers equals the product of a constant multiplied by two other
numbers—that is a trivial truth of mathematics! And we know this cannot be
the case since the variables in the ideal gas law, unlike purely mathematical
equations, are associated with scientific units, e.g. Newtons-per-meter-squared
(Nm−2) for pressure, and degrees-Kelvin (K) for temperature.
A step in the right direction is to understand PV = nRT as describing a
group of functional relationships over variable-properties understood as sets of
possible values for pressure, volume, quantity and temperature. For example,
one function included in the group would be that which takes any value in
a set of pressures as input and outputs some value in a set of temperatures.
But this cannot be the whole story because functions, unlike laws, are not
the sorts of things which can be truth-evaluable: a function is an operation
not a statement. We could understand the equation as indicating a statement
of the form ‘there exists such a function between sets of pressures and sets of
temperatures with the following results’, but this again is an uninteresting fact,
since there exist infinite such functions. If laws were the equations themselves,
it is hard to see either what they represent or how they could be useful.
What is implicit in the formulation of the laws expressed as equations is the
added clause that the group of functional relationships described by them are
true of things. The set of temperatures, pressures, volumes and quantities of
substance are those belonging to one and the same entity to which the
equation may be applied. And the relationships described don’t just exist in
some abstract sense, but reflect the relations between the actual specific
pressure, volume, temperature and quantity of such an entity at some
moment in time. This suggests that the information bound up in equation
PV = nRT is something to be predicated of an entity, something an entity
can satisfy or not. In general, we may understand equations to indicate a
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certain high-order behavioural property which entities have when and only
when a specific group of relations determined by the equation holds between
various (usually quantifiable) lower-order variable-properties of that entity.
In the case of the ideal gas equation the relevant behavioural property is
instantiated by something so long as the functions described by the equation
map from actually instantiated variable-properties to actually instantiated
variable-properties. Consider the pressure-function P (x, t), the
volume-function V (x, t), the temperature-function T (x, t) and the
quantity-function n(x, t), each of which take as input an entity and time and
outputs a real number. This output defines the determinate value of the
respective variable-properties pressure, volume, temperature and quantity of
substance. The relevant higher-order behavioural predicate for the ideal gas
law would be one which is satisfied by entity g at t1 only if the compound
product-function P×V which takes as inputs the outputs of the P (x, t) and
V (x, t) functions and outputs the same value when x = g and t = t1 as does
the compound product-function n×R×T which takes as inputs the outputs
of the T (x, t), n(x, t) functions and the constant R.
So, the equations employed to stand for laws are informative of the behaviour
of things. But laws cannot have the form ‘Bx’ where x is a variable ranging
over entities and B is a behavioural predicate indicating that whatever
satisfies it bears certain internal relations, for this is simply ungrammatical.
Laws are supposed to be general, so a plausible binding of the variable is
with the universal quantifier: ∀x(Bx). However, it is certainly not the case
that scientists use the ideal gas law, or Newton’s, Ohm’s or Yoda’s law to say
that everything bears these relationships between their properties. Concerns
of absolute generality aside, to be the sort of thing which can have its
components related in the way described by the behavioural predicate, that
thing must at least have instances of those property-types, and many entities
don’t have any of them. After all, what’s the pressure of a government, or
the volume of a thought? But even when granting only the systems which
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have the relevant property-instances, the equations (or other formulae
standing for a set of functional relationships) described by the behavioural
predicates are not indiscriminately attributed by scientists to all such
systems. An apple has an internal pressure, volume, quantity of substance
and a temperature, but we don’t expect to use the equation PV = nRT to
describe its behaviour. Similarly, a lamppost has weight and density, but one
doesn’t ask what the respective growth-constant is in order to predict its
behaviour with the equation in Yoda’s power law.
Assuming we want to preserve truth (pace Bach 1994) as best we can while
still retaining generality, laws like the ideal gas law, Ohm’s law and Yoda’s
power law will need to be captured by a more qualified schema than ∀x(Bx),
given a relatively broad domain. Note that this is a different problem from
that which arises when we consider counter-instances to the law. One major
complaint with treating laws as universally quantified is that many of them
would thereby appear falsified by the existence of counter-instances. I have
eschewed finding a solution to this problem in the present discussion (this
is the subject of §3.3). However, the present issue does not concern these
kinds of counter-instances. Countries, thoughts and apples are not counter-
instances to the ideal gas law, since they were never even in the running for
candidate systems to be described by it. Indeed, we might understand the
issue presently under discussion as that of explaining why these examples are
not in the running for being counter-instances to the ideal gas law (in contrast
to a particular real gas in Boyle’s air-pump).
There appear to be two plausible options to qualify the general schema in order
to make sense of this fact. One option is to understand the domain quantified
over by the universal quantifier as restricted to only those things scientists are
wont to ascribe the behavioural predicate to. In the case of the ideal gas law,
for instance, the restriction would be to ideal gases (or those gases which may
be appropriately modelled as an ideal gas). Such a response would be similar
to that often made in order to make sense of utterances like that of Yogi Berra
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when he said that “nobody goes there anymore, it’s too crowded.” Without
some suitable distinction in domain restriction of Yogi’s first clause from that
of the second his utterance appears contradictory.
I do not see why domain restriction to less-than-universal contexts should be
prohibited wholesale from the expression of laws. As Maudlin (2007, 12) points
out, it does not appear to be contradictory to assert that some law describes
physical states around here, or for the last 10 billion years, and we might
deem it appropriate to attribute such restrictions to limitations on the domain
rather than any explicit antecedent condition. However, my present criticism
is with the idea that domain restriction is sufficient to limit application of the
behaviour-predicate. I will offer a few suggestive points to think not.
First, laws are supposed to be re-statable across a variety of contexts and,
assuming they don’t change (see Lange 2008, for a discussion), across time
too. Laws are repeated in textbooks and science classes, they are derived,
explained, invoked for calculation and written down by students. But further
restrictions on the domain of the sort we have been considering are typically
considered to be determined by contextual parameters (Stanley and Szabo
2000). For example, if the domain of quantification is restricted more in an
utterance of “everything is gone” when uttered on return to my burgled home
than when uttered at the end of the universe, then the extra restriction (e.g. to
the things in my house or in my jewelry box) will be provided by the context
rather than by linguistic features of the utterance. Laws are not the sort of
expressions which should be susceptible to so much influence from context. An
electrician, for instance, wants Ohm’s law to be about the same things from
one situation to another. Otherwise, it is hard to see why she should hope to
apply all her understanding from case to case.
Second, it simply does not seem to be the case that laws are expressed in
such a way that they ascribe a certain behaviour to everything and expect
domain restriction to do all the work of cutting out unwanted denotation.
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Invariably, when the terms P, V, n, and T are defined, in relation to an
application of the equation PV = nRT , they are defined, respectively, as the
pressure/volume/quantity-of-substance/temperature of a specific gas in a
cavity. In other words, the terms represent variable-properties of a certain
type of thing. Similarly, when the terms in V = IR are defined, V is defined
as the potential difference measured across a conductor, I as the current
through the same conductor, and R as the resistance of that conductor.
Here, the variable-properties are of one and the same electrical conductor.
The explicit reference to what type of thing the variables are supposed to be of
suggests another way to qualify the schema. This option is to keep the domain
broad and the context open, but to condition the ascription of behaviour on
the satisfaction of some further predicate S, e.g. ‘being an ideal gas’ or ‘being
an electrical conductor’. Such a predicate would pick out a kind of system
from which the behaviour can be lawfully inferred. To take this option is to
understand laws as conditionals of the form ∀x(Sx→ Bx). For instance, under
the proposal, what is missing in the ideal gas law as an unrestricted generalised
predication of behaviour is the added clause that the relationships entailed by
the equation in the behavioural predicate exist between the pressure, volume
and temperature of any ideal gas, i.e.,
Ideal gas law*: For all things, if a system is an ideal gas in a
cavity then its temperature, pressure, quantity of substance and its
volume will satisfy the equation: PV = nRT
Note that being an ideal gas in a cavity is not simply identical to satisfying
the equation PV = nRT , since presumably other assemblies could satisfy it as
well, given peculiar enough circumstances. In §3.2.1 I will suggest what exactly
the identity criteria are for types of system like ideal gases. But it should
be clear already that a proper understanding of the utility of the expression
‘PV = nRT ’ requires us to understand it in the context of Ideal gas law*,
i.e. a conditional. The law predicates a type of behaviour of something if we
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can predicate something else of that thing: that it is an instance of a certain
type of system.
Similar reasoning goes for the other equations often passed off as themselves
laws. Although, as Maudlin says, it would be torturous to put the equations
into the form of Schema 1, this does not mean that laws themselves don’t
naturally take this form. For instance, Ohm’s law of resistance is not an
equation, but a conditional which states that all components with a constant
value of resistance in an electronic circuit will experience a voltage-loss and
current distributed in accordance with the equation V = IR; similarly, Yoda’s
power law is not an equation but a conditional which states that all plant
seedlings in a single sewn area will grow with their properties of dry-weight
and density of sewn seeds being related by the equationW = Cρ−3/2. Newton’s
law of gravitation is a conditional which states that all two-mass systems will
experience gravitational components of force proportional to the product of
each other’s mass according to the equation F = GMm
r2 . Gauss’s law is a








The discussion of laws represented by (and often interpreted as) equations
has resulted in a number of important conclusions. First, to understand an
equation as something scientifically informative, it is necessary to interpret it as
describing a set of functional criteria relating something’s physical properties.
This observation suggests the idea of a ‘behaviour-predicate’ corresponding to
the equation which is defined to be satisfied by an entity if and only if its
physical variable-properties are related according to that equation. Second,
laws’ generality demands that they make a general claim about the behaviour
of things, but since it is plainly false that everything satisfies the behaviour-
predicates corresponding to all the equations considered so far, the predication
has to be qualified. I have suggested that the most plausible way to do this is by
conditioning on what we might call the ‘system-predicate’, which is satisfied
if and only if an entity is of an appropriate type. In order to highlight the
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importance of these two types of predicate and their characteristics I substitute
the traditional schematic letters F andG in Schema 1 for S andB, respectively,
i.e.,
∀x(Sx→ Bx) (Schema 2)
Since the discussion made no essential assumptions specific to the choice of
equations used, we appear to have an argument that laws represented by
equations are in fact more appropriately rendered in the form of a
conditional in the form Schema 2. For most of the rest of this thesis I will
focus exclusively on laws whose behaviour-predicates are characterised by an
equation, such as those mentioned here. Shortly I will extend this reasoning
to provide more reason to think all laws must be conditionals. But before
that it’s worth pointing out how similar reasoning to that presented above
carries over to the other recalcitrant laws mentioned earlier.
3.1.3 Miscellaneous laws
We now move on to those laws which superficially, at least, do not appear to be
conditionals or equations. The first thing to notice is that the examples given
for this ‘miscellaneous’ group of laws assert the existence of some relationship
between variables. Gresham’s law relates the variable of quality of currency to
time; Buys Ballot’s law relates height and direction of pressure with location
in hemisphere and direction of wind; Faraday’s first electrolysis law relates
the mass of a liberated element with a quantity of electricity. Whilst not
equations as such, these laws are nonetheless similar in that they describe
functional relationships.
Similarly to the argument for equations, we can note that these functional
relationships will not be understood properly unless they are interpreted as
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relating the actual instances of various properties by individual entities.
Therefore, we can infer a high-order behaviour-predicate for each putative
law satisfied by an entity if and only if the relation defined in the functional
relation holds between the lower-order variable-properties which feature in
that relation. For example, the above expression of Gresham’s law indicates
a high-order predicate ‘is such that its quantity of undervalued money in
circulation is negatively correlated with its quantity of overvalued money in
circulation and the quantity of overvalued money is increasing’.
The next step is to notice that a full explication of the law would not
predicate such a behavioural property of everything, but rather on some
specific system-type. For Gresham’s law, the relevant system-type is
arguably a closed economy. Consequently, a more explicit rendering of
Gresham’s law would be,
Gresham’s law*: All closed economies are such that their
quantity of undervalued money in circulation is negatively
correlated with their quantity of overvalued money in circulation
and the quantity of overvalued money is increasing.
Similarly, for the Buys Ballot’s law, the relevant system-type might possibly
be the Earth itself; for Faraday’s first electrolysis law, it would be an assembly
comprising an electrode and electrolyte. Therefore, the same argument as
above works to show the implicit conditional in all the considered laws above.
3.1.4 Why all laws are conditionals
I have just provided an argument for understanding some of our laws as
conditionals. There appeared to be a straightforward way to interpret
conditionally the ideal gas law, Ohm’s law, Yoda’s power law, Gresham’s law,
Buys Ballot’s law and Faraday’s first law of electrolysis (among other laws).
The argument relied on the understanding that the behaviour described by a
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formula (such as a numerical equation) by which those laws are typically
represented is not a behaviour attributed to everything in a relatively
unrestricted domain, but rather to a specific class of systems (the ideal gases,
the electrical conductors, etc.) which the behaviour is antecedently
conditioned on. This style of argument works for individual cases. However,
besides inductive motivation, it does not provide conclusive reason to think
that every law need incorporate such conditioning.
Indeed, we might think that some of the most austere behavioural formulae do
not need conditionalising in this way, since they really do apply to everything.
Consider the physicalist view that physics consists in a project to determine
those formulae which most accurately describe the behaviour of every single
system in existence by some basic formulae and generalisations. Perhaps the
Schro¨dinger’s time-dependent wave-equation is expected to be among those
formulae.
i~∂Ψ/∂t = HˆΨ
Schro¨dinger’s equation seems in many respects a paradigm representation of
a law (see for example, Maudlin 2007, 11).3 Assuming that there is indeed
a law associated with Schro¨dinger’s equation, we might follow the reasoning
made above insofar as we recognise the equation to represent some information
concerning the behaviour of things, i.e. we identify a behaviour-predicate such
as ‘is such that its Hamiltonian is related to the time-derivative of its wave-
function according to the equation i~∂Ψ/∂t = HˆΨ.’ Let’s abbreviate this St.
Now, the physicalist might believe that there there is a non-conditional law,
∀x(Stx).
3That is, despite the fact that neither the equation nor the information it represents
are typically referred to as ‘a law’ in scientific practice. While I expect that it is relatively
harmless to use the equation as an example, some have demanded that we take a closer look
at the practice of scientific denotation of the title ‘law’ (e.g. Mumford 2004, esp. p.129).
3.1. LAWS ARE CONDITIONALS 83
While such a generalisation may in fact be true (although only if physicalism
is true), I argue that it is highly implausible as a rendering of any statement
likely to be called a law given the current state of physics. I offer four points.
First, it is well known that there are technical difficulties extending current
analysis involving the wave-equation (quantum field theory, quantum
chromodynamics, etc.) to large-scale entities. Solutions to the Schro¨dinger
equation are just about manageable for Hydrogen and Helium, but even for
the immediately more massive atoms, computational methods are required.
When we come to consider small molecules or anything more complex,
approximation methods like that from Born and Oppenheimer are required
in order to make useful predictions or explanations. So, regardless of whether
this is considered as ‘mere computational intractability’ or not, the
generalisation ∀x(Stx) certainly doesn’t reflect the practice of contemporary
physics. But more importantly, if there is any reason at all to doubt that all
macromolecules behave in the way dictated by the St predicate, any scientist
averse to unnecessarily bold conjectures is going to hedge their bets with
regard to the application of the Schro¨dinger equation. After all, why commit
to saying the St predicate applies to everything when one can be far more
confident of a weaker claim at no cost of utility: that St is satisfied by those
entities which are composed only of relatively few standard-model particles?
Until our numerical capabilities are developed enough to derive and test
solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation (in its unapproximated form) for
macromolecules, there is no scientific reason (supported and motivated
predominantly by empirical evidence) to believe a generalisation like
∀x(Stx)—although we may believe such a law for other (philosophical)
reasons.4
Second, relativistic quantum mechanics may include the application of
4The view expressed here is not meant to be as sceptical as that of Cartwright’s (e.g.
1999, 2). Where we are able to apply classical physics more straightforwardly than quantum
physics, I think we may still have scientific reason to believe the quantum theory to be in
some sense the more correct.
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Schro¨dinger’s equation to contexts of special relativity, but not general
relativity; the latter remains an as yet unresolved problem for physicists (the
tensor fields described in Einstein’s field equations imply definite values for
both position and location of objects whereas the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle implies such precision is impossible). As with the problem of
computational intractability we may believe a reconciliation between the two
theories is possible. But we must also admit that there is no current scientific
support for laws which entail a reconciliation. Again, why should a scientist
commit themselves to the St predicate applying to everything when they can
be more confident of a weaker claim at no cost of utility? One might believe
the predicate applies universally, but such a belief will not be justified by
scientific discovery alone.
Third, even if some reconciliation can be achieved and physics becomes
united under one body of theory, we would still be far from justified on the
basis of physics alone in our commitment to the view that the theory applied
to everything. The project of physics is to describe the behaviour of the
physical world: plausibly, that which has location, size, momentum, charge.
It is an open question what fits into this ontology; presumably the entities of
the standard model and the Higgs particle are there, but what about fields
and gravitons? Whatever we decide, the truth of physics is not hostage to
physicalism. The truth of the standard model, for instance, is not thought to
stand or fall on the debate over platonism in mathematics or mind-body
dualism; its truth is independent of these debates. Physicists’ laws and
theories must, therefore, include a restriction of some kind to avoid
purporting to describe the behaviour of mathematical objects, incorporeal
minds, or indeed any type of entity mooted to be irreducible to physical stuff.
Perhaps a domain restriction might be plausible at this stage to exclude some
of the obviously non-physical stuff. But again, why render laws as something
so liable to contextual influence when an explicit restriction on system-type
would make it instantly more general? Once more, the point here is not that
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physicalism is false, nor that we have no good reasons to believe it. The point
is that we make no explanatory gains by writing unconditional universality
into the conjectures of physics. Physics provides some behavioural claims
about a particular class of entities, it is up to us as philosophers, biologists,
policy-makers, etc. to decide whether or not anything falls outside this class.
Fourth, it’s not even clear to me that a universally accepted physicalism
would lead us to consider the fundamental laws as unconditionally universal.
Physicalism is typically understood as a claim about the sufficiency of
physics (e.g. Davidson 1995, Papineau 2001). But it is not typically
understood as incompatible with an unrestricted mereology, and not all
objects which exist without such a restriction will be characterised well by
the physical laws. For instance, call the object comprising the Earth up to
some specific time and Proxima Centuri for all time thereafter Earturi. If the
laws of physics were thought to apply to it, it would be a counterexample to
many, e.g. conservation of mass/energy, relativistic limits, Schro¨dinger wave
evolution, etc. So if ∀x(Stx) is to be a law, physicalism needs not only to be
an established part of scientific theorising, but it needs to be conjoined with
further highly philosophically controversial theses, such as the rejection of
unrestricted mereology. Once more, even if these controversial views are
correct or have strong philosophical motivation, it does not seem to be part
of scientific reasoning that these views are true. Since science seems to be
the best indication of what to call a law, we should be careful not to let
philosophical biases infect those ascriptions.
I take these points to show that Schro¨dinger’s equation, along with any other
prominent formulae in physics, is not applied unconditionally, but rather only
to a specific class of systems. It may prove difficult to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for such a system, but the practice of quantum physics
reveals at least that the class is not understood to include general relativistic
systems, mental states or platonic forms. It is known to contain systems
which can be predicted and explained (potentially including those reasonably
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approximated; see §3.3) by the formula i~∂Ψ/∂t = HˆΨ. Let ‘Q’ denote the
property of being in such a class of systems. We then get the following
expression for the lawlike knowledge physicists have relevant to applications
and interpretations of the Schro¨dinger equation—what we might call
‘Schro¨dinger’s law’.
Schro¨dinger’s law: ∀x(Q→ St)
This reasoning significantly strengthens the argument that all laws are condi-
tionals, specifically of the form Schema 2. From here on I will assume this is
the correct schema for all laws. Of course, a discussion of laws’ logical form is
still only a portion of the story of them. To this end, I turn now to discuss in
more detail the nature of the subject of laws, viz. systems.
3.2 Laws are system-laws
This section aims to elaborate further on the content and scope of laws
centering on the idea that all laws are ‘system-laws’. Discussion on the logic
of laws of nature has often seen it appropriate to distinguish ‘system-laws’
from other laws. Schurz, for example, distinguishes ‘system laws’ from,
those fundamental laws of physics which are not restricted to any
special kinds of systems (be it by an explicit antecedent condition
or an implicit application constraint). (2002, 367)
This distinction has the potential for at least two interpretations. According
to one, system-laws are so-called if they have an antecedent condition which
contains a singular term, i.e. a term which picks out an individual rather than a
class of individuals. It can seem to be this reading Schurz has in mind when he
says shortly after the previous quote that ‘system laws [...] refer to particular
systems of a certain kind in a certain time interval ∆t’ (my emphasis). It is
in this sense that generalisations found in biology which appear to reference
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specific times and space (e.g. Earth over the last 3.8 billion years) have been
distinguished from those more general laws of nature (Beatty 1995, Rosenberg
2001). Schurz also mentions Kepler’s laws and Galileo’s law of free fall, both
of which condition on the system of application being, respectively, our solar
system and the Earth. (We might think that Buys Ballot’s law similarly counts
as a system-law for the same reason.)
If this is the correct interpretation, then discussion in 3.1 on laws’
conditionality is not directly relevant. Although the arguments provided
there aimed to show that all laws have a conditional form they have not
demanded that the antecedent incorporate a singular term, although this
might be the case for some laws. However, according to a second
interpretation, a system-law is so-called simply because it is a conditional
simpliciter. This interpretation seems to match with Schurz’s claim that the
fundamental laws of physics are not system-laws because they are not
‘restricted to any special kinds of systems (be it by an explicit antecedent
condition or an implicit application constraint)’ and his regarding the total
force law and special force laws as not counting as system-laws ‘at the cost of
being per se not applicable to real systems, because they do not specify which
forces are active’ (Schurz’s emphasis). If we read ‘special’ and ‘real’ in these
quotes as implying that the relevant systems fall under some specific class,
then we have reason to think of any law in the form of a conditional as a
system law.
Under the second, broader interpretation, the argument presented above for
the conditionality of laws entails that all laws are system-laws. The total
force law (Newton’s second law) and the special force laws (e.g. Newton’s
gravitational law) are (pace Schurz) system-laws in this sense since they express
conditionals, both having the antecedent condition that the system is massive,
or perhaps more appropriately ‘Newtonian’. The argument for these points
draws on the fact that the behaviours these laws describe are not expected to
be fully general. Instead, they condition behaviour on entities characterised
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by a particular body of theory (e.g. classical mechanics) not assumed by the
practitioners who use them to capture everything in existence.
I will use the second interpretation of ‘system-law’ in what follows assuming
that the arguments provided in §3.1 provide reason to think all laws are system-
laws. But despite our ability to draw such a generalisation about laws, we still
don’t know much about what precisely a system or system-type is. In §3.2.1
I will argue for a criteria of identity for system-types in terms of conditions
of assembly and in §3.2.2 I will argue that systems are real-world entities
(as opposed to abstractions or fictions). This latter discussion will raise the
problem of non-universality which will then be addressed in §3.3.
3.2.1 What’s a system-type?
In this section I will develop a more precise understanding of what is meant by
the notion of a system by providing a general criterion of identity for system-
types. In what follows I first say what criteria of identity are. I will then
suggest that we should individuate system-types by ‘conditions of assembly’,
which are further divisible into ‘conditions of componency’ and ‘conditions of
organisation’.
Frege taught us that to be able to individuate something for the purpose of
naming it, we should possess a ‘criterion of identity’ which would tell us for
anything whatsoever whether it is the same as that thing. In his words,
to use a symbol a to signify an object, we must have a criterion for
deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not
always in our power to apply this criterion. (1950, 73)
The exact lesson to take from this claim is controversial. We may wonder
whether it reasonably applies to entities which fail to be individuated by sortal
concepts (e.g. water, wine, and other mass-term denotees). Moreover, we may
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even wonder whether Frege’s goal was really to help us individuate objects.
For instance, Lowe has argued that,
it is a misconception to suppose that a criterion of identity is in
general a principle whose primary purpose is to be invoked in
settling particular questions of identity or diversity concerning
individuals: it is not [...] an epistemic or heuristic principle for
the discovery of particular truths. Rather, [...] criteria of identity
are semantic principles whose grasp is essential to an
understanding of certain sorts of general term. (Lowe 1989, 13)
I cannot comment here on whether Lowe has accurately captured Frege’s
intention, as seems to have been his aim. However, I agree with Lowe that
the criterion of identity can be put to service in elucidating semantic facts
regarding general sortal terms. To use Frege’s well-known example, we learn
something informative about the concept of direction when we learn that if
two things are directions, then they are identical if and only if their lines are
parallel. Whether these semantic facts are something to be considered
definitive (i.e. analytic) I will remain silent on. For what follows, I assume a
criterion of identity for the denotation of a term at least elucidates the
extension of the term.
We can utilise this feature of the criterion of identity to elucidate something
informative about the concept of system-type. Drawing on Lowe’s
interpretation, we are looking for a way to fill out the ellipsis in the following
statement:
For all things, if they are both system-types, then they will be
identical if and only if ...
So, what we are looking for are general features of system-types which elucidate
the concept of system-type for us.
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By asking for a criterion of identity for system-types, rather than systems, I
am focusing on how we individuate kinds of systems rather than systems
themselves. I think the question of what criteria we use to individuate any
particular system may be about as difficult as the question of how we
individuate individual persons. If I replace a single resistor in a circuit with
one of the same value of resistance, do I still have the same token electrical
circuit? If I break a covalent bond between two molecules in a gas, do I still
have the same token gas? If Neptune spun out of its orbit around the sun,
would Earth still be in the same solar system? These questions are
interesting, but very difficult and, I suspect, contextually contingent.
However, it appears that a more straightforward and perhaps more
scientifically crucial question concerns whether something is an electrical
circuit in the first place, rather than, e.g. a purely mechanical system or a
bundle of electrical components in a bag. While it may be of limited interest
to a theoretical chemist whether the adjustment of a carbon lattice from a
graphite structure to a diamond structure preserves the same token system,
it is crucial to know whether it is the same system-type. After all, it is the
instantiation of a particular system-type which renders a system’s behaviour
describable by a particular law: if the system-type changes, so may the
inferences one is able to make about how it will behave.
If we focus on types of system, it might seem that formulating a criterion of
identity is easy: two system-types are identical if and only if they have the
same instances. However, for practical purposes, we desire a criterion different
from just a list of all the instances a system-type has. Scientists build systems,
uncover them in nature, discover their behaviour and inner natures, test their
boundary conditions, make predictions about where we will find them and
explain facts based on their having those natures (more on this in §5.2.1 and
§5.2.2). This suggests, I think, that scientists require knowledge of something
more general about what systems must be like to instance a system-type.
If we are to avoid criteria composed merely of a list of instances, then the
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identity criteria for a system-type should make generalisations about what
characteristics all and only their instances have. Note, that this demand for
generality holds even if the scientific knowledge follows a pattern of
explanation via exemplars. Perhaps scientists will explain an entity’s
behaviour by calling on its similarlity to an exemplary system which they can
demonstrate indexically. Nonetheless, there will need to be some general
characteristics shared between entity and exemplar in order to be able to say
why the exemplar is even relevant in such a case.
So, what might these general characteristics of system-types be? One idea we
can quickly reject is that the behaviour associated by law with a system-type
features in those criteria. After all, if the behaviour did feature in the
identity-criteria, laws would be completely trivial, conditioning some
behavioural characteristic on entities defined by their having that very
behaviour. Having said all that, it is certainly not the case that the
behaviour of a system-type is irrelevant to our epistemic access to it. An
important aspect of differentiating system-types from arbitrary classes of
assemblies of objects with no obvious scientific interest surely concerns the
behaviour engaged in (when law-abiding) by their instances. It is the
behaviour of an electrical circuit when compared with the behaviour of a
bunch of wires and power-sources thrown together in any gerrymandered
formation that makes the former and not the latter of scientific interest
(indeed, the specific value of laws’ behavioural formulae is what forms the
basis of the account of laws developed in §5). Moreover, it may in fact be the
behaviour which allows us to keep attention on the system-types of interest.
For example, it is the vapour-trail in a cloud chamber which keeps our
attention on the system (a moving charged particle) which explains it.
Arguably, it is in general what things do that allows us to be aware of them
at all—a system-type with only causally inert instances could never be
recognised let alone incorporated within a scientific theory.
But if behaviour is not to play a role in system-types’ individuation, how should
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we individuate them? My suggestion is the following.
For all things, if they are both system-types, then they will be
identical if and only if they have the same conditions of assembly.
A condition of assembly is a requirement on how a system-type’s instances
are to be constructed, whether synthetically or organically. They divide into
conditions on what types of component the assemblies which instance the
system-type contain and conditions on how those components are organised
in the assembly. Table 3.1 (starting p.92) lists some laws, their
system-predicates, behaviour-predicates and the conditions of assembly for
system-types.
Table 3.1: Laws and their parts
Law
System-type conditions of assembly Behaviour
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I will make use of the following schema for representing the criterion of identity












S is to be replaced by a system-predicate, C1x,C2x, ..., Cnx by conditions of
componency and O1x,O2x, ..., Onx by conditions of organisation.
For the sake of what follows, I presume the conditions of assembly for a
system-type are simply definitive of that system-type. Hence, I will on
occasion make use of explicitly expressions of laws in which the system-type
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is replaced by its conditions of assembly (this will prove particularly useful
when drawing attention to potential causal relationships in §7). However, I
am open to relaxing this connection if careful consideration of modal
contexts suggests a weaker relationship. What’s crucial is that the conditions
of assembly accurately individuate system-types informatively as a matter of
fact. One use this will have is for cases where conditions of assembly for some
system-types are subsets of conditions of assembly for larger system-types.
For instance, the system-type for the Lorentz force law arguably has
conditions of assembly specifying that a system comprise a charge in a
magnetic and electric field. One of these entities is a magnetic field, which
satisfies the conditions of assembly for Gauss’s law of magnetism. Hence, any
assembly which satisfies the conditions of assembly for the system-type in the
Lorentz force law will have a nested sub-assembly which satisfies the
conditions of assembly for the system-type in Gauss’s law of magnetism.
Requirements on components which feature in the conditions of assembly for
a system-type may be obviously dispositional, e.g. being frictionless, being a
predator, being inextensible, or else at least superficially categorical, e.g. being
a photon (I explore the distinction between these properties further in §5.2.1
and §5.4.4). It may be that some assembly comprises objects which are fungible
or perform more than one role in the system. For example, the resistors in
series of a circuit can swap places without changing the system from being an
instance of an electrical circuit. To put it anthopocentrically: the system-type
does not care which component is doing what. What’s crucial is that each role
is performed by some suitable component.
That there are requirements on arrangement which feature in the conditions
of assembly for a system-type should be obvious. As Cartwright says, ‘a
bunch of resistors and capcitors collected together in a paper bag will not
conduct an electric current’ (1999, 57). Requirements on arrangement are
most naturally thought of in terms of the orientation and proximity of the
various components—the components of an electrical circuit must be in
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contact across their terminals, the predator and prey population must be in
the same habitat and capable of crossing paths, etc. It is hard to imagine
requirements on arrangement which are not of this sort, but I don’t think we
should prohibit them out of hand. For one thing, the requirements on
arrangement of instances of system-types which are sensitive to relativistic
phenomena may require a more subtle characterisation rather than one of
relative spatiotemporal orientation and location.
Often the conditions of assembly for a system-type are quite specific. All the
examples in Table 3.1 specify a particular quantity of components systems
need in order to fulfill certain tasks. However, some system-types mentioned
in laws are not so specific. Consider, for instance, Dalton’s law.
Dalton’s law If something is a mixture of non-interacting ideal
gases, then the total pressure it exerts is equal to the sum of the
partial pressures exerted by each individual gas.
This implies a functional relationship between the pressure exerted by distinct
components (gases) of a system (mixture). But the system-predicate which
features in this law’s antecedent denotes a system-type whose conditions of
assembly do not specify how many gases its instances should have. The law
holds for mixtures of any number of gases. Similarly, the conditions say very
little about the arrangement of the components, the gases must merely be
‘mixed’.
In summary, the criterion of individuation I suggest for system-types does not
draw on the behaviour associated with them by law. This criterion identifies
system-types by their conditions of assembly which divide into conditions of
componency and conditions of arrangement. By picking out individuative
aspects of system-types which extend outside of the information provided in
the respective laws for each system-type, we have established that system-
types are conceptually rich in a distinct way from the inference to behaviour
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licensed by laws. Arguably it is this which licenses their explanatory power
over the lawfully inferred behaviour which they exhibit (see §5.2.4 and §6.2.5).
The notion of a system-type so characterised might seem to resonate with
concepts already present in the literature, in particular that of mechanism
(Glennan 1996, Machamer et al. 2000, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Illari
and Williamson 2013) and nomological machine Cartwright (1989, 1999).
First, all three can be understood as comprising objects, sometimes called
‘components’ or ‘entities’ which may be defined dispositionally. Second, all
three are partially characterised by their organisation or arrangement, which
is understood to be partly explanatory of the behaviour witnessed in or by
them. Third, all three can be ‘nested’ within further instances and can
‘house’ further instances within them. Fourth, all three are expected to
behave in some functionally relational way. For nomological machines, the
contained components will be mutually manifesting their capacities to affect
each other in various ways; for mechanisms the contained components will be
engaged in polyadic activities (or interactions/interactivities); and for
system-types, the contained components will be engaging in behaviour often
described quantitatively by equations.
There are also some crucial differences between system-types, on the one
hand, and nomological machines and mechanisms, on the other. In one sense,
system-types have stricter conditions than both nomological machines or
mechanisms. The behaviour associated with types of system is restricted to
that which can appear in the consequent of a law, while nomological
machines and mechanisms are not in principle so restricted. Hence, toilet
cisterns and synaptic transmission can count as instances of types of
mechanisms and nomological machines but perhaps not instances of
system-types. In another sense, system-types are less strict. Nomological
machines have been characterised as needing to exhibit a certain amount of
stability, and mechanisms have been characterised as being productive of a
higher level phenomenon. Systems are not so characterised. Their criteria of
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identity comes from their conditions of assembly alone and the behaviour
they are lawfully expected to exhibit is neither necessarily stable nor a
phenomenon at some ‘higher level’.
More significantly for our purposes, unlike a type of nomological machine or
type of mechanism (at least under some interpretations), the behaviour of
instances of a system-type is not part of its identity criteria. As was noted
above, system-types’ conditions of assembly are a matter of the particular
components they have and their organisation. The activities or manifest
behaviour of a system-type’s instances is something expected given these
conditions’ satisfaction and it is a feature of laws that they capture this
expectation. But the behaviour itself is not definitive of the system-type.
This fact is, I believe, a significant merit of explanation in terms of systems
and will be capitalised on in developing the causal conception of laws (see
esp. §5.2.4).
Conditions of assembly are clearly important for saying what makes one
system-type distinct from another. But it’s worth pointing out what
conditions of assembly do not do. Criteria of identity for system-types are
not alone sufficient to sort system-types from mere kinds of assembly. With
liberal enough scope, there will be conditions of assembly for any
gerrymandered combination of objects in some specified arrangement. But it
seems that system-types and their instances, if they are to be distinctive of
law-like behaviour, should be rather more special. Something about the
specification of organisation and componency conditions which constitute the
conditions of assembly for the antecedent property in Kirchhoff’s laws means
that they supply the criteria of identity for a genuine system-type. But the
specification that the same components be in a paper bag do not—there are
no laws which have being a bunch of resistors in a bag as the antecedent
condition (though there might be true generalisations which do). So far I
have not provided any reason to say what the difference is, i.e. what makes
system-types special. In particular, the criteria of identity for system-types
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does not seem sufficient to draw the distinction.
In what remains of this section I want to discuss two broad options for how
to go about drawing a distinction between system-types and mere kinds of
assembly. The first aims to find first some prior criteria for what makes an
assembly of objects a system-type and then call a law any true (or true
enough) generalisation which holds for them. The second aims to find first
some prior criteria for what makes a conditional a law and then call a
system-type whatever is denoted by the antecedent predicates of those
conditionals. I will show why there are good reasons to opt for the second
option.
Pursuing the first option, one could take a brute realist position concerning
system-types: system-types are part of the world’s natural kinds, thereby
supporting inductive inference, counterfactuals, etc. On this approach we
simply affirm that the kind of assembly, e.g., pears in this basket doesn’t
count as a genuine system-type and so the proposition that pears in this
basket are sweet is not a law.
Tempting as this might be, it does not appear to be particularly informative.
After all, it provides us with no criteria to assess borderline or contentious
cases. Also, it seems to prohibit out of hand the possibility that there might
be laws for non-natural assemblies. Laws of economics like Gresham’s law,
for instance, don’t obviously seem to have system-types which can be
classified as natural kinds. At least, the relevant system-type is not natural
in any informative sense, other than that it is the kind which appears in the
antecedent of a law. But if we are to be brute realists about what
distinguishes system-types from mere assemblies, then it seems nature is
about the only alternative mechanism to do it. We could, of course, deny
that there really are laws of economics. But if we do that, I think we lose a
grip on what a law is. Laws, including those of economics, are conditionals of
a certain class which allow us to do certain useful things such as predict,
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explain and control the (natural or social) environment. One might divide
the class of laws a in two, claiming that only a portion are real laws since
only their antecedent predicates denote real natural kinds. But the question
remains what it was about the ‘unreal’ law that made them useful in the
same way? This is the question I think we should be concerned with and for
that reason I reserve the term ‘law’ for that broader class.
Another approach still in line with the option of starting with an account of
what makes system-types special is to find explicit criteria for their distinctive
features. Some ideas, rejected by Hempel in a closely related discussion, are
that properties like ‘being a pear in this basket’ or ‘being a member of the
Greenbury school board 1964’ are prohibited from being system-types because
they have too few (or unitary) instances, or that they mention specific objects
or locations (pp.339–342). I agree with Hempel that these are poor methods of
demarcation. Some genuine system-types aren’t precisely instantiated by any
instances, e.g. being an ideal gas in a cavity; and other genuine system-types
very explicitly mention locations, e.g. being a freefalling body on Earth.
I don’t presume to have engaged in an exhaustive investigation of potential
ways one might determine what’s distinctive of system-types prior to an
account of laws. But we can certainly see a further general problem with any
attempt to define the laws on the basis of such an approach. The problem is
that even legitimate system-types can appear in conditionals with the right
logical form, and yet those conditionals aren’t laws. It might, for instance be
that every electrical circuit is located this side of the Oort cloud. But despite
having a genuine system-type in its antecedent, such a generalisation is no
law. Or take a classic example: presumably being bulk gold is legitimate
system-type if anything is, from which genuinely lawlike behaviour can be
inferred. Nonetheless the generalisation that all bulk gold is smaller than a
mile in diameter does not seem to be one of them. The existence of such
cases entail that even if we did have a way to specify what made a
system-types distinct from mere assemblies without reference to laws, we still
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would not have thereby solved the problem of saying what distinguishes laws
from accidental generalisations.
The problems with this system-type-first approach should, I think, be clear.
The second option starts instead with a prior account of what makes laws
themselves special. With that in place, we might then hope to work backwards
and define the distinctive feature of system-types as whatever assemblies are
denoted in the antecedent of a law. This suggests that a final account of
system-types will remain deflationary: what makes system-types distinct from
mere assemblies is that they are the types of assembly which feature in the
antecedent of laws. Moreover, this approach suggests that there are no system-
types which do not feature in laws. Although the word ‘system’ may be used
for other kinds of assembly, the notion of a ‘system-type’ would therefore have
a stricter sense of being by stipulation a type of assembly of objects which
appears in the antecedent of a law.
Of course, if one believes that laws can be contingent, it is consistent with
this second approach that there are system-types which have instances in
worlds which do not obey the law of this world in which they feature as an
antecedent condition. Nonetheless, in actuality the notion of a system-type
would never be applied to characterise some class of actual systems without
there being some type of behaviour those system-types are lawfully
associated with. Moreover, this actual connection with behaviour does not
mean that behaviour is part of system-types’ criteria of individuation.
Consider an analogy. Arguably, the criterion of individuation for properties is
their intension (the function from worlds to individuals). We might wish to
distinguish from among the properties the intrinsic properties as peculiarly
special. Intrinsic properties are, let’s assume, distinguished from other
properties by being independent of accompaniment by other properties. But
we need not call upon this fact for individuation of intrinsic properties, since
intension remains sufficient and necessary for the individuation of any
property whatsoever. Similarly, a particular characteristic of behaviour might
3.2. LAWS ARE SYSTEM-LAWS 103
be crucial for saying what distinguishes system-types from mere types of
assembly but the above criterion of individuation in terms of conditions of
assembly need not refer to such a characteristic. In a slogan, conditions of
assembly locate the system-type, association with behaviour by law is what
makes system-types special.
The account of laws developed in §5 and §6 aims to characterise a particularly
important kind of behaviour understood as a ‘robust causal junction’. It is
this which I think ultimately explains what makes laws, and consequently
system-types, special. But we are still not finished discussing the nature of
system-types, specifically whether they can really be understood to concern
real-world entities.
3.2.2 Laws concern real-world systems (not models)
In §3.2.1 I argued that system-types are individuated by their conditions of
assembly. The examples I gave strongly suggest that the conditions are the
sort satisfied by real-world entities rather than abstract entities. In this section
I want to comment on a view growing in popularity that laws should not be
understood in this way, but rather to be about abstract models, or some kind of
entity distinct from the real-world systems we intuitively take them to concern.
In the last forty years it has become common among philosophers of science
to downplay the importance of laws in scientific practice. The reason for this
often has something to do with laws’ apparent failure to precisely describe
those systems to which they are typically understood to concern, i.e. there is
a failure of laws’ universality (see Cartwright 1983, 1999, Dupre´ 1993, Giere
1988, 1995, Mumford 1998, Lowe 2006). No gas precisely obeys the ideal gas
equation, no pendulum precisely obeys the classical pendulum formula, no
mutually gravitating bodies precisely obey Newton’s gravitational equation,
etc. This ‘problem of non-universality’ can seem to render many laws false,
which under most perspectives is seriously undesireable.
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In order to save truth, some philosophers have argued that laws must be
understood to concern entities other than those real-world systems to which
we normally take them to apply. For instance, Giere suggests that we
understand laws as,
statements that characterize the structure of a theoretical model
(p.42) [... where ...] a theoretical model is an abstract structure
that may be characterised in a variety of ways utilizing a variety
of linguistic resources (p.41) [...] The Boyle-Charles gas law, for
example is to be understood as asserting that the pressure,
volume, and temperature of an ideal gas are constrained to satisfy
the relationship PV=nRT. Note that this statement is not to be
understood as a universal generalization concerning real gases,
but as part of the characterisation of what it is to be an ideal gas.
(1988, 42)
As Giere notes, this avoids the problem of non-universality by rendering laws
about something alternative to real-world systems about which they are true
by definition. Similar points have been made by Cartwright who argues that
‘the basic scientific laws do not literally describe the behaviour of real material
systems’ (1983, 203) and by Lowe (2006), who identifies the subject of laws to
be abstract particulars, viz. kinds, in the hope of preserving their truth.
These moves to shift the subject of laws away from real world systems appears
to be part of a general and increasing distaste with laws as the dominant tool
of scientific reasoning. Giere’s latter work, for example, bears the subtitle
‘Science Without laws’ (1995) and a significant focus in philosophy of science
is now focused directly on the models themselves rather than the universal
lawlike generalisations which may be about them. It has also been argued that
models need not be understood as exclusively abstract mathematical devices.
Models can include physical objects (Morgan and Morrison 1999), fictions
(Frigg 2010), analogies (Hesse 1963) and metaphors (Black 1954). Supposedly
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it is these entities which our scientific generalisations really concern.
But while these posits may help reclaim lawlike generalisations’ universality,
it comes at the cost of making the generalisations no longer seem relevant to
the systems to which they are applied in practice. Those who enquire into the
employment of models worry deeply about how they represent the parts of the
real world to which they are applied (da Costa and French 1998, Van Fraassen
2008, Sua´rez 2010, Sa´nchez-Dorado 2017). In the original paper of Giere’s,
for instance, he suggests that elements of the structure of abstract models can
be identified with those in the real world (Giere 1988, 41). But how much
structure is required? Is similarity in this respect sufficient for representation
(arguably not, see Goodman 1976)? More recently, it became clear to Giere
(see his Giere 2010) that representation also requires an agent and a purpose
in order to be successful. In general, the discussion of these issues shows little
sign of abating.
Whatever the prospects for a solution to issues of models’ representation, I
don’t really see the move of making models the subject of laws to really be
worth it. Saving laws’ truth by interpreting them to concern something they
don’t ostensibly seem to is not only in tension with common (and I believe
much of scientific) sense, it generates the issue of representation whilst only
postponing the problem of non-universality which motivated the move in the
first place. In the discussion of representation it seems to me that what is being
searched for are rules which tell scientists when it is appropriate to apply a
model (fiction, analogy, metaphor). If that’s the case, then what are needed
are conditionals with an antecedent satisfied by all and only those worldly
entities which exhibit the right sorts of features to have a model appropriately
applied to them and a consequent satisfied by all and only those entities which
behave in a way appropriately similar to the behaviour of the model (whatever
‘appropriate similarity’ amounts to). But this is just the very structure I
argued that laws have! Moreover, such conditionals have real-world systems
as their subject, plausibly individuated by conditions of assembly divisible into
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conditions of componency and organisation.
Ultimately, the problem of non-universality isn’t really avoided by interpreting
laws as concerning abstract models (fictions, metaphors, analogies, etc.) since
there still remains the problem of explaining how those models represent the
messy world. This will only be solved if we reinstate something that looks
very much like what I’ve been arguing laws look like. As a consequence I think
we’d do better to bypass the move to abstraction (or some other kind of model)
and stick to the prima facie intuition that laws are about things in the world.
Obviously, the problem of non-universality still remains (I discuss this further
in §3.3), but the understanding removes much of the mystery surrounding
representation by bringing the application of laws and numerical equations
right back to things in the real world.
3.3 Laws are universal
In trying to argue against an interpretation of laws as concerning abstract
models rather than real-world entities I have, admittedly, ignored the worry
which motivated it in the first place: the problem of non-universality. If the
domain of laws is to be understood as concerning real-world phenomena
(rather than a model) and being universally quantified, as Schema 2 is, then
any system satisfying a law’s system-predicate which does not conform to the
behaviour described in the law is a counterexample of the law rendering the
law false and thereby (we might presume) unexplanatory. Here I want to
discuss a few approaches to deal with apparent failures of universality which
all stem from a common intuition described in §3.3.1 that laws characterise
some embedded phenomenon even in the case of their counterexamples.
Although I favour none of these approaches to the exclusion of others, in
§3.3.2 I will raise some problems for the dominant approach which aims to
modify the system-predicate in order to save laws’ truth. In §3.3.3, I then
offer an alternative approach of modifying the behaviour-predicate so that
they define special cases of more precise laws. This second approach is rather
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under-explored but nonetheless seems to be extremely powerful. Adopting it
will become of key importance for later chapters.
3.3.1 The Embedded Phenomenon Inuition
As Hu¨ttemann (2007) has pointed out, a law’s claim to universality can seem
to be undermined in a number of (potentially overlapping) ways. For
instance, universality can seem to be undermined by a particular subset of
the domain being counterexamples, e.g. the occasional deformity in a species.
It can seem to be undermined by a particular space-time region, e.g. if
physical constants are thought not to hold in the early universe. Universality
of some laws seems undermined by particular environmental circumstances,
e.g. when gravitational forces complicate the effects of Lorentz forces. And
universality can seem to be undermined by a particular range of values of the
included variables, e.g. when growth models break down at extreme values.
Another dimension is the extent of undermining. Universality can be
undermined by extremely rare recalcitrant cases, e.g. in entropy-decreasing
closed systems; in a high volume of cases, e.g. in growth models; or in all
cases, e.g. for any idealising or ‘classical’ law.
Despite this range of putative failures, I think there is plausibly something
which binds all the mentioned cases together: what I call the ‘embedded
phenomenon intuition’. The embedded phenomenon intuition suggests that
while a strict law connecting a system-type to a behaviour may be rendered
false by counterexamples, all instances of the law’s system-type including the
counterexamples provide a consistent ‘contribution’ to the overall behaviour
of whatever situation they are in (Corry 2009). In genuine examples of the
law, the contribution is all there is to the overall behaviour. But in the case
of a counterexample, the respective system’s behaviour is embedded in the
behaviour of a more complex scenario. So, for example, a deformity in a
species may come about from some mutation, but the underlying mechanism
of heredity and chromosomal translation in reproduction remains a constant
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contribution to the overall behaviour. In the case of Lorenz-force, we expect
there to be a constant contribution of magnetic and electric fields on the
force experienced by a charge even when gravity contributes a further
component of force.
The embedded phenomenon intuition is reflected in a theory of non-universal
laws offered by Pietroski and Rey (1995). In the terminology developed in
§3.1, the theory claims that for any system which satisfies the system-predicate
of a law but fails to satisfy the behviour-predicate, one can infer that there
is a (possibly unknown) independently confirmable disturbing factor which
explains that failure. In other words, external factors can disturb but do not
eradicate the contribution of underlying phenomena attributed to the system.
Now, Pietroski and Rey’s account has been objected to on the grounds that
satisfaction of these conditions is trivial: with a broad enough conception of
what counts as an independent disturbing factor C, any system-type S and
behaviour B can form a true statement of the form ‘if x is S, then it is B unless
factor C is present’ (Earman and Roberts 1999, Schurz 2002). The objection
indicates the failure of the theory to suitably explain what distinguishes laws
with counterexamples from any arbitrarily cobbled together generalisation.
But that is not to undermine the general insight about what sort of entity is
being described in these non-universal laws’ system-predicates. The idea of an
independent but disturbing factor indicates that there is something which can
be disturbed, perhaps a natural kind (Harre´ 1993, Ward 2007, Nickel 2010),
some kind of paradigm (Cartwright 1983), a ‘normal’ system (Pietroski and
Rey 1995, Schurz 2002), or an underlying mechanism (Glennan 1996). This is
exactly what I intend to refer to as the emebedded phenomenon intuition.
Obviously, the intuition does not in and of itself save the truth of a law.
Understanding that the term ‘reproducing population’ picks out a specific
natural kind or mechanism allows us to be confident that disturbing factors
may be explained by further independent considerations beyond those in simple
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growth laws. But for all that the intuition suggests, the Malthusian growth
law remains false. Without further qualification the growth law says that all
populations will develop in a certain way which we know in fact they won’t.
In what follows I will explore some responses to this general problem each
of which tries to say something about how to save the truth of laws whose
instances appear to suffer from such disturbances. I will consider two broad
approaches: system-type modification and behaivour-modification.
3.3.2 System-type modification
If all laws are indeed system-laws (see §3.2), it might seem that we have a fairly
straightforward response to the problem of non-universality. For it is always
possible for us to simply deny that the right system-type has been predicated.
This move makes the classification of laws as ‘ideal’ or ‘classical’ logically
significant. Although gases in general do not satisfy the ideal gas equation,
ideal gases do; although not all pendulums satisfy the classical pendulum law,
classical pendulums do.
This response to the apparent non-universality of laws is rightly figured to
have an air of triviality about it unless the notions ‘ideal’ and ‘classical’ can be
given an informative gloss and as it turns out we can get pretty close in these
two cases. Ideal gases are defined to comprise particles of negligible size with
no interaction forces; classical pendulums operate in a uniform gravitational
field with an inextensible cord and frictionless pivot. Hence, the approach in
general is to ‘modify the system-predicate’ to get a law which is no longer
subject to counterexample.
This tactic has been endorsed on a number of occasions (although not in such
terms). For instance, Fodor (1991) gives the suggestion that we might append
a ‘completer’ C to antecedent conditions in laws to save their truth in many
cases (see also Reutlinger 2011). Consequently, idealising laws would have the
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following more appropriate form.
∀x((Sx&Cx)→ Bx) (Schema 4)
In some cases we may expect to specify enough of the potential disturbing
factors in the antecedent to retain a law’s truth (hence ‘completer’). Perhaps
Newton’s first law is an example of this. It tells us how massive systems
behave in the absence of disturbing factors where we know (pace Cartwright
2000) what the likely disturbing factors are: electromagnetic, gravitational,
strong or weak forces. Hence, we can introduce a more explicit expression of
Newton’s first law which retains universality
Newton’s First law: All materially closed systems isolated from
any electromagnetic, gravitational, strong or weak force will remain
at rest or at a constant velocity.
Despite how promising this approach of system-type modification may look,
one might be concerned that it will not always be available. Consider, for
instance, Malthus’s growth law. A first pass at rendering it might be by the
following conditional.
All ecological populations increase in population size according to
the equation P (t) = P0ert.
In this form it has many counterexamples. Populations will often be under
environmental pressure from natural disaster, disease, predation, habitability
of geographical area, etc. In response to these putative counterexamples we
might attempt a modification of the system-predicate with a further conjunct
as with Schema 4. But in this case it is not so easy to come up with anything
precise which assures we condition on only those systems which do behave in
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the way described by the equation other than by saying something trivial such
as that the systems ‘have no disturbing factors’.
Given that one can’t name all the specific kinds of counterexample to many
direct inferential associations between system-types and behavioural
formulae, an alternative option is to qualify the system-predicate with a less
specific completer-clause which holds in general for all laws with problems of
universality. There are two options I know of along these lines, both of which
I believe to be problematic.
One suggestion is to modify laws so that they concern only ‘normal’ instances
of the system type (i.e. Cx ≡ x is normal; see Spohn 2002, Nickel 2010) This
may seem initially promising, although we may wonder why laws are rarely
made explicit in this way. More problematically, the qualification on normality
doesn’t seem to appropriately capture the fact that scientists generally know
when and why a system will fail to obey some behaviour. When an unexpected
failure occurs, scientists will actively look for a reason for it. The suggestion of
a normative qualification simply doesn’t seem to have the sufficient precision
to make sense of this. Moreover, the restriction on normality suggests that
genuine instances of the law will actually exist. But in the case of many laws
there are only counterexamples (e.g. idealising laws). Ultimately, normative
system-type modifiers may provide a modicum of understanding, but they do
not respect the kind of information scientists are interested in positing when
positing a law.
A different suggestion for how to deal with problems of non-universality is
provided by Hu¨ttemann (2004). He suggests that in general, laws describe the
behaviour systems approach the more isolated they become (i.e. Cx ≡ x is
isolated). While disturbing factors in the real-world might divert a system’s
behaviour from what the law predicts of it, the same system in isolation would
have no disturbing factors and hence satisfy the behaviour-predicate.
This ‘isolation-approach’ to otherwise problematic laws seems continuous
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with the embedded phenomenon intuition, since it suggests that once we take
away all the other factors in which a system is embedded, the behaviour will
return to that predicted by the law. Moreover, in many cases I think
modifying the system-predicate with the further condition of isolation would
indeed retain truth—although its application beyond the physical sciences
may be hard to conceive. Furthermore, we might think that it is a far more
plausible representation of scientific knowledge than the use of a normative
modification, since isolation actually aims to specify the kinds of conditions
under which a system-type’s instances will obey a certain
behaviour-predicate.
Nonetheless, the isolation-approach has significant limitations as well. I offer
three specific complaints before drawing conclusions on system-type
modification in general. A first reason one might be sceptical about the
isolation-approach is that the concept of isolation seems causal, i.e. an
abbreviation of ‘isolated from disturbing causal factors’. If isolation can’t be
given a non-causal interpretation, then Hu¨ttemann’s solution to the problem
of non-universality blurs the distinction between laws of association, which
aren’t supposed to contain any explicit causal language, and causal laws,
which are.
A second concern is that despite an improvement on normative criteria, the
concept of isolation is not really precise enough. Assume, for instance, that
Coloumb’s law is an example of the sort Hu¨ttemann describes. It states that if
a system comprises two charged objects separated by a non-zero distance and





But this will only be true if we understand isolation in a specific way. It
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can’t simply be understood as meaning that the two objects in the system
are the only two contributing to each other’s behaviour, since if they have
mass there will still remain the disturbing factor of gravitational force. It can
seem, therefore, that we need to understand the requirement on isolation in
this case to pick out precisely the components’ charges and nothing else about
them. But is it legitimate to suppose that the law really concerns only charged
objects with no mass? After all, the only charged objects in the standard model
without mass are relatively recently discovered W bosons, and they are posited
to mediate an entirely different force, viz. weak force. By the time we concede
enough physics (or other science) to make coherent a scenario in which two
objects are influenced solely by each other’s charge, we may wonder whether
it is reasonable continue to assume the relevance of Coloumb’s law in that
scenario too.
A third complaint specific to the isolation-approach is that because the
expected behaviour is supposed to be fully manifest in isolated conditions, it
requires that all laws’ behaviour-predicates are those in which the variables
for disturbing factors are set to zero. But some idealisations are those in
which unwanted variables are fixed to other values. For instance, when we
stipulate that a cord is inextensible, we are idealising by assuming its
resistance to extension under load (Hooke’s spring constant) is infinite; and
when we idealise in order to use Newtonian mechanics to predict the path of
a projectile, we often assume gravitational acceleration is ≈ 9.81ms−1. As
long as we require that the ideal behaviour is at some limiting case we can
allow such idealisations which do not condition on isolation.
Drawing on all the proposed system-modification approaches considered, they
seem to all suffer from what has become known as ‘Lange’s dilemma’ (after
Lange 1993a). Lange pointed out that qualifications of law tend either to be too
specific about disturbing factors, in which case they remain false, or else they
are too unspecific, in which case they are trivial. Attempting to specify exactly
the kinds of counterinstances which might crop up in the antecedent is often
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impossible, hence any attempt will not save the laws’ truth. But attempting
to save truth by simply conditioning on ‘normal’ or ‘isolated’ instances of the
system-type seems either open to such wide interpretation that it is bound to
be true or else insufficient to capture the exact cases we want.
But even if some kind of system-type modification can work in certain cases,
there is also another problem which befalls any of these approaches which I
think highlights best the need for a different approach entirely. Note that
any system-predicate modification approach works by restricting the class of
entities the law is about. For instance, it asks us to consider only the ideal
cases, the normal cases, or the classical cases. But often laws are used to
say things about the very systems we know fail to perfectly obey the laws’
behavioural formulae. This is not recalcitrant scientific practice, but exemplary
of the process of idealisation: when we come across a complex situation for
which a perfectly accurate law is either beyond our knowledge, our ability to
solve, or our practical requirements, then we can often benefit from idealising
the situation. Crucially, this practice is one in which we use a law with some
explicit formula to talk about a system which does not precisely obey it.
Take, for example, Malthus’s growth law. Many (perhaps all) real-world pop-
ulations fail to obey the explicit equation in that law,
Pt = P0ert.
In response to this, the approach of system-predicate modification suggests
that we treat the law as really being about only those cases which do obey
the formula, e.g. the ideal, normal, classical, or isolated cases. But even if
that succeeds in rendering the Malthusian law true, we now have the problem
of saying exactly what relevance those normal cases have to all the non-ideal,
abnormal, non-classical, unisolated cases. And there must be something which
connects them, since often in practice an ecologist will use the equation to
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describe the behaviour of these latter cases.
The problem described here certainly bears similarities with that of
representation mentioned earlier. Just like the problem of saying how
analogies, metaphors, fictions and abstract models are able to represent a
wider class of system (including real-world cases) those who pursue the
system-modification approach to the problem of non-universality have to say
how a more restricted class of systems can count as representative of a wider
class. But this whole issue could be abandoned if one simply took laws to be
about the entities they’re used to describe. This is where I think
behaviour-predicate modification may have the answer.
3.3.3 Behaviour modification
Most attempts to rescue the truth of laws in the face of the problem of non-
universality seem to suggest some modification of what in current context we
may call the system-predicate. But what I have just suggested is that we might
also consider rescue by qualification of the behaviour-predicate. For instance,
we might expect that if a phenomenon underlies a more complex scenario, it
will reveal itself at least partially in that complex behaviour. The issue then
is how to make such an idea precise. Here I think a passage from Malthus on
his growth law can be instructive.
The passion between the sexes has appeared in every age to be so
nearly the same that it may always be considered, in algebraic
language, as a given quantity. The great law of necessity which
prevents a population from increasing in any country beyond the
food which it can either produce or acquire, is a law so open to
our view [...] that we cannot for a moment doubt it. The different
modes which nature takes to prevent or repress a redundant
population do not appear, indeed, to us so certain and regular,
but though we cannot always predict the mode we may with
116 CHAPTER 3. THE LOGICAL FORM OF LAWS
certainty predict the fact (my emphasis Malthus 1798, Ch.4).
Malthus seems here to clearly be endorsing something like the embedded
phenomenon intuition. In the first sentence, he suggests that there is some
natural or unchangeable mechanism—the passion of the sexes—from which
the exponential growth model can be inferred. This is where we get
Malthus’s law from. In the second sentence, he suggests that despite the
regularity of the mechanism, we know (by the ‘law of necessity’) such
mechanisms will always be disturbed, resulting in behaviour other than that
predicted by the passion of the sexes. But Malthus also makes the further
claim that the passion of the sexes ‘may always be considered, in algebraic
language, as a given quantity’. This goes beyond the embedded phenomenon
intuition and actually suggests something about how we might formalise the
contribution a system makes in embedded contexts.
An idea I find plausible, and which complements Malthus, is that the
inaccurate formulae used to characterise some laws’ behaviour-predicates
describe a special case of more complex and more accurate formulae involving
further variables not inferred from the system-type alone. A more complex
formula which corrects that in the law will typically comprise further
variables which, when set to some other fixed number, will reduce the
complex formula to that of the law’s. In the case of growth models we can,




= αx− βxy dy
dt
= δxy − γy
These equations are used to describe systems in which different populations
compete, e.g. via predation. If we set the population of one species (e.g. y)
to zero, we get the differential interpretation of Malthus’s equation for the
‘passion of the sexes’ of the other population (x) as a consequence.
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A similar observation works for many other of equations. For example, the
applicability of the Rayleigh-Jeans formula to cases of black-body radiation
at low frequency can be obtained by putting the Planck constant to zero;
the Newtonian constitutive equation for incompressible flow can be obtained
from the constitutive equation for compressible flow by putting the term for
change in mass-continuity to zero; the dynamical behaviour of an undampened
oscillator can be obtained by putting viscosity of non-Hookean springs to zero;
the pressure-volume relationship of an ideal gas can by obtained from the Van-
der Waals equation by putting mediating forces and molecule-size to zero, etc.,
etc. In each case, we can think of the law making explicit the less complex
formula as derivable from the more complex formula, which goes unspecified.
Note, however, that the variable being set to a single value need not be set
only to zero. For instance, the Rydberg formula can be obtained from the
Bohr model of the atom by putting the atomic mass to infinity and treating





In general, I suggest we treat behaviour-predicates of laws as not being fully
characterised by their contained formulae, but by the condition that whatever
satisfies them is described accurately by some further unspecified formulae
which have the contained formulae as a special case. Since the more accurate
formula remains unspecified, we can thereby retain the truth of laws despite
the existence of many possibly unknown disturbing factors.
Mathematically, there may appear something rather vacuous about this
suggestion. After all, isn’t it trivial that for any formula there is a more
complex formula which has the first as a special case and which will fit any
finite set of data? Maybe so. But that doesn’t mean the suggestion for
preserving the truth of laws renders them trivial. Practitioners don’t expect
the additional variables, coefficients and functions to come from anywhere
118 CHAPTER 3. THE LOGICAL FORM OF LAWS
but to be grounded in scientifically appropriate and plausible properties of
the surrounding environment. Sometimes a property might be introduced in
a rather ad hoc basis to retain the underlying phenomena (e.g. dimensional
constants) but for the most part, the additional variables will either be
‘natural’ additions to the numerical explanation of a complex behaviour
(e.g. when molecule size is included in real gas equations) or become
fundamental constants of a burgeoning scientific research programme
(e.g. when the Planck constant was introduced into descriptions of
black-body radiation).
Of course, if the modification is to avoid triviality then we certainly need to
include in the modification to laws’ behaviour-predicates a characterisation of
what kind of unspecified formulae are acceptable. Here I think the embedded
phenomenon intuition may again be of assistance. For it tells us that instances
of the system-types of idealising laws really do exist, but typically in a more
complex environment in which those systems are embedded. This suggests
that for any complex environment in which an instance of a system-type S
is embedded, we have an instance of a different system-type S ′ of which the
instance of S is a part. In this context, parthood can be understood to mean
that the conditions of assembly for S are entailed by S ′ (hence S is a part
of itself). So, for example, the conditions of assembly for a population in a
habitable environment will be entailed by the conditions of assembly for two
populations (one predatory on the other) in that environment.
Obviously, pointing to a more complex system in which some other system is
embedded is of no benefit to providing us with a restriction on the relevant
unspecified formulae K ′ unless we can connect the two together in some
informative way. The trick is, I think, to connect S ′ and the unspecified
formula K ′ by law. In other words, we preserve the universality of a law
relating a system-type S and behaviour-type B by expressing it in the
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following form.
For all x, if x is in instance of the system-type S, then
there is a system-type S ′ and behaviour-type B′ such
that,
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law, and,
2. instances of S ′ have an instance of S as a part, and,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if x has variables V1, V2, ...
related by the formula K ′ which has as a special
case the formula, K).
(Schema 5)
In instances of the schema, K is replaced by the laws’ explicit formula and K ′
by a variable ranging over unspecified formulae. Notice that to state a law in
this form, the corresponding law ∀x(S ′x → B′x) referenced in the modified
behaviour-predicate need not be stated; the behaviour-modification simply
asserts that there is such a law. Consequently, it is not essential to know
how the explicit formula K might fail to accurately describe the system it is
applied to in order to know that the behaviour-modification is appropriate. So,
for example, if we wanted to save the truth of Malthus’s law by this behaviour-
predicate modification technique, we could propose that it be understood as
follows.
Malthus’s growth law: For all x, if x is in instance of a
reproducing population in a habitable environment, then there is
a system-type S ′ and behaviour-type B′ such that,
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law, and,
2. instances of S ′ have an instance of a reproducing population
in a habitable environment as a part, and,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if x has variables Pt, P0, r, t, ... related by
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the K ′ which has as a special case the formula,
Pt = P0ert.)
Let me draw attention to a couple of details in this approach to
behaviour-predicate modification. First, it’s quite possible within the
approach that the instances of a law which don’t precisely obey the law’s
explicit formula can appear in a range of different types of system. The
Malthusian equation doesn’t only fail to describe a population’s growth
because of predation, but also because of environmental pressures, natural
disaster, disease, etc. Plausibly, there is a distinct and more complex
system-type for each of these additions. For the behaviour-predicate
modification to be correct, it only needs to be the case that for each instance
of the Malthusian system-type, there is some law which satisfies the criteria
1–3 in Schema 5.
Second, I presume that there is a reasonable amount of vagueness surrounding
the ‘correct’ expression of Malthus’s growth law with the prescribed behaviour-
modification. In some cases, ecologists might have a much better defined list of
criteria for the applicable system-type S specified in premise 2, in other cases,
perhaps, fewer. This doesn’t seem to me a problem so long as they various
expressions bear a significant degree of overlap.
Let me now address a predictable concern. According to the
behaviour-modification approach as I’ve introduced it, laws like Malthus’s are
acceptable only so long as there exists some other law from which the
system-type and formula in Malthus’s law can be derived. But what if those
further laws describe embedded phenomena as well, i.e. suffer from instances
which don’t obey their own explicit formulae? This would be a problem, I
think, if for any instance of a law with modified behaviour-predicate there
were no law which existed for which its explicit formula was always obeyed.
Behaviour-modification can’t go on forever and eventually there must be
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some laws which just get the situation exactly right.
Maybe this assertion is overly optimistic, but in its defence I should reiterate
that these laws need not be known now or ever. So long as for each instance
of a reproducing population in a habitable environment there is some law
out there—perhaps incredibly complex—for which the corresponding system-
predicate at least requires its instances to also be a reproducing population
in a habitable environment and its behaviour-predicate both describes growth
absolutely correctly and whose explicit formula has the Malthusian growth
equation as a limiting case, then Malthus’s growth law (in the above modified
form) is true. Moreover, as it turns out, the account of laws I will develop
throughout §5 and §6 makes no requirement that any law have more than
one instance (unlike the axioms of the best system, see §4.2). It is therefore
consistent with the view that each of the perfectly accurate laws has only one
instance (although it will need to have at least one instance).
One further query we might have over the behaviour-modification is whether
or not any special case of a formula in an accurate law can be used to define
a further idealising law. While I think it is beyond the scope of the solution
to problem of non-universality to have a ready answer to this question, it will
be useful here to speculate. For it seems clear to me that only some special
cases are reasonable candidates for defining the behaviour-predicate of a law.
For instance, while the equation in the ideal gas law is a legitimate special
case of the equation in Van der Waals’s law, an equation which instead took
the special case in which pressure and volume were held fixed as constants
would seem not to be. This, I believe, is due to the fact that the relation of
special and general case between laws and their idealisations must preserve a
continuity of causal asymmetry among the variables. I will return to this idea
in §5.4.5.
If the approach of behaviour-predicate modification (‘behaviour-modification’
for short) can be made to work, it provides a number of benefits over the
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approach of system-predicate modification discussed in §3.3.2. Unlike a
condition of ‘isolation’ or an explicit prohibition of ‘disturbing factors’ the
approach as I have advocated doesn’t make any explicit causal claims. The
expression of the idea is purely mathematical. Hence the approach retains
the prospect of a Humean account of laws. (Indeed, I will later use this
modification to analyse the causal disposition of embeddability; see §6.1.)
Also, notice that the approach doesn’t require from us that we conceive of
what a situation would be like in which the disturbing factors are absent.
The system-types and behaviour of the more accurate laws go unspecified in
behaviour-modification.
Another benefit is that we are not restricted in what amount of influence
we take the disturbing factors to have in cases which do obey the explicit
formula. In system-predicate modification (and this is most clear in the use of
an isolation-modifier) the disturbing factors must be completely non-existent
for the ideal behaviour to occur. However, as we saw, some laws don’t seem
to follow this pattern. The behaviour-predicate modification I have suggested
only requires that there are some values at which the variables which don’t
feature in the explicit formula can be fixed such that the explicit formula
results. Often this value is zero, but it need not always be (the special case of
the Rydberg formula is one such example).
Finally—and I take this to be the approach’s most significant merit—the
behaviour-predicate modification allows us to say that, for example,
Malthus’s growth law is about any population for which it might feasibly be
used to explain. It is not, therefore, restricted to a subset of populations
which behave exactly according to the explicit formula. Consequently, there
is no problem of giving a story about analogy, metaphor or abstraction in
order to explain why laws like Malthus’s might be relevant in all the
real-world cases we apply it to.
This last point raises an interesting question over what to make of laws where
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system-predicate modifications of the sort considered in §3.3.2 actually occur
in practice. The ideal gas law, for instance, is often explicitly referred to
as a law about ideal gases. This suggests that theorists have opted for a
system-predicate modification: the law is not about real-world cases, only
some abstract ideal. This is how the law was presented earlier in §3, repeated
again here (in slightly different notation).
Ideal gas law*: For all x, if x is an ideal gas in a cavity then x
has variables P, V, n, T which satisfy the equation,
PV = nRT
However, if we wanted, we could offer an alternative interpretation of the ideal
gas law as really being about all gases in a cavity, represented as follows.
Ideal gas law**: For all x, if x is a gas in a cavity, then there
there is a system-type S ′ and behaviour-type B′ such that
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law,
2. instances of S ′ have an instance of a gas in a cavity as a part,
and,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if x has variables P, V, n, T, related by the
formula K ′ which has as a limit case the formula,
PV = nRT )
So which interpretation should we opt for? It seems to me that both have
their merits. The ideal gas law* says explicitly what it would take for a gas in
a cavity to obey the explicit formula. Such a formulation of the law is possible
because, unlike the Malthusian growth law, we know exactly what the system
must be like to exactly obey the formula. But the ideal gas law** says explicitly
how the formula might come to be applicable to real-world cases. This is
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something I have argued that system-predicate modifications don’t do so easily.
Ultimately, I think it is plausible that both interpretations reflect genuine
and distinct scientific knowledge and are worth making explicit. Something
similar could be said for many laws which appear to have been given explicit
system-predicate modification sufficient for retaining truth (e.g. Newton’s law
for incompressible flow).
At the very least, I will from hereon assume that the behaviour-modification
is a suitable way to solve problems of non-universality in laws.
3.4 Beyond logical form
In this chapter I have argued that all laws are system-laws, specifically with
the form of Schema 2 where the antecedent is satisfied by instances of a
specific system-type and consequent instances of a specific behaviour, often
characterised by an equation. I also just offered in §3.3.3 the more specific
Schema 5 for laws whose instances otherwise appear to suffer from failures of
universality. We have seen that while we know what sorts of conditions
individuate a system-type, we couldn’t say that such conditions make
system-types in general distinct from mere types of assembly for which there
are no laws. I also suggested that the best answer to this particular question
would start with an understanding of what makes laws considered as a whole
special.
But by focusing on logical form, I haven’t been able to say very much about
what makes laws special. For presumably mere types of assembly can also
feature in the antecedent of conditional generalisations with a behavioural
consequent. This is not a new problem. It is arguably the central issue of
providing a philosophical account for laws to say what makes them distinct
from accidental generalisations (see Ayer 1999 [1956], Hempel 1965, Swoyer
1982, Lewis 1983, Armstrong 1983, Carroll 1994, Harre´ 1993, Maudlin 2007,
Carroll 2016). However, what I hope to have achieved in this chapter is to
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provide a new and precise way of framing the issue. For we know now that
whatever it is that makes laws special, they are conditional generalisations
which condition a behaviour on instances of a certain system-type. This
observation will help us both to critique contemporary accounts of law and
also to point us in the direction of a more promising account.
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4 The causation-mirroringconception of laws
In this chapter I will discuss and criticise a way in which laws have often been
thought about which I call the ‘causal-mirroring conception of laws’. This
conception has it that laws structurally mirror the relationship of cause-effect
relations including those separated in time and space. Drawing heavily on §3
I will show in §4.1 why this conception is misguided. In the first instance this
will help to more clearly see what a plausible nomological account of causation
will have to look like. But the discussion will also help me in §4.2 to comment
on Humeanism’s most popular account of laws, the best system account, which
I argue is implicitly committed to the causal-mirroring conception.
4.1 Against the causation-mirroring
conception of laws
This section discusses a particular way in which laws have been been
conceived often as a consequence of the conviction that laws bear an
inferential connection with causal relations. As will become clear in §5, I am
sympathetic to the conviction in general, but not in the specific way this
particular conception has it. Briefly, this conception is captured by the idea
that for any causal relation, there is a law which ‘covers’ it, what I call the
‘causation-mirroring conception’ of laws. Despite its popularity and
simplicity, I am going to argue against it. My criticism stems from the
127
128 CHAPTER 4. THE CAUSATION-MIRRORING CONCEPTION
central complaint that the conception represents laws with a logical form
distinct from their true form, i.e. Schema 2,
∀x(Sx→ Bx).
As a result the conception is incompatible with the observations of the
foregoing chapter. My plan is first to introduce a generalised logical form for
laws as understood by the causation-mirroring conception and then show in
§4.1.1 and §4.1.2 how each of the features which distinguishes it from Schema
2 lead it to trouble.
The causal-mirroring conception of laws takes laws to have a similar
structure to that of a causal relation. One might think this if, for example,
one agreed with Armstrong and Heathcote (1991), Armstrong (1997, 2004a)
who argue that causal relations should be understood simply as
instantiations of laws. Armstrong and Heathcote’s particular explication of
this comes idea packaged up with various metaphysical commitments to
nomological necessitation relations, states of affairs and other dubious
entities which we might understandably be weary of. But other less
metaphysically-loaded positions have suggested a very similar relationship
between laws and causation. Indeed, regularity accounts in the Humean
tradition have often made effectively the same judgement (e.g. Ayer 1999
[1956], Goodman 1954 [1983]). For these theorists, a regularity simply
generalises over a conjunction of property-instances or events which
constantly occurs in nature. Although there are exceptions (see, e.g.,
Baumgartner 2008, 2013b), typically these accounts of law distinguish the
cause-variables from the effect-variable in the generalisation by virtue of the
temporal order of their respective instances—causes precede effects—and
certainly it seems in general to be assumed that instances in antecedent and
consequent of the regularity should be spatiotemporally distinct.
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Even when laws are not doing all the analytical work in analyses of causation,
it is also often the case that causal relations are treated like instances of laws.
For instance, Paul (2000) argues that a necessary condition for a causal relation
between c and e is one of lawful entailment, defined as follows.
For any two distinct, actual events or individuals c and e, and any
two logically distinct properties p and q, aspect cp (c’s having p)
lawfully entails aspect eq (e’s having q) iff c’s exemplification of p
is subsumed by the antecedent of the right law or laws that entail
a consequent subsuming e’s exemplification of q. (2000, 214)
And Schaffer (2001) claims that causes are probability-raisers of chains of
‘direct process links’ between events where,
c is directly process linked to e if and only if (i) c and e are actual
distinct events, (ii) there is a law L of the form (∀R)(∀R′)((P,R)→
(P ′, R′)) such that c is an instance of the antecedent and e of
the consequent, (iii) there is no law L’ more fundamental than
L such that actual prior event a is an instance of the antecedent
and c&e is an instance of the consequent, and (iv) tc < te. In
speaking of laws as having the form (∀R)(∀R′)((P,R)⇒ (P ′, R′)),
I take the quantifiers to range over regions, and the laws to relate
the properties of one region to those of another. Thus events,
understood as (P,R) pairs, can instantiate the antecedents and
consequents of laws. Process linkage in general is then defined
from the direct case: c is process linked to e if and only if there is
a chain of direct process links between c and e. (2001, 78)
There are many differences between all the above-mentioned accounts.
However, they all share the common idea that laws mirror the structure of
causal relationships between entities potentially separated in time and space.
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This is exactly what I mean by the causation-mirroring conception of laws.
Each of the above interpretations of law confers on them a common structure
which licenses a cross-temporal and cross-individual implication from any
instantiation of some specific property by an object or region at a time to
that of another specific property by a different object or region at a different
time. Schematically this looks as follows.
∀x, t((Fx at t)→ ∃y, t′(Gy at t′)) (Schema 6)
We are encouraged to think of the variables of this implication as ranging over
the objects (regions, states of affairs) involved in cause-effect relations where
instances of the antecedent assert the occurrence of a cause and instances of
the consequent assert the occurrence of an effect, where t ≤ t′ and x need not
be identical with y (see Pietroski and Rey 1995, for an explicit endorsement
of this schema).
Schema 6 mirrors the structure of paradigm causal relations such as that
involved when someone’s throw of a rock breaks a bottle. As with any
mirror, the reflection captures important structural features but leaves out
some depth of information in what is reflected. Hence, Schema 6 captures
features typical of the causal relation: instances of the conditional may relate
distinct events comprising distinct objects (a rock-thrower, a bottle) and the
possibility of time-directedness (throwing the rock occurring before the
bottle’s breaking). However, Schema 6 refrains from any explicit causal
language. This is why so many Humeans have thought it helpful in analysing
causal relations.
It is clear from the context in which this conception of laws is often made
explicit that when laws are used to analyse causal relations, they are thought
to be able to do so in virtue of having this structure. If a causal relationship
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exists between two events a and b, and there is available some law to analyse
it, then the law will do so by ‘covering’ it, i.e. by showing how b, under some
description G, is implied (perhaps to some non-trivial probability) from a,
under some description F , via a law of the form of Schema 6 (the term ‘covering
law’ comes initially from Dray 1957, and was popularised by Hempel 1965).
Moreover, the causation-mirroring conception reads into a schema like Schema
6 the scope for chaining together laws’ inferential relationships in much the
same way we often do with causation. Whilst the relation of token causation is
only controversially viewed as a transitive relation (see Lewis 2000, Hall 2004a,
and the discussion in §7.2.6), it is invariably thought not to be atransitive. If
the breaking bottle, caused by Billy’s throw, woke the cat, then we can infer
that Billy’s throw woke the cat. Under the causation-mirroring conception,
laws should work much the same way.
So, for instance, Hempel talks of ‘genetic explanation’ as having the following
characteristic:
In genetic explanation each stage must be shown to “lead to” the
next, and thus to be linked to its successor by virtue of some
general principles which make the occurrence of the latter at least
reasonably probable, given the former. But in this sense, even
successive stages in a physical phenomenon such as the free fall of
a stone may be regarded as forming a genetic sequence whose
different stages—characterised, let us say, by the position and the
velocity of the stone at different times—are interconnected by
strictly universal laws; and the successive stages in the movement
of a steel ball bounding its ziggyzaggy way down a Galton Board
may be regarded as forming a genetic sequence with probabilistic
connections. (1965, 449)
As with chains of causal relationships, for such genetic sequences of law-based
explanation to be possible they must include properties in the antecedent and
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consequent which are of the same broad ontological category such that the
consequent of one law can feature as the antecedent of another. What this
individuation amounts to exactly is hard to say. But it should be clear enough
to critique the general idea in what follows.
In summary, the causation-mirroring conception of laws can be captured by
the following principles:
Causation-mirroring conception of laws
A generalisation G is a law if it is a conditional for which the
following holds,
1. G relates instances of two types of property by conditional
inference,
2. G analyses causal relationships by covering them inferen-
tially,
3. G’s antecedent predicate can be the consequent predicate
of another law.
And if we assume that some causal relations are separated in time or space,
the conception also implies that,
4. G can support a logical or statistical inference of the
occurrence of later events from the occurrence of earlier
events.
5. G can support a logical or statistical inference of the
occurrence of an event involving one object/region from
the occurrence of an event involving a non-spatially
overlapping object/region.
So expressed, the conception only aims to provide sufficient criteria for laws. I
see no reason why one under the sway of the conception couldn’t consider there
to be other kinds of law which support other kinds of inferences. However,
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it seems nonetheless plausible that the conception could be put to work in
philosophical analysis. If one takes causation to be a primitive, or at least
prior to laws with regards to metaphysical analysis, the causation-mirroring
conception could be interpreted as a partial account of laws. Such an account
would consider some generalisations’ worthiness of lawhood to be constituted
by satisfaction of the criteria specified in the conception. Alternatively, many
of the other philosophers considered above, particularly those with Humean
intentions, have considered it more plausible that the conception be rather
treated as something to help analyse causation in terms of laws (e.g. Paul
2000, Schaffer 2001). Either way, if one accepts the truth of the conception,
it’s no wonder that Schema 6 is the relative schema of choice for laws. In what
remains of this section (§4.1) I will not assume that the conception is to be
employed in either direction of analysis. I simply want to critique it on its own
merits.
There is much in the causation-mirroring conception of laws which is in
agreement with the discussion on laws’ logical form in §3.1, specifically,
Schema 6 has a universal quantifier and is a conditional. But Schema 6 is not
the particular schema I argued for in §3, viz., Schema 2. Indeed, we might
count Schema 2 as capturing limit cases of the more general Schema 6, in
which x = y, t = t′ and in which the antecedent and consequent predicates
are restricted to system-predicates and behaviour-predicates respectively.
Given the lack of restriction, one might think Schema 6 is the more
appropriate general schema for laws rather than Schema 2—a view to which
we might attribute Hempel, who claimed that,
lawlike sentences can have many different logical forms. Some
paradigms of nomic sentences, such as ‘All gases expand when
heated under constant pressure’ may be construed as having the
simple universal conditional ‘∀x(Fx → Gx)’; others involve
universal as well as existential generalisation as does the sentence
‘For every chemical compound there exists a range of
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temperatures and pressures at which the compound is a liquid’
(Hempel 1965, 338-9).
In response to Hempel, we might defend Schema 2 by noting that even if his
second example doesn’t have the schema’s form, Hempel has yet to justify the
claim that it is a law. After all, it is not explicitly referred to as a law in science
(although it may be explanatory and counterfactually robust). But a more
informative line of response returns to the lessons learned in the discussion in
§3.1. Laws which describe functional relationships between variable properties,
as both of Hempel’s examples do, are invariably descriptions of the behaviour
of instances of a certain type of system. In Hempel’s second example, the
type of system is chemical compound and the functional relationship is that
between a range of temperatures and a particular phase state. But the overall
functional behaviour is attributed in the generalisation to the system-type
chemical compound. Hence, the putative law tells us that there is a range of
temperatures and pressures at which the compounds denoted in the antecedent
are a liquid. It is possible then to render this generalisation in the form of
Schema 2 where the consequent behaviour-predicate is understood as satisfied
by an entity which is such that there exists a range of temperatures at which
it is a liquid.
That such reformulations are often possible is unlikely to support a general
preference for Schema 2 over Schema 6. In what remains of §4.1 I provide
arguments against the three features which give Schema 6 its wider class of
instances, viz. the ability to license cross-saptio-temporal implication, genetic
implication and covering implications. If these features are to be done away
with, we are left with a schema which looks to all intents and purposes, just
like Schema 2.
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4.1.1 Cross-temporal and cross-individual inference
and laws
Schema 6 doesn’t prohibit instances which associate instantaneous and co-
located property-instantiations, but it is certainly formulated with a mind to
avoid any limitation to such generalisations. So much is clear from the use
of distinct times t and t′ and distinct object-variables x and y. As far as the
conception is concerned, we should expect there to be laws which license an
inference from causes to effects which happen far off in time and location.
The problem with this is that there just don’t seem to exist any such laws.
First, look at the behaviour-predicates. In many cases what we have is a
behaviour described by a formula in which the quantities are, from the
perspective of the relevant theory, simultaneously related. The equations in
Newton’s law of gravitation, in Ohm’s law, in Gauss’s law for electricity are
all portrayed as simultaneous relationships from within the classical
framework they were developed. The same goes for many equations in
physics.1 Of course, we suspect now from the perspective of special relativity
that gravitational force, voltage potential and charge are mediated across
space over a non-zero time. But Newton, Ohm and Gauss never supposed
this when proposing their formulae, and when working within their respective
theories, one treats these differences as negligible.
Sometimes a time-difference is expected to exist between the correlated
variables. For example, when the ideal gas law was proposed, it was already
known that the temperature of a gas can (in theory) increase without an
immediate change in pressure or volume. But this possibility is in most
applications practically irrelevant. And even in examples where it is not
irrelevant, it’s not clear that we ever get a structure as that suggested by
Schema 6. Consider, for example, the equation in Yoda’s law. Here the
1This is even true of the second law of thermodynamics when expressed in its more
correct differential form.
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dry-weight of the crop W at harvest is expected to correlate with a value for
the density ρ of seeds sewn earlier in the season. But even then, the equation
is far from specifying anything like the specific times at which one variable is
expected to change given the time of change in another. If the
causation-mirroring conception implies precise temporal procession, then it’s
not clear how such equations could support it.
Regardless of the presence of temporal delays between correlated variables in
behavioural formulae, the key argument in §3.1 is that laws describe how things
will behave so long as they count as an instance of a particular system-type.
A system’s behaviour is, therefore, implied by law throughout a time only if
it remains an instance of the system-type for that time. Yoda’s power law
does not say that if something starts off as an agricultural system then some
outcome will appear somewhere some time later. Rather, it relates variables in
agricultural systems of a certain sort as they remain instances of those systems.
Notice that the fact that these laws themselves aren’t sufficient to license
cross-temporal inference is not to suggest that causation itself can’t be
cross-temporal, nor that laws can’t be used with sufficient other posits to
help support cross-temporal inference. The point is merely that the laws
don’t ‘cover’ such relationships in the way they are often portrayed to. If
laws are to be a central component in an analysis of causation, they will have
to do so in a rather different way (see §7).
A little thought reveals why this is in general the case with laws of association.
A system may be established at one point in time and so allow us, by law,
to deduce its behaviour at that time. But simply given this fact alone, one
cannot deduce how the system or indeed anything else will be behaving at
any later time. After all, something could always interfere with the system in
the intervening time. Just knowing that we have a system to which Yoda’s
law adequately applies at the beginning of a season is not alone sufficient to
license an inference of the fact there will be a relationship described by the
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behavioural equation W = Cρ−3/2 at the end of the season. In the first place,
we need assurance that the system remains an instance of the same system-
type throughout the season and is not disrupted or broken in the intervening
time (e.g by the building of a motorway through the field or an earthquake,
etc.).
Curiously, this issue seemed to be something Hempel was already aware of,
since he admitted that,
the additional premises required for [DN prediction/explanation]
must provide not only a specification of the state of the system
at some time t0 earlier than the time t1 for which the state of the
system is to be inferred, but also a statement of the boundary
conditions prevailing between t0 and t1 [...] The assertion therefore
that laws of theories of deterministic form enable us to predict
certain aspects of the future from information about the present
has to be taken with a grain of salt. (1965, 366).
Hempel here seems to be making a point we might interpret in the current
context as concerning the instantaneous correlation between system-type and
behaviour-type in instances of laws.
Of course, we shouldn’t think that problems of non-universality only exist as a
result of cross-temporal interference. In §3.3, I discussed cases of interference
as a result of the relevant system being continuously embedded in a more
complex environment throughout its existence. But in this sort of case we
might hold out the hope of providing a behaviour-modification of the law
thereby saving universality (see §3.3.3). The problem with cross-temporal
inference is that the possibility of defining all the conditions which need to be
in place at some earlier time such that at a later time the consequence can
be lawfully implied seems vanishingly small. The reason for this is arguably
that the embedded phenomenon intuition (see §3.3.1) does not capture the
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right kind of interference. When a cross-temporal interference of a system
occurs, it is possible that the influence of prior behaviour on later behaviour
is completely removed. In such cases instances of the antecedent system-type
are in no way ‘embedded’ in instances of the consequent system-type and so
behaviour-modification is unlikely to be sufficient to save universality.
In response to these observations, a quick fix to the conception of laws might
be to simply reject Principle 4; or more precisely, to uphold a schema for laws
in the form of Schema 6 in which t = t′, viz.,
∀x, t((Fx at t)→ ∃y((Gy at t)) (Schema 7)
The corresponding conception of laws mirrors instantaneous causal
relationships, and clearly can’t be faulted for an inadequate view about
cross-temporal implication with laws. However, it is certainly far from clear
that such a conception entirely avoids the problem of interference. For so
long as a law licenses an inference from some property instance F to another
property instance G in a different spatial location, there is again always the
possibility of interference which behaviour-modification will be insufficient to
deal with.
Consider another example. Often it is the case that we can explain the volume
V of a cavity (e.g. a balloon) by referring to its temperature T . But we could
not hope to ground such an explanation in a law of the following form.
For all x, if x is a gas with temperature T , then (given values for
P, n) there is a cavity which has a volume V
Such a conditional is simply not true—not even for ideal gases! For the gas
could be out in space, i.e. not subject to any cavity, or mixed with other gases,
such that the volume of any containing cavity is a function of the temperatures
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(and other values) of multiple gases.
This indicates the importance of being able to specify the entire setup in laws’
antecedent conditions. The ideal gas law, for example, conditions behaviour
on a system comprising a single ideal gas in a closed cavity, the behaviour
says what those components of the system do. Likewise, the law of gravitation
relates the properties of very distant objects, but only due to the fact that
those relations exist among the components of a single system with which
the law is concerned, viz. a two-mass system at nonzero distance. In general,
laws provide inferences from one property to another belonging to the same
individual system.
4.1.2 Genetic inference, covering and laws
If the foregoing arguments are correct, then we should be understanding laws
to at least have the syntax of Schema 2. We can imagine a corresponding
‘reduced-causation-mirroring conception’ of laws in which Principles 4 and 5
of the original causation-mirroring conception are given up and the schema for
laws (leaving time implicit) is taken to be the philosopher’s caricature, Schema
1 (p.67),
∀x(Fx→ Gx)
At this stage it is important to remember that despite syntactical equivalence,
even Schema 1 is not identical to Schema 2. First, the reduced-causation-
mirroring conception of laws still holds, according to Principle 2, that when a
law can be used to analyse causal relations, this is because the law mirrors the
structure of those relations. In other words, whenever a causal relationship ‘a
caused b’ is analysable by law, there is some law (or combination of laws) of the
form of Schema 1 which allows an inference from a, under some description
F , to b, under some description G. Second, according to Principle 3, the
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properties denoted in Schema 1 (i.e. instances of F and G) can be of the same
ontological category so that a predicate appearing in the consequent of one
law may appear in the antecedent of another. This is crucial if laws are to
be to chained together in the manner Hempel suggested in order to facilitate
genetic-type causal explanations.
Notice that if we adopt Schema 2 as our schema of choice for laws, one of
these features may hold only for very specific causal relationships and the
other not at all. Regarding Principle 2, the conditional-form of Schema 2 is
at best limited to mirroring causal relationships which occur between systems
and their behaviour. I think it is plausible that there are such causal
relationships (in §5.2.4 I will discuss these relationships under the title
‘law-level causal asymmetries’), but it is clear that the restriction excludes an
abundance other causal relationships from being covered by law which we
might have thought plausible under the reduced-causation-mirroring
conception. For example, although the behavioural formulae of instances of
Schema 2 describe the numerical relationships between variable-properties,
the instances themselves do not in any clear sense mirror the asymmetrical
causal relationships which exist between them, e.g. the influence of force on
acceleration or of temperature on pressure (in §5.2.3 I will discuss these
relationships under the title ‘variable-level causal asymmetries’).
Regarding Principle 3, Schema 2 is simply inconsistent with it. By definition,
the antecedent properties of instances of this schema are system-types, and
the consequents are behaviour-types. We could not, therefore, hope to provide
chains of law-based explanation with these kinds of generalisation, since that
would require there to be laws in which these property-types appear in the
wrong side of the conditional.
The limitations of Schema 2 might appear undermotivated. But they seem
exactly right when we consider the sorts of inferences laws actually allow us
to make. The reason can be expressed as a dilemma for the choice of Schema
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1 (in comparison with Schema 2). On one horn, if a conditional can be
employed in genetic inference, then we have to admit that the antecedent and
consequent properties are of the same type. But by admitting they are of the
same type, we loose the ability to locate an asymmetry adequate for covering
causal relations. On the other horn, if we restrict a conditional to having a
distinction in ontological category of antecedent and consequent properties,
we retain an adequate asymmetry, but loose the ability to employ the
conditional in genetic inference.
Let’s consider this dilemma more slowly. Unlike the contast between laws’
system-types and consequent the behavioural properties, the
variable-properties which feature in laws’ behavioural formulae (e.g. force,
acceleration, charge, flux) are in some relevant sense of the same ontological
category. This means that the explanatory relationships (arguably causal, see
5.2.3) which exist between these properties are just the sort that can be
chained together in genetic inferences. For instance, we might use a law to
explain why something experienced a force on an object by reference to the
electrical field at its location, then we might use a different law to explain the
change in momentum of the object by reference to the force it experienced.
We can chain together the nomological explanations so that we can explain
the change in momentum by reference to the field.
According to the reduced-causation-mirroring conception, we can perform such
genetic explanations because there are laws which cover each of the stages.
There are laws of the following form:
If the combined field of force at an object’s location is X then the
total force it experiences will be Y .
If the total force experienced by an object is Y then it will have a
change in momentum Z.
These two conditionals can then be chained together to form the following
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genetic inference:
If the combined field of force at an object’s location is X then it
will have a change in momentum Z.
The problem is, however, that we seem to know by law that the reverse
inferences hold too. If something has a certain change in momentum Z, then
we also know it will be experiencing a total force Y and likewise, if something
is experiencing a total force Y , then there will be a combined field of force X
at its location. The problem harks back to the same old problem of the
flagpole and its shadow raised against the D-N model of explanation (see
Bromberger 1966). Ultimately, variables related by equations in laws can be
manipulated to allow us to infer any value given the values of the
others—this is what makes them laws of association. There is, therefore, no
asymmetry in the explicit logical inferences licensed by laws among their
variables.
This is an issue for Principle 2, since there appear to be explanatory
relationships (e.g. between field of force and total force, or that between force
and change in momentum) which are not covered by laws in an unambiguous
way. There may exist conditionals following from known laws which mirror
the explanatory direction (like those above), but there will also be
conditionals which go in the exact opposite direction of inference. Given this,
it is simply misleading to say that the laws ‘cover’ such explanatory
relationships, at least if covering is supposed to have any kind of analytical
power when it comes to justifying inference to an explanatory asymmetry.
We might try to avoid this problem by looking for a further asymmetry (beyond
causation and conditional inference) which exists between the two relata, but it
is not easy to come up with anything we could feasibly take laws themselves to
be representing. An interpretation of laws as stating conditional probabilistic
relations will make no difference; for example, total force is dependent on
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change in momentum just as change in momentum is dependent on total force.
In general, when we know the direction of inference between variable properties
goes one way, we will have no reason not to posit further conditionals going
the other way as well. Supporters of Schema 1 might suggest that while force
and change in momentum are truth-functionally symmetrical, they may not
be subjunctively symmetrical, i.e., while we should accept inferences such as,
if total force been 1N then change in momentum would have been
1kgms−2,
we should not accept inferences of the form,
if change in momentum had been 1kgms−2 then total force would
have been 1N .
But this is not a promising suggestion. Notice first that whether one accepts
an asymmetry in truth of the above subjunctive conditionals will come down
to what one’s views are concerning nomic preservation. In §2.2 I suggested
we take counterfactual preservation as a useful diagnosis of laws: laws remain
laws under any counterfactual supposition consistent with all the laws. If that’s
correct, then we should not expect a difference in truth-value between the two
subjunctive conditionals above, since the antecedent of both subjunctives is
consistent with the total force law and the consequents follow by that very
law. But regardless of one’s views about nomic preservation, it is almost
unanimously agreed upon that the truth of subjunctives is something to be
explained by laws rather than something which explains them. Hence, if there
is an asymmetry here to be found, we should be able to use the laws themselves
absent of explicit subjunctive language to justify it. Consequently, the recourse
to subjunctive conditionals is a non-starter, unless one is willing to treat such
conditionals as primitive (or, at least, more fundamental than laws), and this is
something few are willing to admit (pace Lange 2009) and decidedly unHumean
(see §2.2).
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To reestablish the asymmetry, a different tactic entirely—this is the move
that shifts us to the dilemma’s second horn—is to look for intrinsic differences
among the relevant relata. Given such intrinsic differences, it would not matter
if our knowledge of the laws provides us with symmetrical truth-preserving
inferences, since there is a clear asymmetry in the ontological category of
property ascribed, just as there is between system-type and behaviour. But if
we restrict ourselves to laws which have antecedent properties of one intrinsic
characteristic and consequents with another (as instances of Schema 2 seem
to), we thereby prohibit genetic explanation, since antecedent properties will
be intrinsically incapable of being consequent properties and vice versa.
It should now be clearer where the dilemma for supporters for the
reduced-causation-mirroring conception emerges. On the one hand, if laws
relate properties with no intrinsic differences so that laws can be chained to
form inferences of one property-instance with another then there will be no
apparent asymmetry to establish that the inference is explanatory. On the
other hand, if laws relate properties with intrinsic differences, then the
explanatory asymmetry is reinstated, but there is no possibility of chaining.
Genetic explanation in the way Hempel described and in the way that seems
necessary to cover indirect causal relations does not, therefore, seem possible
with laws. This is exactly as Schema 2 predicts.
4.1.3 On causation-mirroring
If we are to get a better conception of the relationship between causation and
laws of nature, I suggest we hold on to Schema 2 (∀x(Sx → Bx)), which has
a single object variable, lacks a temporal variable and captures an intrinsic
asymmetry between antecedent system-types and consequent behavioural
properties. In looking ahead to the prospects for a nomological analysis of
causation, I draw the following morals from the foregoing discussion.
First, the asymmetry of many causally explanatory relationships won’t be
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reflected in the logical structure of laws, i.e. not all causal relationships are
covered by laws. Although the asymmetry between system-type and
behaviour may be determined by intrinsic differences in ontological category
(I will, in fact, suggest a more precise distinction in §6.2.5), the asymmetry of
explanation of certain variables in terms of others will have to determined in
some other manner. In §6.2 I will suggest a probabilistic analysis to do just
that. Under this analysis, it will not be the laws themselves which bear the
structure of explanatory asymmetries between variable-properties, but
certain causal and probabilistic information with which they are inferentially
connected.
Second, any inferences laws license from causes to effects won’t be one which
extends beyond the systems in which the causes occur. This will significantly
limit the extent to which a single instance of a law can connect a cause and
effect. In §7.2.1 I refer to this connection as ‘intra-system causation’. It will
form the core relation with which the analysis of token causation is developed.
Third, given the issues concerning the need for behaviour-modification of many
laws, we should not expect laws to support a logical entailment or even a
precisely statistical inference of effects (under some description) from their
causes (under some description). Again, the analysis will have to proceed in
a different way. Accordingly, the core concept of ‘intra-system causation’ will
pair events within systems which instantiate the system-type of a law in way
which doesn’t rely on such entailment or inference but rather on the type-
level causal information associated with the laws and the particular systems
instantiated.
Fourth, if indirect token causal relations are to be analysed by laws and the
systems described by them, we should not hope to do so by chaining laws
together as with genetic inference. Instead, in §7.2.4, I will suggest we chain
systems together. Again, this will not be a method of showing how the cause
entails or statistically implies the effect, but is rather ‘connected’ to it due to
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the systems present in the local environment.
In general, the observations made here show us that whatever procedure we use
to extract an account of causation from laws will have to be rather more subtle
than that presupposed by the causation-mirroring conception of laws. That
is because laws in fact have a logical form which precludes certain inferences
required by that conception. In §4.2 I want to show why this causes problems
for Humeanism’s most popular account: the best system account (BSA) of
laws. For I want to show that BSA is implicitly committed to something like
the causation-mirroring conception of laws.
4.2 The best system account of laws (BSA)
The Humean should not offer an account which contradicts their own
methodology. Consequently, it seems inevitable that they propose regularities
in the mosaic as the determinants of laws. For although it is coherent to hold
onto a regularity-based account of laws of nature if one doesn’t restrict the
regularities to those in the mosaic (see, e.g., Tahko 2015, Demarest 2017), if
one does make such a restriction then regularities seem to be about the only
worldly resource one can go on.
Granting this assumption, the obvious follow-up is ‘which regularities?’. To
answer this, the current trend is a so-called ‘best system account’ (BSA),
which determines the laws as those generalisations which are theorems in
that deductive system which best captures the world’s history according to
an overall balance of simplicity and comprehensiveness—or ‘strength’
(Braddon-Mitchell 2001, Cohen and Callender 2009, Earman 1986, Lewis
1973b, 1983, 1994, Loewer 1996, Schrenk 2007, 2014). (In order to
accommodate probabilistic laws a further parameter of ‘fit’ is sometimes
included see especially Lewis 1994, but nothing I say in this chapter will
hang on its inclusion.)
One thing to note immediately: the notion of ‘system’ at play here is not
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that invoked in §3 to refer to the instances of laws’ antecedents. The former
is a ‘deductively closed, axiomatisable set of true sentences’ (Lewis 1973b,
74), not to be confused with the latter, a set of physical assemblies. As Lewis
has pointed out, BSA certainly seems to have an answer to some crucial
characteristics desirable for an account of laws. For instance, it shows how
laws are not individuated by logic alone, it allows for laws to be contingent
and mind-independent, it suggests why lawhood might seem a difficult and
vague concept (given the vagueness of the parameters of strength and
simplicity), and it suggests why many theorems of scientifically confirmed
theories are reasonably held to be laws also.
BSA has been incredibly popular among Humeans, although it has not been
without its critiques. For instance, Roberts (2008, §1.6), and more recently
Woodward (2013), have raised a number of queries about the scientific
legitimacy of a balance between the parameters of strength and simplicity in
determining the laws. One issue is that judging by much of scientific
endeavour, it can seem that strength has a priority over simplicity. The
following quote from Einstein provides an example.
It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to
make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible
without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single
datum of experience. (1934, 165; quoted in Woodward 2013, 12)
This would make it seem that strength acts more as a threshold, and simplicity
only as an afterthought. Indeed, it is argued that simplicity only really enters
into practice to determine whether a generalisation is true, for instance, in
utilising the results of Akaike (1973) in curve-fitting problems, rather than in
order to settle which among the true generalisations deserves the title ‘law’.
In the terms of Reichenbach (1958), it is ‘inductive simplicity’ which scientists
make use of, not ‘descriptive simplicity’.
148 CHAPTER 4. THE CAUSATION-MIRRORING CONCEPTION
It seems to me that the supporter of BSA has responses to these concerns.
While theoretical physics aims to concern a very broad range of things, the
scientific enterprises from which biological, economical, ecological, chemical
laws emerge appear to consider strength much less of a lexical priority over
whatever other parameters are at play. The fact that strength plays such a
big role in physics might be put down to the fact that the world has been
kind enough to let it do so.2 As Woodward himself points out, our best
candidates for strict physical laws (e.g. those represented by Maxwell’s
equations, Einstein’s field equations, Schro¨dinger’s wave equation) are both
incredibly simple and strong.
On the issue of simplicity, I think it is open to a supporter of BSA to accept
the ‘inductive’ use of simplicity in curve-fitting problems and to suggest that
descriptive simplicity plays a role (if not explicit) as well. Indeed, one might
think the two uses are closely related. When a choice of curve through some
data is made on the grounds of simplicity, we may believe (perhaps justified
by Akaike’s result) that this will lead to a theory or hypothesis more likely to
be predictively accurate in the future. This is an example of inductive
simplicity playing a vital theoretical role. But in dispensing with the less
simple curves we are also making choice which has repercussions for the
descriptive simplicity of our adopted theories. After all, we may know that
many (all?) theories rejected on inductive grounds could be revised in
various ad hoc ways to accurately predict any future data. So the choice of a
simpler curve for inductive reasons is by default a choice to pursue theories
which are descriptively simpler too. In this way the complaint with BSA that
scientific practice is concerned exclusively with inductive simplicity loses its
force, since inductive simplicity cannot play a role in science without the
latter doing so too.
Despite the intuitions that foregoing criticisms of BSA are inadequate, I do
2Although, if idealisation in physics is as widespread as Cartwright (1983) has suggested,
we might have to recognise this strength as attained only through some universality-saving
device, e.g. behaviour-modification (see §3.3.3).
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believe that it is a seriously flawed account of laws. Given what appears to be a
necessary adjustment to the account recommended by Woodward, it becomes
clear that BSA is implicitly committed to the highly problematic causation-
mirroring conception of laws. Once this conception of laws is removed, the
parameters provided by BSA seem woefully inadequate to give us the laws. As
a consequence, I think Humeans have a duty to look for an alternative account.
4.2.1 BSA and causation-mirroring
Consider again the notion of strength. At first glance it might be thought best
cashed out in terms of deducibility of content about the Humean mosaic: a
system is stronger if it entails more information about the Humean mosaic.
This interpretation can seem inevitable from Ramsey’s thought—a precursor
to BSA—that laws are,
consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms
if we knew everything and organised it as simply as possible in a
deductive system (1978 [1928], 138, my emphasis).
This understanding of strength turns out to be problematic. If BSA is to be
extensionally adequate, it should assure that non-lawlike generalisations,
such as that all planets orbit in the same direction or that all gold spheres
are smaller than a mile in diameter, do not come out as theorems. But in
order to remove all possibility of such derivation, a deductive system will
have to omit a significant proportion of initial conditions from its axioms.
Otherwise it is plausible that in conjunction with uncontroversial laws,
non-lawlike generalisations may be inferred. However, if we remove all initial
conditions, we lose entirely the possibility of any deducibility of content.
After all, if our laws have the form of conditionals then they say nothing
unconditional about what happens and the strength of a system entirely
comprised of them is zero.
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As Woodward suggests,
one way out of this difficulty is to give up on the idea that
‘strength’ has to do just with what can be deduced about the
[mosaic] from the [best system] by itself. Here is an alternative
proposal: the strength of a systemization is (among other things
but perhaps primarily) a function of the extent to which claims in
the systemization can be combined with some facts reported by
the [mosaic] to deduce other facts in the [mosaic]; the more such
facts in the [mosaic] that can be so deduced from a ‘small
number’ of other facts in the [mosaic], along with premises in the
[best system], the stronger this systemization. (2013, 9-10)
Perhaps Woodward’s proposal would avoid the problem of adequate strength.
But whether it is accepted by the BSA theorist or not, the suggestion points
towards a conception of laws which seems to have been implicit all along:
that they have the sort of structural form which will license inferences from
facts about one part of the mosaic to facts about another, i.e. across time and
space. That this was Ramsey’s idea is indicative from his explicit pursuit of
an account of laws which can explain our causal inferences. For instance, he
remarks that,
the world [...] exhibits as we must all agree a good deal of regularity
of succession. I contend that over and above that it exhibits no
feature called causal necessity, but that we make sentences called
causal laws from which (i.e. having made which) we proceed to
actions and prospositions connected with them in a certain way,
and say that a fact asserted in a proposition which is an instance
of causal law is a case of causal necessity.’ (1978 [1928], 148)
Ramsey is here suggesting that our idea of causal necessity comes from what he
calls ‘causal laws’, i.e. generalisations of regular succession of properties from
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which causality is inferred (not to be confused with causal laws in Cartwright’s
sense). But by invoking the notion of succession, Ramsey is clearly assuming
that laws license cross-temporal and cross-individual inferences. At no point
did Lewis try to distance himself from this idea of Ramsey’s and no one I know
of since has tried to offer any alternative.
But now we must recall that laws simply don’t have the form of conditionals
which ‘can be combined with some facts reported in the mosaic to deduce
other facts in the mosaic’ where those facts concern temporally and spatially
distinct regions. Such inferences are only licensed given boundary conditions
at and in between both the region denoted in the antecedent and consequent
of the inference. Why? Because laws don’t mirror causal relations in that
way. Rather, laws are conditional generalisations of the form of Schema 2,
i.e. ∀x(Sx → Bx), and so the available deductions will in each case be
restricted to facts about a single type of system.
Again, the point is not that laws can’t be used to perform such inferences,
but that they alone are insufficient to support them. For instance, the
position of a projectile can be calculated knowing initial trajectories plus
mechanical laws of motion which describe its dynamics at every point. But
this is only possible under the assumption that, for example, the
gravitational forces remain constant, that there is no unexpected interference
which destroys the accelerating system, and that space-time structure
remains conserved.
The kinds of inferences laws are sufficient for supporting are merely local. In
the simplest sort of deduction, we learn that something is an instance of a
certain system-type S and deduce that it behaves in manner B. Plausibly,
the comprehensiveness of a system-type and behaviour would be valuable to
a deductive system of laws, but this comprehensiveness is only tendentiously
associated with a notion of strength conceived in terms of deducibility of
content on the basis of initial conditions. The laws can’t in general ‘fill out’
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the details of the mosaic on the basis of conditions which specify only what
the mosaic is like in some far off time or place.
This issue with how BSA treats laws has been noted before by Ismael (though
not in exactly the same terms) in discussion of its compatibility with quantum
statistical laws.
Quantum mechanics, our central example of a theory of chance
from physics, assigns probabilities to results of possible
measurements, on the basis of the present state of a system and
whatever external influences it is subject to, but on the standard
interpretation one cannot at any given time assign probabilities to
events that occur in the non-immediate future without knowing
the results of all intervening measurements. (2008, 301; see also
Glynn 2015)
Ismael is here aiming to criticise the BSA’s notion of ‘fit’, but part of her
point in so doing is exactly that BSA’s expectation that the laws it outputs
will license inferences from present (or past) to non-immediate futures is not
consistent with the laws as we know them, specifically, those of quantum
mechanics. As was predicted by the arguments in §3.1, the laws of quantum
mechanics are temporally and spatially local to the systems they concern.
If BSA is to be plausible it must, therefore, include a conception of strength
which is liable to return laws of the form of Schema 2 rather than Schema 6
(that of the causation-mirroring conception). There are at least two problems
with this which seem to me so problematic that Humeans should look for
further parameters beyond strength and simplicity (and fit).
First, it is unclear how can a best deductive system balancing simplicity with
strength interpreted as one of deducibility of content can be assured to avoid
axioms and theorems which do not the form of Schema 6. While no law that
we know of actually has this form nothing in the way BSA is described would
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seem to prevent one appearing in the best system. One predictable response
is that the world just turned out to be such that our laws are all localised
in the way that they are (having no distinct time-index for antecedent and
consequent and only one object-variable). But this can seem incredible. For
doesn’t it seem plausible that once the history of the world is up, the deductive
system which best compromises strength, simplicity and fit is bound to return
some generalisations which are sufficient to license inferences across time and
space? If so, BSA is committed to such generalisations being laws.
A supporter of BSA might consistently accept that there will be such laws,
admitting that we haven’t discovered them yet. But I do not think this is a
reasonable stance. For it encourages the supporter of BSA to strike a division
between what the laws are and the kinds of generalisations we are liable to
posit as laws. Something about our epistemic capabilities means that the
generalisations we induce on the basis of evidence are of the form of Schema
2. What good is it to us if the ‘true laws’ turn out to have a very different
form? Does this mean that our inferential practices, our modal reasoning, our
justifications for our interventions are misguided? Such an outcome appears
beyond what a Humean should want to admit. Therefore, there must either
be an additional parameter to compete with simplicity and strength (and fit)
for best system which limits the system’s generalisations to same-time, same-
individual inferences, or else an additional constraint on which generalisations
count as laws from the system determined by strength and simplicity (and fit)
alone. Both options take us beyond BSA.
Second, even granting that the BSA can return us a set of generalisations
limited to same-time, same-individual inferences, it is another further
requirement that the generalisations be of the form Schema 2. For inferences
of this latter form have extra constraints on the kinds of properties which
feature in their antecedent and consequent. Given the meagre set of
parameters recommended under BSA (even including whatever further
criterion might limit the returned generalisations to same-time,
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same-individual) it seems implausible that the outputted generalisations will
inevitably denote system-types in their antecedent and behaviours in their
consequent.
In fact, the problem is even worse. We know that laws are supposed to
contribute to the justification of our goal-directed actions (see §2.4). Hence,
the outputted laws should not only have the form of Schema 2, but have a
system-type and behaviour which are actually useful for such purposes.
Although I have not gone into the details of what this might amount to, I
think it is clear that BSA will need some significant further qualification
before it is able to assure us of this.
In sum, it is very difficult to make sense of the trade-off between simplicity
and strength as playing the central role in accounting for what makes laws
important. BSA has typically been presented as an account in which strong
laws license inferences across time and individuals. Once we reject this
causation-mirroring conception of laws, the interpretation of BSA must be
rejected too. But it is entirely unclear how the notion of strength, simplicity
and fit can alone provide the required parameters to give us laws in the form
they really have, i.e. of the form of Schema 2. While there is scope for a
trade-off between simplicity and strength to play some role in determining
the laws, this is certainly not all there is to scientific reasoning about laws.
Indeed, there clearly seem to be other assumptions in play when a
generalisation is in the running to be deemed a law, such as the fact that
laws have a system-predicate in the antecedent, a behaviour-predicate in the
consequent, and a form utilisable for justifying goal-directed actions.
It is curious that the diagnosis of BSA should put so much stress on a
misconceived causal conception of laws. After all, many Humeans have been
fairly dismissive of the importance of causation in physics and certainly in
the formulation of their laws. But if I am right, the long shadow cast by the
causation-mirroring conception has found its way into the very essence of
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BSA. Once removed, the account is unrecoverable. In §5, I propose an
account of laws which assures us of the kinds of aspects of lawhood we are
after by explicitly adopting causal parameters.
4.2.2 Diagnosis of strength and simplicity
If BSA is really committed to the causation-mirroring conception of laws, and
that conception must be rejected, then we must reject BSA along with it. Or
at least we must reject the sparse form it is typically presented in, since the
parameters of strength and simplicity (and fit) cannot alone do the work of
determining the laws.
But does that mean there is no role to play for strength and simplicity at all?
The account of laws to be developed in §5 and §6 will not make use of them.
Indeed, according to the behaviour-modification of idealising laws (see
§3.3.3), it is possible that there may be—though this is not
essential—incredibly complex laws which have only a few instances from
which many more abundantly instanced idealising laws are derived. This
might seem strange given the enormous plausibility that somehow strength
and simplicity shape our concept of law. To placate these worries it can be
pointed out that perhaps what we have in mind when we put such
importance in simplicity and strength are the properties of idealising laws.
Given the behaviour-modification approach to universality (see §3.3.3) we
can expect of any law whose behaviour-predicate has few contexts of precise
application that there will be idealising laws whose behaviour-predicates are
defined in terms of special cases of that complex behaviour. Such modified
predicates plausibly have a much wider application and will be
mathematically simpler than the complex laws from which they derive their
lawhood. The more variables are held fixed in providing a special case, the
more widespread the idealisation becomes. So we might expect that a
significant proportion of the laws are both strong and fairly simple, as a
corollary of behaviour-modification. Nonetheless, the account I will propose
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does not use these features as definitive characteristics of law.
In denying a central role for strength, simplicity or the causation-mirroring
conception I do not assume that we should reject entirely the assumption that
laws have some valid causal conception. Indeed, as I remarked in §1, I do think
laws are causally conceived somehow. §5 is all about getting that conception
right.
5 The causal-junctions conception oflaws
In §4 I argued against a certain causal conception of laws, viz. the causation-
mirroring conception. Nonetheless, like Helmholtz, I submit that laws are
causally conceived somehow and in this chapter I will argue for this in two
ways.
The first is the subject of §5.1 and involves rebutting certain classic concerns
with the relevance of the concept causation in physics. These concerns might
equally be levelled against the causation-mirroring conception of laws, but now
I have presented different reasons to reject that view, the need to discuss these
concerns becomes relevant to my hope of reinstating a causal conception of
laws. In responding to these issues I will draw attention, specifically, to how
the notion of experimental intervention can lend support to a causal conception
of laws.
The second way in which I provide support for the Helmholzian thought will
take up the majority of this chapter and involves the development of a new
‘causal-junctions conception’ of laws which I believe to be both independently
plausible and also to provide a key insight into a promising new Humean
account of laws. I begin in §5.2 by proposing four causal features which I
believe to be associated with many laws. In §5.3 I then define a particular
class of laws, the robust causal junction laws, which exhibit each of the four
causal features in a particular way. In §5.4 I then work through some examples
157
158 CHAPTER 5. THE CAUSAL-JUNCTIONS CONCEPTION
of laws which do not fall into this class and show how they are inferentially
connected to those which do. I end this section, in §5.4.5, by defining the
causal-junctions conception explicitly. In §5.5 I then propose the conception
be modified into a causal junctions account of laws, drawing attention to a
number of its merits. While the account may be adopted by causal primitivists
as it is, a Humean who accepts it will have the duty of analysing the causal
features which characterise it; this is the task of §6.
Although a causal-conception implies some kind of conceptual priority of
causation over laws, by saying that laws are causally conceived I certainly
don’t wish to claim anything about the meaning of lawhood or individual
laws. After all, with the end goal of providing a non-causal analysis of
causation in terms of laws, the laws I am interested in must be contrasted
with what Cartwright (1979) has called ‘causal laws’, i.e. laws which have the
word ‘cause’ or some surrogate right in them. Moreover, as I use the term, a
‘conception’ should not entail any metaphysical or epistemic priority of
causation over laws or vice versa nor any implication that the two cannot be
provided a Humean account.
What I do intend by the idea that laws are causally conceived is that knowledge
of laws is inferentially connected with causal knowledge. There are systematic
and truth-preserving ways in which we can and in fact do move from the
understanding that a law applies in some context to the understanding that
there exist certain causal relationships. Moreover, and this is where the basis
for the new account of laws comes in, there are systematic and truth-preserving
ways in which we can and do move from the understanding that there are
certain causal relationships in a context to the understanding that a law is
applicable. Hence, drawing attention to this causal conception will give us an
answer to the question raised at the end of §3 concerning what makes laws
special (as opposed to accidental generalisations and generalisations about
mere assemblies of objects).
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Obviously, establishing this may seem bound to have metaphysical
implications. For instance, it can’t be that laws are causally conceived and
yet the correct analysis for causation (reductive or otherwise) be completely
independent of the correct account of laws (reductive or otherwise). In §5.1 I
will rebut some of the classic complaints that certain areas of physics and
physical laws are devoid of causal import. But none of this should imply
anything about the direction of metaphysical priority between causation and
laws. Indeed, by framing the discussion in terms of ‘systematic and
truth-preserving inferential ties’ from understanding of one to the other I am
consciously trying to avoid committing to a direction of metaphysical
priority. The purpose of this is to show how much a common basis for laws
can be achieved without assuming Humeanism or otherwise. Even the
hardened Humean should appreciate that, since any Humean account of laws
built on such a conception would inherit much of its plausibility.
5.1 Causation in physics
Since the late 19th century, there has been a trend of dissatisfaction with the
concept of causation as a useful concept, particularly within physics. Physics
is certainly not the only science whose laws I think should be understood as
causally conceived (though, of course, not in the way suggested by the
causation-mirroring conception). However, enough of the phenomena I
ultimately want draw upon in causal analysis are from physics that I think
failure to accommodate it within my overall claims about causation and laws
of nature would severely undermine the plausibility of my arguments.
Many of the early complaints with causation as a useful concept in physics were
addressed to very particular conceptions of causation (I take Frisch 2014, for
my lead in this discussion). For instance, Kirchhoff (1876) complained of the
inherent vagueness of metaphorical associations with the concept of causation
in analysis of force. Mach (1900, 1905) argued (and the same point appears in
Russell 1912) that the idea of ‘similar causes’ being related to ‘similar effects’ is
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either too indeterminate, imprecise and perspective-relative or else so specific
that the putative lawlike regularity could not occur more than once. As a
result, Mach concluded that the concept of causation should be replaced in
science by the more precise idea of functional dependence. Russell (1912)
argued furthermore that the inherent asymmetry of the causal relation has no
place in physics, which is predominantly time-symmetric (see Norton 2009 for a
more recent version of this complaint). Another common issue which emerged
with the dawn of quantum mechanics concerned the plausiblity of the so-called
‘principle’ or ‘law of causality’ (e.g. Schro¨dinger 1951) that “Everything that
occurs, has one or more causes, which together necessarily lead to the event
in question” (Planck 1937, 83; translation in Frisch 2014, 13). Under its usual
interpretation, the indeterminism of quantum processes seem to undermine
this principle.
While these complaints may well serve to undermine certain interpretations
of causation, I do not think they serve to reject entirely the relevance of the
causal concept from physics. We now have at our disposal a plethora of
theories of causation which render it precise and unmetaphorical (to cite a
few: Lewis 1973a, Salmon 1977, Fair 1979, Mackie 1980, Glennan 1996, Dowe
2000, Pearl 2000, Schaffer 2001, Woodward 2003). All of these theories
appear to accommodate the distinction between a total cause and the
particular causes picked out for perspectival reasons, and they can each
define conditions for causation which do not suffer from the failure of basic
regularity accounts in being caught between uninformative vagueness and too
much specificity. Indeed, it might be that behind each theory is a method for
interpreting the functional dependencies specified in physics as causal
dependencies in their own terms (see Frisch 2014, 112). Furthermore, none of
these theories demands that causation be deterministic—the principle of
causality is not intrinsic to causation according to them (see, especially
Anscombe 1971).
Admittedly, it is typical for theories of causation to make use of a criterion of
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asymmetry (not necessarily temporal) in order to distinguish causal
attribution from effect attribution, but this need not conflict with the fact
that the basic laws of physics are represented by formulae which themselves
provide no grounds for inferring asymmetry. Responding to Van Fraassen
(1993), Frisch points out that ‘we cannot conclude from the fact that an
uninterpreted formula F = ma does not on its own mark F as a cause and a
as effect—that the causal “distinction is made outside the theory”’ (2014,
114). Indeed, it can seem that the attribution of cause to force and effect to
acceleration is exactly the interpretation we should be providing as part of
the physical theory incorporating that formula. As physicist Gustav Fechner
pointed out ‘physicists often speak of force simply as the cause of motion’
(1864, 126, translation by Frisch 2014, 2; see also Suppes 1970 and Hitchcock
2007a).
Moreover, the fact that laws might allow the past to be inferable from the
future in the same way they allow the future to be inferred from the past
(given other assumptions; see §4.1) is not enough, in itself, to prevent a
meaningful causal asymmetry playing a role in physical theory. Nor is it
enough to show that dynamical equations void of causal information are
physically indistinguishable from their equivalent but time-reversed
analogues (as opposed to what the arguments in Norton 2009, seem to
suggest). What would be needed to show this is an argument to the effect
that positing causal asymmetries are always unjustified when considering
time-reversal invariant laws.
Although there do exist such arguments (see, e.g., Price and Weslake 2009)
to my mind, (Frisch 2014, especially ch.6) has successfully defended the
importance of causal knowledge in physics. Two key points lead him to this
conclusion. First, many conclusions reached in experiment rely heavily on the
principle of common-cause: that when correlated variables are not related as
cause to effect, there will be a common causal variable of both. While this
principle may, on rare occasions, give unsound advice (see Arntzenius 2010),
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it appears in many cases to be this very principle which plays a crucial role
in the formation of successful hypotheses when the available evidence
provides no reason to prefer one dynamical model (void of causal
information) from another.
As an example, Frisch considers the inferences we would make based on a series
of observations of points of light at the same observed location in the night-sky.
The non-causal dynamical models derived from Maxwell and Lorentz combined
with the wave equations and the available evidence are insufficient to confirm
that the various points of light can be attributed to a single source, viz. a
particular star, rather than, say, multiple light-sources coming in from infinity.
Nonetheless, we typically do make such an attribution. Frisch argues, I think
successfully, that the only way we can plausibly infer the existence of such
common-causes is with an active principle like the principle of common-cause,
thereby justifying the role of causal knowledge in physics.
The principle of common-cause is shown to be particularly useful in cases where
the available evidence is limited (in the above case, we do not have access to the
field values across the entire future-surface of each light-source’s light-cone).
But Frisch’s second point is that employment of the principle of common-
cause itself serves to support an explanatory assumption that is recognisable
even when data is not lacking. For a strictly non-causal view cannot support
the intuition that, for example, while processes in which broadcast waves emit
from antennas can seem perfectly normal, a time-reversal of this process in the
form of ‘anti-broadcast waves coming in from spatial infinity and collapsing
on the antenna’ would seem ‘nearly miraculous’ (the example is from Earman
2011). This intuition—shared by both supporters and naysayers of causation
in physics alike—suggests that while we have reason to think the future will
bring ever more dependence among events, our past recedes into occurrences
that are ever more independent of each other. The principle of common-cause
may seem to explain such an asymmetry of dependence, since it implies that
dependencies between variables can be screened off by their (past) causes rather
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than anything futurewards. Here again causal knowledge is playing a crucial
role in making sense of physical phenomena.
Frisch has shown that just because an uninterpreted formula doesn’t mark
some variable, e.g. of force, as causally relevant to acceleration this doesn’t
entail that the causal distinction is made outside theory. However, accepting
this alone will not be enough to persuade everyone that causal distinctions are
part of the very conception of physical laws—we are still a long way off being
able to justify the claim that laws themselves are causally conceived. One may,
for instance, be reminded of Russell’s sceptical observation that,
in the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that
can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect;
there is merely a formula. Certain differential equations can be
found, which hold at every instant for every particle of the system,
and which, given the configuration and velocities at one instant, or
the configurations at two instants, render the configuration at any
other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable. (1912, 14)
In §5.2 I will show explicitly how, on a plausible interpretation of Russell, he
was wrong to say this. There are, in fact, at least four distinct causal features of
many laws including the law for mutually gravitating bodies. But we need not
wait until then to make it plausible that laws are often conceived of causally in
some sense. One very clear way to see how laws come to be conceived causally is
in the process of intervention. Consider, for instance, the interventions possible
with an air-pump of the sort used by Boyle. The gas in a sealed chamber can
be diminished in volume under a load or its temperature increased by a heat
source and its pressure measured with a gauge. By experimentally intervening
in this way the causal relationships between volume, temperature and pressure
are revealed, since a variable intervened on (if done so correctly) will be a cause
of any other variable which changes with it. The interventions of this sort are
just those used by Boyle to infer his law. By carefully measuring the volume
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and pressures as they changed under various loads, Boyle could infer that
volume and pressure were inversely proportional. It seems inevitable, then,
that this law would be causally conceived as a consequence.
Admittedly, the ideal interventions of the sort recommended by Woodward
(2003) may not always be possible in order to prove the existence of a causal
relationship between the variables in laws’ behaviour-predicates. In
particular, it has been questioned whether interventions should be conceived
of as having to be ideal according to the standard Woodward originally
suggested (e.g. by Eberhardt and Scheines 2007, Frisch 2014 and even by
Woodward himself see Woodward 2014, 2015, 3583-3584).1 But it is not my
concern to validate Woodward’s—or, indeed, any—account of causal
manipulation via intervention here. Rather, my concern is to make plausible
the fact that knowledge of many laws is closely associated with knowledge of
causal information. Once we help ourselves to the notion of an intervention,
understood in some intuitive sense, the close association between causal and
law-based knowledge is easily stated: that we know the discovery of many
laws including Boyle’s and Charles’s laws, Galileo’s laws of freefall and
Coloumb’s law of electrostatics were the result of careful experimental
interventions. (Although I do not say this is all that was involved). Since
successful experimental interventions are a paradigm way to reveal
relationships of causal influence, it is hard to conceive how the derivation of
such laws by experimental interventions could avoid the derivation of causal
information as well. When interventions are used to discover laws, causal
knowledge comes as part of the very method of learning the laws; the
association of laws with causal information is, in this sense, unavoidable.
Some of the laws we know, however, were not inferred from experimental
1For example, interventions may need to be, and in some cases are to be preferred when,
‘soft’ in the sense that they do not break the connection between original causal influences
and the variable intervened on (see Eberhardt and Scheines 2007). Also, it may be that
in practice, a change in the values of variables cannot be performed by manipulating some
single component, but rather by replacing it with another, as when Galileo observed the
effect of mass on velocity with his inclined-plane experiment by exchanging one steel ball
for another.
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interventions at all; instead they may have been derived from purely
observational data (e.g. Kepler’s laws), from further principles (e.g.
symmetry principles), or have been introduced as starting assumptions
(e.g. Newton’s first law). However, laws of this sort will still need testing.
And where possible, the kinds of tests scientists will want to carry out will be
interventions. So, for example, inspired by Newton’s inverse-square law of
gravitation, Coloumb (as did others) assumed that electrostatic forces would
obey a similar relationship to distance. He did not infer the relationship from
intervention, but he certainly tested it this way, by manipulating the
distances between loadstones he was able to measure the torsion induced in
his torsion-balances and so confirm a inverse-square relationship with force.
Coloumb obviously felt able to infer what experimental interventions would
enable him to confirm the relationship. The hypothesis therefore had
associated with it certain inferences about what the causal relationships
among the variables would be if the hypothesis were true. Without such an
association, the experiment would never have been performed.
I take these observations to show that at least from the perspective of how we
think about discovering and testing laws, they are intimately bound up with
causal inferences. This lends support to the idea that there is some kind of
causal conception going on with laws. The problem is to say what that is.
5.2 Four causal features of laws
In developing the new conception of laws, I will begin here by drawing
attention to four causal features which I believe to be associated with many
laws: two features of dispositionality and two features of causal asymmetry.
Each of the four causal features of laws which contribute to laws’ causal
conception have in fact been touched upon at some stage in the foregoing
sections. Dispositionality is divided into the dispositional properties of
components (noted in §3.2.1) and the disposition of systems to embed their
behaviour in larger more complex systems (noted in §3.3). Causal asymmetry
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is divided into the variable-level asymmetries among the variables of laws’
behavioural formulae and the law-level asymmetries between system-type
and behavioural properties themselves. Both asymmetries were mentioned in
§4.1.2 in discussion of the possibility of genetic explanations with laws. Also,
both forms of causal asymmetry are, I believe, implicit in the idea that laws
can justify our goal-directed actions, first noted in §2.4 and just brought
again to our attention in discussion of experimental interventions, §5.1.
The following discussion of each causal feature should serve to make the
particular kind of inferential connection with laws clearer. In each case I will
draw attention to the particularly valuable and unique form of utility each
feature provides us with. This should serve to strengthen support for the
idea that laws are systematically related to causal information. Consider an
analogy: I show you instances of the same kind of device one after another
and draw attention to the fact that they have features which make them
particularly useful for banging sharp pieces of metal into wood. But unless
you think there’s a general reason for wanting to do the latter, you may
remain unconvinced that all instances of such devices are able to perform this
task. Then I point out that banging sharp pieces of metal into wood is
peculiarly useful for building furniture. Wouldn’t that then lend credence to
the idea that instances of the device I showed you were in general made or
sought out for that purpose? The particular value of the device is justified by
the uniqueness of the utility of the activity it is employed to enable.
Something similar goes for laws and causation: the idea that laws are
inferentially connected with certain kinds of causal information is supported
by the fact that that causal information is a peculiarly useful thing to know,
e.g. for navigating, predicting, controlling and manipulating the world
around us. If knowing certain laws is part of what it is to have that causal
knowledge (as I will suggest) then we can see why those laws have the
features they do.
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5.2.1 Component-level dispositionality
The first causal feature of laws I will discuss is component-level dispositionality.
This refers to the dispositional requirements components have in order that
assemblies in which they feature satisfy the system-types laws are about.
As I will understand it, a dispositional property is one defined by its causal
potential (although, that is not to say the property is irreducibly causal). For
example, fragility is defined as a potential for being caused to break,
irrascibility as a potential for being caused to get angry. These dispositions
are typically (though there may be exceptions, see Vetter 2015) understood
in terms not only of the behaviour they ‘manifest’, but also in terms of the
stimulus (or ‘trigger’) required to cause that behaviour. So, for instance,
something isn’t fragile just because it has the potential to break under a
hydraulic press nor is person irascible just because they have the potential to
get angry from catastrophic events. In each case the stimulus must be
correctly specified.2
I pointed out in §3.2.1 that laws often concern entities defined dispositionally.
The classical pendulum law, for example, has among the conditions of
componency which constitute its system-type, the requirement that the
string be inextensible, the bob have mass and the pivot be frictionless.
Arguably, the gravitational law applies to systems made up of components
with the causal disposition of mass where to have mass is to the causal
disposition to exhibit inertia under force and to accelerate proportionally
with such forces. Recently Higgs’ hypothesis that mass can be understood in
terms of interaction with a certain kind of field—the ‘Higgs field’—confirmed
the attribution to mass of dispositionality. We might plausibly take to be
dispositional many of the other variable-properties required for the
construction of the systems with which laws (often idealising) are concerned,
2By treating dispositions as having stimulus and manifestation conditions I assume it
safe to ignore the subtle translational issues which exist between so-called ‘conventional
dispositions’ (e.g. being fragile) and ‘canonical dispositions’ (e.g. being disposed to break
when struck; see Choi and Fara 2016).
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e.g. being charged, being electrically conductive, being frictionless, being
inextensible, being a predator, being an ideal gas (consult Table 3.1, p.92 for
more example dispositions and their corresponding laws).
Perhaps someone might object to such interpretations and rather opt for an
interpretation of these properties as categorical, i.e. having unconditional
non-causal conditions of individuation (what are sometimes referred to as
‘quiddities’ see, e.g., Black 2000, Schaffer 2005a). However, I think such an
interpretation would be wrong. Conductivity is essentially the property of
being able to conduct electricity; mass is essentially the property of being
able to interact with the Higgs field; being inextensible is essentially the
property of being unable to be extended. These properties’ dispositionality is
reflected in the cross-cutting taxonomy of what we have found to have them.
Conductivity is exhibited by metals, and in certain states also carbons,
silicons, and many other ‘doped’ materials. Mass is exhibited by leptons,
quarks, animals, planets. Inextensibility is exhibited by nothing at all, but
many disparate materials come close under proportionate loads. Insofar as
we recognise the world as constituted ultimately by natural categorical kinds,
the dispositional properties which feature in system-types’ conditions of
assembly cut across the taxonomic structure of these categories in ways
which suggest that what is crucial to dispositional roles is not the categorical
nature of the substances which fulfill them but something consistent in the
way they enter into causal relations. It is arguably for this reason that
science remains open to new substances being found to behave in familiar
ways: consider, for example, our discovery that gases can be conductive when
ionised, the hypothesis that photons have mass, that dark matter or neutron
stars are inextensible. If the properties I have suggested are dispositional are
in fact categorical properties then this kind of openness would be hard to
rationalise.
The observation of dispositions’ cross-cutting nature resonates with some of
Quine’s remarks.
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The general [dispositional] idiom is programmatic; it plays a
regulative rather than constitutive role. It forms families of terms
on the basis not of structural or causal affinities, among the
physical states or mechanisms that the terms refer to, but on the
basis only of a sameness of style on our own part in earmarking
those states or mechanisms. (1973, 11)
In Quine’s terms, dispositional characterisations capture the phenomenal
affordances of things rather than the deep physical explanations for them,
that is why dispositions can be multiply realised by different substances and
so be instantiated in ways which cut across categorical taxonomy. But Quine
was also sceptical about the lasting utility of dispositions. He remarked that
despite the dispositional idiom being practically ‘indispensible’,
if I were trying to devise an ideal language for a finished theory
of reality, or of any part of it, I would make no place in it for the
general dispositional idiom. (Ibid.)
Pace Quine, I would argue for quite the opposite view.3 Other than the pursuit
of knowledge, scientific discovery is supposed to help us take control of our
environment. What we want to know is how to make use of the natural world
in order to do that. Dispositional knowledge is, therefore, enormously useful if,
for instance, a material with the right disposition is proven to be undesireable
for other purposes, e.g. if it is too expensive, difficult to source, is too heavy,
brittle, has poor thermal properties, etc. It is not the underlying mechanism
that we care about in such cases, but the disposition it affords us. Therefore,
component-level dispositionality is both a widespread and an important feature
of laws we should be happy to embrace.
3Quine’s distaste for dispositions partly stemmed from his belief that an extensional
analysis of them was impossible (see the discussion in Quine 1973, §3). I present my own
extensional analysis of dispositions in §6.1.3.
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5.2.2 Law-level dispositionality
Whereas component-level dispositionality concerns the dispositions of system-
types’ components, a kind of dispositionality involved with laws which enters
at a different level concerns the embeddability of the instances of entire system-
types. The embedded phenomenon intuition described in §3.3.1 was the idea
that apparent failures of laws’ universality can be understood as a result of
systems being embedded in more complex environments. This very idea seems
to me to be a dispositional one.
When we come across a complex situation for which a perfectly accurate law is
either beyond our knowledge, our ability to solve, or our practical requirements,
then we can often idealise the situation. We do this by abstracting away certain
features in the circumstances for which we have a law (Weisberg 2007). The
whole practice of idealisation therefore relies on the understanding that the
behavioural relationships described by an idealising law causally contribute to
the more complex phenomena going on in the real world in which the simple
system-type described by the law is embedded (Corry 2009, Cartwright 2017).
Arguably, Newton’s law of mutually gravitating bodies precisely describes the
behaviour of no system in the world. All systems of mutually gravitating bodies
experience gravitational force from all other such systems, and assuming (as
seems plausible) that all large masses have some degree of non-neutral charge,
there are further contributions to total force which means that the formula
does not precisely apply. Nonetheless, we still want to say that instances
of the simple two-body system-type mentioned in the gravitational law are
embedded in those real-world cases such that they contributes to the overall
behaviour. For how else, could it be so appropriate to use this formula as an
idealisation? Similarly, the ideal gas law precisely describes the behaviour of no
system in the world, since all real gases are non-ideal. Nonetheless, we can say
that real-world gases in some sense have instances of the ideal gas system-type
embedded in them, contributing to the overall real-world behaviour.
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This common thought seems to be exactly the embedded phenomenon
intuition. Instances of system-types mentioned by laws underlie and hence
causally contribute the behaviour associated with them by law to whatever is
the more complex behaviour in which they are found. In §3.3.3 I suggested
that the truth of such laws might be retained by modifying their
behaviour-predicates to the claim that the relevant formulae are special cases
of more complex formulae attributable to instances of more complex
system-types of which instances of the law’s system-type are a part. My
belief in that suggestion still stands. The new suggestion I’m making here is
simply that the contribution that an underlying phenomenon provides as a
special case is a result of a causal disposition: embeddability. Since
behaviour-modification concerns both the behaviour of entire systems,
embeddability is a law-level disposition.
If we understand the behaviour-modification to formally capture the intuition
behind the disposition of embeddability, the criterion that an embedded
system be a part of a larger system can be understood as stimulus for the
disposition and the criterion that a formula be a special case of whatever
behaviour accurately describes the system can be understood as its
manifestation. The details of this analysis will be made more precise in §6.1.3
when I come to provide a Humean analysis of laws’ dispositionality.
As with many dispositions, embeddability seems to be defined in terms of a
behaviour which can be exhibited in degrees. Hu¨ttemann (2004) usefully
distinguished these ‘continuously manifesting dispositions’ from ‘discretely
manifesting dispositions’.4 For instance, whereas a disposition like
irrascibility can be thought to manifest in degrees depending on the context,
the manifest behaviour of the disposition of fragility seems to be all or
nothing, since something is either broken or it isn’t. Embeddability seems to
be of the first sort. When an embedded system only experiences a modicum
4Cartwright calls dispostions which have this continuous feature ‘capacities’ (Cartwright
1999).
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of external disturbance, we can expect the idealising behaviour to be
approximately accurate, when there is a lot of disturbance, the idealising
behaviour may be almost entirely hidden.
As a consequence of this feature, knowledge of embeddability is incredibly
useful to us. When we know the instances of some system-type are
embeddable we can make certain crude predictions and interventions despite
external interference. For instance, we know that despite interference from
other bodies’ masses and charges, a decrease in the distance between two
bodies will greatly increase the force they experience, and that if we could
increase the mass of one body, the force will be increased also—or, at least,
such an intervention will contribute positively to any change in force. While
this knowledge may not always help us make perfectly accurate predictions
and interventions, it is often suitable enough (for engineering, navigation,
forecasting, etc.). It can also be the groundwork for positing more accurate
laws which take into account more phenomena.
5.2.3 Variable-level causal asymmetry
In the foregoing two sections, I have discussed two causal features of laws which
both count as kinds of dispositionality. Now I want to consider a different
kind of causal feature: causal asymmetry. As with dispositionality, I divide
the types of causal asymmetry into two. This section deals with that which
appears at the variable-level.
Symmetry is considered a paradigm feature of many laws, particularly in
physics, and a big motivation behind many philosophers and physicists
distaste for causation in physics. As far as the non-statistical laws of
mechanics go processes are at least in some sense ‘reversible’ in time,
meaning that the exact reverse of a physically possible temporally evolving
process is also perfectly compatible with the mechanics.5 Insofar as such
5There is a need for some delicacy surrounding what exactly is reversible; see, Albert
(2000), who argues that we can only make sense of this in the language of ‘states’ rather
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mechanics can be used to accurately predict temporal evolution forwards in
time, they can be used to predict the ‘backwards’ direction as well.
In contrast with this, causation is famously asymmetrical: its instances
comprise a cause and an effect, and at least typically, we don’t suspect effects
to cause their own causes. It can’t be doubted, however, that in practice,
explanation with laws only goes in certain directions as well. As supporters
of the D-N model of explanation have been repeatedly reminded, we may
predict the height of the sun in the sky by reference to the length of the
shadows it casts, but we would not explain it that way—a lack of symmetry
is reflected in the interventional possibilities that we know laws afford us.
Laws themselves may look symmetrical, but when we learn to apply them,
we do so in a way that reveals our knowledge that the height of the shadow
can be manipulated by intervention on the height of the flagpole and not vice
versa.
It’s fairly obvious why asymmetry is useful. If an explanatory relation
weren’t asymmetrical then it would have symmetrical instances, and since
the relata of explanation are distinct, this result in a circularity. Circularity
is typically looked on as anathema to explanation. Specifically, problematic
circularities develop when there is no way to break down the circle into
multiple independent and asymmetrical explanatory generalisations, i.e. the
circle of causally relevant variables is ‘closed to intervention’. This would
happen if, for example, we took the length of objects’ shadows to always and
exclusively explain and be explained by those objects’ heights. If this were
the case, it would seem impossible to have knowledge of how to use one of
these phenomena to influence the other. We could not, for example, hope to
change something’s height by any means other than via its shadow-length,
but similarly we could not hope to change something’s shadow-length other
than by its height. Such explanatory circles, if they exist at all, would be
entirely useless for these purposes.
than dynamical conditions.
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It is typical, though by no means ubiquitous, to think that the causal
asymmetry can be mapped to temporal order, since causes always (or at least
typically) precede their effects. But while the kind of asymmetry drawn
attention to in the famous flagpole case is temporal, there are plenty of
non-temporal kinds of asymmetry which allow us to reach similar
conclusions. This seems to be especially the case with those causal
asymmetries associated with the variables in laws’ behavioural formulae.
Take, for instance, the asymmetry which exists between force and
acceleration in the total force law. If the mass of an object is known, then we
can either use the total force to predict its acceleration or acceleration to
predict total force. But we would only ever think to explain acceleration by
citing the force, not vice versa. That this asymmetry is causal seems to be
largely accepted among physicists (though perhaps not among philosophers).
Recall Fechner’s claim cited in §5.1 that ‘physicists often speak of force
simply as the cause of motion’. An example of this comes from the following
statement from Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, quoted in (Cartwright
1979, 419).
The action of an external force changes the velocity [...] such a
force either increases or decreases the velocity according to whether
it acts in the direction of motion or in the opposite direction.6
(Einstein and Infeld 1971, 9, my emphasis)
The explanatory asymmetries in the total force law is instantaneous, so it is
hard to see how an analyses in terms of a temporal (or entropic) order could
hope to explain it. And it is certainly not the only law which exhibits such
asymmetries. For instance, we will explain the current through a component in
terms of its voltage and its resistance, but not typically the other way around.
6Curiously, Cartwright uses this to provide an example of a causal law which contrasts
with her example law of association that force, mass and acceleration are functionally related.
One might interpret the case I am making for variable-level asymmetry as an argument that
laws of association are often conceived of in terms of causal laws. But I will not press this
point in the main text.
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Again, this asymmetry seems naturally captured as causal: we say that current
is ‘induced’ by voltage potential and that resistors resist current. A typical
physics textbook claims that,
a potential difference ∆V = Vb − Va maintained across the
conductor sets up an electric field −→E , and this field produces a
current I that is proportional to the potential difference.
And also that,
most electric circuits use circuit elements called resistors to control
the current in the various parts of the circuit. (Serway and Jewett
2006, 813, my emphasis)
If we take ‘control’, ‘sets up’ and ‘produces’ to indicate causal relationships,
as seems natural, this would highlight why applications of Ohm’s law exhibit
the explanatory asymmetries that they do.
In the way considered in §5.1, our intuitions in this regard can be supported
by what manipulations via explerimental interventions we know to be possible.
Or we might simply be able to reflect on the how instances of the law are built
to see the causal asymmetries. For instance, consider an electrical component
c for which the equation in Ohm’s law accurately applies. It is plausible that
the following two equations also hold,
R = l
σA
∆Vc = E − Ir
where l is the length of the component, σ the conductance of the component’s
material, A the component’s cross-sectional area, E is the electromotive force
produced across the terminals by the rest of the circuit and Ir is the internal
resistance of the rest of the circuit. That these further equations also hold
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serves to justify the claim that current is reasonably treated as an effect of
resistance and voltage-drop, since the causal relations between the values like
lc, σc, Ac, Ed and Ir on the one hand and current through the component on the
other seem even more pronounced. Surely we would not explain the length of
an electrical component by reference to the current flow through it! But we may
indeed explain the latter by reference to the former: length explains resistance
and resistance explains current. Hence, by mediating the explanation here,
resistance shows itself more plausibly to be an explainer of current and not
vice versa (something similar can also be said concerning voltage potential).
At least within the context of classical electronics, the relationships between
voltage, resistance and current are all instantaneous. Now, it may be objected
whether any causal relationships are truly instantaneous. After all, the edicts
of Einstein’s special relativity appear to prohibit causal signals passing faster
than the speed of light. It is unclear whether this point alone is sufficient
to prohibit instantaneous inter-spatial causality in general (mightn’t we say
that the next in line to the throne is instantaneously caused to become king
or queen if the incumbent dies, regardless of whether they are on the other
side of the universe or not?) But we needn’t put any argumentative weight
on this. It is more important to point out that relativity seems if anything to
imply instantaneous causation if it is direct and maximally proximate, i.e. in
the same place as. Huemer and Kovitz (2003) have argued for this point with
respect to the Lorentz equation.
a body with charge q moving at velocity v through electric and
magnetic fields experiences a force given by
F = qE + qv×B
where E and B are the electric and magnetic field vectors at the
body’s current location in space. The vectors E,v and B will
typically vary over time, along with F , and the value of F at any
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given time is determined by the values of E,v and B at that time.
Bodies always experience the effect of the electromagnetic field at
their location in space and time. (2003, 559, my emphasis)
Indeed, with many laws, the variables are assumed to be correlated
instantaneously because they describe variable properties at the same
location. Any law relating the force experienced in a field is a paradigm
example. Furthermore, there are just the same asymmetries in explanation
between such properties. For instance, the Lorentz force law is used to
explain why certain forces are experienced due to the strength of electric and
magnetic fields, velocity and strength of charge. In contrast, Lorentz-forces
do not explain any of these latter variables. It is exactly these sorts of
asymmetry I believe we have good reason to treat as causal.
Since the explanatory asymmetries discussed so far have been between
variables which appear in the behaviour-predicate of laws (e.g. voltage,
resistance, current in Ohm’s law; force, charge, electric and magnetic field in
the Lorentz-force law). I’ll refer to these from now on as variable-level
asymmetries. Notice that these asymmetries are just the sort we considered
in discussion of the genetic principle in §4.1.2. There I said that the logical
structure of the causation-mirroring conception could not cover explanatory
relationships between variables because the variables appear in manipulable
formulae. It is typically possible to isolate any variable we choose to
determine one on the basis of the others. However, in pointing towards the
systematic variable-level causal asymmetries in laws we seem to admit that
the intuition that such explanatory relationships exist is a sound one. Indeed
I think it is. But unlike causation-mirroring, the causal conception being
developed in this chapter will not aim to have this asymmetry reflected in
laws’ logical form. There is, however, a different causal asymmetry which the
conception will take laws’ logical form to reflect. This is the subject of §5.2.4,
to which I now turn.
178 CHAPTER 5. THE CAUSAL-JUNCTIONS CONCEPTION
5.2.4 Law-level causal asymmetry
Another kind of asymmetry associated with laws which is plausibly looked
on as causal was intimated in §3.2.1 and also discussed in §4.1.2. This is
the asymmetry which exists between a system and the behaviour it exhibits.
We would not, for instance, expect to explain that something is an electrical
conductor by the fact that the voltage across it, the current through it and
it’s resistance are related by the equation V = IR. Rather, the direction of
explanation seems to go the other way around: being an electrical conductor
explains why it obeys the formula. The relationship here is, like some of the
examples considered above, a simultaneous one, since laws are conditionals
stating that if some system-type is instantiated by something for some time
then it behaves according to some behaviour-type for that very time. However,
this asymmetry is worth distinguishing from that at the variable-level since
it relates entities at the level of system-types and overal behaviour. I will
therefore refer to it as law-level asymmetry.
In order to motivate further the existence of law-level asymmetry we can move
from considering it as a single relationship between two relata (system-type
and behaviour) as is reflected in the logical structure of laws according to
Schema 2, and instead consider it as an an asymmetry between three relata:
the behaviour and the two conditions of assembly (conditions of componency
and conditions of organisation). Consider an example. If a heating element is
underneath a hot-air balloon’s opening and the balloon is rising, we have details
of two components (burner and balloon), an organisation (one underneath the
other) and a behaviour (rising). I take it that it would be wrong to say that
the organisation and the behaviour explain why the components are as they
are: the fact that one object is below another, and that the whole assembly is
rising does not explain why one is a burner, the other a balloon. I also take
it that it would be wrong to say that the components and behaviour explain
the organisation: the fact that one object is a balloon and the other a heater
and that the whole assembly is rising does not explain why one component
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is underneath the other. However, notice what happens when we look at the
final combination. For it seems entirely plausible that the components and the
organisation explain the behaviour: the fact that one component is burner, the
other a balloon, and that the former is underneath the latter does very much
seem to explain why the whole assembly is rising.
What this example effectively draws attention to is an explanatory
asymmetry between each law’s system-type (with individuating conditions of
componency and organisation) and the corresponding behavioural property.
So what, then, is the source of this asymmetry? I believe that there is good
reason to treat such an explanatory asymmetry as causal. Unlike other forms
of explanation, it isn’t abstract or logically deductive, as mathematical
explanation often is. Nor does the explanation seem adequately captured by
the notion of constitutive explanation; the system doesn’t constitute the
behaviour but rather performs it. Like paradigm causal relations, the
asymmetry can be used to assign responsibility (to broken components or
unexpected systems), to answer what-if-things-had-been-different type
questions, to develop strategies for intervention and control, to establish
successful predictions and to raise the probability of certain outcomes.
Despite similarities with various contemporary analyses of causal explanation,
this explanatory asymmetry seems to be rather underrepresented in philosophy
of science. As I pointed out in §3.2.1, the notion of an assembly or system bears
similarities with that of a mechanism and nomological machine. But the kind of
explanation between conditions of assembly and a system’s behaviour is not so
obviously available to approaches in terms of the latter two phenomena (since
behaviour of these entities is part of their identity criteria). Perhaps the main
sticking point in regarding the relationship as causal seems to be that there
is a salient difference in the ontological category between the relata. While
typical causal relationships are taken to be that between events or property-
instances what we have with conditions of assembly are the presence of types
of components and the way they are organised.
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In response to this sort of concern, three things should be noted. First, we
can, if we so choose, represent the satisfaction of componency and
organisation conditions as a value of a variable with a particular time-index.
Therefore, there is no formal reason why we cannot treat an assembly of
objects’ satisfaction of these conditions as the right category of entity to enter
into causal relations. Second, when it comes to conditions of organisation
especially, there does not appear to be any deep difference with paradigm
causal relata in the kind of property being instantiated. Organisation
conditions (I have suggested) typically concern spatial arrangement,
orientation and relative position. But such properties also feature in the
behavioural formulae of laws. If we accept that variable-properties in laws’
behavioural formulae can be causal relata, then we should accept the
satisfaction of conditions of organisations can be also. Third, conditions of
componency are typically dispositional. While dispositional conditions only
require entities to exhibit some potential for causal relations, it seems
reasonable to suspect that the conditions are part of those laws’ system-types
because they are required to manifest in order to bring about the relevant
behaviour. For example, a pivot’s frictionlessness must be manifest in any
classical pendulum in order for the pendulum equation to apply, an object’s
mass must be manifest in any gravitational system in order for the
gravitational equation to apply, and a species’ predatory inclinations must be
manifest in any habitat where there exists prey in order for the
Lotka-Volterra equations to apply. Given this is the case in general, it seems
entirely reasonable to assume that the satisfaction of conditions of
componency play a causal role in bringing about systems’ behaviour.
If law-level asymmetry is causal then the arrow in laws of nature can be
interpreted causally salva veritate. Hence laws do cover one very specific
form of causal relationship mentioned in §4.1: that between system-type
instances and their behaviour. But to admit this is not to presume that laws
explicitly state causal facts—the arrow in laws isn’t to be read causally. Nor
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is it to presume that laws analyse the type-level causal relationship between
system-type and behaviour (cf. the analysis proposed in §6.2.5). However, I
do think that the existence of law-level asymmetry lends credence to the
claim that causal relationships are part of how we conceive of laws.
5.2.5 Four ways Russell was wrong
Given the forgoing sections, let’s return now to a point made by Russell quoted
in §5.1.
[I]n the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing
that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect;
there is merely a formula. Certain differential equations can be
found, which hold at every instant for every particle of the system,
and which, given the configuration and velocities at one instant, or
the configurations at two instants, render the configuration at any
other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable. (1912, 14)
In a sense we must agree with Russell. Take one relevant component of the
formula in Russell’s example, Newton’s gravitational equation:
F = Gm1m2
r2
This clearly makes no explicit causal claims. The values taken by the variables
are simultaneous (at least within Newtonian theory) and can be manipulated
to isolate any variable we so choose. We know the formula systems applies to
systems exactly when those systems comprise two massive objects separated
by a non-zero distance, i.e. the following conditional is an (unmodified) law.
Gravitational law: For all x, if x is a two-mass system separated
by a non-zero distance, then the force F experienced by each mass,
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the respective massesm1 andm2 and the distance r which separates
them are related by the formula,
F = Gm1m2
r2
However, I believe that Russell nonetheless overlooked four causal features of
this formula and the gravitational law. For the gravitational law exhibits all
four causal features discussed above. First, the law’s system-type has
conditions of componency which specify that it its instances are made of two
objects with mass. As I have already suggested, I think we should
understand having mass as a dispositional property, i.e. the disposition to
interact with the Higgs field and impede acceleration under force. In the
terminology of §5.2.1, the law exhibits component-dispositionality.
Second, instances of the gravitational laws’ system-type have the ability to
contribute behaviour in more complex systems. The gravitational law does not
perfectly predict the net forces experienced by any two masses. This is partly
because any gravitational component of force on a particular mass is generated
by that mass’s role in many more than a single two-mass system. Every other
distinct mass will be a component in some two-mass system of which the first
mass is the other component. But the law also does not perfectly predict
because there may be other components of force present too. For instance, in
Millikan’s oil-drop experiment, the gravitational force on charged drops of oil
which resulted from being components in a two-mass system with the earth
was counterbalanced by the electrostatic force of a charged plate attracting
the oil-drops in the opposite direction. The set-up of the experiment is such
that the net force on the oil-drop can be zero, or even negative with respect to
the gravitational field. Nonetheless, the embedded phenomenon intuition (see
§3.3.1) tells us that instances of the system-type featuring in the Gravitational
law are embedded (somehow) within more complex experimental systems such
that they contribute to the overall behaviour of those more complex systems.
In §6.1.3 I discuss various ways this embedding might be analysed. But for
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now it is enough to realise that the very notion of an embeddable system is a
dispositional—hence causal—feature of the law. This is what in §5.2.2 I called
a kind of law-level dispositionality.
Third, the formula F = Gm1m2
r2 exhibits what I referred to in §5.2.3 as variable-
level asymmetry, i.e. a causal asymmetry among the variables. As in all special
force laws, it is natural to think of the variables other than force playing
the role of causes of force. After all, we wouldn’t explain or manipulate any
of the other values by reference to or an intervention on force, but we do
explain and manipulate force by reference to and intervention on the other
variables. Despite being a numerically manipulable equation, there is a causal
asymmetry present among the variables. In §6.2 I will discuss how we might
go about analysing such asymmetry in terms of structural interpretations of
these equations which are not manipulable.
Fourth, the law itself exhibits what I referred to in §5.2.4 as a law-level
asymmetry between system-type (divisible into conditions of componency
and conditions of organisation) and behaviour. It is natural to think of the
presence of two-masses oriented at distance r explaining their satisfaction of
the formula F = Gm1m2
r2 and not vice versa. This explanation is, I have
argued, plausibly viewed as causal.
One might wonder why there are specifically four causal features of laws.
Although I’m not in principle closed to the discovery of further features, I
think something can be said about the relationship between the four mentioned
which gives their individuation a certain legitimacy. The four features fall into
the quadrants of Table 5.1 (p.184).
The horizontal axis of Table 5.1 divides causal features into levels of focus.
While the higher level is concerned with causation concerning the
law-instantiating system considered as whole, the lower level concerns
causation at the level of parts of the system, specifically either in terms of
the parts’ variable-properties or the parts’ dispositional properties.
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Actual causation Law-level causalasymmetry
Variable-level
causal asymmetry
The vertical axis of Table 5.1 divides causal features according to a different
criterion. It has been made clear already that the features divide into pairs of
dispositionality and causal asymmetry. But what could be made clearer is that
the distinction charts the complemantary aspects of causal potential and causal
actuality in lawful systems: dispositions characterise an object’s potential for
causal relations and causal asymmetries characterise the structures of actual
causal relationships.
I take it that the tabulation of features in the above way lends some support
to the existence, distinctness and mutually complementary characteristics of
each of the four features to which I have been drawing attention. And in
turn, these four causal features lend support to a causal conception of laws
(although not a causation-mirroring conception!). I do not suppose that every
law exhibits every kind of causal feature (except, perhaps, law-level causal
asymmetry). However, these features are pervasive enough that I think we
should see whether they can be put to use in helping us provide a better
account of laws in general. The first step towards doing so is to isolate that
class of laws which exhibit these causal features in a particularly important
way. These are the ‘robust causal junction laws’ to be dealt with in §5.3.
In closing this section, I suppose that even by this stage it is likely that some
will remain unconvinced that the causal intuitions I have drawn on in
motivating the four causal features of laws are really reflective of anything
objective. The Russellian intuition is a strong one, particularly in philosophy
of physics, and it is unlikely to be completely overturned by drawing on
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common turns of phrase found in textbooks or drawing on intuitions about
explanation and intervention motivated outside rigorous experiment.
Nonetheless, I think I’ve done enough in the foregoing sections to motivate
the fact that we do have those causal intuitions about laws. Given that, it
seems like a legitimate project to attempt to see if an analysis of the putative
relations is forthcoming. This will be the project of §6. However, I also take
it as implicit in what follows that the development of a coherent account of
laws which not only incorporates the causal intuitions motivated above but
also analyses them in ways typically associated with causal analysis (e.g. in
terms of probabilistic dependency) would lend even more support to the
causal features motivated above. I would ask, then, that those who remain
unconvinced by the causal conception as it has so far been developed in this
chapter to hold off their judgement until they have taken into consideration
the full account developed in the rest of this chapter and in §6.
5.3 Robust causal junction laws (RCJLs)
Here I want to introduce the idea of a particular kind of system which
exhibits all the causal features described in §5.2.5 in a particularly important
and prevalent way. I call such systems ‘robust causal junctions’ and laws
which concern them ‘robust causal junction laws’ (RCJLs). The aim of this
section is to explain exactly what a robust causal junction is and why RCJLs
are so useful to us. While RCJLs form a significant proportion of the laws,
they do not account for all laws. Nonetheless, it is my understanding that
RCJLs form a central class of laws from which the rest can be understood as
playing a derivative or supporting role. Showing how is the project of §5.4.5.
The concept of robustness in scientific practice often indicates that
perturbations of a certain type do not influence the overall behaviour of a
system. In the case of component-level dispositionality, this robustness comes
from the fact that changes in the material or construction of a component in
a system need not affect the overall type of system if its disposition remains
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constant. As I pointed out in §5.2.1, this is a very useful feature of
system-types in general. For instance, electrical conductivity can be achieved
by a number of different materials, hence the systems which electrical laws
concern are robust to the extent that the conductivity of their components is
not affected by changes in their material. The fact that systems can be
robust in this way means that we can look elsewhere for more suitable
materials or designs to play the same role in a system.
A different kind of robustness in a system comes from the fact that changes
in the complexity of an environment does not affect the qualitative causal
relations it exhibits. As mentioned in §5.2.2, the phenomenon of system-types
with the law-level disposition of embeddability enables us to idealise away
from the real-world complexities to more easily perform rough predictions.
An extra benefit arises when it is not only the numerical relations which are
preserved (as a special case) in embedded contexts, but when the variable-level
causal asymmetries are preserved as well. As has been noted before, though
in different terms, such idealisation can help us draw clearer causal analogies
across phenomena of varying degrees and types of complexity (Hesse 1963),
allow us to set up more stable interventions and controls (Elgin 2004) and allow
us to better conceptualise the complex theoretical body of causal knowledge
about environments in which embedded systems appear Woody (2015).
Systems which are robust in these two ways are clearly very useful to us, and
it is plausible that many of the laws we care about will be those which concern
them. RCJLs are just of this sort. But of course, neither form of robustness
is particularly desirable unless the behaviour associated with the system is of
interest. This is where the idea of a causal junction comes in.
A causal junction is any set of multiple causal relations which all share the
same effect—what I will call the ‘focus’ of the causal junction. Many of the
laws we have considered so far which exhibit a variable-level causal asymmetry
are ones in which there is clearly a single variable which is the effect of all other
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Table 5.2: Laws’ focal-variables and their variable-level causes
Law Focal-variable Variable-levelcauses
Ohm’s law I V,R
Total force law a F,m
Lorentz-force law F q,E,v,B
Law of mutually
gravitating bodies F m1,m2, r
Law of pendulum
motion T l, g
Snell’s law θ2 θ1, v2, v1
Compton shift law λ′ λ,m, c, θ
Archard’s wear law Q K,W,L,H
First law of
thermodynamics ∆U Q,W
variables. This variable is the focus of causal junctions at the variable-level,
what I will call the ‘focal-variable’ (we shortly consider causal-junctions at the
law-level). So, for example, in Ohm’s law the focal-variable is current, in the
gravitational law it is force. In general, it seems to me that laws which exhibit
such variable-level asymmetries are very likely to be structured in this way.
Table 5.2 (p.187) provides a representative sample.
The tabulated causal junctions all exist at the variable-level. But we can also
draw attention to another kind causal junction present in most laws, which
exists at the law-level. Recall that in §5.2.4 I pointed out that if we break
down the criteria of identity for a system-type into its conditions of
componency and organisation, we can observe a causal relationship both
between the satisfaction of the conditions of componency and behaviour and
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the conditions of organisation and behaviour. Hence, we have a causal
junction at the law-level in which the focus is the overall behaviour
referenced in the law. Arguably, such ‘meta-junctions’ are even more
ubiquitous than variable-level causal junctions and are equally important to
the definition of a robust causal junction, not least because they help us
better analyse law-level asymmetry (see §6.2.5).
One might reasonably enquire whether there are causal relations between the
variable-level and law-level causal junctions. The connection is certainly not
straightforward. Since the foci are different in each case, we cannot simply
add to one junction the causes of the other. Moreover, it would seem wrong
to restrict the causes in the law-level junciton to a causal influence only over
the focus at the variable-level junction. In many cases, law-level causes
(i.e. conditions of componency and organisation) have causal influence over
the variable-level causes as well. For example, in the case of the causal
junction in Ohm’s law, the value of voltage potential V (a cause in the
variable-level junction) owes its existence to the resistor and voltage potential
being appropriately organised (a cause in the law-level junction).
In general, I think we can draw at least the following point concerning the
causal relations between law-level causal junctions and their corresponding
variable-level junctions: that the causes in the junctions at either variable-
level or law-level are always causal influences, though perhaps only indirectly,
of the focal-variable (i.e. the focus of the variable-level causal junction). Even
if the law-level causal junction has the satisfaction of the whole variable-level
model as its immediate focus, the causes in that junction will have the focal-
variable as a ‘derivative’ effect. For example, in the specific case of Ohm’s law
this amounts to the claim that the causes (derivative or otherwise) of current
I are the cause-variables from the variable-level causal junction (i.e. R and V )
and also the cause-variables from the law-level junction (i.e. the conditions of
componency and organisation for Ohm’s law’s system-type; see Table §3.1).
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I believe that many laws can be naturally understood as concerning both
variable-level and law-level causal junctions. Observing this trend one might
wonder why so many laws are like that. Continuing with the theme of
explaining features of laws by exposing their utility, consider a simple game
in which players roll a die d Rd times and calculate scores by summing the
values of each roll, where V id represents the number of times value i comes up
on d. The numerical relationships in the scenario can be represented in the
following equation.
Rd = V 1d + V 2d + V 3d + V 4d + V 5d + V 6d
This equation tells us that the number of rolls is equal to the sum of the
total number of times each value of a die comes up. If the number of rolls
increases, so will ∑6i=1 V id . Arguably, the equation exhibits variable-level causal
asymmetries. After all, we know that it is the roll of a die which causally
explains the number which comes up and not vice versa (see Jeffrey 1971, for
some indirect support of this). However, the asymmetries do not have the form
of a causal junction, since there are multiple effect-variables (V 1d , V 2d , ...) and
only one cause-variable (Rd). For that reason, it is of limited value for certain
practices.
To see why, notice that we can’t ascertain for any instance of an increase in rolls
with any certainty which specific effect-variables will increase. Now, when we
construct gambling games we often want a repeatable element of randomness
beyond the powers of the players to straightforwardly predict. This is what the
roll of a die provides us with. But for that very same reason, a die would make
a relatively poor device with which to perform other goals, such as controlling
the rate of increase in score as one increases the rolls, or finding a way to
achieve specific scores given that one knows how many rolls will take place. In
general, the roll of a die is a poor tool to use in the service of in performing
the effective strategies we often expect causal knowledge to provide us with.
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One way to improve our predictive abilities for an indeterministic process is to
reduce the number of effect-variables. Obviously, the most desirable structure
for these purposes is the limit case in which there is only one effect-variable.
If only rolls which resulted in a ‘four’ were counted then one could very easily
predict the score one would achieve with a certain number or countable rolls,
and one could very easily control the score by controlling the number of rolls.
This, in effect, is an expression of the utility of causal scenarios in which there
is a causal focus.
But there is also another way to improve our chances: one could increase
the number of cause-variables. If the game described above instead allowed
players to choose the number of dice Dd they threw each roll, where the score
for each roll is the sum of all the values on each die rolled in that throw, then
they would be able to exercise more predictable control over their scores. If
someone’s current score is 93 and their main priority is to end up as close to
100 as possible, they can work out that their best bet is to have one more roll
with two die, or two more rolls with one die. Furthermore, if some technicality
limits that player to a certain number of dice Dd they can compensate by
choosing an appropriate number of rolls Rd and vice versa. This, in effect is
an expression of the utility of the presence of multiple cause-variables for any
effect. More cause variables often means more options for control, prediction
and intervention (at least, where the variables can be intervened on).
In effect, what this reasoning shows us is the utility of causal junction
structures in which there is only one effect—a focus—and multiple causal
variables. Moreover, while we have reasoned this through considering
variable-level asymmetries, it also carries over to junctions at the law-level.
In the dice-game case, we know that substituting a 6-sided die for a 4-sided
die (a change in the components) will affect the overall relationship between
number of rolls and potential increases in value. We also know that sticking
all the dice together so that the values on each die are no longer independent
(a change in organisation) will similarly have an effect on overall behaviour.
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We might also imagine that we could compensate for a change in the number
of sides on a die by sticking it to another die to control for certain outcomes.
In combination with the two kinds of robustness described earlier the presence
of two levels of causal junction in systems licenses a particularly useful kind
of generalisation about them. These generalisations, I propose, are the robust
causal junction laws (RCJLs), and the systems they describe robust causal
junctions. More specifically:
Robust Causal Junction Laws
A generalisation of the form ∀x(Sx → Bx) is a robust causal
junction law if and only if:
• S is a system-type with dispositional conditions of com-
ponency,
• B is modified (see §3.3.3)
• There are at least three variables in B exactly one of which
is the effect of all the others (i.e. a focal-variable),
• B is the effect of the conditions of componency and
conditions of organisation for S (i.e. a focus in the law-
level causal junction).
RCJLs will play a central role in defining the soon-to-be-defined
causal-junctions conception of laws (see §5.4.5), the Humean account of laws
to be provided in §6 and the analysis of causation to be provided in §7. They
are, therefore, perhaps the key concept of this entire thesis. But despite their
pervasiveness, RCJLs do not account for every law, hence it is incumbent to
say how they are related with other laws.
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5.4 Non-robust causal junction laws
(Non-RCJLs)
Not all laws are RCJLs. Some are almost RCJLs, others are not even close.
This section works through a few examples which show how a law might fail
to be an RCJL. My aim is to show, in each case, why these ‘non-RCJLs’ are
nonetheless closely related to causal junctions and RCJLs. I will take this
as an indication that the notion of lawhood in general is dependent on the
existence of and close connection with the characteristics which define RCJLs.
5.4.1 Example 1: the ideal gas law
The behavioural equation of the ideal gas law in its standard arrangement is,
PV = nRT.
Plausibly (and I take this to be supported by the standard arrangement) the
variable-level asymmetries are such that temperature T and quantity of
substance n are cause-variables and pressure P and volume V are
effect-variables. After all, if we intervene on either T or n (say by increasing
them), we will expect the function P × V to increase. However, if the system
is materially and mechanically isolated, an intervention on either pressure or
volume would not result in change to quantity of substance or temperature.7
7Sometimes in practice when we intervene on volume, we can affect temperature too—
as in diesel engines when the gases contained in the piston-chambers ignite as a result
of an increase in temperature as the piston compresses the gas. (Thanks to Inge de
Bal for suggesting this example to me and pressing me on the issues discussed in this
section.) However, we must be careful not to intuit a causal symmetry between volume
and temperature. Strictly speaking, the temperature of a gas increases in a diesel engine
because work is supplied to the system by imparting momentum to the gas-particles and not
because the volume the particles have to move around in diminishes. It is, thereby, possible
(though not easy) to intervene on volume without supplying work to the system such that
temperature does not change, and it is possible to intervene on work without changing the
volume such that temperature does increase. Changes in volume and work of a diesel engine
in such a process are effects of a common cause, viz. compression of the piston. Temperature
increases are a result of the change in work only.
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Granting that the variable-level asymmetries associated with the equation
should be interpreted this way, it is clear that they do not capture that of a
causal junction, since there are two effect-variables and hence no
focal-variable. If we knew nothing more about the systems which obey the
equation than that they are ideal gases in a closed cavity, we would not be
able to tell, for some adjustment in temperature, say, whether or not
pressure, volume or both would increase.
I think we should concede that in this under-specified state, the law does not
have an unambiguous interpretation in terms of a causal junction.8 But we
can still claim that it has interpretations as an RCJL in specific contexts of
application. For instance, when we turn up the heat under a sealed pressure
cooker, we know that the pressure of the gas inside will increase. When we we
put a blown up balloon in the fridge, we know that its volume will decrease.
We know these things because we know something extra about the respective
systems than is required by what it takes to be an instance of the system-
type in the ideal gas law. Specifically, we know whether or not the systems
are (nearly) isometric or isobaric. Table 5.3 (p.193) represents the process of
disambiguation.
So, while the variable-level asymmetries of the ideal gas law does not have an
8I suppose we could posit some new variable ‘X’ where X = P ×V as the focal variable.
This might render the variable-level asymmetries of the modified equation that of a causal
junction. Although I take it that replacing P × V with X in the ideal gas law would (at
best) change the law itself. We are interested here specifically in the ideal gas law.
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unambiguous causal junction associated with it, there are further contextual
specifications commonly applied in practice which are clearly associated with
a single kind of causal junction.9 In general, we might reasonably expect other
laws with ambiguous focal-variables to be associated with further contextual
disambiguating procedures which render them able to be treated as RCJLs in
those contexts.
5.4.2 Example 2: Gauss’s law
The second law whose variable-level asymmetries fail to have a straightforward
association with a causal junction is Gauss’s law. The behavioural equation
relates the displacement electrical field D normal to a closed surface S to the







Similarly to gravitational fields, which can be understood as the result of the
presence of mass, the displacement field in Gauss’s law is typically considered
the result of the presence of free and bound charges. It can therefore seem
natural to consider the variable-level causal asymmetries associated with the
equation in Gauss’s law to be such that the charge p contained within the
volume is a cause and the displacement D normal to the closed surface its
effect.
The choice of Gaussian surface also has an influence on the values we obtain
for contained charge and displacement. This might lead us to posit the
surface as another cause of displacement thereby allowing for an
9From a historical perspective, this is just what we would expect, given that the ideal
gas law was, in fact, discovered via a precisification of Avagadro’s law and three further
previously known laws concerning the dependence of volume on temperature at constant
pressure (Charles’ law), of pressure on temperature at constant volume (Guy-Lussac law),
and of pressure on volume at constant temperature (Boyle’s law). All of these latter laws
are RCJLs.
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interpretation of the law as an RCJL (with displacement as the
focal-variable). However, I think it would reasonably be objected that S is
not a genuine cause. For the displacement field itself is not causally
influenced by our choice of surface, only the value of field displacement across
the surface. Moreover, since Gaussian surfaces are generally acknowledged to
be imaginary mathematical devices ‘which need not coincide with any real
physical surface’ (Serway and Jewett 2006, 626), a causal effect of the surface
on anything can seem even less plausible.
Nonetheless, knowledge of the change in field across different Gaussian surfaces
can help us make practical decisions. For instance, it can help us decide how
best to develop the geometry of a capacitor. When we build a capacitor we
will want to build conductors which can contain a charge-distribution across
surfaces which can be brought close together to create a large uniform electric
field. Knowledge of Gaussian surfaces in the context of Gauss’s law tells us
that flat plates will serve well since they have a high surface to volume ratio
and can be uniformly separated by a small distance. The three variables of
Gauss’s law thus serve to provide knowledge of causal junctions where charge
and conductor-geometry causally influence the electric field.
So, even if Gauss’s law does not have a straightforward interpretation as an
RCJL, the law seems to be conceived of in such a way that it can be used in
contexts which enable it to be treated as one.
5.4.3 Example 3: the Planck-Einstein law
The third example of a non-RCJL I will consider is the Planck-Einstein law.
This relates photons’ energy E to their frequency ν according to the following
equation (where h is the Planck constant).
E = hν
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There are at least two reasons the variables in this equation cannot have
asymmetries of the form of a causal junction. First, there are only two
variables. So even if there were any causal influence at all between them,
there is no third variable with which to form a causal junction. Second, it
would be grossly misleading to say that physicists thought of frequency as a
cause of a photon’s energy or vice versa. The relationship, instead, seems to
capture something like a conversion from one set of units to another.
Frequency, we might say, is the way a photon’s energy manifests.
Unlike the previous non-RCJLs, I don’t believe there is a legitimate way to
conceive of the variables in this law as causally related. However, I think we
can show how the Planck-Einstein law is informatively associated with a law
which does exhibit variable-level causal asymmetry and more specifically is an
RCJL: Planck’s law.
Planck’s law, relates the system-type black-body with a behavioural property
defined by the following equation (where Bν(ν, T ) is the spectral radiance of a
body in the frequency ν at temperature T ; c is the constant speed of light in
a vacuum and kB the Boltzmann constant).
Bν(ν, T ) =
2hν3
c2(ehν/kBT − 1)
In contrast with the Planck-Einstein relation, the Planck equation more
plausibly has variable-level asymmetries in the form of a causal junction,
since the temperature and frequency of radiation may be reasonably
considered cause-variables and spectral radiance a focal-variable. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that spectral radiance is an emission
of energy which has been absorbed as a result of the heat transfer process
which confers the black-body with heat, and further that the quantity of
radiance is explained (in quantum physics) by the distance between energy
levels at different frequencies.
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But Planck was only able to explain the correctness of the Planck law under
the assumption that the numerical relationship between the frequency and
potential energy-changes of his ‘atomic oscillators’ in black-bodies’ cavity
walls was E = hν. Therefore, despite itself failing to exhibit the features
characteristics of an RCJL, the Planck-Einstein law bears an important
theoretical role supporting the truth of a law which does.
5.4.4 Example 4: Single-value laws
The final non-RCJL I will consider is rather different from any law so far
considered. All the previously considered laws are multi-variable laws
(MVLs): their behaviour-predicates are characterised by a formulae in which
there appears more than one variable. However, I think it is plausible that
we should treat a whole further range of conditionals as laws which do not
have this feature. Table 5.4 (p.198) displays some examples.
The tabulated cases may not always be explicitly referenced as being laws, but
they certainly seem sufficiently lawlike for them to be titled so. After all, they
concern the behaviour of certain kinds of systems whose criteria of identity can
be divided into conditions of componency and (admittedly trivial) conditions
of organisation. These conditionals are also plausibly taken to support certain
counterfactuals, can be incorporated into causal explanations and so on.
However, these laws clearly do not have a natural conception in terms of causal
junctions. First, the behaviour-predicates only incorporate reference to one
property. Since causal junctions require at least three property-terms (one for
the focus and at least two for causes), there is no way that laws can exhibit
the necessary variable-level asymmetries to form a causal junction. Second,
the system-types’ conditions of assembly are too simple. In most cases of
MVLs the system-types’ conditions of assembly comprise both conditions of
componency and conditions of organisation. The laws just tabulated, however,
only require of systems that they be an entity of a certain monadic property
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Table 5.4: Table of single value laws
Law S conditions of assembly BComp’ts Organis’n
electron-charge electron x:electron none -1eV(x)
proton-charge proton x: proton none 1eV(x)
metal-


















none x exerts force oncharged particles.
Gene-
heritability gene x: gene none heritable(x)
Lion-nutrition lion x: lion none Carnivorous(x)
Gold value gold x: gold none x is good money.
5.4. NON-ROBUST CAUSAL JUNCTION LAWS (NON-RCJLS) 199
with trivial conditions of organisation.
For these reasons, I call the above laws ‘single-value laws’ (SVLs) and
distinguish them from MVLs. SVLs are a special case of counterexample to
the claim that laws can be interpreted in terms of causal junctions which are
worth focused consideration. For as well as failing to count as laws
concerning causal junctions, SVLs also fail to exhibit component-level
dispositionality. Consequently, they are not robust in the way that RCJLs
are. (This is also plausibly true of some MVLs, such as the Planck-Einstein
law.)
However, whilst there are no dispositional criteria in SVLs’ system-predicates,
there are dispositional requirements in their behaviour-predicates. This feature
makes them pertinent to the application of many MVLs. For we can see how
knowledge of an SVL can help us determine whether a particular object is a
suitable component for an instance of some multi-variable system-type. An
SVL tells us, for instance, that,
All copper is electrically conductive,
where being electrically conductive is a disposition to conduct electricity. Yet
another SVL tells us that,
All polystyrene is electrically insulating.
where being electrically insulating is a disposition to insulate (rather than
conduct) electricity. Clearly such SVLs are invaluable if, for instance, we want
to build an electrical circuit which obeys Kirchhoff’s or Ohm’s laws, since to
be an instance of those laws’ system-types, the respective system must be
built from components which are electrically conductive. So, although SVLs
do not themselves exhibit the variable-level or law-level causal asymmetries of
a causal junction, they nonetheless often play a vital role in helping us make
use of laws which do.
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5.4.5 The causal-junctions conception of laws
We’ve now looked at four kinds of law which are not RCJLs. Certainly this
is enough evidence to conclude that not all laws are RCJLs; there exist non-
RCJLs. However, in each case, I have tried to show how the non-RCJLs
are inferentially connected to RCJLs in some crucial manner. Some laws can
be treated as derivative of RCJLs which have further contextually variable
conditions of assembly concerning the context in which they are applied; some
can be treated as derivative of RCJLs used in construction or design of certain
systems; some can be treated as supportive of RCJLs by allowing for certain
substitutions of variables; some can be treated as supportive of RCJLs for
the sake of construction and design of their system-types. In general, non-
RCJLs appear to be inferentially connected with RCJLs in what I will call
from hereon a ‘supportive or derivative way’. Although I understand that the
above examples of various supportive or derivative ways may not be exhaustive,
I will take them as evidence that all laws are either RCJLs or connected in
some supportive or derivative way to laws which are RCJLs.
This insight forms the the basis of the causal-junctions conception of laws
which can be summarised with a single slogan: all laws concern robust causal
junctions. But more precision is provided by the following definition.
The causal-junctions conception of laws
A generalisation G is a law if and only if it has the form
∀x(Sx→ Bx), and either:
• G is an RCJL (see p.191), or,
• there is some other generalisation G′ which is an RCJL,
and G is inferentially connected to G′ in some supportive
or derivative way.
Despite the open-endedness and vagueness of the notion of a ‘supportive or
derivative way’ I think the conception is suitably defined to provide us with a
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fairly deep understanding of the relationship between laws and causal
relations. The conception reveals that RCJLs are key to our general
conception of lawhood, and since causation is central to the classification of
RCJLs, this puts causation right back into our conception of laws.
5.5 Proposal for a causal-junctions account
of laws
Recall that to say there is a causal conception of laws is to imply that there are
certain truth-preserving inferences between laws and causal facts. We saw how
this worked in the case of the causation-mirroring conception of laws. Under
that view, laws mirrored the structure of causal relations such that for any
causal relation, there would be a law which ‘covered’ it, and for any law, there
would be causal occurrences which could count as an instance of it. Crucially,
granting the conception does not imply any direction of metaphysical priority.
While some who upheld the causation-mirroring conception would follow the
traditional Humean approach of grounding causation in facts about laws (e.g.
Paul 2000, Schaffer 2001, Baumgartner 2008), others (e.g. Armstrong 2004a)
take there to be no direction of priority and perhaps others still, a priority in
the opposite direction.
Having said that—and as we saw with the causation-mirroring conception—if
we take causation to be a primitive in our analysis, then the causal-junctions
conception can provide us with a fairly substantial non-Humean account of
laws (due to the open-endedness of the conception I stop short of calling such
an explication of laws an analysis). The account can be expressed as follows.
The causal-junctions account of laws
What constitutes a generalisation having the status of a law is
its satisfaction of the criteria described by the causal-junctions
conception of laws.
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By saying that the conception constitutes lawhood, the account makes the
inferential connections defined by the conception part of what underlies the
very character of laws, explaining what makes them special.
But observe that in fact, there is nothing in the causal-junctions account as it
is stated above which a Humean could not in principle agree with. Under a
Humean perspective, the causal-junctions account indicates how certain type-
level causal relations can be employed to account for laws thereby implying
that previous Humean attempts to analyse all causation only once the laws
have been established (as those who uphold BSA do) was wrong. Obviously it
is then incumbent on the Humean to show how causal features which contribute
to the definition of RCJLs can be analysed in terms of the mosaic.
This Humean strategy is precisely what I will be proposing in §6. But before
moving on to that specifically Humean goal, it will be informative to consider
briefly the merits of the causal junctions account of laws regardless of whether
it is to be adopted by the primitivist about causation or the Humean.
As a first remark, the causal-junctions account of laws provides an indication
of how we might account for those aspects of law mentioned in §4.2 from
Lewis. For example, the connection with robust causal junctions shows that
laws cannot be individuated by logic alone and it seems to be consistent with
the idea that laws are contingent and mind-independent. The account also
gives us a suggestion as to why many theorems of scientifically confirmed
theories are reasonably held to be laws. For if those theorems concern similar
causal relationships, or else are inferentially related to such relationships in
appropriately derivative or supportive ways, then those theorems will also be
laws according to the account. Notice, however, that without any further
criteria, the account is not committed to every theorem of a confirmed law
coming out as a law. This, I take it, is a good thing; as I pointed out in §2.2
with regard to NP, the commitment to an unrestricted deductive closure seems
to render accounts of laws subject to counterexample.
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Although it beyond the scope of the thesis to explore the idea fully, we might
also be hopeful that the connection made in the account between laws and
causation will help us to see more clearly the way in which counterfactuals
come to be supported by laws (a feature noted by many, e.g. Goodman 1947,
Hempel 1965, Swoyer 1982, Fales 1990, Loewer 1996). Moreover, it should be
considered a significant boon of the account that it is so clearly inferentially
connected with the causal knowledge. Throughout §5.2 and in §5.3 I have
made an effort to show how useful all the causal features of RCJLs are and
so, derivatively, how useful the non-RCJLs inferentially connected to them.
If we think it is a feature of the laws we posit that they bear a significant
degree of practical and epistemic benefit (as seems especially plausible from
a Humean perspective Hall 2015) then any account which stays true to the
causal-junctions conception would seem to offer a particularly comprehensive
explanation of what this benefit is.
As a last point in support a causal-junctions account of laws, I want to return
to a point briefly touched on in §3.3.3 concerning the legitimacy of some special
case formulae over others. Consider, for instance, the equation which features









For this equation, τ is shear stress of the fluid, µ is the steady-shear viscosity,
∂u
∂y
is the velocity variation across the y direction (transverse to direction of
flow), κ is bulk viscosity and v the bulk flow velocity (I is the identity
tensor). There are many variables we could fix at constants to get a special
case equation. One notable example is the equation we get by putting
∇ · v = 0. For this gives us the equation which describes the behaviour in
Newton’s constitutive law for incompressible fluids. However, some fixings of
variables are certainly off the table. Perhaps most clearly, we would not get a
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legitimate special case by taking τ as constant.
In §3.3.3 I had no explanation for this distinction, but now it seems like there
might be one available: that special cases of a formula are only legitimate for
reference in laws’ behaviour-predicates if they do not treat the focal-variable of
the formula as a single value. Since τ is the focal-variable of the constitutive
law for compressible flow, we get a legitimate special case when fixing other
variables (such as ∇ · v), but not when fixing τ itself.
It’s not hard to see why this would be a general, if implicit, rule in our practice
of formulating laws. Laws, and RCJLs in particular, are constructed around
causal junctions which allow us to control or predict a particular variable of
interest: the focal-variable. Since interventions or changes in variables in such
junctions typically lead to a change in the focal-variable, special cases in which
the focal-variable is stable will be relatively rare. Indeed, it is this feature of
causal junctions which forms the basis of the probabilistic analysis for them
in §6.2. But already we can see why special cases of formulae in which the
focal-variable is assumed to remain a single value are unlikely to be of much
use to us.
Given the foregoing, an account of laws which adopts the causal-junctions
conception as the central insight clearly has many merits. Were we to take
causation as a primitive, we might end there. But my project aims to satisfy
the Humean methodology. Consequently, there is further work required to
show how the relevant causal features of RCJLs (two of dispositionality, two
of causal asymmetry) can be given a Humean analysis.
6 A Humean analysis of robustcausal junction laws
At the end of the previous chapter I proposed a ‘causal-junctions account of
laws’. In effect, this suggests that all laws can be understood derivatively of a
special class of laws: the robust causal junction laws (RCJLs). These laws in
turn are to be accounted for in terms of their causal features, viz. the
component-level and law-level dispositionality, which makes them robust by
stabalising their instances against certain kinds of interference, and the
structure of variable-level and law-level causal asymmetries, which take the
form of causal junctions each centering on a single respective effect or ‘focus’.
In proposing a causal-junctions account I have made free use of causal terms,
thereby offering it as a complete account for the primitivist about causation
or a partial account for the Humean. In this chapter I aim to make it
respectable from the perspective of a Humean methodology by analysing the
causal features of RCJLs.
Analysing the kinds of causal feature which go into characterising RCJLs in
Humean terms has proven tricky in the past, and the task at hand might
plausibly be thought even tougher given the causal-junctions account of laws.
Typically Humean treatments of causation have assumed the laws are
decidable prior to any account of causation (e.g. Reichenbach 1956, Lewis
1973a, Dowe 2000, Baumgartner 2008, Fenton-Glynn 2011). This way the
laws can be used to then provide an account of causation. However, if
type-level causal phenomena such as those concerning dispositionality and
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causal asymmetry are to be used to provide an account of laws in the way
this current proposal has it, we certainly can’t expect to analyse those causal
phenomena with laws.
Nonetheless, I believe the task of giving a Humean analysis of those causal
features which enter into the causal-junctions account of laws can be
provided without circularity. In §6.1 I focus on the features of RCJLs which
contribute to their robustness, i.e. component-level and law-level
dispositonality. I then move on, in §6.2, to give analysis of the causal
asymmetry in RCJLs by providing a probabilistic analysis of causal
junctions. §6.3 concludes.
6.1 Analysis of RCJLs’ dispositionality
Here I propose to analyse the dispositional features present in RCJLs. I begin,
in §6.1.1 with a defence of an extensional conditional analysis of dispositions
‘StoCA’ inspired by that given by Storer (1951). I then discuss, in §6.1.2,
the problem of masks, which I take to be the central obstacle to developing
successful conditional analyses. As I understand it, the problem of masks
is closely connected with issues of universality and in §6.1.3 I show how the
solution of ‘behaviour-modification’ proposed in §3.3.3 can also be put to work
in giving us an extensional analysis of both law-level and component-level
dispositions in laws without the threat of masks. The outcome of this analysis
is that we can confidently assert the dispositional features of RCJLs without
concern that this threatens the Humean methodology.
6.1.1 In defence of an extensional analysis of
dispositions
It might not immediately seem obvious why a Humean is threatened by
dispositional properties. After all, the Humean methodology was defined in
§2 as a position which requires no reference to primitive causal connections in
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the final analysis, rather than causal properties. Still, dispositions were
introduced in terms of a potential to cause or be caused to do things. At
best, this can sound like shifting causal talk away from the actual mosaic to
some possible causal events, thereby invoking both subjunctive causal talk. I
will assume from hereon that any honest Humean would aim to find an
analysis of dispositions in terms of the mosaic.
The project of analysing dispositions in non-causal (specifically, Humean)
terms has been long and, arguably, unresolved. A good place to start
recounting its development is with the early and quickly dismissed suggestion
that dispositions should be understood as having the form of an extensional
conditional analysis (ExCA) of the following form.
(ExCA) ∀x(Dx↔ ∀t(T (x, t)→M(x, t)))
In ExCA, x ranges over objects and t times, ‘D’ is replaced by some
dispositional property term, T by a categorical stimulus or ‘trigger’ condition
and M by a categorical manifesting behaviour of the disposition. So, for
instance, the disposition of fragility might be analysed,
∀x(Fragile(x)↔ ∀t(Stress(x, t)→ Breaks(x, t)))
Despite all its problems (to be discussed shortly), ExCA has a number of
notable merits. First, it has the form of a genuine analysis. This is because
its instances, if true, would provide conditions that all and only objects with
the corresponding disposition replacing D have. Second, it is a conditional
analysis drawing on stimulus and manifestation conditions. This is invariably
the way in which philosophers have thought an analysis of dispositions should
proceed and I will assume the same. Third, it is something the Humean
can accept, since the stimulus and manifestation conditions (the properties T
and M) are defined to be categorical (as opposed to dispositional) with no
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non-trivial causal, subjunctive or higher-order characteristics. Fourth, it is
extensional; that is, the truth-values of instances of ExCA are determined by
the distribution of the extension of their terms. This is to be contrasted with
opaque truth-conditions (defined in terms of beliefs or desires) and intensional
truth-conditions (which make reference to possibilia). While I suppose the
latter could be entertained under a Humean approach which openly embraced
modal realism (see Lewis 1986f) I will assume this would constitute a concession
on the part of the Humean. An extensional analysis restricted to the actual is
just the sort of thing a Humean would aim for were it considered workable.
So much for the merits of ExCA. One issue with it concerns the inclusion of
an explicit time-variable. Presumably, in propositions which do quantify over
times, the absence of a time variable from a predicate-clause is supposed to
indicate the permanence of the property. But though D lacks a time variable
in ExCA, I see no reason in general to suspect that dispositions are essentially
always had by their bearers (see McKitrick 2005). We should assume, I think,
only that the disposition needs to be instantiated at least for the time in which
it is stimulated and manifests. But if stimulus and manifestation are at the
same time (as indicated above) then why include an explicit time variable in
the dispositional predication at all? Just as we did with Schema 2 for laws, it
may seem better to simply leave time out of the explicit formulation.
But is it in fact true that all dispositions manifest simultaneously with their
stimulation? Although this conflicts with some analyses (e.g. Malzkorn 2000),
it seems to me that as long as we treat the relevant predications in the present-
continuous, we will retain the simultaneity in all the cases we’re interested in
(viz. those dispositions which feature in laws). Indeed, it is plausible that this
will work for dispositions in general. For example, a cube of sugar may dissolve
after it is placed in water, but it will be dissolving as soon as, and throughout
the time that, it is immersed in the water. A vase may be breaking still after
the striking is over, just as temazepam makes one sleep after one has ingested
it. But at least it seems correct to say that a vase is breaking as soon as
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it is being struck, and a person is growing sleepy as soon as the temazepam
starts to be ingested. In general dispositions are manifesting as soon as, and
throughout the time that, they are being stimulated.1
Insofar as ExCA is plausible at all, I will assume it is harmless to leave out
the time-variables. This leaves us with the following.
(ExCA*) ∀x(Dx↔ (Tx→Mx))
A harder problem to solve both for ExCA and ExCA* was pointed out by
Carnap (1936). If something is never struck or it breaks for any reason
whatsoever, then the above analysis deems the object fragile. But this is
surely too inclusive. Plenty of fragile things never break and plenty of
non-fragile things break, e.g. under extreme stress.
In response, Carnap suggested that the best we can hope for are ‘reduction
sentences’ for dispositions of the following schematic form.
(CRS) ∀x∀t(T (x, t)→ (D(x, t)↔M(x, t))).
The corresponding reduction sentence for fragility does not appear to make
the unwanted ascription of fragility to non-fragile objects (as ExCA* does).
But this comes at the cost of only partially defining the disposition, since a
reduction sentence does not give a necessary and sufficient condition for having
a disposition but only the condition for having the disposition D if it is subject
to stimulus T . Hence, reduction sentences will not help us analyse dispositional
ascriptions by substituting them with any expression in terms of the mosaic’s
categorical properties.
1Ultimately, the move to get rid of time-indexes is one of simplification. If it turns out
that they are after all required to define some dispositions (e.g. in relativistic contexts) I
will assume they could be put back in.
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In response to this failure of extensional analysis, a subsequent approach was to
introduce subjunctive conditionals into the analysis. What has become known
as the ‘standard conditional analysis’ (SCA) of dispositions has the following
schema.
(SCA) ∀x(Dx↔ (Tx Mx))
‘’ symbolises the subjunctive conditional so that the right hand side of SCA
is to be read ‘had it been the case that Tx then it would have been the case
that Mx’. Under this schema, fragility gets defined informally,
Anything is fragile if it would break were it struck.
As Choi and Fara (2016) point out ‘SCA has been explicitly endorsed by Ryle
(1949), Goodman (1954), and Quine (1960) and implicitly by countless others’.
Despite its plausibility, there are many reasons not to accept SCA. One issue
with it is the plethora of counterexamples to many of its putative instances.
Consider the above analysis of fragility in its terms. A moment’s thought shows
that it is false for at least the following four reasons. First, if a something is
wrapped in enough bubble-wrap it may not break despite being struck even
if it were fragile. In such cases we say the disposition has been ‘masked’ (or
there exists an ‘antidote’, Bird 1998). Second, if something were protected by a
force-field whenever anything hard comes near it above a certain momentum,
it may not break if it were struck even if it were otherwise fragile; in such
cases we say the disposition is subject to ‘reverse-cycle finks’ (Choi and Fara
2016). Third, if something is liable to be subjected to some further destructive
mechanism while being struck, e.g. a dissolving agent, then it might be the
case that it would break were it struck even if it were not fragile; in such
cases we say the disposition has been ‘mimicked’ (Johnston 1992). Fourth,
if something were subject to a significant restructuring mechanism whenever
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struck it might break were it struck even if it were not otherwise fragile; in
such cases we say that the disposition is subject to a ‘fink’ (Martin 1994).
There have been a number of responses to one or other of these
counterexamples, some more plausible than others (Bird 2007a, Choi 2008b,
Lewis 1997, Malzkorn 2000, Manley and Wasserman 2011). But while I will
come to consider some of these shortly, there is a more immediate concern
with SCA worth mentioning for the particular project at hand. As we have
seen, SCA proposes to analyse dispositions in terms of subjunctive
conditionals and hence is no longer extensional. Now, there are Humeans
who have accepted the employment of subjunctives in their analysis of
dispositions (e.g. Lewis 1997), but the duty then must be to analyse the
subjunctive claims themselves in Humean terms. While such analyses do
exist, they will not be appropriate for our project, since almost every
plausible reductive semantics for subjunctive conditionals (including those
explicitly Humean) uses laws to analyse them (see, e.g. Stalnaker 1968, Lewis
1973b, Jackson 1977, Maudlin 2007). Remember that the purpose of
providing an analysis of dispositions is so that the causal-junctions account of
laws can be rendered in a Humean light, thereby giving us a Humean
treatment of the causal-junctions account of laws. The laws themselves
cannot, therefore, be employed in an analysis of those very dispositions which
help to analyse them.2
So, SCA is not easily adopted under the current project. However, it appears
that there is, anyway, an extensional analysis which both improves on ExCA
and is not subject to so many of the problems listed for SCA two paragraphs
back. This is the analysis proposed by Storer (1951). Admitting that there
2Perhaps there are more nuanced options which might seem available to the Humean
who wants to maintain both a subjunctive conditional analysis of dispositions and propose a
causal-junctions account of laws. For instance, one could hold that there are ‘fundamental’
laws which have no dispositionality whatsoever and are sufficient to get the subjunctive
facts from where we get a causal analysis and finally the remaining dispositional laws.
However, I will not pursue this thought. I’m neither confident about the claim that there
are fundamental laws, nor about the claim that they would be without dispositionality were
there any.
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may be objects with a disposition which never get to manifest it because they
are never appropriately stimulated, Storer suggested that such objects will
nonetheless share some (categorical) property with a class of objects to which
the disposition can be attributed at least one of which is stimulated and none
of which fail to manifest the disposition when stimulated. In Storer’s original
(but expanded) formulation, this looks as follows.
∀x(Dx↔ (∃t(T (x, t) & M(x, t)) ∨
∃F ((Fx & ∃y(Fy & ∃t′(T (y, t′) & M(y, t′))) &
¬∃z(F (z) & ∃t′′(T (z, t′′) & M(z, t′′)))
It says that for anything x, it has a disposition D if and only if there is a time
t at which x is subject to stimulus T and manifests property M or else, there
is a property F which x and another object y has where y is stimulated by T
and manifests M at some time t′ and nothing z which has property F and is
stimulated in way T at a time t′′ is such that it manifests M at t′′.
Storer’s origninal formulation seems to me a bit long-winded. Following the
reasoning concerning ExCA, I think we can remove most of the time-variables.
Moreover, it can be reasonably reformulated in the following almost logically
equivalent but even more abbreviated way.
(StoCA) ∀x(Dx↔ ∃F (Fx & ∃y(Fy & Ty) & ∀z(Fz → (Tz →Mz))))
I say ‘almost logically equivalent’, since StoCA makes use of my assumption
that all dipositions manifest whilst being stimulated and unlike Storer’s
original precludes something having a disposition without also having a
categorical property F to which it can be attributed. Insofar as we expect to
explain dispositions via reference to a categorical property at all (something
made more plausible given consideration of SVLs; see §5.4.4), this latter
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preclusion seems like a reasonable further assumption.
Whilst being extensional, StoCA quantifies over properties as well as
particulars. I don’t suppose there is anything specifically problematic about
this. But if the analysis is to avoid triviality, it must be that the domain of
properties is restricted to some degree—the domain obviously shouldn’t
include dispositional properties! But it must also be restricted further to
avoid gerrymandered grue-like properties or properties defined by a list.
Storer’s rather brief suggestion is to restrict the properties to those denoted
by “‘natural’ predicates; i.e. undefined predicates, or predicates whose
definitions do not involve explicit reference to an individual’ (1951, fn.1).
Hence, the corresponding non-formalised expression of an analysis of fragility
might look something like the following.
For all things, it is fragile if and only if it has some natural
categorical property which something which is struck has such
that if anything has that property and is struck, it breaks.
It seems to me that there are many properties to which we might both plausibly
refer to as natural in some sense and to which we attribute objects’ fragility,
e.g. being made of thin glass, being made of thin porcelain, etc.
One might understandably be concerned with the brief definition for
naturalness given by Storer. But there is more to say. For the Humean, what
counts as natural is likely to have some connection with the basic
constituents of the mosaic. So, for Lewis, naturalness is a matter of degree,
with a set of perfectly natural properties populating the mosaic and less
natural entities being defined derivatively in terms of them; the more natural,
the simpler the definition (Lewis 1983, 1984). Others have proposed more
specific claims about what count as the fundamental properties and
consequently what counts as the most natural. Earman (1986), for instance,
counts space-time magnitudes as the central class of natural properties
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whereas Loewer (1996) considers them to be ‘changes of the locations and
motions of macroscopic spatio-temporal entities’ as well as ‘changes in
properties that account for locations and motions and so on’ (p.110).
A more radical Humean approach to naturalness has been advocated by
Callender and Cohen (2009; see also Schrenk 2007). Partly in an effort to
allow for the basic entities of special sciences to have a place among the
natural, Cohen and Callender (2009) suggest we advocate a world comprising
a plurality of mosaics layered over each other and individuated by the
properties relevant to existing and potential scientific fields. According to
such a picture the natural properties and kinds are relativised to the
particular granularity of the mosaic in which they are found. The various
mosaics have their own taxonomic structures of properties either basic to or
compounded from properties which are basic to that specific mosaic. Zoology
has a structure in which the basic properties are presented by genus-species
relations among animals; particle physics has a structure in which the basic
properties are presented by the standard model; microeconomics has a
structure in which the basic properties are presented by the model of
exchange of commodities between individuals and firms; etc. The naturalness
of a property is, therefore, relative to the mosaic in which it appears.
Whatever our answer concerning what defines the natural in the mosaic, I
take it that the analyses we provide for dispositions of the form StoCA
should quantify over properties which are at least as natural as the
dispositions’ stimulus and manifestation properties. Otherwise we once again
risk trivialising the analysis by allowing ‘grue’-like properties to count as
suitably natural. Of course, if it turns out that we must commit to a
particular view of naturalness, then we may have to deny that certain
dispositions can be analysed in the manner of StoCA. Here it’s worth
recalling that the project at hand is to analyse the dispositional properties
which feature in laws rather than all dispositions whatsoever, and I take it
that the dispositions which appear in nature’s laws will be at least as natural
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as the laws are.
A different concern we might have is that in contrast with SCA, StoCA
requires that for a disposition to be analysable, it has manifested sometime
and someplace in the mosaic. This may seem more of a problem than it is.
For example, Storer considers ‘a class of things none of which would ever be
put into water,’ and asks ‘would these things be soluble or not?’ I think
Storer’s own response is just right.
On our definition [i.e. StoCA], they would be soluble only if they
belonged to some larger class such that all the members of this
class that had been tested in water did dissolve. Thus we may say
of some hypothetical chemical substance that will never be tested
for solubility that it is soluble if, for example, it belongs to the class
of salts of which all the members that are ever tested do, in fact,
dissolve. (1951; see also Lewis’s 1994 discussion of ‘unobtanium’.)
Perhaps this response will not eradicate all concern. Couldn’t it have been the
case that no soluble thing ever dissolves? Or at least, couldn’t it have been
the case that no thing which dissolves shares a natural property with some
class of objects all of whose instances dissolve when placed if water? To some
degree I think we Humeans can simply be hard-nosed about this. At least,
everything in the actual world which has a disposition shares some natural
property with a class whose members all manifest in the appropriate way if
they are stimulated in the appropriate way (whatever those ways are) and
where at least some member in that class is appropriately stimulated. After
all, it seems in keeping with the Humean-empiricist approach that we don’t
posit the existence of properties which have no unexplained manifestation in
the mosaic at all.
Things get more nuanced when we move to modal contexts. For it is plausible
that it could have been that no soluble thing ever dissolves in water, and
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if we accept this then we’ll have to drop any expectation that dispositions
are determined by the content of mosaic in which they appear. But this is
anyway something which must be given up upon accepting NP (something I
have already voiced support for; see §2.2). The repercussions of the various
decisions we make with respect to how dispositions and laws behave under
counterfactual suppositions are worth thinking about. But to discuss them
here would take us beyond the problem at hand of getting the extensional
analysis right.
In sum, I think there is a lot going for StoCA as a schema for dispositional
analysis. By virtue of remaining extensional it is more in keeping with a
Humean methodology which accepts that dispositionality is an explanatory
feature of laws. But notice also that by remaining extensional, StoCA also
appears to avoid many of the previously mentioned problems which beset
SCA. The problem of finks and reverse-cycle finks stems from the fact that a
stimulus condition can at the same time introduce or remove (respectively)
the disposition which is otherwise present by default. In order to avoid such
problems Lewis (1997) supplemented his subjunctive analysis with the
qualification that some relevant intrinsic property be retained throughout the
stimulus and manifestation process. But because StoCA is extensional, and
implicitly attributes properties simultaneously, it already entails that the
disposition is had at the time of that process. StoCA also does not suffer
from the existence of mimickers. On the one hand, so long as there isn’t a
class of entities which fall under the same natural property all of which
mimic some genuine disposition, a single case is no threat. On the other
hand, if there is such a class, there would be good (Humean) support for the
idea that its instances were not mimics at all, but genuine instances of the
disposition.
StoCA therefore appears superior to SCA not just for the specific project at
hand, but also for more general considerations. However, we cannot ignore
entirely the counterexamples posed to SCA, since StoCA does suffer from the
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problem of masks. A moment’s reflection should reveal why. The existence
of masks means that it is simply not the case that for all instances of the
disposition, if they are stimulated then they will manifest the right property. If
a vase is wrapped in bubble-wrap then the vase will not break if struck, despite
having the disposition and having a relevant natural property (e.g. being made
of thin porcelain). The next section considers what to do about this.
6.1.2 The problem of masks
In contrast with some, I assume that the problem-cases of masks are indeed
genuine and problematic. Choi (2008a), for instance, has suggested that we
are interpreting masking cases wrongly: a Ming vase wrapped in bubble-wrap
is no longer fragile and a plastic cup which melts when struck (because of
some peculiar mechanism involved) would be fragile. I do not think this can
be right. A Ming vase remains wrapped because it is fragile, not that it would
be fragile were it not wrapped. More importantly, dispositional ascriptions
are useful to us because we know what sorts of systems an object with the
property can contribute to. We know that copper is conductive, so we put
it in electrical circuits. We desire a way to recognise the utility a feature of
an object can supply us with even when it is not supplying it; that is, the
dispositional property ‘carries over’ from context to context (Cartwright 1999,
Hu¨ttemann 2004).
The problem of masks means that, in general, dispositions cannot be analysed
in the form of StoCA. Here I take inspiration from the great many attempted
solutions to the problem of masks on behalf of SCA and consider whether an
extensional reinterpretation of any of them would be a suitable response on
behalf of StoCA. The resounding answer will be ‘no’, leading me, in the next
section, to propose an alternative solution.
One response to masks on behalf of SCA, which is considered by Bird (2007a,
§3.3) allows that while masks (Bird calls these ‘antidotes’) are a threat to SCA
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for non-fundamental dispositions, they may not be for the most fundamental
dispositions.
Since we are dealing with the fundamental level, and have already
removed the problem of multiple realizability, it might be
reasonable to expect that any dispositions of this sort will suffer
from relatively few antidotes. [...] [T]he direction of the
development of physics with ever fewer fundamental properties
and corresponding forces indicates that the prospects for
antidote-free fundamental properties and thus strict laws only at
the fundamental level are promising. (2007a, 63)
Taking inspiration, we might hope an analogous argument could be made
in defence of StoCA. However, there are problems. First, Bird seems to be
working under the widespread assumption that the physical laws (for Bird,
ultimately grounded in fundamental powers) constrain what systems cannot
exist (see also Fine 2002). But if we take seriously the claim that laws are
conditionals and concern properties essentially local to the systems they are
about (see §3.1 and §4.1) it can seem entirely unjustified to infer from the fact
physics is positing fewer and fewer properties and forces that this implies that
there can be no masks at that level. The fact that there don’t happen to be
any systems in existence whose lawlike behaviour involves masking the effects
of all four forces by some unknown further kind of influence is nothing the
laws of physics can tell us. A strict law may be strict because nothing in fact
interferes with its instances, but in developing an analysis of a disposition we
are typically after something modally stronger.3
3This is even the case in the context of our preference for an extensional analysis, since
Humeans may still want to draw inferences based on the extensional analysis about how
dispositional properties behave in other worlds. Under the assumption of NP, I suggest we
are safe to infer the instances of the following schema.
Phys. ∀x(Dx↔ ∃F (Fx & ∃@y(Fy & Ty) & ∀z(Fz → (Tz →Mz)))).
Instances of this schema remain true in physically possible worlds (the range of Phys.)
where a ‘@’ suffix restricts a quantifier to the domain of the actual.
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Second, even if all physically possible objects were constrained by the strict
fundamental physical laws which concern what actually happens, I simply
disagree that there would be no masks at the fundamental level. Presumably
mass and charge are pretty fundamental properties if any are, and yet they
appear to be able to mask each other—making use of this fact seems to me
precisely the ingenuity of Millikan’s oil drop experiment. Gravitational mass
is the disposition to accelerate under the presence of another gravitational
mass, electrostatic charge is the disposition to accelerate under the presence
of another electrostatic charge. If we set up the situation correctly an object
with mass and charge can do neither of these things in the presence of other
gravitational masses and electrostatic charges. The fact that we know how to
combine strict (though potentially behaviour-modified) laws in order to predict
such behaviour does not, I take it, contradict the fact that the case is one of
masking.
Third, and regardless of whether the previous points are correct, the project I
am engaged in here is to say something general about very many more
dispositions than those which exist at the so-called fundamental level. For
example, frictionlessness can be masked by drag forces, elasticity can be
masked by distribution of loads, predatorial dispositions can be masked by
environmental factors (e.g. disease, geographic distribution), the value of a
currency can be masked by political and social factors, the fertility of soil can
be masked by weather conditions, etc., etc. Even if Bird is right about the
fundamental level, its worth pursuing an analysis which doesn’t limit itself to
getting things right only at that level.
A different approach to the problem of masks is to develop a more sophisticated
analyses (e.g. Lewis 1997, Malzkorn 2000). Perhaps the most sophisticated of
which is that provided by Manley and Wasserman (2007, 2008, 2011). They
suggest the following conditional analysis.
(MWCA) ∀x(Dx↔ (Tx  (P (Mx) > ThresholdC)))
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This is to be read ‘for all x, x has the disposition D if and only if were it subject
to stimulus T it would have a probability of being M , P (Mx), greater than
some threshold (on the number line between 0 and 1) defined by the context
of utterance C’. Taking inspiriation, an extensional analogue of MWCA in the
style of Storer’s proposal would then be the following.
(MWCA-Ex) ∀x(Dx↔ ∃F (Fx & ∃y(Fy & Ty) &
∀y(Fy → (Ty → P (My) > ThresholdC))))
Under this definition, it need not be the case that every instance of a disposition
manifests when stimulated, only that there is a suitable probability (above the
defined context-sensitive threshold) that each does.
By only requiring a non-trivial probability of manifesting M in response to T ,
MWCA-Ex (like MWCA) is consistent with the existence of recalcitrant cases
as a result of masks.4 Nonetheless, I do not think MWCA-Ex (or, indeed,
MWCA) is a very helpful analysis.
First, as I pointed out in §3.1.4, laws are the sorts of thing which should not be
subject to so much variation from context. Laws are written down in textbooks,
taught in lectures, posited in international journals, etc. If laws are to be
characterised partly in terms of dispositions, as the causal-junctions account
of laws would have it, then those dispositions had best not be overly context
sensitive. But the inclusion of a parameter of context seems necessary for
Manley and Wasserman’s analysis to work. Otherwise, there would have to be
implicit in every dispositional ascription an exact probability for manifestation
upon stimulus for each dispositional property (or at least, those which feature
4Manley and Wasserman’s account is not only motivated with the intention of solving the
problem of masks, but also a number of other problems which they raise for the traditional
SCA of so-called ‘achilles heels’ and ‘reverse achilles heels’. While I don’t doubt such
problems are logically possible, I think they are certainly beyond the scope of the sort
of problems which face component dispositions, and so will not take into account the merits
of MCWA and MCWA-Ex in avoiding them.
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in laws), which can seem implausible without further motivation.
Second, MWCA-Ex and MWCA both seem to imply that masking and
manifestation is an all-or-nothing affair. The probabilities in question
generate an expected frequency of cases which are completely unmasked or
completely masked. However, we saw in the discussion of embeddability
§5.2.4 that some dispositions may be ‘continuously manifesting’. The
embeddability of a system is like this because it can manifest certain
behaviour completely in the isolated case or partially under some
interference. Similarly, it seems that electrostatic charge will be continuously
manifesting depending on the extent to which non-electrostatic forces
interfere with objects which have it. Indeed, given the heavy emphasis on
quantification in scientific laws, it seems that it will often be the case that
the kinds of disposition which feature in system-types’ conditions of
componency can be masked to some degree rather than completely or not at
all. Therefore, we need an analysis of dispositions which makes sense of the
continuous nature of masking and manifestation.
While I will not suppose that analyses of the form Manley and Wasserman
present cannot be made to work, I want to now explore a different option
which does not rely on context-sensitive probabilities of manifestation.
6.1.3 A systems analysis of component-level
dispositions
In proposing a new solution to the problem of masks it is important to
remember that the task at hand is not to analyse all dispositions, but only
those which feature in laws, viz. the various component-level dispositions and
the law-level disposition of embeddability. So while the solution I propose
should work for those dispositions which feature in laws, I will not attempt to
argue that it works for all dispositions. The solution I propose stems from
two basic insights which I discuss in turn. First, that the analysis of
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dispositions can be rephrased in terms of the system-types and behavioural
properties found in laws. This will help us propose an new schema for
analysis specifically of component-level dispositions, SysCA. The second
insight is that the embeddability of systems is not a maskable disposition.
Indeed, I will show how an analysis of it of the form of StoCA is not subject
to masks. Putting the two insights together I will show how instances of
SysCA will not be subject to masks either.
Insight #1: component-level dispositions can be analysed in terms
of laws
To show why the first insight is true, we begin by noticing that laws’
component-dispositions have ‘correspondent variable assignments’
(schematically: VD for disposition D). This means component-dispositions
can be defined in terms of a permitted range of values of specific variable
properties which appear in the behavioural formulae of certain laws in which
they feature. So, for instance, some object has mass if and only if m > 0,
where m is the object’s mass; some object is electrically conductive if and
only if 0 ≤ R < ∞, where R is the object’s resistance; some object is
frictionless if and only µ = 0, where µ is the object’s coefficient of friction;
and some object is inextensible if and only if k = ∞, where k is the object’s
Hooke constant.
That a disposition has a correspondent variable assignment is extremely
helpful, for it suggests we might be able to define it by drawing on the
formula in which its correspondent variable appears. For instance, we might
think that the manifestation of inertial mass is defined by having impedance
to acceleration a under the stimulus of a net force F ; a relationship
represented in the total force equation,
F = ma
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for m > 0. Similarly, the manifestation of electrical conductivity is an inversely
proportional resistance to electrical current I under the stimulus of voltage
potential V ; a relationship represented in the behavioural equation of Ohm’s
law,
V = IR
for 0 ≤ R < ∞. The manifestation of frictionlessness is an absence of
contribution to frictional force FF under the stimulus of a reactive force R
perpendicular to the plane of movement; a relationship represented in the
behavioural equation for the dynamic frictional force law,
FF = µR
for µ = 0. The manifestation for inextensibility is an infinite resistance to ex-
tension x under the stimulus of an extensional force FE; a relationship repre-
sented in the behavioural equation for Hooke’s law,
FE = kx,
for k =∞.
In each of these cases, the formula in which the disposition’s correspondent
variable appears can be thought of as defining the manifestation property of the
disposition and the remaining conditions of assembly for the law’s system-type
as defining the stimulus.5 So, an analysis of component-level dispositionaliy
5 Note that not every law’s behavioural formula in which a disposition’s correspondent
variable appears can be considered as defining it. For instance the variable R for resistance
appears not only in the equation for Ohm’s law, but also in the equation for Pouillet’s law
of electrical resistivity R = ρ lA , which relates resistance to length l, cross-sectional area
A and specific electrical resistivity of the material ρ. While resistivity can be calculated
with this equation, one might think that it doesn’t describe the manifestation conditions
which identify resistance. Resistance is a resistance of flowing current, not of length or area.
224 CHAPTER 6. HUMEAN ANALYSIS OF RCJLS
can be provided by looking for those laws in which they and their correspondent
variables feature (ignoring further restrictions, see fn.5) and rearranging the
conditions of assembly appropriately.
For instance, an analysis of conductivity would proceed by identifying a law in
which it features as a condition of componency and its correspondent variable
appears in the behavioural formulae. An appropriate law would be Ohm’s
law, which may be presented in unmodified form as follows (with conditions
of assembly made explicit).
Ohm’s law (unmodified): For all x, if x is a system S
comprising a conductive component, a source of charge in the
component and a voltage potential across it, then the resistance
of the conductive component R, the voltage potential V and the
flow of charge through the resistor I are related by the formula,
V = IR
.
Here we clearly see how the dispositional property of being conductive and
the manifestation behaviour of taking a certain value in systems behaving
according to V=IR are displayed in Ohm’s law. By pulling out the
system-type’s condition of componency that some component be conductive
we establish the left hand side of our biconditional analysis of conductivity.
The right hand side is given by following the structure of StoCA, using the
further conditions of assembly to define the stimulus property and the
behavioural formula of Ohm’s law with a specified range for the disposition’s
correspondent variable as the manifestation property.
The fact we know this suggests there is some causal directionality in dispositonal ascription
which is lost when we analyse manifestation in terms of a mathematical equation. I assume
that such directionality is something to be addressed once we have properly considered
whether the correspondent variables are focal-variables or causal variables—something to
be determined by the laws’ variable-level causal asymmetries.
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Analysis of conductivity (first pass): For any x, x is
electrically conductive if and only if it has a natural property F
which if had by the component of a system (of which there exist
instances) which also comprises a source of charge in the
component and voltage potential across it, then the voltage
potential V and flow of charge through the component I are
related to resistance R by the formula,
V = IR,
. where 0 ≤ R <∞.
Examples of F in such a case are copper, carbon, and liquid helium, and indeed
the antecedent of any SVL which has conductivity as a consequent behavioural
property (see §5.4.4).
Analysing dispositions in this way shows the close analytical connection
between laws and dispositions. In general, I suggest we approach analysis of
component-level dispositions by drawing on the very laws in which they
feature. One way to conceive of this approach is that we are treating the
analysis of a component disposition as in fact concerning the system-types in
which components feature. Begin with the form of a law:
∀x(Sx→ Bx)
where S is a type of system and B a type of behaviour. Now recall Schema
3 which indicates that the criterion of identity for a system-type S is given
by a set of conditions of assembly divisible into conditions of componency
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where ∑n1 Xi to indicates a conjunction X1 & X2 & ... & Xn. For many laws
some condition of componency Cjx will be that the system x has a component
part y with some dispositional property D. Hence, the following translation
schema will hold.
∀x(Cjx↔ ∃y∃j(P (y, x) & Dy))
where j ranges over numbers, x over potential components, y over potential
systems, and ‘P (x, y)’ says that x is a part of y. Since conditions Ci can be
arbitrarily ordered, we can stipulate that for some disposition D of interest,
this translates the nth condition of componency (i.e. Cn) for systems in which









Fy & P (y, z) & ∑n−11 Ciz & ∑n1 Oiz) &
∀y∀z
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The ‘BVD ’ indicates that the behaviour-predicate includes an assignment of
some range to the disposition’s correspondent variable VD.
I admit SysCA looks monstrous, but the basic idea is straightforwardly built
from ideas already developed in foregoing sections and chapters: any object
x has a disposition D if and only if there is some natural property F which
x has such that if had by any object y (of which there exist instances) which
is a component part of a system z which itself satisfies further conditions of
componency C1, ..., Cn−1 and conditions of organisation O1, ..., On, then that
system z will behave in the way described by the behaviour-predicate B with
a restriction on values of the disposition’s correspondent variable.6
6 It may seem plausible that in some cases, the natural property F will simply be captured
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Of course, by formulating analyses of dispositions in this way we don’t see
immediately how to deal with the problem of masks. But it is the start of a
solution which is completed once we make use of the behaviour-modification
approach to the embedded phenomenon intuition.
Insight #2: embeddability is not a maskable disposition of systems
I said that the solution to the problem of masks (at least for those dispositions
which feature in laws) requires two basic insights. The first is noticing that all
component-level dispositions can be given an analysis in terms of the very laws
in which they feature. The analysis involved reinterpreting the dispositional
property as one ascribable to system-types in which the component disposition
features. But what does all this formal machinery for reinterpretation and
system-based analysis give us? For one thing, it may not appear enough on
its own to solve the problem currently under investigation, viz. the problem
of masks. For as we have seen in §3.3, in its unmodified form Ohm’s law is
subject to failures of universality as a result of interference, effectively masking
the conductivity of components. But here is where we can combine the first
with the second insight: that embeddability is not a maskable disposition.
Sometimes when a law makes a generalisation of the form ∀x(Sx → Bx),
it seems to be rendered false by the existence of counterinstances (Ss which
are not Bs). This would be a failure of the the law’s universality. But for
most theorists of laws, laws are supposed to be true (Cartwright 1983, Lange
2000, are two rare examples which suggest otherwise due to this very issue).
So some sort of ‘fix’ is needed. Solutions to apparent failures of universality
in laws have invariably assumed what I called the ‘embedded phenomenon
intuition’, the idea that even in the case of counterinstance, there is some
underlying phenomenon described by the law which contributes to the overall
by the system-type’s conditions of componency, in which case the condition on F would be
redundant. However, as I have tried to make clear elsewhere (see §5.2.1), conditions of
componency are often dispositional rather than categorical, thereby establishing the need
for Storer’s extra condition on a natural categorical property.
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behaviour. This suggests in the first place that we might render the false law
true by a modification of it in some manner.
My specific proposal in §3.3.3 of modifying the behaviour-predicate, captured
in Schema 5, in effect displays the manifestation conditions for the law-level
disposition of embeddability of instances of system-types with respect to
certain formulae. Extracting the essential features, we get the following
analysis of embeddability in a form consistent with StoCA.
Analysis of embeddability:
For all assemblies x, x is embeddable with respect to some
formula K if and only if x has a natural property F which if
had by something y (of which there exist instances) such that
y is part of an assembly z, then the overall behaviour of z has
K as a special case.7
Notice, there’s no mention of any system-type property here. After all, while
we have no reason to expect all assemblies to do so, it is an open question for
each assembly whether it might be embeddable with respect to some formula
in the sense that the formula is a special case of the behaviour of any larger
assembly in which it is a part. Nonetheless, it is a feature of the system-types
which feature in laws, especially RCJLs, that their instances are embeddable
with respect to certain formulae featuring in those laws’ behaviour-predicates.8
It was this which made the behaviour-modification a plausible solution to the
problem of non-universality (§3.3).
As was noted in §3.3.3, what makes behaviour-modification a general solution
to the problem of non-universality is the assertion that any external
interference with the instance x of a system-type with respect to the formula
K associated with it by law will be captured under a (larger) system-type for
a non-idealising law whose behavioural formula has K as a special case. This
8Again, it might be tempting to identify the natural property F with system-types S in
some cases. I refrain from making that suggestion here for reasons noted in fn.6.
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is made plausible by acknowledging the clear mathematical relationships
between known idealising and less idealising laws (e.g. in electronics, fluid
dynamics, and thermodynamics).
If this assertion concerning the interference of instances of laws’ system-types
is correct, then it is clear that the embeddability of systems with respect to the
formulae with which they are lawfully associated cannot be masked. To see
this, first assume otherwise. In that case, there will be instances of a system-
type which are part of larger assemblies such that the overall behaviour does
not have as a special case the formula associated with that system-type by
law. This means there can be no law ∀x(S ′x → B′x) whose system-type S ′
has the larger assembly as a part and where the formula of B′ has the formula
as a special case. Since that is contrary to the assertion, we can conclude
that embeddability is not maskable disposition of systems given the assertion
(though it may be for mere assemblies). One way to think about why we get
this result is that the stimulus for emebddability simply is interference, so
long as it can be captured in the antecedent of a law, which all systems can
be according to the assertion made in §3.3.3.
Putting the insights together
Consider again Ohm’s law, but this time in its behaviour-modified form.
Ohm’s law (behaviour-modified): For all x, if x is a system
S comprising a conductive component, a source of charge in the
component and a voltage potential across it, then there is a system-
type S ′ and behaviour-type B′ such that,
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law,
2. all instances of S ′ have an instance of S as a part,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if the resistance of the conductive
component R, the voltage potential V and flow of charge
through the resistor I are related by the formula K ′ which
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has as a special case the formula,
V = IR)
.
As we just saw, behaviour-modification effectively incorporates the
embeddability of instances of system-types. So, following the steps of
expressing dispositional analysis in terms of system-types to form a
biconditional of the schematic form of SysCA, but now drawing on the
modified version of the law, we get the following analysis of conductivity.
Analysis of conductivity (second pass): For any x, x is
conductive if and only if it has a natural property F which if had
by the component of a system S (of which there exist instances)
which also comprises a source of charge in the component and
voltage potential across it, then there is a system-type S ′ and
behaviour-type B′ such that,
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law,
2. all instances of S ′ have an instance of S as a part,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if the voltage potential V and flow of charge
through the component I are related to resistance R by a
formula K ′ which has as a special case the formula,
V = IR,
where 0 < R <∞).
As far as I can see, there are no plausible masks which present a counterexample
to this analysis (at least, not without breaking a law of nature). If a circuit
is passing through a magnetic field, it may in fact be the case that there is
no current flow through a conductive component despite there being a voltage
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potential across it (a mask of the disposition under typical construals). But
the analysis is consistent with that, so long as a law ∀x(S ′x → B′x) which
does describe the interaction of magnetic field and electrical component also
satisfies conditions 1–3. In a non-gravitational context, one might plausibly
argue that the Lorenz force law is such a law, although I will not aim to prove
that here.
In summary, SysCA remains a satisfactory schema for conditional analysis of
component dispositions so long as we treat the behaviour-predicate B (and so
also BVD) in each case as modified in the way suggested in §3.3.3. Consequently
we have a way of analysing the dispositional features at component-level and
law-level in RCJLs by drawing on the connection between the problem of masks
for dispositional analysis and the problem of non-universality for laws.
6.1.4 Concerns about regress, circularity and triviality
I have argued that some kind of conditional analysis, viz. SysCA, can be
defended against masks in the case of the dispositional properties which
feature in laws’ conditions of assembly. Notice that this is like none of the
defences of SCA, or derivatively of StoCA, which I discussed in §6.1.2. It is
not like Choi’s because it accepts that dispositions are genuinely subject to
masks, e.g. an electrical component remains conductive even when in a
magnetic field which masks its conductivity. Like Bird’s defence SysCA does
rely on a distinction between dispositions which can be provided a strict
conditional analysis and those which may not. But the distinction I advocate
is not one required to carve along the divide between fundamental and
non-fundamental properties or laws. Rather, it distinguishes systems which
feature in strict (though potentially behaviour-modified) laws and mere
assemblies which don’t. It might in fact be that this exactly extends to all
and only the fundamental dispositional properties which cannot be multiply
realised, but there is no in principle reason for that (unless we simply defined
‘fundamental’ to apply to such properties).
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SysCA is also unlike Manley and Wasserman’s analysis in that it maintains a
strict relationship between stimulus and manifestation rather than weakening
the relationship to a probabilistic one under contextual parameters. This way
SysCA does not suffer from the kind of relativism that contextual sensitivity
brings. The analysis also treats masks as influencing the manifestation of
dispositions on a continuum rather than either entirely masking or not
masking at all as Manley and Wasserman’s analysis does. This way SysCA
can better represent the many quantifiable causal relationships between
masks and dispositions science appears to reveal to us.
Of course, our ultimate goal in this chapter is to analyse all the causal features
of RCJLs, and the combination of SysCA and the analysis of embeddability
only gives us a way to analyse the dispositional features of RCJLs. However,
I think there are foreseeable concerns as to whether they can even do this.
For example, one might be concerned about the fact that the modified BVD
predicate on the right hand side of SysCA makes reference to other laws. I
have already dispelled concern that this would result in some kind of unending
regress. As I said in §3.3.3 and reiterated above, the hypothesis that there
is always some law describing accurately some system in which others are
embedded is requisite, but it needn’t imply that we know such laws or that
there are many instances of such laws. I believe we should simply commit
to the idea that some laws are strictly universal without the requirement of
behaviour modification.
Another reason to be concerned is that the further laws referenced in those
which are modified won’t be RCJLs. The point of accounting for the
dispositions specifically in RCJLs is due to the expectation, motivated in
§5.4.5, that other laws could be defined derivatively from them. So it would
be a problem if the laws referenced in RCJLs with modified
behaviour-predicates were not themselves RCJLs. However, I think it is
reasonable to think that they will be. Take any law ∀x(S ′x → B′x). Now
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assume that there is an RCJL ∀x(Sx → Bx) where S is a part of S ′ and the
behavioural formula of B is a special case of the behavioural formula of B′.
Then by definition, ∀x(S ′x → B′x) will be an RCJL. This is because the
dispositional components of S will also be dispositional components in S ′ and
any instance of a system-type of a law which is universal without
modification will be embeddable trivially (since the behaviour of all
assemblies its instances are part of will be defined by the behavioural formula
itself). Moreover, because of the embeddability of the instances of the law’s
system-type, the causal asymmetries between variables in the associated
formula in B will be causal asymmetries in B′. Hence, ∀x(S ′x → B′x)
satisfies all the requirements of being an RCJL.
Of course, this suggests that wherever a behaviour-modified law can be pressed
into service to analyse a component-disposition, there will be a law which is
not in need of modification which can do the job equally well. Moreover, we
might think the latter law is better than the former, since it will be more
precise (specifying actual behaviour rather than special case behaviour). I am
happy to accept such an outcome of the approach developed above. However,
SysCA provides a way for us to use actual laws that we know to analyse
component-dispositions. Practically, then, it serves enormous benefit.
A different set of worries one might have about the analysis which certainly
needs addressing concerns the involvement of laws in the analysis of
dispositions. Earlier I rejected any analysis of dispositions which employed
counterfactuals (like SCA, MWCA) since the truth of counterfactuals appear
to be grounded themselves in laws. According to standard semantics, the
laws need to be established independently of dispositions in order for
counterfactuals to analyse dispositions. Since I want to use dispositions to
account for laws, the analysis would be circular. However, the extensional
analyses for component-level dispositions which I have come down in favour
of also draws on laws. SysCA was formulated with the insight that
component-level dispositions could be defined with the conditions of
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assembly and behavioural formulae of the laws in which they feature as
(respectively) stimulus and manifestation properties.
Despite the apparent concern, I do not think it would be right to deem the
employment of SysCA given the current project as problematic as SCA and
other counterfactual-based schema of analyses. SysCA does not require an
independent analysis of laws, but only a rearrangement of the information
contained within laws. The analysis of component-level dispositions and the
laws which they are rearrangements of come together as a single informative
set of generalisations. In using certain laws to form analyses of dispositions we
do not, thereby, prohibit a non-circular account of laws which defines some of
them—viz. RCJLs—to have dispositional conditions of assembly.
But even if the analysis does not open the project up circularity, there may
appear in this claim cause for a related concern. For even if laws need not be
established independently for the analysis of dispositions in order for the
latter to work, there appears to be a resulting triviality in our understanding
of both phenomena. For RCJLs have been defined partly by their
system-types having dispositional conditions of componency and SysCA
defines those dispositions in terms of the very RCJLs in which they appear.
It is reasonable therefore to conclude that a dispositional requirement on a
law somewhat trivialises the law itself. For example, having a component
which is conductive is a condition of componency for the system-type in
Ohm’s law. But the disposition’s stimulus conditions are defined by the other
conditions of assembly for that same system-type and its manifestation
conditions are defined by the law’s corresponding behaviour-predicate. So,
according to the analysis of conductivity (p.230), by saying that something is
conductive we say (roughly) that it can play the role of a certain component
in instances of Ohm’s law. Consequently, as a condition of componency for
Ohm’s law, having a conductive component simply amounts, roughly
speaking, to requiring that something play whatever role is required to fit
with the rest of an assembly in order to bring about the relevant behaviour.
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It therefore tells us very little about what to look for if we want to build or
observe the relevant system-type.9
Perhaps this triviality is no surprise, especially given the often-noted
‘dormitive virtue’ concerns with dispositional explanations in general.
Indeed, I think one should just embrace that some laws have conditions of
assembly for their system-types which require, roughly speaking, that a
component is whatever will fit in with the rest of the assembly such that it
satisfies the law’s consequent behaviour-predicate. The triviality of one
condition of assembly is not obviously a problem for the analysis or the
causal-junctions account of laws. After all, it is perfectly consistent with a
disposition being partly defined by some behaviour that the component
which has it is causally relevant to the behaviour. We need only recall
Davidson’s (1967) observation that the fact the cause of some event is its
cause is completely trivial, but not false, to notice this. More relevantly,
(Ellis 2002, Mumford 2004) have argued that dispositional explanations may
have an element of vacuity regarding the causally relevant property of some
behaviour but are still able to inform us of the causally relevant entity (it is
trivial that it is the dormitive virtue of some pill rather than another of its
properties that makes one sleepy, but not trivial that taking the pill rather
than some other action makes one sleepy).
A more pressing concern regarding the triviality of dispositional conditions of
componency is that if each condition of assembly for a law were dispositional
then a law would end up conditioning behaviour on itself. I take it that
this would be a disaster, rendering laws completely uninformative. So, in
saying that certain laws are robust, in the sense that they have dispositional
conditions of componency, we need to make sure that they are not so robust
that they are true trivially. However, in general I don’t think we should be
9Of course, given the extensional analysis, what the analysis actually requires is that the
component shares some natural property with some object which actually does play that
role in an assembly and that all things with that property which are in such an assembly
also play that role. Perhaps this makes the analysis marginally more informative than I
make out in the main text.
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too concerned that this is going to be the case. As well as conditions of
componency, all laws which have dispositional conditions of componency also
have conditions of organisation too (recall that SVLs have neither). Whilst
conditions of componency might conceivably consist entirely of dispositional
conditions, conditions of organisation will not. This alone should be enough
to save any such law from complete vacuity. And I think it’s reasonable to
suspect further that many laws’ behaviour predicates go far beyond that which
is necessary to define their system-types’ component-level dispositions. For
example, conductivity is a dispositional condition of componency for many laws
(e.g. Kirchhoff’s laws, Ampere’s law, etc.), but its definition is exhausted by
the information contained in Ohm’s law. So, while Om’s law may be trivialised
somewhat by the dispositional condition, these other more complex laws will
be even less so.
6.1.5 Summary
This concludes my analysis of the dispositional features of RCJLs. Both
component-level and law-level dispositions have been analysed using an
extensional conditional analysis along the lines proposed initially by Storer
(1951). The idea has been to analyse the law-level disposition of
embeddability by treating the stimulus condition to be a system’s parthood
of a larger system and defining the manifestation condition in terms of the
behaviour-modification of idealising laws proposed in §3.3.3.
Component-dispositions have been analysed in terms of specific laws whose
system-types they are conditions for, treating the rest of the system-type’s
conditions of assembly as stimulus conditions and the behaviour as a
manifestation condition. If we treat the behaviour-predicates of those laws as
modified (since their system-types are embeddable), then I have argued
neither analysis suffers from the problem of masks.
Due to its extensional form and quantification only over first-order particulars
and categorical properties, if the analysis does its job, then the robustness
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of RCJLs can be given a Humean treatment. This takes us one step closer
to a Humean account of laws in general which respects the causal-junctions
conception of laws. The other necessary step is a Humean treatment of the
other pair of causal features associated with RCJLs, viz. variable-level and
law-level causal asymmetries. It’s to that task I now turn.
6.2 Analysis of RCJLs’ causal asymmetry
In §5.2.3 and §5.2.4 I drew attention to two kinds of causal asymmetry which
exist in instances of RCJLs. ‘Law-level asymmetry’ is that which exists
between an instance of a law’s system-predicate and its behaviour-predicate,
e.g. between an object’s satisfaction of the conditions required to be an
electrical conductor and a behavioural property defined by having
variable-properties which satisfy the equation V = IR. This asymmetry was
distinguished from ‘variable-level asymmetry’, which exists among the
variables referenced in the behaviour-predicate, e.g. as a result of V and R
being causes of I. In the case of RCJLs, the asymmetries at both levels
combine to form a causal junction, in which there is a single effect or ‘focus’
of all the causal relations at that level.
In this section I propose a Humean treatment of the asymmetries in causal
junctions. My basic idea is to develop a probabilistic analysis for what I will
call ‘causal theories for causal junctions’. Under certain plausible assumptions,
causal junctions will have instances or ‘models’ which exhibit a probability
distribution over their variables unique to a certain kind of causal structure.
This is due to the fact that the junctions’ foci in these models can be identified
as approximating ‘unshielded colliders’ along a set of causal paths (Spirtes
et al. 2000). By identifying the relevant conditions for these models with those
in cases in which the causal junctions may be embedded, we can infer the
existence of the same causal junction even if there is a qualitatively different
probability distribution. Ultimately, what this means is that the proposal
allows the asymmetries at the variable-level of RCJLs to be determined by the
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mosaic. A similar method of analysis will then be provided for the asymmetries
at the law-level.
I begin in §6.2.1 with a defence of actual frequentism, an interpretation of
probability which I take to be consistent with a Humean approach to the
causal-junctions account of laws. In §6.2.2 I then introduce the formalism
behind causal modelling and in §6.2.3 develop the concept of a causal theory
for a causal junction. The probabilistic analysis of causal junctions at the
variable-level ensues in §6.2.4 where I draw on the Causal Markov Condition
and the condition of Minimality in order to define the assumptions required
for the analysis to work. In §6.2.5 I then show how the existence of causal
junctions at the law-level can be treated with the same probabilistic analysis
thereby giving us an analysis of law-level causal asymmetry as well.
6.2.1 In defence of actual frequentism
It would be deceptive to offer a probabilistic analysis of causal phenomena
under the auspices of a Humean methodology without acknowledging the
various interpretive issues that surround probability. For some
interpretations of probability are commonly thought to be unHumean, and
others incompatible with the current project for more specific reasons. After
mentioning some of these and defending Humean interpretations in general, I
will defend the actual frequentist interpretation of probability over other
Humean options. This interpretation deems the probability P (A) of some
outcome A in some reference class B to be the actual frequency of outcomes
A in B.
Certainly, some interpretations of probability, e.g. a propensity interpretation,
are often noted for their incompatibility (or inharmoniousness) with the
Humean approach (Ha´jek 1997, Ha´jek 2012, Bradley 2015). One could hope
to pursue a Humean analysis of propensities (perhaps along the lines of
analysis for dispositions offered in §6.1), but I will assume such an approach
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is not optimal. Other interpretations also seem not to be in keeping with the
current project. For instance, while I suspect a subjectivist interpretation of
probability (e.g. Ramsey 1950 (2nd edition, de Finetti 1937) could be made to
work with the Humean approach, it might rob us of the desire to develop an
account of laws which is properly objective. Pending any reason to think this
cannot be achieved, I will assume probability is to be ridden of the any hint
of subjectivity at play in the causal analysis.
Interpretations of probability more naturally compatible with Humeanism
typically determine probabilities to be a function of what happens in the
mosaic throughout the entire history of the world. As with laws, such
interpretations are non-local, in that they determine the probability of some
isolated event partly on the basis of what’s going on throughout the entirely
of time and space. However, since the very trials to which we assign
probabilities are part of history, it is inevitable that the Humean
interpretations end up partly grounding the probability of a certain trial’s
outcome in that very trial itself. This has lead to a number of complaints
echoing those presented to Humean accounts of laws, many of which can be
characterised under the basic intuition that probabilities should obey a
certain sort of explanatory independence from the trials in which they are
revealed (Ha´jek 1997). But as much as the Humean has learned to dismiss
complaints over their view of laws, I believe many of these complaints can be
dismissed on the grounds that they are either unmotivated or simply
mischaracterise the Humean position (in what follows I draw for complaints
exclusively on Ha´jek’s 1997 compilation of arguments against finite
frequentism).
For instance, it has been complained that Humean interpretations suggest
curiously simple arguments against solipsism or for backwards causation due
to their implication that probability is dependent on events beyond those under
scrutiny (including events in the future). A Humean should simply respond
that such criticisms stem from the undermotivated assumption that probability
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is an intrinsic characteristic of individual trials.
A similar complaint is that Humean interpretations suggest that probabilities
about our personal futures implausibly imply that we should be concerned
about the fate of others in the same reference class beyond mere empathy. This
is an analogue of Kripke’s 1980 Humphrey-objection to possible worlds analysis
of modal claims and can be dismissed in the corresponding way by pointing
out that under Humean views probabilities about our futures do depend on
events external to our own causal futures but this doesn’t prohibit them from
concerning ourselves.
Another issue often levelled at Humean interpretations of probability
concerns relativity to a reference class. Any view which determines
probabilities at least partly by frequency of outcomes must say exactly what
class or sequence counts as a relevant trial for the probability of an outcome.
One problem with this is that it means the intuition that events simply have
a probability simpliciter cannot be satisfied. As Ha´jek (1997) suggests, I
think this is something the Humean should simply embrace, pointing out
that ‘knowledge of inequalities between conditional probabilities might be all
that we need in order to control our environment in desireable ways’ (p.74).
Anyway, I doubt that the notion of a probability simpliciter is really any
more intuitive than conditional probability.
A different problem is the difficulty associated with specifying exactly what the
reference class is in any case. Under the Humean approach probabilities either
seem ambiguous, vague or undefined. In response to this problem, Humeans
will likely want to fall back on the resources of the mosaic itself. If we are
of Lewis’s persuasion, then the perfectly natural properties and individuals
will determine the appropriate reference class (see Lewis 1994); if we are more
pluralist about the contents of the mosaic, then something more nuanced must
be said (see Cohen and Callender 2009, 26–30). I will assume some position
along either of these lines is sufficient.
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Admittedly, I think the Humean may have to accept some genuinely counter-
intuitive results. One such intuition is that stability of a frequency of a certain
outcome across a number of trials should be explained by the probability of
that outcome. But under Humean approaches, probability is grounded in
frequency (in some manner or other) and so arguably cannot explain it on
pain of circularity. The problem here is much the same as that presented
in §2.3 against laws’ apparent lack of explanatory power under Humeanism.
I argued there that even if we accept the result against Humeanism, it is
far from clear that any other approach has done a better job of restoring
the explanatory power of laws. I predict the same result for interpretations
of probability alternative to a Humean one (see, for example, Lewis’s 1994
arguments against the explanatory power of nomic necessitation with regard
to probabilities).
Some complaints with Humean interpretations of probability don’t stick
under certain further assumptions. For instance, some Humeans have
embraced NP as a modal characteristic of laws (see §2.2). NP entails that all
laws remain true under any counterfactual supposition consistent with all of
them (at least in scientific contexts). If that’s the case then worlds in which
an event goes without trial (e.g. the half-life of some atom of plutonium in a
short-lived universe) may nonetheless retain the same probability as that in
the actual world so long as the counterfactual supposition under which that
world is considered is not inconsistent with the laws. Therefore, it’s no good
to complain that the Humeans are committed to an overly positivistic
operationalism about probability (Ha´jek 1997, 79-80). Yes, for the Humean,
the probabilities determined by our laws must be determined by what is
trialed in this world; but, under the assumption of NP, it is also possible that
a sequence can vary wildly from what is probable so long as this remains
consistent with the laws.
Another problem is supposedly avoided by Humeans who accept a best system
account of laws. This is the notorious ‘problem of the single case’. If some
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outcome is trialed only once (its reference class has only one trial), or even
not at all, then under a strict actual frequentism, the probabilities will be
deterministic (the outcome has a probability 1 or 0 of happening) or else
go undefined. According to Ha´jek, there are indeed such one-off events: ‘a
football game, a horse race, a presidential election, a war, a death, certain
chancy events in the very early history of the universe’ (p.81), subsequently
actual frequentism can seem to be in trouble. One might wonder, of course,
whether such events as these are really ‘one-off’. Surely any attempt to assess
the probability of an outcome in these cases will draw on other football games,
wars, deaths, quantum mechanical outcomes. If these assessments can be
understood as a recourse to other instances in some larger reference class then
these trials are not one-off after all.
But the supporter of best-systems analysis need not push for such a response.
The best systems approach aims to determine probabilities on the basis of
initial or boundary conditions together with the laws which emerge from a
best systematisation of the history of the world which best compromises
strength, simplicity and fit (see §4.2). Fit is a function of frequency in the
mosaic, hence if the actual frequencies diverge wildly from what is probable
given a theory, this counts against the theory. But since the importance of fit
in determining the correct theory for the world is compromised by strength
and simplicity, the best-system interpretation suggests that probabilities may
diverge from actual frequencies if it would make significant gains according to
these latter parameters. As a consequence, it is plausible that the best
system interpretation can provide non-trivial probabilities for single cases
and even instanceless cases.
Now, the best system interpretation of probability is typically thought to rely
on the success of the best system account of laws. One may recall that, in
§4.2 I argued against the best systems account of laws due to its implicit
commitment to the causation-mirroring conception of laws. But regardless, the
interpretation would appear to be anyway unavailable since the best system
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account aims to determine probabilities with laws established via other means
(i.e. through systematisation). In contrast, my project aims to provide an
account of laws by first defining that subclass of laws, viz. RCJLs, partly in
terms of the probabilistic relations which constitute the causal asymmetries
associated with them. Perhaps the best-systems interpretation of probability
could be employed in support of my account of laws if it were not assumed, as
Lewis does, that the systematisation was a way to get both probabilities and
laws. But I will not consider this option further. For I’m tempted to think it
simply gets things wrong about probability anyway; a closer tie with fit is in
fact preferable. Let me explain.
A commonly agreed on platitude of objective probability (or ‘chance’) is that
it should constrain our rational credences. This idea is formally captured in
the Principal Principle,
(Principal Principle) C(A|E.P (A) = x) = x
where C(A|E.P (A)=x) is the idealised rational credence we should give to an
outcome A given the following conditions: any admissible evidence E (which
may concern facts about the history of the world up to the trial which tests
whether A and any general theory providing history-to-probability
conditionals), and that the probability (or ‘chance’) P (A) of A is x.10
The basic connection between probability and credence which the Principle
aims to characterise is typically understood as something approaching self-
evident, a conceptial truth (Hall 2004c), or analytic (Schwarz forthcoming).
Moreover, formal arguments have even been presented in its favour drawing on
the epistemic utility of credence functions which match objective probability
(Pettigrew 2012, 2013). So there are good reasons to suppose it is correct (or
thereabouts; see fn.10).
10Lewis (1994) argued that the Principle should be updated to accommodate the
possibility of undermining futures. What I say here should be consistent with the update.
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The important point for the sake of this discussion is that the Principal
Princple suggests that whatever interpretation we give of probability, it
should be one which makes sense of probability’s role in constraining what is
rational to believe. Now, the nature of rationality itself is a thorny issue. But
I think we would do well to assume that something is rational to believe if it
maximises expected utility; that is, if believing it brings about what is
maximally subjectively valuable (other things held equal; see Briggs 2017). If
that’s the case, then surely interpretations of probability which are
exclusively constrained by frequency are the most plausible. Consider a
scenario in which God can tell you either the exact frequencies of each
number for a series of die-rolls (which I assume does not violate any
condition of inadmissible evidence), or tell you some predicted value for each
roll determined by compromising information about frequency with
considerations of strength and simplicity. If you had to make a bet on the
outcome, you would surely rather the exact frequencies. It is frequencies and
frequencies alone knowledge of which maximises utility. Hence, as Glynn
admits, ‘the advocate of the BSA requires some general explanation of why
the best-fitting probabilities (the actual overall world frequencies) aren’t
automatically the best players of the chance role in guiding rational credence:
i.e. why simplicity considerations constrain rational credence’ (2017, 306).
Both hypothetical frequency interpretations (which interpret probability as
frequency in infinite sample sizes) and propensity interpretations of probability
also seem to compromise this utility-maximising feature of probability with a
desire to satisfy intuitions about probability’s independence from frequency.
But whilst the actual frequentist interpretation of probability is often criticised
for positing an overly tight connection with frequency, the above reasoning
makes it seem reasonable to press precisely the opposite intuition: if probability
is to play that role of maximising utility (as seems plausible given the Principal
Principle), then actual frequentism comes out on top.11
11Arguably, Pettigrew’s 2012, 2013 arguments support the same conclusion on the basis
of consideration about maximising epistemic utility.
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A similar point can be made about other concerns presented against actual
frequentism. For instance, (Ha´jek 1997, ‘problem 12’) has complained that
under the interpretation, any number of trials which is not a multiple of the
possible outcomes will necessarily bias some outcomes (as would be the case
if the total number of coin tosses were odd). He also complains (problem 13)
that the interpretation implies many more correlations between apparently
independent sequences simply due to the fact that the number of trials in the
smaller of any two samples is unlikely to exactly divide that of the larger.
And again along the same lines, Ha´jek complains that as the sample size
increases the likelihood that bias will be introduced into the frequency increases
(compare your expectation that a fair coin lands heads exactly 50% of the time
in 2 and in 100 tosses). However, in all these cases, if we want to uphold a close
connection between probability and what knowledge we should most desire in
order to maximise utility (beyond knowing the exact order of outcomes!) it
seems that actual frequency is exactly the right interpretation. After all, if
a coin which is otherwise considered to be fair is known to come up heads
7 times in 11 tosses, it’s better for the sake of that sequence to calibrate
one’s expectation of heads in any randomly chosen toss to 7/11 (assuming one
doesn’t also know the exact order of outcomes) rather than 1/2.
Lastly, I think the tight connection between frequency and probability should
be willingly embraced in the case of existential and universal statements. Ha´jek
complains that under actual frequentism, statements of the form ‘the F exists’
and ‘all F s are G’ (including laws) can have no non-trivial probability of being
true. Pace Ha´jek, that seems to me exactly right. But notice that this doesn’t
prohibit non-trivial probabilities for statements concerning the process behind
how the F came about, or the likelihood of things being G in general.
Admittedly, actual frequentism has other strange results which might lead us
to remain sceptical of the interpretation. For instance, it implies that there
can be no irrational probabilities (assuming all probabilities’ respective trials
are finite). So it turns out that irrational number solutions to the modulus
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square of the wave-function can’t represent exact probabilities of particle
position, hence some tweaking of the ‘Born rule’ is required. But this
shouldn’t be considered a philosophical snub of science itself! The
wave-equation may still be our best practically attainable method of
determining probabilites for particle-position, save knowing the frequencies
themselves. Moreover, the actual frequentist may simply wish to question the
typically assumed tight connection between objective probabilities and what
our best laws say.
I suppose that despite my foregoing efforts, one might anyway remain a
sceptic about the actual frequentist interpretation of probability. It is worth
stressing before moving on that it is not essential to the following analysis of
causal asymmetries in laws that probability have this interpretation. There
are at least two conceivable alternatives. Under one alternative, we provide a
different interpretation of probability appropriate to the Humean
methodology and the causal-junctions account of laws. On the second
alternative, the analysis is pursued in terms of actual frequencies directly
rather than probabilities. Having said that, I personally cannot see how the
first alternative would proceed and I think it’s better not to have to rely on
the second, since the plausibility of the following analysis is greatly
facilitated by the widely accepted connection between causation and
probability. So I will continue under the assumption that probability is the
actual frequency of outcomes within the appropriate reference class defined
(somehow) by the contents of the mosaic.
6.2.2 Structural equations, causal models and causal
theories
It is a central observation of the analysis of the causal junctions inferentially
associated with RCJLs that they will have instances in which the junction’s
focal-variable approximates an ‘unshielded collider’ on a causal path leading
from one of its cause variables to another. This section introduces some of
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the terminology required in order to develop this idea formally, specifically,
structural equations models, causal graphs and causal paths.
Structural equations modelling is a technique employed (though not
exclusively) for analysing causal relationships. According to the framework, a
causal model for some situation in which the variable properties of objects
are causally related is represented as an ordered pair 〈V,E〉, where E is a set
of structural equations {E ′, E ′′, ...} each of which relates the values of
variables V ′, V ′′, ... in the set V.
Despite being equations, the members of E for any causal model do not
represent purely symmetrical relationships but rather represent the type-level
causal influence of the left hand variables on the right hand variables which
are invariant across certain ranges of values. So, for example, an equation of
the form Z:=fZ(X, ..., Y ) should be understood as representing the fact that
there is a range of values x1, ..., xn, ..., y1, ..., ym, such that X taking value xi,
..., and Y taking value yj (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ..., and 1 ≤ j ≤ m) are type-level
causal influences of Z taking the value determined by the function
fZ(xi, ..., yi).
I follow the convention of using the symbol ‘:=’ to relate left and right hand
sides of structural equations in order to keep structural equations visibly
distinct from algebraic equations. Left-hand variables are denoted
‘effect-variables’ and right-hand variables ‘direct cause-variables’ relative to
the equation (since an effect-variable in one equation may be a cause-variable
in another and vice versa). Crucially, since the equations aren’t symmetrical,
it’s not possible to rearrange them while preserving their content: what
appears on the left hand (right hand) side stays on the left hand (right hand)
side relative to each equation. However, this doesn’t mean that
rearrangements cannot on occasion preserve truth (perhaps implying cyclic
conditions), nor that a re-arrangement is never useful in order to determine
the numerical values of the variables.
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Occasionally it is useful to represent a model graphically. One way this can
be done is by placing the variables at the nodes of directed edges which
represent the direction of causal relevance. Hence an equation Z:=X + Y can





Using graphs we can define a number of useful notions (I follow here the
terminology of Spirtes et al. 2000). A direct cause of some variable V is any
variable at the node at the other end of a directed edge leading into V and a
causal path is any sequence of variables in which neighbouring variables in the
sequence are directly causally related. A causal path is directed if the direct
causal relations go in the same direction in the sequence and is otherwise
undirected. However, graphical representations are limited. It is not obvious,
for example, how to distinguish graphically equations like Z := XY 2 or Z :=
X−Y . Typically the graph for both of these equations would be just the same
as in the above diagram, even though the pattern of influence is radically
different (see the discussion in Woodward 2003, 44-45). This limitation of
graphs has drawbacks and benefits. While I will often prefer representation
by structural equations for the sake of maintaining numerical precision, it
will often be useful to refer to graphs when it comes to discussing embedded
systems in which numerical relations are lost but the qualitative relations of
causal influence are maintained.
One overall benefit of the structural equations approach (in comparison with,
say, neuron diagrams; see Hitchcock 2007b) is that the values of the variables
can be mapped to any set of numbers (natural, real, imaginary, complex, etc.),
thereby enabling them to capture the precise kinds of functional dependencies
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which Mach (1900, 1905) and Russell (1912) decried vaguer understandings of
causation for failing to accommodate (see §5.1). This is of particular benefit
for the project of investigating the kinds of causal relationships which exist in
laws, since the laws of science often describe complex numerical relationships
between variables themselves.
Another similar benefit of structural equations modelling is that the
contribution of many types of cause can be captured with familiar
mathematical devices. Hence, negative effects can be captured with
minus-signs or divisors, compound effects with multiples or powers, etc.
Moreover, structural equations preserve numerical transitivity: causally
correct equations remain causally correct if we substitute for any causally
influential variable (on the right hand side of an equation in E) the function
of its own causal influences in the model (see, e.g., Cartwright 2007, 154).
This is helpful if we want to show the way in which variables can play a role
in the effects of their effects.12
A final aspect often noted in discussion of structural modelling is that it
relativises causal facts to a model or theory. But where I am happy to accept
some relativisation for the purposes of what follows, I am less inclined to
accept it all. Of course, a model which simply doesn’t include certain
variables is unable to display causal relations between them. As I will show
in §6.2.3, the behaviour-predicate in RCJLs can be defined by a structural
equation which is limited to the variables and causal relations which feature
along a set of paths with a single ‘collider variable’ (to be defined shortly).
This means that causal dependencies which may exist between the
cause-variables or to and from other variables beyond the paths will not get
mentioned in the model associated with the law. To this extent, there is
relativistation of causal information associated with a law. However, I will
12Accepting numerical transitivity is not the same as accepting the transitivity of
causation, which many in the structural equations literature want to reject for various
reasons (see Kvart 1991, Hitchcock 2001b). See the discussion in (Cartwright 2007, fn.3,
ch.5).
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not assume that all variable-selection and causal dependency is relative to
laws. After all, the account of laws to be provided is supposed to reflect
something objective about the world. I will assume that there are some
objective matters of fact about what variable-properties are actually present
in the Humean mosaic. This will be paramount for closing off some apparent
counterexamples to the Causal Markov Condition in §6.2.4.
Before moving on with the analysis, it is necessary to introduce some more
terminology concerning the various levels of causation being analysed. The
sort of causal information licensed by a causal model is typically understood
to be at the type-level. This is to be contrasted with causal information at the
token-level ‘to the effect that some particular token event has caused another’
(Woodward 2003, 40). This difference in level need not be interpreted as
reflecting a contrast in different kinds of causation itself. Rather, a type-level
claim ‘depends on relationships that do or would obtain [...] at the level of
particular individuals’ (ibid). We can maintain that causation occurs at the
level of token events, where individual events are classified as the instance
of a value of some variable property. A type-level claim of the form “X is
causally relevant to Y ” then amounts to the claim that in general, when a
value is instanced by variable property X it causes a value to be instanced by
variable-property Y .13
Woodward has claimed that type-level causal relations are supposed to be
‘cases in which the relationship between variables X and Y is general or
reproducible in the sense that Y exhibits some sort of systematic response
when the same changes in the value of X are repeated, at least in the right
circumstances’ (Woodward 2003, 41-42). The repeatability of relations
between variables mentioned in type-level causal claims validates the
suggestion that the relationship is at a higher level of abstraction than that
picked out by token-level causal claims. But it is not always made clear at
13More correctly, there exist values of X which when instanced cause values of Y .
Although this nuance will be irrelevant for the examples I’m considering.
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what level of abstraction these types are supposed to be. Getting clearer on
this will be important for what follows.
Woodward has admitted elsewhere with Hitchcock that ‘to count as invariant
and hence explanatory, a generalisation must describe a relationship that
holds for certain hypothetical values of X and Y possessed by the very same
object o’ (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, 20). Putting aside the authors’
argument for invariance, it is clear from the context that they are talking of
generalisations formulated as structural equations. Though operating at the
level of variables-properties, a ‘type-level’ causal claim appears to be still
restricted to a particular (token) system—‘the very same object’. To avoid
misunderstanding, I will make such restrictions explicit from hereon by
adding subscripts to the variables in causal models which denote the system
they apply to, e.g. causal model 〈Va,Ea〉 is the particular token system a).
Making the restriction to particular systems explicit allows for the
representation of a less restricted sort of type-level causal claim. This takes
into account the abstraction from causal relevance between variables-property
of particular systems to causal relevance between system-types. Drawing on
the terminology of model-theoretic semantics, let’s say that a ‘causal theory’
has causal models which interpret the causal structure of the theory as causal
relationships exhibited by a particular real-world system. In such a case I
will say the system ‘models’ the theory. A causal theory is denoted 〈V,E〉
(NB no subscripts!), where E is a set of equation-types {E ′, E ′′, ...} and V is
a set of variable-types {V ′, V ′′, ...}. The members of E and V thus
correspond, respectively, to the equations (e.g. {E ′i, E ′′i , ...}) and variables
(e.g. {V ′i , V ′′i , ...}) of each of the theory’s interpreting models 〈Vi,Ei〉.14
14 Technically, it is necessary to put some constraint on what counts as a model for
a theory. A model is any instance of the causal theory exhibited by a causally related
assembly of objects. But if models were restricted to occasions with the exact same enduring
component parts it may turn out that certain variables cannot vary in value. For instance,
it may not be straightforward within an assembly for a component part’s mass to vary
(in classical contexts at least). I suggest that models of causal theories be restricted to
occasions under the same ‘experimental context’, where a context remains the same so long
as component parts (with varying mass, say) are swapped in and out one at a time.
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In what follows I will generally refrain from the added complexity of referring
to the numerical identities between ‘equation-types’ of ‘variables-types’. This
would require denying, for instance, that F = ma is strictly an equation
relating variables—strictly speaking, it is an equation-type relating
variable-types. In what follows I’ll often use the word ‘equation’ and
‘variable’ to cover both theory and model levels of description and let the
more formal representation of variables with or without subscripts do any
needed disambiguation that isn’t otherwise clear.
In the same way causal models license type-level causal claims which relate the
variables of specific systems (instances of system-types), causal theories license
causal claims relating the variable-types of system-types. Clearly both forms
of causal knowledge can be represented in the form of structural equations
and graphically in a similar manner. Once again, a distinction in levels of
abstraction at which the claims are characterised does not commit us to a
distinction between kinds of causation.
To make this distinction in levels of causal analysis clearer still, let’s consider
a highly simplified example. The dry-weight yield Wc of a particular crop in
some field some year is causally influenced by the density ρc of the crop and
growth characteristic Cc of the crop. Using the structural equations framework,
we can represent this pattern of influence with the following equation (where
f is some specific function).
Wc := f(ρs, Cc)
The causal model for this scenario is thus represented as the ordered pair
〈{Wc, ρs, Cc}, {Wc:=f(ρs, Cc)}〉. Here Wc, ρs, Cc represent the variables for the
properties of some particular system c, viz. the field with planted crops. The
model licenses causal claims such as “ρc is causally relevant to Wc”. Also, in
conjunction with information about the particular values taken by the variables
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(possibly with some further contextual facts) the model also licenses token-level
causal claims, such as “the 10mm2 density of seeds sewn was a cause of the
crop yield being 10 tons”. However, we will also find it useful to be able to
make causal claims of the form “ρ is causally relevant to W” where ρ and W
are variable-types related by the equation-type W :=f(ρ, C). This latter causal
claim draws on the existence of a causal theory about a type of system (hence
no subscripts) and says that any system which models the theory (including
c) will exhibit relations of causal relevance between the variables which are
instances of the theory’s variable-types.
As I will understand it, a causal theory and its various models are
structurally isomorphic. That is, for all and only the causal relations between
variable-types in the causal theory, there are causal relations between the
corresponding variables in each model. That is not to say, however, that it is
trivial what it takes for some model for a causal theory to exist. Alongside a
causal theory (defined by a set of variables and structural equations) there
will also be model-conditions. These provide the criteria according to which a
particular system models the causal theory. In the above example, we may
expect the model-conditions to require that systems comprise a particular
crop which has been sewn in a particular field. Essentially, model-conditions
are equivalent to conditions some assembly must satisfy in order to be an
instance of the system-type for a law. Accordingly, we can expect the
model-conditions to be divisible into conditions of componency and
conditions of organisation (see §3.2.1). Those conditions in the considered
example are, I take it, the same which define the system-type for Yoda’s
power law, in which the behaviour-predicate is defined by the non-structural
equation,
W = Cρ− 32 .
In general, it is this requirement for model-conditions for a causal theory which
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will ultimately help to tie the analysis of causal asymmetries at the variable-
level developed in §6.2.4 to those at the law-level in §6.2.5.
On a final point about terminology, I realise that my chosen way of parsing
things may clash with a related use of the term ‘model’ as something which is
used to represent a target system (e.g. in the papers in Morgan and Morrison
1999, and see §3.2.2 above). Its not obvious to me, however, that the issue
over terminology choice amounts to any philosophically significant disputes
regarding the thesis put forward here.
6.2.3 Causal theories for causal junctions
We are now ready to start applying the terminology to the issue of determining
the causal asymmetries in causal junctions. For the sake of simplicity, I focus
in this section and the next on variable-level causal junctions and extend the
analysis to law-level causal junctions only in §6.2.5.
As we have seen, structural equations are not the equations of laws. The former
display causal asymmetries among their variables explicitly, the latter do not.
Nonetheless, in §5.2.3 I suggested that there are indeed causal asymmetries
among the variables in many laws’ equations. We might think, therefore, that
there should be an interpretation of such laws’ equations in the form of a
structural equation. Take, for example, Ohm’s law. In §6.2 we saw that there
is strong evidence that current I is treated as an an effect of resistance R and
voltage potential V , its cause-variables. Textbooks on electronics will claim
that current is ‘resisted’ to degree R by the component it passes through and
that the voltage ‘produces’ the current. Rearranging the formula so that I is
isolated on the left hand side and changing the identity sign from that of an
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This tells us that voltage drop and resistance are causal influences of current.
We can thus construct a causal theory of electrical resistance <{I, V,R}, {I :=
V/R}>.
Although nothing in the way I’ve introduced structural equations requires
it, the structural interpretation of the equation in Ohm’s law has a single
variable on the left hand side and multiple variables on the right (some require
this explicitly; see, e.g., Hitchcock 2001b). Notice that this is exactly the
requirement for representation of a causal junction, since causal junctions have
a single focus (in this case, I) which is causally influenced by the other variables
(in this case, R and V ).
To give some indication of how RCJLs’ formulae may be given an interpretation
as a structural equation, Table 6.1 (p.256) gives the structural intepretations
of all the causal junctions tabulated in §5.2.3 (p.187). As before, the table is
by no means exhaustive.
In each of these cases, the junctions’ focal-variable is isolated on the left hand
side. Notice how this is different from a plausible structural interpretation of
the equation for a non-RCJL, such as that of the ideal gas law:
PV := nRT
Since P and V are both effects of temperature and quantity of substance, there
are two variables on the left hand side and so there is no focal-variable.15
Each structural equation in Table 6.1 comprises the sole equation in what I
will call a causal theory for a causal junction. Formally, causal theories for
causal junctions have the form 〈V,E〉 in which the one and only structural
equation E ∈ E relates a single endogenous variable to multiple exogenous
15Although in §5.4 I discussed various system-types (e.g. isobaric, isometric) in which one
of these variables is singled out as the focal-variable. Presumably, the equations of some
non-RCJLs will have no structural at all, e.g. the Planck-Einstein equation.
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Table 6.1: Structural interpretations of laws’ equations
Law Structurally interpretedbehavioural equation
Ohm’s law I := V
R
Total force law a := F
m
Lorentz-force law F := q(E + v×B)
Law of mutually
gravitating bodies F := Gm1m2/r
2
Law of pendulum




Snell’s law sin θ2 := sin θ1 v2v1
Compton shift law λ′ := λ+ h
mc
(1− cosθ)
Archard’s wear law Q := KWL
H
First law of
Thermodynamics ∆U := Q−W
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cause-variables. Like other typical causal theories, it has certain non-trivial
model-conditions which define when each theory has an instance. As I
suggested in the case of Yoda’s power law (§6.2.2), I will assume that the
model-conditions for each causal theory are exactly the conditions of
assembly for the system-type in each corresponding law.
This assumption is not trivial, for it implies that conditions of assembly are
enough to maintain identical causal structure across instances. It comes under
particular scrutiny when we consider cases in which systems are embedded
with respect to theories for variable-level causal junctions in more complex
scenarios. In such circumstances I will continue to say that the causal junction
has a model in the context. However, the structural equations in that model
may no longer be quantitatively accurate.
Taking what we have learned from the analysis of embeddability in §6.1.3 we
can say that if some system is embeddable with respect to a causal theory
then the single structural equation which describes it will always be a special
case of some structural equation in a more accurate causal theory (or equally
accurate in the trivial case where the system is embedded only in itself) for
which the system contributes by satisfying part of the model-conditions. So,
being embedded with respect to some causal theory entails not merely the
mathematical fact that the characterising algebraic equation is a special case
of the other but also that the causal structure of the model is maintained in
embedded systems as well as.
To see how this works, return to the example of the causal junction associated
with Yoda’s power law. For a system c to be embeddable with respect to
the causal theory for the causal junction associated with Yoda’s power law
must be the case not only that the symmetrical equation Wc = Ccρ−3/2c is a
special case of whatever formula actually applies, but that structural equation
Wc := Ccρ−3/2c is as well. So, if some other variable Xa is also causally relevant
in the more complex system of which c is a part, it must be the case that












Wc is still preserved as the focal-variable of Cc and ρc. In terms of causal
graphs we can say in general that the causal graph of the causal junction for
associated with Yoda’s power law is a ‘subgraph’ of whatever graph accurately
represents the situation in which the model-conditions are satisfied, where for
some graph G1 to be a sub-graph of another G2 the graphical structure of G1
must be present in G2.16
Figure 6.2 (p.258) comprises three graphs. The left hand graph represents a
model of a causal junction associated with Yoda’s power law by some assembly
c; the middle graph represents a more complex model in which the model for
the causal junction is a subgraph; the right hand graph represents another more
complex model in which the model for the causal junction is not a subgraph.
While the first and second graphs are consistent with the embeddability of
instances of the variable-level causal theory for the causal junction associated
with Yoda’s power law, the third is not.
The structural interpretation of the equation of Ohm’s law represents another
example of a causal structure whos instances are typically embeddable. From
the structural interpretation we can tell that any instance of the system-type in
Ohm’s law will be one in which the current is the effect of voltage potential and
resistance. However, in many instances of the system-type of Ohm’s law, the
current will heat up the resisting component thereby affecting its resistance;
and in some instances, a current is generated by a ‘current pump’ (e.g. in
the sodium ion channels of the axons of the brain). These further causal
16The converse is not generally true, since graphs are not as precise as the causal theories
or models they represent.
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relations will be particular to the circumstances surrounding the model for the
variable-level causal junction associated with Ohm’s law. We might expect
that those further causal relations will be predicted by the causal inferences
licensed by some more accurate law whose system-type is also instantiated in
those circumstances. Nonetheless, the structure of the causal junction entailed
by a structural interpretation of Ohm’s law is maintained in all these more
complex cases.
In sum, we have now defined a causal theory for a causal junction and can refer
to the equations which feature in laws in both structural and ‘unstructural’
interpretations. Of course, it is one thing to be able represent the causal
relations in causal junctions when we know what the causal asymmetries are,
but it is exactly finding an analysis for the latter which is in question. That
is the aim of the following two sections continuing first with consideration of
variable-level causal junctions.
6.2.4 A probabilistic analysis for variable-level causal
junctions
The project of determining asymmetrical causal relations from the functional
relations described in physical equations has been taken up on an number of
occasions (see, e.g., Simon 1953, Spirtes et al. 2000, 46, Woodward 2003, 318).
Perhaps the most well known attempt at this project is that of Hans
Reichenbach who makes explicit reference to the problem of formulae’s
ability to be rearranged or numerically ‘converted’.
It has been argued that, because of this convertibility of functions,
physical laws do not define a direction or an order (cf. Russell
1912, quoted in §5.2.5). Functional relationship, it is said, is a
symmetrical relation; if y is a function of x, then x is a function
of y. Now there is no doubt that the latter statement is true, that
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functional relationship is, indeed, a symmetrical relation. But the
question remains whether we have to conclude that causality is
a symmetrical relation. The relation of causality may be of such
a nature that it is not exhaustively characterized by the general
concept of functional relationship. (1956, 28)
Reichenbach’s proposal was a probabilistic analysis. It draws on the plausible
principle capitalised on in many subsequent analyses of causation that causes
raise the probability of their effects (see, e.g., Hempel 1965, Suppes 1970,
Salmon 1977, Cartwright 1979, Eels 1991, Hausman 1998, Spirtes et al.
2000). As Reichenbach noticed, this is not alone sufficient to demarcate
causal relationships. For it is a consequence of fairly undisputed probability
axioms that if causes raise the probability of their effects then effects raise
the probability of their causes; moreover, the effects of common causes raise
each other’s probability.
To get an asymmetry out of probabilistic analysis, Reichenbach noticed he
could make use of the asymmetrical causal structure of ‘future-directed
causal forks’ in which the probabilities of multiple effects of a common cause
are ‘screened off’ by conditioning on that cause. But as important as this
observation was (recall its relevance to the arguments from Frisch 2014
summarised in §5.1), it has been noticed that future-directed forks are in fact
not the most appropriate phenomenon to analyse the asymmetry of causation
Hitchcock (2016). This is especially the case if there is no time-order
information to draw upon (as is the case with many variable-level and all
law-level causal junctions).
It is now thought that asymmetries are most accurately captured by
capitalising on the existence of past-directed forks, in which a single
effect-variable has multiple causes. These past-directed forks are effectively
causal junctions which, in situations satisfying certain specific conditions,
exhibit a unique probabilistic character meaning that their asymmetrical
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structure can be unambiguously determined from statistical data.
Under a different terminology, this unique probabilistic character has been
explored extensively by Pearl (1988) and Spirtes et al. (2000). Their project
was one of developing algorithms for causal discovery. With some data for a
set of variables, the algorithms they provided aimed to say what the causal
structure is underlying those variables. Many of the algorithms were
developed with the aim to aid discovery of causal structure in particularly
complex scenarios where the data may may be incomplete or partially
erroneous.
For the purposes of explaining how the objective probability distribution
determines the causal structure between the variables in a law, we needn’t
investigate the success of these algorithms. After all, the project at hand is
not one of causal discovery, but one of causal analysis. However, I believe
that we can, to a certain extent, simply transfer many of the observations by
Pearl, Spirtes et al. to form the basis of an analysis of causal junctions in
terms of those probabilistic relations: according to such an analysis, the
kinds of probabilistic dependencies and independencies which indicate a
causal junction actually constitute what it is to be a causal junction.
The specific way which I will argue characterises the probabilistic analysis of
a causal junction at the variable-level of a law can be given as follows.
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The Probabilistic Analysis of Variable-level
Causal Junctions
A causal theory 〈V,E〉 is a causal theory for a causal junction
at the variable-level if and only if, it has at least three variables
in V and only one structural equation E in E where,
(I) for each model 〈Vx,Ex〉 there is a system-type S ′ and
behaviour-type B′ such that,
(i) ∀y(S ′y → B′y) is a law,
(ii) instances of S ′ satisfy (at least) the model-conditions
for 〈V,E〉,
(iii) ∀z(B′z) if and only if z has variable-properties related
by the formula K ′ which has a valid structural
interpretation which has E as a special case.
AND,
(II) there is a variable W in V such that in at least one model
〈Vi,Ei〉,
(i) Wi is probabilistically dependent on all other vari-
ables in Vi, and,
(ii) at least one variable in Vi other than Wi is approxi-
mately probabilistically independent of at least one
other variable in Vi other than Wi, except when
conditional on Wi.
The purpose of condition I is to make sure that all models of the theory
exhibit the right quantitative relationships between the variables to count as
an instance of a law. It incorporates a version of the behaviour-modification
(see §3.3.3) tailored to causal theories thereby allowing us to include among
the causal theories for causal junctions those associated with idealising
RCJLs. Hence, the structural interpretation of Ex for any model of the
theory need not accurately predict the values of the focal-variable given the
values of its cause-variables. But by being a special case of a structural
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equation in a more accurate model, it is expected that whatever causal
relations it describes will be at least qualitatively preserved in all instances.
As before, if the modification is to be plausible for causal junctions
associated with RCJLs, it requires that there do in fact exist laws which get
things absolutely right (see §3.3.3). Moreover, these laws will also be RCJLs
by virtue of having RCJLs as special cases (see §6.1.4).
Condition I also assures that the models for causal junctions associated with
laws will always be either ‘deterministic’ or ‘pseudo-indeterministic’. That
is, the sole endogenous variable (the focal-variable) is either a function of
other variables in the model or else is a function of other variables in some
larger model of which the first is a special case. Note, this doesn’t imply that
the world must be deterministic for the analysis to work, only that the most
accurate laws are deterministic in this sense.17 This is crucial for minimising
the assumptions required to support it (specifically, it blocks one reason to
assume the condition of Faithfulness; see fn.18).
The purpose of condition II is to provide the conditions according to which a
the theory will exhibit the right causal relationships between variables. The
identification works by supposing that every causal junction has at least one
model (i.e. one system which models the theory) in which the focal-variable
(W ) ‘reveals itself’ in the probability distribution over the model’s variables
thereby establishing the causal asymmetries which exist in every model of the
theory.
This identification works in part due to the equivalence between causal
junctions and what we may refer to in graphical terms as a set of undirected
causal paths containing exactly three variables each of which has one and the
same ‘unshielded collider’ (Spirtes et al. 2000). A collider is a variable along
a causal path that has the effect of both adjacent variables, and a collider is
17This seems consistent with the genuinely indeterministic results of quantum mechanics.
After all, both Schro¨dinger’s equation (featuring in the behaviour-predicate of Schro¨dinger’s
law; see p.86) and the Born rule are deterministic within non-relativistic quantum theory.
It is only measurements of their system-types which exhibit indeterminism.














unshielded if there is no directed path in the model or theory from one of its
causes to the other.
In the simplest case, a causal junction has one undirected path of exactly
three variables, e.g. the causal junction associated with Ohm’s law or the
first law of thermodynamics (see Table 6.1). The collider on such a path is
the middle variable in the sequence. But a causal junction can be made of
many such causal paths (e.g. the causal junctions of Snell’s law and the special
force laws) so long as each path has the same unshielded collider as every
other. This entails that the collider will be the effect of every other causal
variable represented in the causal junction rendering the collider the focus of
the junction. Figure 6.3 (p.264) comprises the graphs of the causal junctions
associated with two example laws.
The probabilistic analysis relies on the idea that a particularly unique
probabilistic profile associated with causal theories for causal junctions will
occur in at least some model. But this is only plausible under certain
non-trivial assumptions concerning the extent to which the Causal Markov
Condition and Minimality hold in various circumstances. I will consider each
in turn.18
18 It is common in the probabilistic analysis of causal models to assume a further and
more controversial assumption of Faithfulness, that all causal relations in the model are
entailed by the Causal Markov Condition. This, in effect, precludes the causal influences
of a variable on another cancelling along multiple causal routes Hitchcock (2016). Despite
existing attempts to defend the principle (e.g. Spirtes et al. 2000, Steel 2006), it has also
been harshly criticised (see Cartwright 2007, 66-68). While I’m inclined to think it can be
defended in the case of lawful systems, it seems to me more impressive to show the extent
6.2. ANALYSIS OF RCJLS’ CAUSAL ASYMMETRY 265
The first assumption required for the probabilistic analysis to work concerns
the extent to which models satisfy the Causal Markov Condition (CMC). CMC
has been utilised in a number of discussions of causal modelling (see, e.g., Pearl
1988, Spirtes et al. 2000, Pearl 2000) and can be defined in the following way.
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): A model 〈Vx,Ex〉 (for any
system x) satisfies the Causal Markov Condition if and only if, for
every Wx in Vx, Wx is probabilistically independent of all distinct
variables which are not effects of Wx, given the direct causes of Wx
in the model 〈Vx,Ex〉.
Two variables (continuous or discrete) are probabilistically independent if the
joint probability density function of the two variables is equivalent to the
product of the marginal probability density functions for each variable;
otherwise they are dependent. So long as CMC holds approximately of a
model then we know that any variables which are not directly causally
related in the model will be probabilistically independent conditional on their
direct causes.
Satisfying CMC is certainly not trivial and there are many known reasons
why it may not hold for a particular model. However, in discussing potential
failures, it will be important to get clear on what is actually required by the
probabilistic analysis of causal junctions. Some mooted counterexamples will
need to be dismissed out of hand, others may exist but must not be ubiquitous,
the acceptance of others’ existence depends on context.
One kind of failure of CMC was observed by Salmon (1984a) in cases where
there exists an ‘interactive fork’ between the effects of a common cause.
Consider the direction of a cue-ball and an 8-ball after a collision in a game
an analysis of causal asymmetry can be provided without it. The main reason we need not
posit Faithfulness is that the causal models we are considering are pseudo-indeterministic.
Under this condition, no failure of Faithfulness by a causal model can exhibit a variable
which can be misidentified as the focus of a causal junction (specifically, such failures will
not satisfy II(i) or II(ii)).
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of pool. In some circumstances, the angles can be such that whether or not
the 8-ball goes in one corner pocket depends statistically on whether or not
the cue-ball will go in the neighbouring pocket. Both are distinct effects of a
common cause, viz. the initial collision, but given the cause, the status of
each ball’s potting remains dependent on the other’s.
In a case such as this, the interactive fork appears to be a consequence of the
particular variables we choose to model it. After all, if we individuated the
collision in terms of the precise momentum of the cue-ball, we would expect to
render the effects independent once more. In this case, at least, the failure of
CMC is dependent on the choice of variables in the model. In general I think it
is plausible that the natural properties of the mosaic will be sufficient to provide
the kind of variables which are not subject to interactive forks which fool us
into attributing causation where it does not exist. Many apparent interactive
forks are a consequence of poorly chosen variables which don’t reflect the
actual detail of a situation. But the mosaic itself does not have this problem.
Famously, there still remains the problem case of quantum entanglement (see
Spirtes et al. 2000, 63-64, and also Elby 1992). However, I will not presume
that it is incumbent on the analysis to be provided here to analyse whatever
causal relations may or may not exist in cases of quantum entanglement. For
instance, I think we can agree with Spirtes et al. who argue that,
the apparent failure of the Causal Markov Condition in some
quantum mechanical experiments is insufficient reason to
abandon it in other contexts. We do not, for comparison,
abandon the use of classical physics when computing orbits
simply because classical dynamics is literally false. The Causal
Markov Condition is used all the time in laboratory, medical and
engineering settings, where an unwanted or unexpected statistical
depedency is prima facie something to be accounted for. If we
give up the Condition everywhere, then a statistical dependency
between treatment assignment and the value of an outcome
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variable will never require a causal explanation and the central
idea of experimental design will vanish. (2000, 64)
We can, I think, remain confident that interactive forks are at most rare outside
of the quantum domain and for the sake of much analysis can be assumed not to
exist. Moreover, for an interactive fork to be involved in a causal model whose
probability distribution allows for a false identification of a causal junction, it
would have to be the case that the putative collider is dependent on multiple
other variables as well as the one it is interacting with, while that interacting
interacting variable must remain independent (in at least one model) of some
of those other variables. Though logically possible, it seems to me that such
a circumstance would be very strange, even for the quantum domain. I will
assume from hereon that interactive forks can be ignored as a problem case
for CMC.
A different kind of failure of CMC which must be considered can occur if a
model isn’t large enough. For example, if a model includes two effects of a
common cause but not the cause itself, then those variables will be dependent
and yet have no cause in the model to screen off their dependence. When it
comes to models of the causal junctions associated with laws this may often
be a possibility. For instance, the electrostatic force experienced by each of
the plates in a charged capacitor is the focal-variable of a causal-junction
associated with Coulomb’s law were the charges of each plate are its cause-
variables. However, if the two plates have been charged by the same voltaic cell,
then their opposing charges will not be probabilistically independent, despite
being uncausally related in the causal junction’s model. (Recall that models
and theories for causal junctions only include the variables in the junciton
itself.)
Clearly, by including the power from that cell in the model, the probability
distribution would obey CMC once more. But the assumption I wish to defend
does not demand expanding the models of causal junctions to include the
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cause-variable’s causes. It merely requires that there exist some instance which
models the causal junction in which causally unrelated variables in the model
are probabilistically independent. As with any causal junction liable to be
referenced in a law, I think this is plausible in the electrostatic case. There
are, for example, plenty of instances of electrostatic attraction between charged
objects (e.g. charged sub-atomic particles and ions) which are independently
charged. Such instances are all that are required for the first assumption to
go through. So, unlike models with interactive forks, the existence of models
which fail to satisfy CMC because the model isn’t large enough do not need
to be dismissed out of hand for the probabilistic analysis of causal junctions
to go through.
The final problem case I will consider for CMC is one in which there do not
appear to be any instances in which the direct-causes are independent. For
instance, in any model of the causal junction associated with the total force
law in which mass varies across token instances, we should not expect force
and mass to be probabilistically independent. This is because mass has a
positive effect on force in models of the causal junction associated with the
Gravitational law, and wherever there is a model of the total force law’s
causal junction in which mass varies, there is also a model for the
Gravitational law. Hence, for every model of the total force law (except the
model comprising the entire universe), there is an expanded model in which
the first is embedded which represents acceleration as a shielded collider,
i.e. there is a causal influence between its cause variables in the model
(viz. force and mass). As a consequence, no model of the causal junction
associated with the total force law will exactly satisfy CMC, since these
restricted models do not acknowledge a causal relation between mass and
force despite the two failing to be probabilistically independent conditional
on their causes in the model.
It is examples like this (perhaps the only example!) which leads me to include
the weaker requirement of approximate independence between cause-variables
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in condition II(ii) of the probabilistic analysis for causal junctions. For despite
the constant influence of mass on force, there are models of the causal junction
associated with the total force law which are clearly very close to satisfying
CMC. A nonzero charge in two bodies, for example, will typically significantly
outweigh the effects of gravitational attraction in small bodies. This can be
seen by comparing of the extreme difference in the constants ke = 8.99 ×
109Nm2C−2 in Coloumb’s electrostatic law and G = 6.67× 10−11Nm2kg−2 in
Newton’s gravitational law. It will be clear from the probability distributions
over variables in models where mass and charge vary that mass and force
are very nearly independent in comparison with the significant dependencies
between, on the one hand, mass and acceleration and, on the other hand, force
and acceleration.
The weakened requirement of approximation to CMC may seem problematic.
However, it’s worth pointing out that this the notion of approximation comes
with a quantifiable measure. We could, if necessary, put an exact value on the
threshold for approximation to CMC in order to dispel vagueness, although I
doubt this would be helpful. Having said that, if we keep the boundary vague
this need not entail that there are any boundary cases—the world may be
kind enough to make each case clear enough. But even if there are some cases
of indeterminacy in the causal structure for some systems, I take this to be
entirely acceptable under the Humean world-view.
Alternatively, if the move to approximation turns out to be too problematic
there are other options. One is to revise the set of assumptions which constitute
the analysis such that the focal-variable is determined in ‘expanded models’ in
which the indirect causes of the focal-variable are also taken into account in
the probability distribution. If, for example, neighbouring masses, charges and
distances were included in the model, we would reclaim CMC and the focal-
variable would be determined once more. Another response would be to argue
that the force law should not be represented as having a single force-variable,
but rather a variable for each component force. Although this would only
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solve the problem for this specific case, there seems to me some independent
justification for it given the mysteriousness of ‘total force’.
But despite various alternative options, for the sake of simplicity I will stick
with an analysis in terms of approximation. The weakening to approximate
independence is something any hard-nosed actual frequentist should be open
to anyway, since according to that interpretation failures of independence can
occur simply if the proportion of correlated variables do not cleanly factor into
the reference class (see Ha´jek 1997, 223-224 and also the discussion in §6.2.1).
Whereas the assumption that CMC holds approximately in relevant models
provides the assurance that probabilistic dependencies are indicative of causal
relations, the second assumption, that Minimality holds in all such models,
provides the assurance that probabilistic independencies are indicative of non-
causal relations. Minimality (MIN) is also widely assumed in causal modelling
(see, e.g., Pearl 1988, Spirtes et al. 2000) and can be defined in the following
way.
Minimality (MIN): A model 〈Vx,Ex〉 (for any system x) satisfies
the Minimality Condition if and only if no model obtained from
〈Vx,Ex〉 by removing any direct causal relations satisfies CMC.
In this context ‘removing a direct causal relation’ implies fixing one of the
structural equations in the model to be such that the coefficient of one right
hand variable is set to zero. Graphically, this is equivalent to removing the
arrow (or ‘edge’) which joins that right hand variable to the left hand
variable in that equation. For the deterministic and pseudo-indeterministic
settings we are considering, so long as a model satisfies MIN, any two
variables which are directly causally related will either be probabilistically
dependent on each other, given their other direct causes, or else their
relationship will be undefined (in failures of Faithfulness; see fn.18).
Crucially, in neither case can the identifying features of a causal junction be





Like CMC, MIN is not trivial, and there are cases where it appears to restrict
too much. An example exists if all the direct causes in a deterministic model
of some cause-variable C for a collider S are the other cause-variables O for
the same collider (Zhang and Spirtes 2011; see Figure 6.4, p.271). In such
a case the model will not satisfy MIN because S will be independent of O
conditional on C and independent of C conditional on O, and the removal
of the causal relation either between O and S and or between C and S will
still satisfy CMC. However, although plausible, the failure of MIN is no threat
to the probabilistic analysis of causal junctions since in none of these models
(either the ‘true’ model or any models obtained by removing causal relations)
does any variable exhibit the same probabilistic character of a causal junction
which satisfies CMC. This is a result of the collider in the example being failing
to being shielded.
A different way a model can fail to satisfy MIN is if one of the variables does
not vary at all. In that case, that variable will be probabilistically independent
of all other variables even if it should be counted as a cause-variable or focal-
variable. Presumably there are many such models for many causal junctions,
particularly when the variable is a conserved quantity (e.g. mass or charge).
Nonetheless, the probabilistic characterisation of causal junctions only requires
that there be some models which satisfy MIN, which there plausibly will always
be.19
For deterministic and pseudo-deterministic models which satisfy CMC and
19So long as we can identify models by an experimental context in which components
(with different mass, say) can be swapped in and out, rather than by a single permanent
system of enduring objects (see fn.14).
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MIN the pattern of probabilistic relationships exhibited by unshielded
colliders turns out to be unique. CMC implies that the direct causes of an
unshielded collider will be probabilistically independent conditional on their
causes (although not when conditional on their effects!), and MIN implies
that the unshielded collider will not be probabilistically independent of any
of its direct causes. Hence among models which (approximatly) satisfy CMC
and MIN, a model for a causal junction comprising a set of causal paths
which share the same unshielded collider will be unambiguously determined
by the probability distribution over it. Supposing there is one such model for
every causal theory for a causal junction, the causal asymmetries in the
theory itself can be determined.
Let’s consider an experimental example. Imagine an experiment e in which
one goes into a series of rooms one after the other and measures the time
it takes for the reverberation RTD of a repeatable complex sound wave of
constant amplitude to drop a certain number of decibels D, the volume V
of the room, its surface area S, and a constant of absorption a for sound
which depends on the material of the surfaces in the room. It turns out
that each of the variables RTD, V, S, a can be expressed as a function of the
others and, moreover, that while RTD is dependent on every other variable,
there exist approximate independences among some of the remaining variables.
Specifically, S and V are independent from am. According to the probabilistic
analysis of causal junctions, this information is sufficient to formulate a causal
theory for a causal junction 〈{RTD, V, S, a}, {RT := f(V, S, a)}〉 in which RTD
is the focal-variable.
Like any other causal theory, this one has model-conditions. Formulating
these will take into account the circumstances required for a measurement
to be valid, e.g. that the sound in each case is the same, that the sound is
made inside the room, that the room is closed, etc. Whatever the specifics,
it is an implication of the probabilistic analysis of causal junctions that those
circumstances which satisfy the model-conditions will be models of the same
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causal theory of which experiment e is a model. In any circumstance in which
the same sound is made inside a series of closed rooms, that circumstance will
be a model of the causal theory for the causal junction just described. Notice
that this will be the case even if the model itself does not satisfy CMC or
MIN. Only one model of the theory for a causal junction needs to have the
special probabilistic features defined in the probabilistic analysis and it was a
stipulation that the experiment e provided such a model.
As I have said, one model is all that is required to determine the type-level
causal relations within a causal junction and all its models. Presumably this
limiting situation is very often not the case and there are numerous models
with the characteristic probability distribution captured in condition II of the
probabilistic analysis of causal junctions. However, the fact there need only be
one might seem problematic. To placate the concern somewhat, notice that
at least one prima facie undesireable consequence does not in fact follow. For
the fact that only one model need exist with the right probability distribution
in order to establish the truth of a causal theory for a causal junction doesn’t
commit us to saying that if the model hadn’t existed, the causal relations
predicted by the theory wouldn’t exist in any of its instances. Recall that
if we accept NP (see §2.2) we will accept that laws remain laws under any
counterfactual supposition consistent with them. It seems continuous with
NP that if we accept a causal junctions account of laws, we should hold that
the causal theories associated with RCJLs will hold under such counterfactual
suppositions consistent both with them and the associated causal theories.
Since it is consistent with RCJLs and the causal theories for causal junctions
associated with them that they lack models which satisfy CMC and MIN,
those models need not exist in order for the laws and causal junctions to still
accurately capture the causal relations in other models. The only constraint I
wish to assert, therefore, is that there must be at least one model in the actual
world which satisfies these conditions in order for the probabilistic analysis
of causal junctions to be possible. (For analogous remarks concerning actual
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frequentism, see §6.2.1, and concerning extensional analysis of dispositions, see
§6.1.1.)
6.2.5 A probabilistic analysis for law-level causal
junctions
So far in §6.2 I have put aside law-level asymmetry to concentrate on
analysing the variable-level causal asymmetry associated with RCJLs. I just
provided such an analysis by using observations drawn from Spirtes et al.
(2000) about the unique probabilistic character of certain models of causal
theories for those junctions. Crucially, for the discussion on law-level
asymmetry, I also suggested that the conditions of assembly for system-types
could be identified with model-conditions for those causal theories. One
might presume this to be sufficient in order to supply an analysis also of
law-level asymmetry, i.e. deeming the asymmetry between system-type and
behaviour in a law to be captured by the intrinsic difference between
model-conditions and the causal theory itself (recall §4.1.2). However, I think
there is something more informative we can say.
First notice that the satisfaction of various conditions of assembly can be
denoted as value-instances of variables. Consider a causal model for some
particular electrical conductor r, an instance of the system-type of Ohm’s
law. We can introduce new binary variables: Cr = 1 if r has a conductive
component, 0 otherwise; Pr = 1 if r has a voltage potential, 0 otherwise; Chr =
1 if r has a source of charge, 0 otherwise; Oacrossr = 1 if r is organised such that
the voltage potential is across the conductive component, 0 otherwise; and
Oinr = 1 if r is organised such that the source of charge is in the conductive
component, 0 otherwise. The behavioural property of Ohm’s law is having
properties voltage, V , current I and resistance R satisfying the equation V =
IR. We can accordingly introduce the variable ‘Ohmr’, where Ohmr = 1 if r
instantiates the behavioural property, 0 otherwise.








Given the characterisation of variables, the law-level causal asymmetry in r
can be captured in the following structural equation.
Ohmr := Cr × Pr × Chr ×Oacrossr ×Oinr
What we have described is the model of a causal theory
〈{Ohm,C, P, Ch,Oin, Oacross}, {Ohm := C×P×Ch×Oin×Oacross}〉. The
causal information of the theory is represented graphically in Figure 6.5
(p.275).
It is noticeable that the causal theory is that of a causal junction, although
this time at the law-level, with Ohm as the focus. We might expect, therefore,
that a probabilistic analysis akin to that provided at the variable-level will
apply here also. I say ‘akin’, since the theory for the law-level causal junction
would appear not satisfy Condition I in the probabilistic analysis.20 But it
certainly appears to satisfy Condition II.
To see that this is the case observe first that in the model just considered, it is
reasonable to assume that Ohmr will be statistically dependent on the other
variables in the model. After all, if any one of the conditions of assembly fails
20A question I have not pursued in the main text is whether there are model-conditions
for causal theories for causal junctions at the law-level. If so, we might be tempted to posit
further laws in which the system-type is defined by those conditions. However, I suspect,
that the model-conditions will be trivial: being satisfied by any assembly so long as it is
meaningful to assess whether or not it satisfies the system-type in Ohm’s law or not.
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to hold, the behaviour will not result. Furthermore, many of the conditions
of assembly in the model will be statistically independent of each other. For
example, whether a component is conductive or not is independent of whether a
source of charge exists within it. Admittedly, it is plausible that not every pair
among a system-type’s conditions of assembly will be independent. But as long
as some condition of componency is independent from some other condition,
then the probability distribution on the model will sufficient to reveal Ohmr
as the focus.
In general, the probabilistic features which help determine the asymmetries
in a causal junction defined in Condition II of the probabilistic analysis for
causal junctions at the variable-level works just as well for causal junctions at
the law-level. Indeed, it seems to be in some sense even more stable, since there
is not the same issue of embeddability (hence why Condition I is irrelevant in
the law-level case).
Drawing on the suggestion in §5.3, I take it that we will often be able to
collapse causal theories for both levels into one. For example, we might think
that in any instance of the system-type of Ohm’s law, the existence of a source
of charge in the conductive component is a direct causal influence of both
the value of resistance and the current flow. Similarly, we might think that
the existence of a voltage potential and its organisation across the conductive
component is a causal influence of the voltage drop across the conductive
component. Taking these causal relations into account and adding them to
the graph representing the variable-level causal junction associated with Ohm’s
law gives us the graph represented in Figure 6.6 (p.277).
Although each case in which causal theories at the law-level and variable-
level are collapsed into one causal theory must be considered independently, I
suggested in §5.3 that it is invariably the case that causes of either junction
will causally influence (directly or indirectly) the focal-variable (i.e. the focus
of the variable-level causal junction). This is clear in the above graph where











all causal paths end up at I and the general idea will be of central importance
on for the analysis of token causation developed in §7. Although it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to offer any general probabilistic analysis for causal
theories of the sort represented graphically in Figure 6.6.
But we do not need to see the compatibility of the two levels of theory to notice
what’s important for the purposes of this chapter: that causal junctions at the
law-level as well as the variable-level can be provided a probabilistic analysis
consistent with the Humean methodology.
6.3 A Humean causal-junctions account of
laws
Over the course of this and the previous chapter a new account of laws has
emerged consistent with the Humean methodology. The account comprises
two components. The first component was the conclusion of §5: a
causal-junctions account of laws. This accounts for laws as any generalisation
which has the form ∀x(Sx → Bx) and is either a robust causal junction law
(RCJL) or else associated inferentially with an RCJL in some derivative or
supportive way (see §5.4.5). Although the list of appropriate ways provided
is open ended (hence ‘account’ rather than ‘analysis’), I take it that it
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provides an informative enough generalisation to play a role in accounting for
laws. Nonetheless, the account in the form presented in §5 took various
causal features as primitive, hence the need for a second additional
component of the account specifically designed for those who want to avoid
such unHumean posits. In effect this means providing an analysis of RCJLs
in Humean terms. This second component has been the task of this chapter.
In §6.1 a proposal for analysis of the dispositional features contributing to
RCJLs robustness was provided in terms of two extensional conditional
analyses StoCA and SysCA. In §6.2 a proposal for analysis of the causal
asymmetrical features contributing to RCJLs association with causal
junctions was provided in terms of a probabilistic analysis of certain models
of those causal junctions’ causal theories which satisfy conditions of CMC
and MIN.
This completes the discussion on accounting for laws under Humean
methodology. In the final chapter I show how it can be put to use in
developing an informative analysis of token causation.
7 A nomological analysis of tokencausation
The causal-junctions account of laws proposed at the end of §5 builds heavily
on the inferential associations of laws with type-level causal features.
However, the analyses provided for those causal features in §7 do not directly
supply us with an analysis of type-level causation in general. For instance,
the extensional conditional analyses of dispositional properties provided in
§6.1 gives us an analysis of dispositions which feature in laws’ conditions of
componency or at the law-level, in the case of embeddability. But the
analysis does not extend to dispositions which do not feature in laws of which
there are plausibly many. The probabilistic analysis of causal junctions
provided in §6.2 also does not extend to an analysis of type-level causal
asymmetries in general, since it only aims to provide an account of those
asymmetries which exist in a single causal junction. Therefore, it presumably
cannot be used directly to account for the causal relationship between
smoking and contracting cancer, or between the production of greenhouse
gases and climate change, which may in fact be linked by long chains of
causal connection.
An account of type-level causation in general is beyond the scope of this thesis.
I do, however, suspect that a plausible way one might approach such an account
is via a generalisation over the token-level causal relations. If that’s to work
we need first an analysis of token-level causation, i.e. instances of type-level
causal relations relating a temporally and spatially locatable cause and effect.
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It is my understanding that the notion of a robust causal junction law can be
put to work relatively straightforwardly in accounting for token causation with
only one essential further commitment concerning event-identity. This chapter
aims to show how this can be done and moreover, how such an account may
improve on other analyses of token causation which do not draw on laws. The
result is a defence of a nomological account of token causation.
While it is not as popular as other approaches to understand laws of nature
to play the central role in the analyses of token causation, it is noticeable
that laws have rarely been completely absent from popular theories. The
early process-theories of causation (e.g. Aronson 1971, Fair 1979) were
heavily motivated by observations about the structure of laws, and later
variants (specifically Dowe 2000, 172) make use of laws to assure the
sufficiency of their causal criteria. Among views of causation which analyse
causation in terms of counterfactual or probabilistic dependency laws have
typically played a role in making sense of the dependency relations
themselves (e.g. Jackson 1977, Lewis 1986b, Maudlin 2007 for
counterfactuals, Hempel 1965, Lewis 1994, Hall 2004c for probabilities).
Moreover, laws have also crept in into the analysans more explicitly in
certain cases (see, e.g., Paul 2000, Schaffer 2001, Hall 2007).
Still others believe that a workable set of (possibly necessary and sufficient)
criteria for causation might be provided with very few analysanda other than
laws (e.g. Armstrong and Heathcote 1991, Armstrong 2004a, Maudlin 2004).
One of the most promising of the ‘purely’ law-based accounts is surely
Maudlin’s, and yet he admits that ‘I do not think that there is any uniform
way that laws enter into the truth conditions for causal claims’ (2004, 430). I
disagree with his scepticism and my purpose will be to describe something
approaching a ‘uniform way’ drawing heavily on the thesis so far.
In §7.1 I provide a recap of the key points in the foregoing chapters which
will contribute to the subsequent analysis of token causation. In §7.2 I
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develop the analysis by first proposing an analysis of ‘intra-system
causation’, the direct and indirect token causation which takes place within
single instances of laws’ system-types, and then proposing an analysis of
‘inter-system causation’, the token causation which takes place across
multiple instances of system-types. The discussion will lead me to conjecture
on event-identity and draw attention to the contrasting features of the
analysis with typical entailment-centred nomological accounts. §7.3 presents
an extended example of how the analysis applies to causal explanation using
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster as a case-study.
I then move on to motivate the analysis provided by comparing its successes
in different ways with other approaches to token causation common in
contemporary literature. In §7.4 I show how the analysis addresses classic
problem cases of preemption and negative causation which have formed the
foundation of many complaints with dependency and physical connection
views of token causation, respectively. In §7.5 I show how the analysis
addresses an ‘accommodation criterion’ concerning how token causes and
their effects are related in time which dependency views and powers-based
views seem to struggle with. §7.6 concludes.
7.1 Recap
In order to develop the analysis of token causation I will be drawing heavily
on a number of claims from the foregoing chapters which I will repeat briefly
here, making use of the example of Sabine’s equation. This is also a good pace
to remind oneself of the key conclusion of the thesis so far.
In §3.1 I argued that laws should not be considered identical to the equations
typically employed to stand for them. Instead, laws are conditionals of the
form
∀x(Sx→ Bx)
where ‘S’ is replaced by a system-predicate which denotes a system-type and
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‘B’ is replaced by a behaviour-predicate which denotes a type of behaviour




which relates the reverberation time RT60 of a sound in a room to decay 60
decibels with the speed of sound c20 in that room to the volume V of the
room, the surface area S of the room and the average absorption coefficient
a of the room’s surfaces. According to the argument I provided in §3.1, the
equation itself is not a law. But we might nonetheless posit a law—‘Sabine’s
law’—in which the satisfaction of the formula by some assembly of objects is
conditioned on the assembly satisfying the right system-type—what we might
call a ‘Sabine Room’.
In §3.2.1, I suggested that we understand system-types in general to be
individuated by ‘conditions of assembly’, further divisible into conditions of
componency and organisation. Arguably, the conditions of assembly for a
Sabine Room are satisfied by all and only assemblies comprising a closed
room in which a constant sound-wave is made (see the example of
experiment e in §6.2.4).
I then discussed, in §3.3, equations which do not accurately describe the
behaviour of any system-type. I suggested that the corresponding law can be
rendered true by modifying the behaviour-predicate to require that the
contained equation be a special case of a more accurate equation in a law
whose system-type has the modified laws’ system-type as a part. This
behaviour-modification aims to save the universality of problematic idealising
laws by capitalising on the idea that laws describe the behaviour of
embedded systems. Notably, the solution worked without having to restrict
the class of systems to which the idealising laws describe thereby making
sense of the full breadth of cases they are applied to in practice.
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With our example, we know that Sabine’s equation doesn’t accurately apply
to any system perfectly accurately. The presence of objects in the room and
moving surfaces can complicate the relationship between its variables.
Nonetheless, we might suspect there to be a more accurate equation which
takes into account these further conditions and which will have Sabine’s
equation as a special case. The law with which this more accurate equation is
associated will have a system-type whose conditions of assembly have those
for a Sabine Room as a part. Consequently, the truth of Sabine’s law can be
saved if it is rendered as follows.
Sabine’s law: For all x, if x is a Sabine Room, then there is a
system-type S ′ and behaviour-type B′ such that,
1. ∀x(S ′x→ B′x) is a law, and,
2. instances of S ′ have an instance of a Sabine Room as a part,
and,
3. ∀x(B′x if and only if x has variables RT60, c20, V, S, a related





In the analysis that follows I will make explicit use of all of these general
observations from §3. The first step is to provide an analysis for ‘intra-system
causation’ (in §7.2.1 and §7.2.2), the token causation among the behavioural
variables (e.g. RT60, c20) and conditions of assembly of laws’ system-types
(e.g. being a closed room with a repeatable soundwave). Here the
behaviour-modification will serve to show how laws can still be used to
analyse token causal relations even in scenarios in which they are not
accurate. Hence, we should expect to be able to use Sabine’s law for causal
analysis despite its inaccuracy.
In §4.1 I discussed the plausibility of a typical way in which laws and causation
have been thought to be inferentially connected, viz. the causation-mirroring
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conception of laws. This conception interprets laws as having a logical form
whose instances can, like causation, concern distinct individuals and times.
I defended the logical form proposed in §3 against this conception thereby
showing that the way in which laws analyse causation (if they do at all) cannot
be simply one of ‘covering’ causal relationships. For example, Sabine’s equation
cannot be applied in such a way as to entail anything about some system in
the future based on the values of some potentially distinct system at a time.
Rather, the equation is known to apply to systems at the very time that they
themselves are Sabine Rooms.
In what follows I will uphold this prohibition of ‘covering’-type analyses of
causal relations. The relationship will be instead much more similar to one of
physical connection in which the existence of instantiated system-types
provides the means of connection. However, I will also show, in §7.4, why the
account improves on physical connection accounts by being able to
accommodate a certain degree of negative causation. In §4.2 I used the
rejection of the causation-mirroring conception to reject the best system
account of laws, which I argued was implicitly committed to the conception.
A more promising account, I argued, would draw on a more accurate causal
conception.
To this end, in §5.2 I drew on four causal features which I argued are
inferentially connected with many laws: component-level and law-level
dispositionality, and variable-level and law-level causal asymmetry. I then
argued, in §5.3, that there is a class of laws—the robust causal junction laws
(RCJLs)—which exhibit all four features in a particularly notable and
prevalent way. RCJLs are considered to be robust since the conditions of
assembly for their system-types contain dispositional requirements on their
components and instances of their system-types’ are embeddable with respect
to the laws’ behavioural formulae in the instances of system-types of more
accurate laws. Perhaps more relevant to the analysis to follow, the causal
asymmetries in these laws at both variable and law-levels combine to form
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causal junctions, in which a single effect or ‘focus’ has multiple causes.
Moreover I argued that the focus of the variable-level causal-junction—the
‘focal-variable’—can be considered the effect both of the other variables in
the variable-level junction and the conditions of assembly in the law-level
junction.
Returning to our current example, Sabine’s law appears to be just such an
RCJL. The law is rendered robust partly due to the fact that a condition
of componency for being a Sabine Room is that the room’s surface is closed
with a material which reflects a non-zero quantity of sound energy. It is also
rendered robust by the fact that instances of its system-type are embeddable
with respect to the Sabine equation in more complex scenarios, such as those
in which there are objects present and moving surfaces. Brief consideration of
the kinds of explanatory relationships and interventions available should also
make it clear that RT60 is a focal-variable, causally explained by reference to
the other variables and the conditions of assembly which individuate the class
of Sabine Rooms.
In what follows I will make essential use of the idea that token causal
relationships can exist whenever the system-type of an RCJL is instantiated.
These causal relationships exist between the token instances of any
cause-variable from either the law-level or variable-level causal junction
associated with the RCJL and the focal-variable. The central intuition of the
account is that any token effect can be identified with some focal-variable of
the variable-level causal junction associated with some RCJL taking a
specific value. For ease of reference I will refer to the focal-variables of the
causal junction associated with a law L of the form ∀x(Sx → Bx) as the
‘focal-variable of B’, ‘the focal-variable of L’, ‘the focal-variable of a law’,
etc. Hence, the focal-variable of Sabine’s law is RT60.
In §6 I argued that we can provide an analysis of the type-level causal
features of RCJLs appropriate to the Humean methodology advocated in §2.
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Obviously, if the analysis of token causation in terms of RCJLs is to be
genuinely non-causal it is vital that these type-level causal features admit of
some non-causal analysis themselves. I will assume that the Humean analysis
provided in §6 lends substantial support to this being the case. More
specifically, if the analysis of RCJLs’ type-level causal features is genuinely
Humean then the analysis of token-level causation which makes use of such
laws will be Humean also. Consequently, in combination with §6, the result
of this chapter will be a Humean account of token causation.
Nonetheless, in what follows I will not make any essential reference to the
Humean analysis of RCJLs’ dispositionality or causal asymmetry. All that is
needed to develop the analysis of token causation is the notion that an RCJL
has a focal-variable which is the effect of all other variables in the behavioural
formula and all the conditions of assembly for the laws’ system-type. I will
often write as though it is clear which is the focal-variable of a law assuming
that some argument could be provided for this in the manner of the foregoing
chapters (e.g. either by drawing on knowledge of what can be manipulated
via certain interventions, or thinking more specifically about the probabilistic
dependencies). While differences of opinion on which is the focal-variable may
jeopardise the success of my examples, it would only jeopardise the overall
approach if the very concept of a focal-variable were in question. I assume
enough has been done in §5 and §6 to block that concern.
7.2 The Proposal
My proposal for causal analysis of token causation is to make use of the system-
relativity of focal-variables. A particular instance of the value of a variable may
be the instance of the focal-variable for one system, but the instance of a cause-
variable in another. It is this feature of causal events which allows for token
causation to be analysed via chaining together instances of laws’ system-types.
These chained causal relationships I will call ‘inter-system causation’, and my
proposal is that all token causation is inter-system causation. In order to show
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why this might be plausible, I need to start first with the links in the chains
of inter-system cauation, viz. ‘intra-system causation’.
First we need to establish some terminology and notation. I denote causal
events (whether causes or effects) with logical constants a, b, c, ...,
nominalisations (e.g. the Beatles’ last gig, the sinking of the Andrea Doria)
and also as ‘value-instances’ of the form ‘Θty⇐θ’, to be read ‘the instantiation
of the value θ at t of the variable-property Θ by object y’. For the sake of
simplicity, I will for the most part treat the times of such events as instants
of zero duration. However, I work under the assumption that any event a
which has a temporal part which causes a temporal part of another event b is
a cause of b. Hence, by providing an analysis for causation between instants,
we get (via the assumption) an analysis for enduring events also (see §7.3 for
an example of this). When I want to denote an event comprising a
summation of value-instances between two specific times, e.g. t1 and t9, I will
use the notation Σ9t=1Θty⇐Θ(t), to be read ‘the summation of value-instances
from t1 to t9 of the variable-property Θ by object y’. Events will constitute
the sole relata for all token-level causation analysed in what follows.1 Their
method of denotation should not, however, be taken to imply a commitment
to any criterion of identity for events; this issue is discussed below in section
§7.2.5.
I will also make use of the notion of a ‘system-event’. This can be denoted
in a similar way to other events, but here, the variable which takes the place
of Θ will indicate whether or not a particular system-type is instantiated or
not, y by the name of an assembly of objects and θ by a 1 to indicate that
the system-type is instantiated (0 would indicate that the assembly does not
instantiate the system-type). Also, the time-variable will be prefixed by a ‘∆’
to signify that system-events endure for some period of time denoted by a single
variable (e.g. ‘t’) or by a range (e.g. ‘t1−t9’). So, a system-event comprising
1The account will, therefore, be inconsistent with a fact ontology (e.g. Mellor 1995, 2004)
or a states-of-affairs ontology (e.g. Armstrong 1997, 2004a) of causal relata.
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the instantiation of a system-type S which features in the antecedent of at
least one law by an assembly of objects a for some duration ∆t will be denoted
‘S∆ta ⇐1’. Assuming the respective law(s) are true, then a system-event allows
us to predict the satisfaction of the laws’ behaviour type by that same assembly.
I will also make use of the idea that system-events may have their own focal-
variables when the instantiated system-type is that of an RCJL.
Finally, I will say that two events p and q, where p = Θt1y ⇐θ and q = Φt2x⇐φ,
are system-paired in S∆ta ⇐1 if and only if, x and y are both part of a, t1 and
t2 fall entirely within ∆t, and for some law ∀x(Sx → Bx), for either event,
either,
1. it is the satisfaction of a condition of assembly for S,2 or,
2. its variable (Θ or Φ) features in the behavioural formula in B.
So, for example, a system instantiating the system-type for Ohm’s law can
be expected to incorporate system-paired events between any of the following
events (given appropriate times of occurrence): the event of the conductive
component being conductive, the event of the source of charge being a source of
charge, the event of the voltage potential being applied across the component’s
terminals, the event of the source of charge being in the electrical component,
the event of the electrical component’s resisting the charge to the a value of
R, the event of the voltage potential being of a value of V and the event of
the current-flow being a value of I.
We are now ready to start building up an account of intra-system causation.
The basic idea behind intra-system causation is simple: all instances of the
type-level causation associated with RCJLs are token causal relations. But
when it comes to considering token-level causation there are a number of
delicate issues concerning the temporal occurrence of the relata, which need
to be dealt with carefully. In order to do this I divide intra-system causation
2More specifically, the disjunct should require that the event is a condition of assembly
for S which actually constitutes part of the reason a is S.
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into two varieties, direct and inertial, treating each in turn before
characterising intra-system causation simpliciter.
7.2.1 Direct intra-system causation
In §5.3 and §6.2.5 it was suggested that in general we can assert that type-level
causes of the focal-variable in a system can be either the cause-variables in the
variable-level junction or the causes in the law-level junction, also describable
as the value-instance of a (binary) variable (see §6.2.5). With this in mind,
the most straightforward token-level cases are what I call ‘direct intra-system
causation’, defined as follows.
Direct Intra-System Causation
c is a direct intra-system cause of e, where c = Θt1y ⇐θ and
e = Φt2x⇐φ and c 6= e, if and only if there is some robust causal
junction law ∀x(Sx→ Bx), such that,
1. Φ is the focal-variable in B,
2. c and e are system-paired in S∆ta ⇐1 (for some assembly
a), and,
3. t1 = t2
To get an idea of how direct intra-system causation has been defined, consider
Figure 7.1 (p.290) of an electrical circuit with a single-cell power source and
resistor.
Say we want to find the direct intra-system causes of the event e = I tr⇐i, the
circuit r having a particular current i through it at t. First, we note that there
is a system-event in which the system-type which features in the antecedent of
Ohm’s law is instantiated by assembly r. In its unmodified form, and making
the conditions of assembly explicit, Ohm’s law can be expressed as follows:
Ohm’s law: For all x, if x is a system S comprising a conductive
component, a source of charge in the component and a voltage
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Figure 7.1: Cell, Resistor & Switch in Series
potential across it, then the resistance of the conductive component
R, the voltage potential V and flow of charge through the resistor
I are related by the formula,
V = IR.
According to the above definition, the direct intra-system causes of e will
include the simultaneous value-instances of variables in the same behaviour-
predicate and the simultaneous satisfaction of conditions of assembly by r
appears. Since I is the focal-variable of Ohm’s law, these will include the
simultaneous value-instances of voltage potential V across r (the terminals of
the cell), the resistance R of r, the conductivity of r, the existence and location
of a voltage potential across r, and the existence and location of a source of
charge in r (i.e. all the instantaneous instances of relations represented in
Figure 6.6, p.277). I take these results to be intuitively correct.
Notice that nothing in the definition of direct intra-system causation requires
that the equation in the law’s behaviour-predicate accurately predicts the effect
on the basis of its causes. Even at this stage, the nomological analysis does not
require that the law be used to entail the effect given some conditions (thouh
this may in fact be possible in the circumstances). Hence, if we wanted, we
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could employ the behaviour-modified variant (see §3.3.3) of Ohm’s law in the
case above and still get the same result.
Nonetheless, the current definition can appear deficient in a couple of ways.
First, from a contemporary perspective, we will expect the most precise laws of
physics to be relativistic. This suggests that the notion of absolute simultaneity
in causal influence should be abandoned in favour of simultaneity relative to
a frame of reference. Moreover, the causal influence between any two objects
in an assembly may also take time due to other factors (e.g. light/signal-
propagation, damping) and so not be simultaneous from within any reference
frame. Indeed, we might take contemporary physics to imply that the only
truly direct intra-system causal influence will be that which occurs between
co-located objects, e.g. a charge in a field, or two variables of the same object,
e.g. force and acceleration (see the discussion in §5.2.3).
A more careful analysis would, perhaps, have to assess the permitted time
for causal influence between cause-variables, conditions of assembly and the
focal-variable by taking into account the distances between components and
the speed of lower-level processes which constitute the causal behaviour of the
system. In what follows I will largely ignore this deficiency of the current
analysis in this respect and assume that variables in laws are simultaneously
correlated except where a law says explicitly otherwise.
But while we might permit causal influence mediated instantaneously, it is a
further issue that direct intra-system causation is restricted to characterising
only instantaneous causal relations. I don’t think that intra-system causation
should be restricted in this way. At least some intra-system causes should be
allowed to precede the time at which causal influence is mediated to the
focal-variable. Otherwise we risk not being able to make sense of any
causation taking time at all! §7.2.2 discusses how we might go about opening
up the definition of intra-system causation in general to accommodate this in
a plausible way.
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7.2.2 Inertial intra-system causation
An easy way to incorporate non-instantaneous causal influence within the
current definition of intra-system causation might seem simply to allow that
the times t1 and t2 of the respective events c and e be such that t1 ≤ t2
(rather than t1 = t2). But here we have to be careful. For it seems to me
that only limited variables are plausible earlier intra-system causes of the
values of a system-event’s focal-variable.
Some value-instances of laws’ focal-variables seem obviously to be caused by
past value-instances of their intra-system cause-variables. For instance,
within a single system-event of the system-type in Malthus’s growth law, past
size of population is surely a cause of current size of population. But other
value-instances of laws’ focal-variables do not seem so clearly to be caused by
past value-instances of their system-events’ cause-variables. For instance,
within a single system-event of the system-type in the law of pendulum
motion, past lengths of a pendulum and past values of gravitational field do
not straightforwardly seem to bear causal relevance to the value of the
pendulum’s period at a time. And within a single system-event of the
system-type in Snell’s law, past angles of incidence and velocity do not
straightforwardly seem to be relevant to the refracted velocity at a time.
One could dispute the intuition in these latter examples. After all, if one
intervened on a pendulum’s length or the gravitational field, one would
expect the period to be forever affected unless some further careful
intervention was made to put things back to how they were before. Similarly,
if one intervened on the incidence angle of a ray of light, one would expect
the refracted velocity to be affected from then on pending any similarly
careful rectifying intervention. But when we consider what has been argued
for over the foregoing chapters, I think we will be less inclined to think that
the causal relations these dependencies correspond with are licensed by the
the pendulum law and Snell’s law themselves.
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If one accepts the causal-junctions conception of laws one will accept that
many laws, including the classical pendulum law and Snell’s law, are each
associated inferentially with a different causal junction. In §6.2 I tried both
to lend support to this intuition and analyse the causal asymmetries in these
junctions in terms of probabilistic dependencies and independencies among
the variables. Something that went implicit in the analysis was that the
dependency that focal-variables have on their cause-variables in the junction
was relative to the particular time at which the values of variables were
taken. Putting aside relativistic effects, low periods of oscillation of
pendulums at a time is probabilistically dependent on high gravitational field
strength and (independently) low length at that very time. High velocities of
refracted rays at a time are dependent on high velocities of the corresponding
incidence rays at that very time. Insofar as the probabilistic analysis supports
the causal-junctions conception, it supports only instantaneous causal
relationships between variables (again, ignoring relativistic effects).
Moreover, the arguments for the logical form of laws presented in §3 and against
the causation-mirroring conception of laws in §4.1 lent credence to the idea
that laws condition behavioural properties on the simultaneous satisfaction of
certain conditions of assembly. Hence, the logical structure of laws themselves
also provides no support for non-instantaneous intra-system causation.
If we are to take seriously these points, it suggests that we should make sense
of non-instantaneous causation within instances of systems in a rather more
careful way. Although I take it to be an empirical matter, it seems to me
that only a certain class of laws are legitimate for licensing inferences about
non-simultaneous intra-system causation. Hempel agreed with this restriction
suggesting that ‘causal explanation by reference to antecedent events clearly
presupposes laws of succession,’ where ‘these laws concern temporal changes
in a system’ (1965, 352).3 As I understand it, a law of succession is any law
3 Indeed, Hempel thought that all causation required explanation in terms of laws of
succession, citing explanations of the contrasting laws of coexistence such as the pendulum
law, Ohm’s law and the gas laws as supporting non-causal explanation. Hempel thought,
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which expresses a variable as a function of some other variables with respect
to time.4 Continuity laws are an example. In integral form these laws relate
the flux jζ of some variable ζ across the boundary of a closed surface S and
the change over time of the quantity of ζ within the volume enclosed by the
surface to the net rate Σζ at which ζ is being generated or destroyed within






jζ · dS = Σζ
Arguably, continuity equations have a structural interpretation in which the
rate of change of their respective variable ζ over time (i.e. dζ/dt) is the focal-
variable of a causal junction in which the flux jζ and net rate of generation Σζ
are cause-variables. For instance, a continuity equation can represent how the
rate of change of population ζ within a region (dζ/dt) is influenced by those
entering and leaving the region (
‚
S
jζ ·dS) as well as the birth-rates (a source
in Σζ) and death-rates (a sink in Σζ) in that region. This would make the
value-instance of a rate of change of population the direct intra-system effect of
simultaneous value-instances of all the variable-properties in the equation. But
what makes continuity equations seem relevant to non-instantaneous causation
in systems is that they constrain the amount the quantity ζ can change over
time. That is, the equation shows how variables like ζ have a certain degree
of inertia. It is this, I take it, which makes it plausible that earlier instances
of the variables in the relevant equation are causes of their later variables (so
long as the system is maintained).
for example, that ‘one surely would not want to say that the pendulum’s having a period of
two seconds was caused by the fact that it had a length of 100 centimeters.’ I hope I have
done enough in the foregoing chapters to undermine that general view. But in the case of
causal explanation by reference to ‘antecedent events’ (i.e. earlier in time) Hempel seems to
have been right.
4Therefore these laws are not the same as generalisations concerning temporally
successive property instances mentioned in §4.2.1. As I understand them, Hempel’s laws
of succession are genuine dynamical laws whereas those generalisations considered earlier
concern an unfolding sequence of events and are not reasonably considered to be laws.
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In general, laws of succession help causally connect value-instances of certain
variables at a time with value-instances of the same variable at a later time.
They do this by describing the numerical relationships of a causal junction in
which the particular variable’s time-derivative is a focal-variable. The
time-derivative of population is a focal-variable in the population-specific
interpretation of the above continuity equation. Hence, in the system
described, I suggest population itself is caused by earlier values of population.
If we are to accommodate this non-instantaneous causation within single
system-events (so that it is an instance of intra-system causation) I suggest
we introduce the idea of ‘inertial intra-system causation’, which links causally
variables whose time-derivatives are focal-variables in laws of succession. For
this I notate for the time-derivative of any variable β the same variable with
a dot above it, i.e. β˙; correspondingly, for some event f , where f = Υtz⇐υ,
the event f˙ is the value-instance of the time-derivative of Υ at t by z,
i.e. f˙ = Υ˙tz⇐ν for some value ν. The precise definition can then be given as
follows.
Inertial Intra-system Causation
c is an inertial intra-system cause of e, where c = Θt1y ⇐θ
and e = Φt2x⇐φ and c 6= e, if there is some robust causal
junction law ∀x(Sx→ Bx), such that,
1. Φ˙ is the focal-variable of B,
2. c˙ and e˙ are system-paired in S∆ta ⇐1 (for some assembly
a),
3. Φ = Θ, and,
4. t1 < t2.
This allows us to say, for example, that past population is a cause of current
population in a system since the time-derivative of population is the focal-
variable in a law of succession whose system-type is instantiated by the system
from the time of that past population to the present. It also allows us to say
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the same for any variable whose time-derivative has direct intra-system causes,
e.g. the focal-variable of any continuity equation, including mass, energy and
momentum.
7.2.3 Intra-system causation simpliciter
Figure 7.2 (p.296) represents diagramatically two possible arrangements of
direct and inertial intra-system relationships between the focal-variable F ,
some cause-variable N in the variable-level causal junction with F and some
condition of assembly C for the instantiated system-type (other cause-variables
are omitted). Events in both diagrams are represented by black dots and intra-
system causation is revealed by the grey arrows.
Figure 7.2: intra-causal route
In the left diagram, the time-derivative of F is also a focal-variable in a law
of succession. F might, for example, be potential energy, N height in a
gravitational field and C the component’s having mass. Since F is the focal
variable, its value-instances are directly intra-system caused by the
instantaneous value instances of N and C. But since energy is also a
conserved quantity, its time-derivative is the focal-variable of a law of
succession, viz. the law of conservation of energy. This means it’s
value-instances will be inertially intra-system caused also by its earlier
value-instances.
In right diagram, the time-derivative of N is a focal-variable in a law of
succession. N might, for example, be population, F the quantity of social
networks of some kind and C the habitability of the environment. Since F is
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the focal variable, its value-instances are directly intra-system caused by the
instantaneous value instances of N and C. But since the time-derivative of
population is a focal-variable in a law of succession, viz. growth laws, past
value-instances of population will be an intra-system cause of later
value-instances of population.
The diagrams might seem to imply that past events and contemporary events
can overdetermine value-instances of focal-variables. Is this right and if so is it
a problem? Here it’s worth recalling that part of the campaign of §4.1 was to
undermine the relevance to causation of the idea that effects are determined
in any logical sense by their earlier causes by law. After all, there is simply no
way to determine what the energy value of some macroscopic object is given
its energy at a previous moment. Indeed, as far as I can see, no amount of
additional premises about the way the world is restricted to that past moment
will do so either. So whatever kind of overdetermination relation one might
worry about here, it is not one of logical determination. But then in what
sense is there a causal overdetermination worry remaining? Perhaps it is some
kind of ‘nomological overdetermination’ which is causing the worry. But while
effects can be connected via law-abiding systems both to past and simultaneous
causes, the removal of logical relationships makes it harder to say why we
should think direct and inertial intra-system causes are independently sufficient
to bring about the effect—which I take to be the crux of the worries about
systematic overdetermination.
Insofar as we have any kind of overdetermination in cases of intra-system
causation, it is rather different from those usually worried about. Direct intra-
system causation is always instantaneous (or at least as fast as causation can
be mediated between variables) and exists between distinct causal variables. In
contrast, inertial causation exists between property-instances which are causes
of their own later property-instances and is never instantaneous. The two kinds
of causation connect the cause with the effect effectively in different dimensions
(on the one hand laws’ behavioural formulae, on the other hand, time). From
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hereon, I assume that the two forms of intra-system capture the full breadth
of token causal relations within a system-event without being subject to any
problems as a result of overdetermination. (I will consider worries about the
disjunctive nature of intra-system causation in §7.2.6.)
A final theoretically optional by exegetically useful step is to provide a
definition for intra-system causation simpliciter. Plausibly, causal relations
exist between any pair along a path comprising either direct or inertial
intra-system causal relations. e.g. between any value-instances along any
continuous path comprising grey arrows in the above diagrams. This suggests
the following complete definition of intra-system causation.
Intra-system causation simpliciter
c is an intra-system cause of e, where c = Θt1y ⇐θ and e =
Φt2x⇐φ and c 6= e, if and only if there is some robust causal
junction law ∀x(Sx→ Bx), such that,
1. c and e are system-paired in S∆ta ⇐1 (for some assembly
a), and,
2. c and e are linked by a chain of direct or inertial intra-
system causal links.
For example, return to the cases of the pendulum law and Snell’s law
considered in §7.2.2. The reason we are inclined to think that an earlier
change in length of pendulum would be a cause of current period is not,
according to the analysis so far provided, simply due to the fact that length
and period may be system-paired. Rather, it is because they are
system-paired and length is associated with certain further continuity laws
(e.g. of mass or momentum) so that past value-instances of length is an
inertial intra-system cause of later value-instances of length which in turn is
a direct intra-system cause of period (an example of the right hand diagram
in Figure 7.2, where N=length and F=period). Similarly, the reason we are
inclined to think that an earlier change in angle of incidence of a refracted
7.2. THE PROPOSAL 299
ray would be a cause of later velocity of the refracted ray is because a change
in angle of incidence is a direct intra-system cause of the refracted ray’s
velocity (according to Snell’s law) which is an inertial intra-system cause of
later values of velocity due to the continuity of the photon’s moment (an
example of the left hand diagram in Figure 7.2, where N=angle of incidence
and F=velocity). So we can reclaim our initial intuitions by witnessing how
intra-system causation simpliciter zig-zags its way between value-instances
and across time via specific direct and inertial intra-system causal relations.
In general, I take the definition of intra-system causation to capture all of the
causal relationships which go on within a single system-event. The next step
is to analyse token causation between events which aren’t even system-paired
in any system-event.
7.2.4 Inter-system causation
Not all causation is mediated by a single system. The extension to causation
in other systems is fairly straightforward and comes again in both direct and
inertial varieties. Regarding the former, systems exhibit a degree of nesting and
overlapping, and if we are happy to put to one side concerns with transitivity,
we may assume that the direct intra-system causes of a variable within some
system which is both the focal-variable in that system and a cause-variable
in a second system will be direct causes of the focal-variable in that second
system.
So, for example, the resistor in our above example may count as an instance
of Pouillet’s law (expressed in its unmodified form).
Pouillet’s law: For all x, if x is a system S comprising a solid
object with continuous cross-sectional area A, then its resistance
R, the length l and resistivity ρ are related by the formula,
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R = ρ l
A
.
I take it that the focal-variable of Pouillet’s law is R. Hence value-instances of
R will be directly intra-system caused by simultaneous value-instances of l, A, ρ
and by the simultaneous satisfaction of conditions of assembly being a solid
object and having a continuous cross-sectional area. But we have seen that
R is also a cause-variable in the variable-level causal junction associated with
Ohm’s law. Therefore, value-instances of R can play the role of a ‘system-link’
between two system-events (in this case, where one is nested in the other),
viz. the instantiation of the system-type in Pouillet’s law and the instantiation
of the system-type in Ohm’s law. Consequently, when considering the effect
in our earlier example e = I tr⇐i, we might plausibly infer that simultaneous
value-instances of l, A, ρ and the fact that r is a solid object with continuous
cross-sectional area to also be among its causes—more specifically, its ‘inter-
system causes’.
Regarding the inertial case, I think we should look again at quantities whose
time-derivatives are focal-variables in laws of succession, such as conserved
quantities. Such quantities allow for causation to be mediated across time
within systems but also between them. For instance, a projectile’s momentum
can be influenced by multiple boosting and retarding variables if it successively
moves through a number of systems. This happens when the momentum of
a snooker ball is affected by the momentum of the cue in a collision system,
then by the friction of the baize in frictional system, then by the momenta
of other balls, cushions and pockets in further collision systems, etc. The
system-links in these cases are value-instances of the snooker ball’s momentum
which appear in multiple overlapping system-events. Again, putting worries
about transitivity aside, I take this to suggest that the intra-system causes of
a variable whose time-derivative is the focal-variable of a law of succession are
also the causes of that conserved quantity at later times (even when the system-
types in which those intra-system causes existed have gone out of existence).
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Incorporating these ideas we get the following definition for ‘inter-system
causation’.
Inter-system causation
Inter-system causation is the transitive closure of intra-
system causation.
This makes inter-system causation effectively equivalent to intra-system cau-
sation without the requirement that cause and effect be system-paired (this is
why I said earlier that intra-system causation simpliciter is ‘theoretically op-
tional’). Since intra-system causation is a limiting case of inter-system causa-
tion, we can say that all intra-system causation is inter-system causation.
Given the above example, it might not be immediately obvious why a
distinction between inter-system and intra-system causation needs to be
maintained. For we might imagine that in the example we can take the
perspective of there being one single system which incorporates all the
variables in Pouillet’s law and Ohm’s law, thereby reducing all the instances
of inter-system to cases of intra-system.
In this example, I am open to such a move. Though the laws are kept apart in
practice, positing a law which combines the two does not appear to conflict with
scientific understanding. However, I think it would be wrong to assume this is
always possible. In non-simultaneous inter-system causation, the system-links
can join systems which do not endure for the same times, so that an earlier
inter-system cause might never be construed as an intra-system cause (recall
that for intra-system causation, the duration of the system-event must include
both cause and effect). Moreover, there appear to be cases of system-linking
which are not captured by system-events formed from any mere combination
of laws. This will become clearer with the discussion of event-identity.
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7.2.5 Type and token event-identification
The procedure for chaining systems together to form inter-system causal
relations is fairly straightforward in the case when the system-link is the
value-instance of a variable which features in the behaviour-predicate of both
systems (as the specific value for R is in the previous example). But this
need not always be the case. Sometimes a single event must be identified as
the value-instances of two distinct variables. Here I discuss a way this can
happen in which such identifications work for all instances of a type of
value-instance and another way in which such identifications only work given
the contingent token features of the situation.
Some non-robust causal junction laws (non-RCJLs) entail the value of one
variable on the basis of another. A very clear example of this is the Planck-
Einstein law (see §5.4.3), which allows us to infer from the energy of a photon
what its frequency will be and vice versa. Arguably, there is no explanatory
asymmetry between these two variables. Indeed, it seems that rather than
describing a relationship between two distinct event-types, the Planck-Einstein
law gives us a way to identify the same event in two different ways: a photon’s
having a particular energy at a time just is its having a certain frequency
at that time. Hence, it is plausible that a system-link can be established by
using the system-event of an instantiation of the Planck-Einstein law itself to
mediate the connection. In such cases, there will be inter-system causation
between two further distinct system-events in which the focal-variable of one
is the energy (frequency) of a photon and the cause-variable of another is
frequency (energy) of a photon.
As with the example of inter-system causation in §7.2.4, system-links identified
under different descriptions related by law are type-identifications of events.
That is because the law permits an identification of the event as an instance
of either variable (e.g. frequency or energy) at a time in all cases where the
system-type has an instances. Non-RCJLs can, therefore, be used to support
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type-identifications of events for system-links in the chains of inter-system
causation.
Perhaps there are many such system-links. But my understanding is that
they are not the only way in which inter-system causation is thought about (if
implicitly) in practice. For there seem to be cases of system-linking in token
cases where no law can be found which helps translate from characterisation in
terms of one variable to that of another. Consider, for instance, the following
example, in which a switch is placed in the circuit considered earier. The
resulting circuit is represented in Figure 7.3 (p.303).
Figure 7.3: Cell, Resistor & Switch in Series
The current flow through the circuit will occur if the switch is closed. So, we
might plausibly attribute any mechanical force applied to the switch which
results in its closure as a cause of the resultant current flow. Here, the switch’s
closure seems to be playing the role of a system link between the application of
a force and the current flow through the circuit. But it may not be immediately
obvious how to make sense of this within the framework provided. After all, the
variable concerning the position of the switch is not a variable which features in
known electrical laws, and there are no obvious laws analogous to the Planck-
Einstein law which license a translation of the event described as a spatial
position of the switch to a description of the same event in terms of properties
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relevant to electrical laws.
However, it is a condition of the system-type in Ohm’s law that its assemblies
must comprise a conductive component. And we can see that the closure of the
switch in this token case will allow the assembly represented in the diagram
to satisfy the conditions of assembly for that system-type where it currently
does not.5 Therefore, it does appear that in the specific scenario represented
in the above diagram, that the event of the switch’s closure can be identified
with the assembly’s satisfaction of a condition of assembly for the system-type
in Ohm’s law. This is the case, regardless of any mediating law to license the
identification.
Once we grant such a token event identification, it can form the system-link
between the mechanical switch system and the electronic system. The total
force F applied perpendicular to the switch-lever at a distance d from the pivot
creates a torque, which we can causally link to the angle of the switch-lever φ
by recognising that the switch is an instance of the antecedent of the following
law.6
Torque and angle law: All inertial rigid bodies rotated from
rest about a frictionless pivot have distance d, moment of inertia






Fdt.dt+ φ0 = φ
I take it that in this law, φ is the focal-variable. Hence, we can infer that the
5Although I do not say that the assembly is dependent on closure for satisfaction of the
conditions. For this is may not in general be the case (see the preemption case in §7.4).
6This law can be derived from the angular analogue of the total force law (where L is
angular momentum):
Angular force law: All rotating inertial rigid bodies have properties F, d,L
related by the formula,
Fd = dL
dt
If we integrate twice the formula and substitute for momentum according to the relation
L = I dφdt we get the behavioural formula for the torque and angle law.
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switch exhibits an intra-system causal relationship between force and angle. If
we now incorporate as the system-link the event identified both as the switch
taking a particular angle φ and as the circuit coming to satisfy a condition
of assembly for the system-type in Ohm’s law then we have an inter-system
causal path from force on the switch to current in the circuit.
To adopt a view of events as identifiable under different descriptions is not, in
and of itself, controversial. However, my treatment may appear incompatible
with any one description being that which captures the event’s ‘true essence’.
Otherwise the analysis would be at risk of deeming some intra-system causal
relations merely superficial in comparison with others. This takes us away
from Kim’s (1976) and Lewis’s (1986d) individuation criteria and towards a
more Davidsonian view according to which token events are particulars (see
especially Davidson 1976, but also Davidson 1967, 1985, Quine 1985).
Despite Davidson struggling to convincingly settle on a criterion of identity for
events, I think his characterisation of events to be anyway the most promising
of the three just mentioned. After all, redescription of token events in the way
required for inter-system causation is ubiquitous. It is present when we say
that an act of apology was someone’s saying ‘I apologise’, or when we identify
someone’s intentionally burning some scrap paper with their unintentional
burning of a valuable document (Davidson 1976, 296). As Davidson pointed
out, we also make use of the redescription of events when we explain them.
Last week there was a catastrophe in the village. In the course
of explaining why it happened, we need to redescribe it, perhaps
as an avalanche. There are rough statistical laws [generalisations]
about avalanches: avalanches tend to occur when heavy snow falls
after a period of melting and freezing, so that the new snow does
not bind to the old. But we could go further in explaining this
avalanche—why it came just when it did, why it covered the area
it did, and so forth—if we described it in still a different and more
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precise vocabulary. (Ibid.)
While Lewis and Kim’s individuation of events has the facility for some
redescription, they still require events to have something like an essence or
fundamental description. For Kim, an event’s essence comprises the property,
object and time underlying an event; for Lewis, it is the (contextually
defined) class-relation which identifies instances of the event across possible
worlds. The benefit of Davidson’s treatment is that events have no
fundamental characterisation. In the terms of the nomological account, an
event is not defined essentially by its role in any single system. In the token
case, the closure of the switch just is the forming of a closed loop of
conductive material and just is a lever moving through a certain angle φ.
None of these descriptions is the essential description.
Much of the past concern with the Davidsonian view has been over which
criterion of identity should be employed. Davidson famously vacillated between
a causal-individuation and a space-time individuation. Both suffer problems.
The causal-individuation can seem to result in circularity since causes and
effects must be individuated first (although see Horsten 2010, De Clercq et al.
2014), and since they are events, we seem to need the criterion of identity
for events to pick them out. But the space-time individuation can seem too
coarse-grained, as when a sphere both rotates through an angle and heats up
simultaneously (Davidson discusses this example at the end of his 1976 and
further in Davidson 1985 and Quine 1985). Here is not the place to enter into
any detail on the matter. It should suffice for the sake of the present account to
note that the space-time individuation appears at least necessary condition on
event-individuation, and I don’t think we should take our current lack of a full
analysis to indicate any sense of incorrectness with the view. After all, it’s not
like Kim’s and Lewis’s own views don’t also have problems of individuation.
Indeed, it is a merit of Davidson’s approach that the issues of individuation
can be laid bare so clearly.
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I will from hereon assume that token-identification of events of the sort made
plausible by Davidson are another way in which system-links can be understood
when observing sequences of intra-system causation chained together to form
inter-system causal relations.
7.2.6 Is all causation inter-system causation?
The proposal for a nomological analysis of token causation is completed by the
following claim.
Token Causation
c is a token cause of e if and only if c is an inter-system cause
of e.
But is this plausible? A first and obvious complaint is that there will be
plenty of causation which doesn’t fall into law-based causation. I cannot
respond comprehensively to this kind of complaint here. After all, without
counterexamples to the analysis or any substantial explanation as to why the
analysis is limited to back up the complaint, it is hard to combat properly.
But I can point out that the preceding points concerning event-identity mean
that all that is required for all causation to be subsumed under the analysis
is for it to consist in events which under some description can be linked by
chains of instantiations of laws’ system-types. Moreover, these descriptions
don’t even have to be remain at the same ‘level’ of description throughout a
particular instance of inter-system causation. Having said that, if one
thought that physics was on the way to being both causally closed, entirely
law-governed and at a constituent level of every causal relationship then one
might expect that a redescription of the events in the terms of physics would
support the proposal (see, e.g. Davidson 1970, 1995).
A second conceivable complaint which again queries the completeness of the
analysis is that the stipulation that causation follows the temporal order is
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overly restrictive. A response which should placate this kind of objection
comes from noticing three things. First, while the proposal prohibits
retro-causation out of hand (i.e. causation in which the effects precede their
causes) it does not prohibit simultaneous causation. I will argue in §7.5 that
this in fact a significant boon for the account. Second, almost no non-causal
account of causation in the literature today is completely compatible with
retro-causation. As I will point out later on, dependency accounts invariably
have to posit temporal order at some point of the analysis in order to have a
hope of avoiding counterexample. And I will suggest later why accounts
which focus on power-manifestations for their analysis of causation are
arguably committed to causation which is only simultaneous, i.e. neither
past-directed nor forward-directed. Third, the constraint on temporal order
in the account comes from explicit stipulation. If we decided, for instance
that there were determinable cases of causation which are retroactive, then
the current account could be amended to incorporate them still making use
of the idea that a nomological analysis will draw on connections with causal
junctions. After all the defining feature of the proposed analysis concerns the
causal asymmetries in causal junctions which have been defined purely
probabilistically i.e. without the assumption of a temporal order. What needs
to be the case for the account to work is that the causal order maps to some
non-causal order such that the latter can define the former and be
incorporated within the general nomological framework given above. If this
order is not a temporal order, then maybe some adjustments will need to be
made, but this is a long way off a complete overhaul of the proposed analysis.
A third complaint one might make against the proposed analysis is that the
assumption of transitivity leads the analysis to make some unsound judgements
of causation where there is none. Failures of transistivity have often been
discussed in the causation literature (e.g. in McDermott 1995, Lewis 2000,
Hitchcock 2001b, Hall 2004a,b) so it is incumbent on me to say something
about such possibilities.
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One way of response to apparent cases of transitivity-failure is simply to
deny the cases are genuine: causation just is transitive and appearances to
the contrary are to be explained away. This is the response of a number of
admirable philosophers (Lewis 2000, Hall 2004a) and in some cases seems
highly defensible. However, its worth pointing out that the systems-based
account is not in principle prohibitive of a further qualification which denies
transitivity in certain cases. It seems plausible to me that whatever it is that
does lead us to suspect that transitivity has failed in certain cases is a feature
of causal analysis which extends beyond that of basic causal structure. For
instance, we might attribute transitivity-failure to cases where the net result
of a causal influence does not change the effect we’re interested in from what
it would have been otherwise (Hitchcock 2001a), or from some value
considered a default (along the lines suggested in Hitchcock and Knobe
2009). But in each of these explanations, we understand that there exists an
underlying structure of transitive relations independent of net effects or
contextual parameters. It is always possible, then, to take recourse to the
view that the above analysis is for this basic kind of causal structure and a
full analysis of causation proper is pending some further contextual
parameters.
The final complaint I will consider is that the proposal is overly disjunctive.
One disjunction exists in the analysis between the binary causal variables for
system-types’ conditions of assembly and the multi-valued variables in
behavioural formulae. Another disjunction exists between intra-system
causation and inter-system causation. Finally, a disjunction exists between
the instantaneous direct intra-system causation and the non-instantaneous
inertial intra-system causation. Is it plausible that token causation should
admit of so many subdivisions?
Let me respond to the concern over each of these sub-divisions in turn. On
the first disjunction, the distinction between binary variables for conditions
of assembly and the multi-valued variables in behavioural formulae is a
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distinction which comes about from the way in which laws are characterised
rather than from causation itself. While the binary variables represent
properties at the law-level, multi-valued variables represent properties at the
variable-level (although recall from the functional relationships considered in
§3.1.3 that this need not be the case). But it is quite possible to conceive of
the relations between all these variables as part of one single causal theory.
In §6.2.5 I showed how this might be done specifically with the example of
the causal asymmetries associated with Ohm’s law. If this can in general be
achieved, then the types of causation at the law-level and at the
variable-level need not be understood as qualitatively distinct from a
modelling perspective.
On the second disjunction, whether a causal relationship comes out as one of
intra-system causation or inter-system causation may be relative to a particular
description of the events and laws employed to pair them. Earlier, I argued
that a resistor’s length was an inter-system cause of the current flow in that
resistor, since I drew on two laws and two corresponding system-events to show
how they were related. But I also admitted that there does not seem to me any
deep reason why Ohm’s law and Pouillet’s law could not be combined to form
a new law in which the correspondent system-events related instances of length
and current as those of intra-system causation. The title ‘law’ is often reserved
for particular relations for reasons of mere historical contingency, and no doubt
if a generalisation inferred from combining accepted laws is too overloaded with
variables or too detailed in its conditions of assembly then we are unlikely to
call it a law. But for the sake of causal analysis, combinations of laws which
stick to the right logical form (or better still, are RCJLs) can be treated as
laws themselves, as is suggested by the account provided in §5.5.7
On the third and final disjunction, while the previous subdivisions are fairly
superficial, the distinction between simultaneous and non-simultaneous
7Although I don’t take this wide scope to imply the much stronger and, to my mind,
dubious thesis that any consequence of a law is a law; see the discussion in §2.2.
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causation is, I think, actually quite fundamental. Shortly, I will show why
too much focus on one or the other has restricted the scope of many accounts
of causation. But that doesn’t mean the two aren’t importantly different.
Arguably, a crucial failure of those who adhered to the ‘causation-mirroring
conception’ of laws (see §4) can be attributed to the assumption that
causation is the same in both cases. Indeed, insofar as token causation is
something analysable by the kinds of laws which we know exist in this
world—roughly, laws of succession and laws of coexistence, see fn.3—I think
we should expect a clear division in the analysis between simultaneous and
non-simultaneous causation.
In sum, I take the disjunctive nature of the analysis provided for token
causation to be in some respects tolerable, in others admirable. The analysis
presents a way of using laws to analyse causation which seems to capture well
the kind of explanatory measures we commonly take. In §7.3 I will draw on
an extended example to show just how adept and continuous with
explanatory practice the analysis is. But despite this continuity the analysis
is fairly novel from the perspective of philosophical literature on causation.
The reason for this, I believe, stems from the long shadow cast by the
misguided causation-mirroring conception (see §4) which has lead to a fairly
systematic misinterpretation of the logic, and therefore also the capabilities,
of laws. One of the main symptoms of the misinterpretation seems to me the
idea that laws explain by supporting entailments of the effects from the
causes. It is, therefore, a particular novelty of the analysis of causation
proposed here that it uses laws as the key analysans without making this
claim.
7.2.7 Nomological analysis without entailment
I have proposed a nomological analysis of token causation summarised by the
claim that all token causation is inter-system causation. The analysis is
nomological because according to it, it is instantiations of laws’ system-types
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(i.e. ‘system-events’) and behavioural properties which provide the conditions
according to which token causal relations exist.
Under the right specification, it is often possible to use the law to deduce
the value instanced by the effect-variable (or ‘focal-variable’) on the basis of
its intra-system causes. In such cases intra-system causation would admit
something akin to lawful entailment of the effect. But despite the potential
for entailment from causes to effects, under the proposed analysis of token
causation, this is neither sufficient nor necessary for intra-system causation.
Entailment isn’t sufficient (at least at the variable-level) because laws
typically license symmetrical inferences. It is only with some further
non-logical analysis of the type-level causal junctions associated with laws
(e.g. in terms of probabilistic dependencies, see §6.2.4) that we can actually
tell which entailments correspond to a causal asymmetry.
Lawful entailment also isn’t necessary for intra-system causation since in
cases where a system-event is the instantiation of the system-type of an
idealising law, the behavioural formula do not provide precise entailments.
This is clearest when we consider the behaviour to be modified in the way
suggested in §3.3.3. This modification says that the formulae in idealising
laws is a special case of whatever behaviour is actually exhibited by the
system and so cannot be expected to entail accurate values for the
instantiated variables.
For longer causal chains, i.e. inter-system causal relations, the notion of lawful
entailment becomes even less relevant. Value-instances of the focal-variable
in one system-event are identified with value-instances of causal-variables in
other system-events which can occur in the distant past. This step can be
entirely contingent on the particular set up of the scenario and on the kind
of token identifications of events available under different descriptions. Hence,
any kind of entailment is typically out of the question.
7.3. EXTENDED EXAMPLE: THE CHALLENGER DISASTER 313
It’s worth comparing the view developed here once again with the
commonplace assumption that insofar as laws help analyse token causation,
they do so by entailing the effect from the conclusion (see, e.g., Hempel 1965,
Armstrong and Heathcote 1991, Armstrong 1997, 2004a, Paul 2000, Schaffer
2001). Ever since Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) suggested their covering
law account of causal explanation, it has been commonplace to criticise such
accounts. But in criticising them, theorists seem to have missed the
opportunity to make use of laws in analysis in the rather different way I have
presented above. Clearly according to the current analysis, entailment is
beside the point. We may use the mathematically precise features of laws to
make predictions, but this is not what constitutes the ability for laws to
analyse causation.
7.3 Extended example: The Challenger
Disaster
In this section, I will present a brief representation of how the nomological
analysis as I have described it can be used to explain extended causal
relationships in a real-world example. I will refrain from going into specific
details about numerical values; after all, often we don’t have access to these.
Indeed, given the foregoing section it should be considered a merit of the
analysis that it doesn’t require specific values to work. Moreover, I think the
example draws attention to the plausibility and informativeness of the
analysis, particularly in its ability to help us provide the kinds of explanation
for causal relations we actually might look for.
The example I will use is the explosion of the Space-Shuttle Challenger on 28th
January 1986 in which all seven crew lost their lives. The enormity of such
a public, expensive and heavily engineered tragedy instigated a very long and
rigorous inquiry by a US Presidential Commission. Their conclusion was given
as follows.
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In view of the findings, the Commission concluded that the cause
of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in
the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor (Report of the
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident).
Let’s call this conclusion by the Commission the ‘primary causal claim’. The
justification for the primary causal claim was a result of the connection they
were able to draw between the failure of the pressure seal to the explosion of
the external tank through a number of intermediate events part of which is
summarised in the following passage from the Commission’s report.
The destruction of the [solid rocket motor] seals caused hot gases
to leak through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket
motor [40]. The flame from the hole impinged on the External Tank
and caused a failure at the aft connection at the External Tank [76-
77]. Since the internal pressure of the liquid hydrogen tank is at
approximately 33 pounds per square inch, a sudden venting at the
aft section will produce a large initial thrust that tails off as the
pressure drops [67] (Report of the Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chapter IV ).
Subsequent events were captured in two moments in a timeline of the launch
prepared shortly it after it happened. Two relevant entries are the following:
T+73.124: The resulting forward acceleration begins pushing the
[hydrogen] tank up into the liquid oxygen section in the tip of the
external fuel tank.
T+73.213: An explosion occurs near the forward part of the tank
where the solid rocket boosters attach. (Timeline on the
Space-shuttle Challenger explosion assembled by United Press
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International’s Cape Canaveral Bureau chief William Harwood
and radio chief Rob Navias.)
There are a number of mediating events we can infer from the report and
timeline. The following appear particularly salient: seal-destruction, the
destruction of the seals; gas-leak, the gas leak from the right solid rocket
motor; tank-impingement, the impingement of the gas leak on the external
tank; tank-failure, the failure of the liquid hydrogen tank; tank-thrust, the
thrust of the hydrogen tank; tank-collision, the fusion of the liquid hydrogen
and oxygen tanks; fuel-conflagration, the spontaneous conflagration of the
fuel in the external tank.
Assuming the defining moment of the accident can be identified with the last
event in this sequence, the primary causal claim can therefore be supported
by the following connected token causal claims:
1. seal-destruction caused gas-leak.
2. gas-leak caused tank-impingement.
3. tank-impingement caused tank-failure.
4. tank-failure caused tank-thrust.
5. tank-thrust caused tank-collision.
6. tank-collision caused fuel-conflagration.
In analysing these relations, a pre-emptive task will be to notice the different
descriptions we can identify the relata under. Table 7.1 (p.317) suggests some
plausible token relata which will be helpful in what follows. In each case, I
suspect some of the identifications can be challenged. For instance, I have
suggested that we might identify tank-failure both with the flux-density across
the hydrogen tank reaching a critical point and with that area of the tank
failing. Perhaps a more precise explanation of the Challenger disaster would
distinguish these latter two value-instances and instead find a way to link
them by inter-system causation. I suspect whether we do this in practice or
not depends on the precision we require. For instance, in some circumstances
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we might identify a catastrophe with an avalanche, including along with it
the destruction of houses, etc. In other circumstances, we might prefer to
identify the catastrophe with the consequences of the avalanche, i.e. the effects
of the pressure of the compacted snow on the walls of the buildings. I see no
reason why admitting this would compromise the general fact that we can in
general successfully identify events under different descriptions (compare the
contextually relative validity of identifying the referent of ‘Holland’ with ‘The
Netherlands’.)
I will now describe how we can justify this causal sequence in terms of inter-
system causation (for simplicity I omit the behaviour-modification of each law
used in the analysis).
seal-destruction caused gas-leak. Seal-destruction was an event which
took place in the right solid rocket motor as it warmed up during launch.
Since the rubber o-rings which constituted part of the seal were slow to expand
during the rocket booster’s initial thrust, the seals between the booster’s tang
and clevis joint exposed a gap through which the internal ignited gases could
be forced out under the booster’s internal pressure.
We may identify the system-event S-orifice-flow∆t1−t5a in which, from soon
after the launch at t1 to the explosion at t5, an assembly a comprising the
destroyed seal and escaping gases instantiate the system-type of the following
fluid dynamical robust causal junction law (RCJL).
Orifice-flow law: For all x, if x is a gas flowing from an orifice
then it has variables pressure P , mass flow-rate M˙ and area of the
orifice A which satisfy the formula,
P = M˙2A.
Since seal-destruction can be identified with the presence of an orifice at the
seals and gas-leak with the mass-flow rate of gas at the orifice (see Table 7.1),
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Table 7.1: Event-sequence of the Challenger accident
key times descriptions





(the presence of an
orifice at the seals)
gas-leak Σ5t=1 m˙tgas ⇐ m˙(t) Σ5t=1 mt1gas ⇐ m(t)
(the mass flow-rate of
the gas at the orifice)
(the presence of some






gas ⇐ m(t) Σ4t=2 T tgas ⇐ T (t)
(the presence of some






t3 tank-failure qt3tank ⇐ q(t3) At3tank ⇐ A(t3)
(the flux density across
the hydrogen tank
reaching critical)
(an area of the hydrogen
tank’s wall failing)
t3-t5 tank-thrust Σ5t=3 F ttank ⇐ F (t)
(the thrust of the
hydrogen tank)
t4-t5 tank-collision Σ5t=3 σttanks ⇐ σ(t) Σ5t=1 mixttanks ⇐ mix(t)
(the stress on both
tanks at the point of
collision)







(the combustion of the
fuel)
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the two events are system-paired in S-orifice-flow∆t1a . Moreover, because they
both occur between t1 and t5, and M˙ is the focal-variable of the Orifice-flow
law we can infer that every value-instance comprising seal-destruction is a
direct intra-system cause of a value-instance comprising gas-leak for all times
t1− t5.
gas-leak caused tank-impingement. Gas-leak began at the destroyed seals
in the rocket booster and flowed out towards the external tank. We may
identify the system-event S-gas-flow∆t1−t5b in which an assembly comprising
the gas itself between t1 and t5 instantiates the system-type of the following
conservation RCJL.
Gas-flow law: For all x, if x is a continuous flow of fluid across
some distance then it has variables mass M , density ρ and volume
V which satisfy the formula,
M˙ = ρV˙ .
Since gas-leak can be identified with the presence of gas at the orifice and
tank-impingement can be identified with the presence of gas at the tank, their
time-derivatives are system-paired in S-gas-flow∆t1−t3b . Moreover, since gas-
leak commences earlier than tank-impingement and M˙ is the focal-variable
of the Gas-flow law, we can infer that there exist value-instances comprising
gas-leak which are inertial intra-system cause of value-instances comprising
tank-impingement.
tank-impingement caused tank-failure. As the gas impinged on the
external tank it heated the aft section up so much that the tank failed. We
may identify the system-event S-thermal∆t2−t3c in which an assembly
comprising the gas and the walls of the external tank between t2 and t3
instantiates the system-type of the following thermal conduction RCJL.
Fourier’s heat law: For all x, if x is thermal gradient across a
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thermally conductive material then it has variables flux-density q,
heat-conductivity k and temperature T which satisfy the formula,
q = −k∇T.
Since tank-impingement can be identified with the presence of a temperature
gradient across the tank hydrogen tank’s walls (a condition of assembly for
Fourier’s heat law) and tank-failure can be identified with the flux-density
across the hydrogen tank reaching a critical point at t3, the two events are
system-paired in S-thermal∆t2−t3c . Moreover, since they both occur between t2
and t3, and q is the focal-variable of Fourier’s heat law, we can infer that every
value-instance comprising tank-impingement is a direct intra-system cause of
a value-instance comprising tank-failure.
tank-failure caused tank-thrust. As described by the presidential
commission, ‘a sudden venting at the aft section [of the external tank] will
produce a large initial thrust’. We may identify the system-event
S-thrust∆t3−t5d in which an assembly comprising the pressurised liquid
hydrogen in the hydrogen tank (with its failed aft-section) between t3 and t5
instantiates the system-type of the thrust RCJL,
Thrust law: For all x, if x is liquid flowing from an orifice in a
pressurised container then it has variables pressure of the liquid
hydrogen Pl, area A and Thrust force F which satisfy the formula,
F = PlA.
Since we can identify tank-failure with the presence of an area of the tank
which has failed and tank-thrust can be identified with the hydrogen tank’s
thrust force, the two events are system-paired in S-thrust∆t3−t5d . Moreover,
since both occur between t3 and t5 and F is the focal-variable of the Thrust
law, we can infer that every value-instance comprising tank-failure is a direct
intra-system cause of a value-instance comprising tank-thrust.
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tank-thrust caused tank-collision. The propulsion of the hydrogen tank
into the oxygen tank caused a the two to undergo stress at the point of
collision. We may identify the system-event S-stress∆t4−t5e in which an
assembly comprising the hydrogen tank and oxygen tank between t4 and t5
instantiates the system-type of the stress RCJL,
Stress law: For all x, if x is a collision between two objects then it




Since tank-thrust can be identified with the hydrogen tank’s thrust force and
tank-collision can be identified with the stress on both tanks at the point of
collision, the two events are system-paired in S-stress∆t4−t5e . Moreover, since
the events both occur between t4 and t5, and σ is the focal-variable of the
Stress law, we can infer that every value-instance of tank-thrust is a direct
intra-system cause of a value instance comprising tank-collision.
tank-collision caused fuel-conflagration: At the point of collision
between hydrogen and oxygen tanks the fuels started to mix. We can identify
the system-event S-combustion∆t4−t5f in which an assembly comprising the
hydrogen and oxygen between t4 and t5 instantiates the system-type of the
chemical reaction RCJL,
Hydrogen combustion law: For all x, if x is the combustion
of hydrogen then it has variables energy E, lower heating value
of hydrogen LHVH and mass of hydrogen mH which satisfy the
formula,
E = LHVH ×mH .
Since tank-collision can be identified with the mixing of the hydrogen and
oxygen (a condition of assembly for the combustion law) and fuel-conflagration
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can be identified with the release of energy E the two are system-paired in S-
combustion∆t4−t5f . Moreover, since they both occur between t4 and t5, and
E is the focal-variable of the Hydrogen combustion law, we can infer that
every value-instance of tank-collision is a direct intra-system cause of a value-
instance comprising fuel-conflagration.
According to the nomological analysis I provided in §7.2, c is a token cause
of e if and only if c is an inter-system cause of e, i.e. connected by a chain
of direct and inertial intra-system causal relations. Since there are temporal
parts of all the events in the causal sequence which are connected to some parts
of subsequent events in the sequence either via direct or inertial intra-system
causation, the above reasoning allows us to confirm the primary causal claim
made by the Presidential Commission.
Working through extended examples like this exposes the immense power of
the proposed nomological analysis of token causation. For it is natural in
explanation of token causal relationships to draw on actual known laws where
possible and yet, so far as I know, no account of token causation since Hempel’s
has proposed any general method by which this should be done.8
Hempel’s (and Oppenheim’s) approach was reprimanded for requiring that
the effect be deduced or statistically inferred from the conjunction of cause
with laws, and also for the fact that laws do not seem to exhibit the required
type-level asymmetry. But the analysis I have proposed rectifies both these
issues. It rectifies the first by requiring only that the cause and effect be
linked via a chain of suitable system-pairs, where there is no expectation of
deduction or statistical inference (see §7.2.7). The analysis also rectifies the
second issue concerning the symmetry of laws’ deductive/statistical
entailments by showing how the asymmetrical structure of a causal junction
is associated with the central class of robust causal junction laws which are
8There are accounts which bear similarities, e.g. Strevens (2008), Baumgartner (2008,
2013a), but it seems to me that none of these accounts provide any method for drawing
explicitly actual laws which are actually drawn on in practice.
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inferentially associated with type-level causal asymmetries (perhaps
themselves analysable in probabilistic terms; see §6.2).
So much for the success of my nomological analysis in consideration of other
nomological approaches to causation. I now turn to consider its success in
consideration of other approaches entirely.
7.4 Classic problem-cases
In this section I show how the proposed nomological analysis of token causation
tackles two kinds of causal scenario known to be problematic for other popular
approaches to analysis of causation. While I don’t take this to provide any
clear conclusive indication of the superiority of the approach, it should certainly
indicate its competitiveness.
Dependency theories understand causal relations to be defined in some
manner by effects’ depenency on their causes. Examples include
counterfactual theories of causation (1973a, 1986g, 2000, 2001, 2007), and
probability-raiser theories (e.g. Menzies 1996, Kvart 2004, Fenton-Glynn
2011). In their simplest form, dependency theories have often suffered from
not being able to judge the causation in cases of preemption successfully.
There have been many attempts to respond to these concerns which I will
not delve into here. But where there has been success, it is typically due to
conscious and baroque adaptation of the basic premise that causation is
rooted in dependency. One could be forgiven, therefore, for thinking that the
amendments to the theory are unreasonable post-hoc fixes to an essentially
flawed approach. Hence, a different approach which is already able to deal
with cases of preemption in its nascent state should bear some appeal.
Consider Figure 7.4 (p.323; developed from an example in Pearl 2000). Switch
a is a single-pole double-throw (SPDT) switch and has two positions: up
or down. Switch b is a single-pole single-throw (SPST) switch which has
two positions: open or closed. If a moves down and b closes, the bulb will
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Figure 7.4: SPDT and SPST in series
illuminate. But a’s movement will also prevent b from having any causal
relevance to the lighting of the bulb, since by moving down, a prevents b from
being in a circuit with the bulb. In such a scenario it is natural to treat a’s
moving down as the cause and b’s closure as the pre-empted non-cause, or
‘fizzler’ (Schaffer 2001).
As with all cases of preemption, the scenario involving Figure 7.4 poses a
problem for basic dependency theories because the effect (the bulb’s
illumination) is not dependent on the cause (a’s moving down). The example
represents a case of causation without counterfactual dependence, since if a
had not moved down, then the bulb would still have lit. If we assume the
system is deterministic, then the example represents a case of causation
without probabilistic dependence, since given that b closed, the probability of
the bulb lighting was not increased by a moving down. Moreover, if we
assume the system is indeterministic, then the example also represents a case
of probabilistic dependence without causation, since given that a moved
down, the probability of the bulb’s lighting would still be increased somewhat
by b closing
However, if we follow the nomological analysis provided in §7.2 and treat token
causation as inter-system causation, we have a simple solution. When the bulb
is lit it is in an instance of the system-type of Kirchhoff’s voltage law.
324 CHAPTER 7. A NOMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Kirchhoff’s voltage law: For all closed electronic loops, the sum
of resistances ΣR, current through each conductor I and the total
electromotive force Σemf available in that loop are related by the
formula,
Σemf = ΣR× I
Since the bulb’s illumination can be identified with (or at least has as an
uncontroversial intermediary event) the current through the bulb, it will be a
value-instance in the system-event consisting in the assembly instantiating the
system-type in Kirchhoff’s law. Moreover, since current is the focal-variable of
Kirchhoff’s voltage law, the bulb’s illumination is directly intra-system caused
by any simultaneous value-instance of another variable (e.g. Σemf or ΣR)
or by any simultaneous satisfaction of a condition of assembly for the law’s
system-type. Clearly, the movement of switch a into the down position will
be one of these latter intra-system causes. For it is the event of the switch
becoming part of the closed electronic loop which the bulb is in. In comparison,
the closure of switch b, is no such event, since switch b does not come to be in
the closed loop with the bulb when moved down. Switch a is a direct intra-
system cause, hence an inter-system cause, hence a token cause of the bulb’s
illumination according to the proposed nomological analysis. Switch b does
not appear from the setup to be any kind of token cause under the analysis.
Despite the terminology I use to make the causal relevance of switch a clear in
the example, I take it that the explanation charts a very basic sort of reasoning
which we actually make in the scenario (an was in fact already made when
introducing the example): that switch a is part of the relevant circuit/system
and b is not. The analysis can capture formally this reasoning partly due to
the fact that it does not rely on any notion of dependency to analyse token
causation. Rather, it is concerned with the actual events which take place.
In this regard the approach is similar to physical connection views of causation.
These views characterise causation in terms of the physical connection which
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causes have to their effects, e.g., via some flow of energy or momentum (e.g.
Aronson 1971, 1985, Fair 1979, Ehring 1997, Salmon 1998b, Dowe 2000, Rueger
2006). The competitive edge of physical connection views over dependency
views is most obviously their adeptness when dealing with preemption cases.
However, they have typically struggled to handle a different kind of causal
relation we called ‘negative causation’.
Negative causation exists when at least one relatum consists in an object’s
failure to instantiate a particular property at some time, such as in cases of
causation by omission or prevention. Despite some philosophical argument to
the contrary (see Dowe 2000, Beebee 2004) it seems natural on occasion to
treat negative causation as genuine causation (see Lewis 2004, Schaffer 2000,
2003). But since such relations include events consisting in the absence of
energy or momentum, negative causation is not easily accommodated by the
physical connection views.
The nomological analysis of causation as inter-system causation does not have
such restrictions and is, subsequently, able to easily accommodate many cases
of negative causation. Consider the circuit represented in Figure 7.5 (p.325).
Figure 7.5: Drained Cell & Bulb in Series
In this circuit, there is no current supplied to the bulb because the cell is
supplying no electromotive force (emf). This appears a case of negative
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causation since the cause of the bulb’s failure to light is itself a negative
event consisting in an object’s failure to have nonzero emf . Subsequently,
physical connection views will not (traditionally) treat such a case as one of
causation; after all, there is certainly no flow of energy or momentum from
the cell to the bulb.
Yet, notice how easy the nomological analysis gets an affirmation of
causation in this case. For again, in this scenario we have an instance of the
system-type in Kirchhoff’s voltage law. That is because, despite there being
zero emf produced by the cell, the whole assembly still forms a closed
electronic loop. Subsequently, the event of the cell having zero emf is still an
event system-paired with the value of current supplied to the bulb. Moreover,
since current is the focal-variable of Kirchhoff’s law, we can infer that the
value of emf produced by the cell (viz. zero) is a direct intra-system cause,
hence inter-system cause, hence token cause of the simultaneous zero current
through the bulb. Notice also, that the solution doesn’t entail that any
drained cell is similarly a cause of the bulb’s lack of illumination nor does it
invoke contextually dependent default or deviant properties in order to avoid
this result (this has been seen as a necessary recourse for some dependency
views; see the discussion in Beebee (2004), Hall (2007)).
Many dependency views and physical connection views have found ways to
deal carefully with instances of their respective problem-cases which are as
simple as those have presented. But I take it to be a significant merit of the
nomological analysis that it does not suffer from either kind of case in its
very initial presentation. After all, the analysis was not developed specifically
with such cases in mind (unlike many of the baroque dependency and physical
connection views; see, e.g., Lewis 2000, Halpern and Pearl 2001, Hall 2007,
Fenton-Glynn 2011 for advanced dependency views, Fair 1979, Salmon 1994,
Ehring 1997 for advanced physical connection views).
7.5. THE ACCOMMODATION CRITERION 327
7.5 The Accommodation Criterion
A final merit of the proposed nomological analysis I want to draw attention
to is its ability to accommodate both simultaneous and sequential causation.
While I remain unsure about the prospects of physical connection views on this
point, it seems to present difficulties both for dependency views and another
popular approach to analysing causation which we might call ‘powers-based
views’.
In the presentation of my proposal, I have assumed that we should prefer an
account of causation which can accommodate both simultaneous and
sequential causation. Some arguments for the existence of simultaneous
causation have already been provided in the foregoing chapters (see,
especially, §5.2.3). The one I consider to be the most persuasive came from
Huemer and Kovitz (2003) who pointed out that the total force law and
Lorentz-force law suggest (under a causal conception) that acceleration, force
producing that acceleration, and the presence of electrical and magnetic
fields inducing that force are all simultaneous. Notice that such simultaneous
relationships bear many of the trademark symptoms of causation. They are
handles for the control and manipulation of variables, they can be used to
assign responsibility, and so on. Granting such examples shows that it is not
so easy to dismiss simultaneous causation on the basis of special relativity.
Whereas relativity is only a problem for spatially separated and simultaneous
relata, in both of Huemer and Kovitz’s examples, the causes are co-located
with their effects.
Granting that some causation is simultaneous, should we thereby expect all
of it to be? Strangely, the weaker view that causes are sometimes
simultaneous with their effects has been most prominently defended recently
via the stronger view that all causation is (for instance, Huemer and Kovitz
2003 seem to take this view, as do Mumford and Anjum 2011, ch.5). But this
is highly problematic. To start with, although we may agree that some
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effects of an applied force are instantaneous with that force (e.g. acceleration)
other phenomena are certainly not instantaneous with the application of a
force despite being paradigm effects of it. For instance, the movement of an
object initially at rest will not be simultaneous with the application of a
force. If the force is applied at t0, then the object will not be moving at t0,
but only (a vanishingly brief but non-zero amount of time) afterwards. This
is the case regardless of how much force is applied. Problems like these can
be generated for any relationship governed by a differential relation (see the
discussion in Easwaran 2014).
Moreover, one might think, as I do, that the distinctness in times of causes
and their effects is not limited to cases in which the times overlap—causes can
happen in the extended past of their effects too! But these kinds of causal
influence have been objected to in the past. A common line of argument,
started by Russell (1912), is that if an influence entirely precedes its effect,
then it cannot be contiguous with it, and hence cannot necessitate the effect.
Putting aside whether or not necessitation is an essential feature of causality,
the very premise needs questioning. As has been pointed out by Chakravartty
(2007), among others, causes may be understood to occur in the open interval
up to but not including the time of their effects. And yet Chakravartty has
gone on to complain that if causes are continuous with their effects this leaves
no way to properly individuate them. So the argument goes, the only part of
the cause which can truly have any power to bring about the effect is the very
last temporal slice, and assuming time is contiguous, this renders the cause
interpreted as an enduring event undefinable.
I don’t find this line of reasoning particularly persuasive. Chakravartty’s point
seems to amount to the point that causes will have vanishingly brief final
temporal parts which ‘screen off’ their influence of the effect from the earlier
temporal parts. This would be the case if time is continuous and, for example,
‘... we have [...] a causal chain [... c → d → e], in which positive
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time is indicated by arrows. [... O]nce we know that d has occurred,
it is no longer necessary to know that it was preceded by c; event
c is no longer relevant to the prediction of e. The contribution of
c to e has been absorbed in d, so to speak; and d may be said to
screen off x from e’ (Reichenbach 1956, 189).
Such cases of screening off seem entirely plausible, perhaps even pervasive.
But I see no reason why this fact should preclude some event extended in
time and entirely preceding another counting as the cause of that other event.
This would seem especially natural if one thinks that causation has plenty of
transitive instances. Indeed, it can seem in such cases that screened off causes
of an effect are indeed causes because they are also causes of the intermediate
screening events. After all, we don’t claim that only the top layer of bricks in
a house (let alone an indefinably small part of the top layer) holds up the roof
because they are the only layer in contact with the roof!
But perhaps such indirect causation could be accepted whilst still
maintaining that where there is screening off of earlier temporal parts by
later temporal parts, those later temporal parts will inevitably be
simultaneous with the effect. If true, this might appear to reclaim the
fundamentality of simultaneous causation. However, we know that this
interpretation cannot in general be true. To show this, let’s look at an
example.
Consider the situation represented in Figure 7.6 (p.330). A ball is in a
stationary but unstable equilibrium between the jaws of a grip up to time t0
(see diagram in Figure 7.6, p.330). At t0 a small force Fp is applied which
releases the ball downwards out of the grip. The force is applied until t1 and
is removed entirely by t2, at which point the ball is in freefall. We can ask: is
the force Fp a direct influence of the freefall? If it isn’t then we must find
some relatum entirely distinct from the push which screens it off from the
freefall (NB. this is the case even if the push is claimed to be no cause at all).
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But this will be difficult under any interpretation of screening off. For there
is no obvious event distinct from the freefall itself which absorbs the influence
of the push on the freefall. Nor is the energy supplied by the push mediated
by another object or power. These facts can be stipulated of our hypothetical
example to hold so long as there is a smooth and continuous removal of
Fp—a perfectly physically plausible scenario.
Figure 7.6: ball in grip
But now notice also that the force Fp and the freefall do not overlap in time.
This is because the ball cannot be in freefall if the pushing force is still being
applied. Hence, the push and the freefall must be purely sequential: there are
no temporal parts of the cause which both screen off the earlier parts and are
simultaneous with the effect. Consequently, the view that putative causes are
always screened off by legitimate causes simultaneous with their effects cannot
be true.
It has been argued that the sort of case just described is not one of genuine
causation. This is a view made explicit by Mumford and Anjum (similar
sentiments are present in Huemer and Kovitz 2003, Heil 2012) who say that
‘a key point to note [...] is that one causal process is not seen as the cause
of another but only as an enabler; thus, we do not need to invoke causation
between temporally distinct events’ (2011, 127).
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But how convincing can such a view be? First, we know it cannot be exactly
right simply from consideration of the non-zero time it takes for a force to
bring a resting mass to a nonzero velocity. And even if such cases can
somehow be incorporated within this view, there are further difficult
questions to be addressed. First, from a neutral standpoint, the view seems
wildly unmotivated. Sure, if we have some particular metaphysics we’re
already committed to (as Mumford and Anjum do), then maybe we must
deny sequential causation, but from a pre-theoretical position, the view
seems unquestionably counter-intuitive. For it denies, ultimately, that the
Big-Bang did not cause a rapid expansion of space-time, that over-lending for
sub-prime mortgages did not cause the 2008 credit crisis, that my staying up
all night did not cause me to be tired this morning. Compare such claims, for
example, with those of other philosophers who have tried, and in general
failed, to convince us that causation has a wildly different extension than we
typically think it does, such as Dowe’s (2000) distinction between negative
causation and genuine causation, or Russell’s (1912) eliminativism about
causation in altogether. The literature which responds to these texts reflects
the fact that we are more inclined to see their radical conclusions as a
reductio on their positions rather than anything else (see, e.g., Schaffer 2000,
2003, Bontly 2006).
But why do we find it so implausible when philosophers try to persuade us
that causation is not where we thought it once was, specifically between relata
separated in time? One reason is that we want to allow that experiments which
rely on our ability to affect changes across time are making use of genuine
causation. The administration of a drug, for example, can surely be a causal
influence on someone’s health. If it wasn’t then how come it’s so effective—or
are we not allowed to say even that it is effective? What are we supposedly
missing out on by confidently bringing about things in the future that we get
when bringing them about simultaneously? To be persuasive, Mumford and
Anjum need to show us how it can be that despite our intuitions, our use of the
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concepts of causation, influence and efficacy can be so consistently wrong. This
requires, at least in part, an explanation of how such concepts can mean one
thing, when most of us use it to mean another. Not even the most hardened
causal reference theorist should doubt that use has some impact on meaning
(see, e.g., the discussion on names in Evans 1982, Dummett 1978, McDowell
1998)—and even if they did, presumably their view about reference could not
be maintained under a denial of sequential causation anyway.
Another point in support of sequential causation is that it is incumbent on
theorists of the ontology of causation to provide an account about what
distinguishes real processes from pseudo processes. A beam of light is a real
process, the movement of the spot of light across a stage is a pseudo process
(see Salmon 1984a, Hitchcock 1995, Dowe 1995, Salmon 1998b, Choi 2002).
This distinction is one which appears to demand a causal explanation. But
theorists like Mumford and Anjum might seem committed to denying that
any temporal stage of a process could be the cause of later temporal stages of
the same process. And their denial would therefore seriously complicate the
issue of how single processes gets to be extended through time at all. On the
one hand, if past stages of a process can’t cause latter stages, then how do
those latter stages come to be? Mumford and Anjum’s use of the word
‘enabler’ would seem to be appropriate at this stage, but if enabling is
capable of doing the important work of bringing about sequences of events or
processes, then why is enabling not just plain old causation after all? On the
other hand, if past stages of a process can cause its own latter stages, then
why can’t we say the same for distinct processes too?
This leads to a final point about the need for sequential causation. There is
an old problem first raised by Hume, which questions how simultaneous
causation can ever provide the grounds for a universe which has duration at
all. On the one hand, if enabling were a new metaphysical category, maybe it
could be used to make sense of this. But then the view promoted by
Mumford and Anjum becomes far less ontologically parsimonious at no
7.5. THE ACCOMMODATION CRITERION 333
obvious benefit to clarity or understanding. On the other hand, if enabling is
not some distinct metaphysical category, but a construction from non-causal
and real causal relations, then if all causation is simultaneous (or mediated
by a vanishingly brief amount of time), then we might expect enablers must
be as well. This would make it utterly mysterious how earlier moments of
history are explanatory of later moments at all.
All in all, there is some proportion of relations which we typically think of as
causal and which are extended throughout time. If we are to be persuaded
that they are not causal, this won’t erase the requirement to understand those
relations as metaphysically and explanatorily significant. If enabling is that
relation, then it’s something philosophers like Mumford and Anjum should be
worrying about just as deeply as they do about causation.
The preceding comments are enough for me to believe it is worth steering
away both from views which are not open to purely simultaneous causation
and views which are not open to purely sequential causation. My conclusion in
general is that an analysis of token causation should accommodate causes which
are both simultaneous and sequential with their effects. That is, it should—
pace Hume, Mellor, Glynn—allow that certain causes can be simultaneous with
their effects, but also that—pace Huemer, Kovitz, Mumford and Anjum—allow
that causes can completely precede the time in which their effects occur. I call
this the ‘accommodation criterion’.
The accommodation criterion sets a constraint on any analysis of token
causation if it is to be plausible. There are countless analyses around, but in
what follows I will focus on two broad approaches which appear to me
particularly prominent in the current metaphysics of science literature,
viz. powers-based views and dependency views before considering the
nomological analysis proposed above. It turns out that while the former two
each struggle to accommodate the accommodation criterion in different ways,
the nomological analysis does not.
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7.5.1 Powers-based views and the accommodation
criterion
Could a powers-based view of causation support the accommodation
criterion? My inclinations are to say ‘no’. Often, the dialectic of powers-based
views is to argue that an ontology of powers is more suitable for capturing
genuinely simultaneous causation than one of related events, such as we find
in dependency views. This may bear some truth, as we will shortly find out.
But regardless, it is important here to focus on what an ontology of powers
cannot do, and it seems the suitability of handling simultaneous causation
has, in this case, come at the expense of any ability to handle sequential
causation: powers-based views seem committed to simultaneity.
To see this, consider first the phenomenon of manifestation. It is sometimes
said by powers-theorists that causation is not a relation (see Lowe 2012, Heil
2012). The argument for this idea is that causation should be understood as
the manifestation of a power by an agent in some patient. There is, therefore,
only actually one relatum to causal occurrences, namely, a manifestation. For
example, the dissolving of the sugar-cube is done by the water, but it was
just one thing—a dissolving—which happened to the sugar-cube. Causation
occurs according to these powers theorists when two things do some one
thing together. In this way, causation is not understood to be a relation. But
if causation is not a relation, then simultaneity is entailed trivially, since one
monadic occurrence has no other relata to be temporally distinct from
(although this needn’t preclude the manifestation being a temporally
extended process).
True, some powers theorists do not like the Aristotelian idiom of agents and
patients, opting instead for a focus on reciprocation in causation between
‘power partners’ (see Heil 2003, Martin 2008). In this case, there may not be
an agent or patient as such in a causal occurrence, but rather two entities
which manifest their powers mutually in each other. If this is the story, then
7.5. THE ACCOMMODATION CRITERION 335
there may indeed be more than one relatum in a causal occurrence. For
instance, the sugar-cube is dissolved by the water, but the water also gets
sugary because of the sugar-cube. However, simultaneity is still demanded by
the fact that the manifestations are reciprocal.
A form of analysis of powers which might seem to countenance cross-temporal
causation is that given by Bird (2007a). For in discussion of finks he suggests
that ‘the process whereby a disposition manifests itself will typically take time’
and that ‘finkish dispositions arise because the time delay between stimulus
and manifestation provides an opportunity for the disposition to go out of
existence and so halt the process that would bring about the manifestation’
(p.25). A closer reading of Bird reveals, however, that his view of powers (or
in his terms ‘potencies’) do not take time to manifest. Indeed, his central
argument against the possibility of finks at the fundamental level appears to
rely on this fact (assuming time is continuous; see pp.60-62).
I do not presume that powers theorists will find it impossible to accommodate
sequential causation, but given this brief survey it seems that they are likely
to have difficulty in doing so; or at least, their ontology does not naturally
dispose them to such accommodation.
7.5.2 Dependency views and the accommodation
criterion
I now turn to consider the compatibility of dependency views and the accom-
modation criterion.
In their most basic form, counterfactual-dependency analyses tell us that
causes of some effect are those distinct events which are such that if they
hadn’t happened, the effect wouldn’t have happened either (see Lewis 1973a,
for an early version of the idea). But to make sure the analysis captures the
asymmetry of causation, it must be that those depended-on events would still
have occurred even if the phenomenon hadn’t. If this were not a
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consequence, then the theory would make causes dependent on their effects
just like effects are on their causes and so lack the required asymmetry.
Obviously, the source of this asymmetry will be reflected in whatever semantics
is appropriate to give for counterfactuals. So it is a useful place to look if we
want to understand the theory better. Many of the philosophical treatments
for counterfactuals’ assess whether the truth of their consequents are true in
worlds where the antecedent is true but otherwise the history is exactly like
the actual course of history up to the time of the antecedent (see Jackson 1977,
Maudlin 2007; Lewis’s semantics is discussed below). If the consequent turns
out to be true in those worlds, the counterfactual is true. This approach will
capture the asymmetry of sequential, forward-tracking influence, since in the
relevant worlds where some effect doesn’t happen, the cause has still occurred
by virtue of the stipulation that the worlds be like ours up to the time of the
antecedent. But this semantics seems to fail when it comes to simultaneous
influence for that very reason: all worlds in which some phenomenon doesn’t
occur, will be ones in which its simultaneous causes don’t occur either.
A similar problem befalls many of the probabilistic-dependency theories of
causation. Typically, probabilistic-dependency theories deem a relationship
between two relata as causal if the probability of the putative effect occurring
given that the putative cause occurs in conjunction with some background
conditions is higher, or at least different from, the probability of the first
occurring without the cause. Surveying the various accounts, background
conditions have been characterised in a couple of ways. One way is
Cartwright’s (1979), who claimed that they should be understood as the
independent causes of the putative effect (see also Eels 1991). But since we’re
looking for a non-causal analysis of causation, this suggestion must be passed
over. The other way, advocated by Reichenbach (1956), Suppes (1970), Kvart
(2004), Fenton-Glynn (2011) is that the background conditions are facts
about the situation’s history before the putative influence occurs. As with
the counterfactual semantics just considered, the problem with this is that in
7.5. THE ACCOMMODATION CRITERION 337
the case of purely simultaneous causal influence, such a choice of background
conditions is not sufficient to preclude the analysis returning the result that
an event is a cause of its simultaneous causes.
Returning to counterfactual dependency, these views might appear
untouched by the above concerns if, instead of holding fixed the past by
stipulation, they treated counterfactuals (or counterfactual probabilities) as
assessed by some other means. Lewis (1986b), for example, suggested that
one might avoid a stipulation on historical background by assessing the truth
of counterfactuals according to an independent asymmetry of causal
overdetermination.9 To motivate this idea, Lewis argued that it is harder to
eradicate all the effects of a cause than it is to prevent a cause in the first
place. One would have to suppose that many of a cause’s effects did not
occur before being able to infer that a single cause did not happen either.
But supposing a single cause didn’t happen is typically enough to know that
a number of its consequences didn’t either.
Such an asymmetry makes no obvious mention of temporal direction and so
might be thought, unlike those theories which explicitly condition on
historical backgrounds, to accommodate simultaneous causation. Indeed,
Lewis spoke openly about desiring to accommodate causal occurrences
mediated by tachyons, advanced potentials (in Lewis 1986b), or (more
fantastically) an unobservable battle of goblins in causal relations with the
co-spatiotemporal presentation he was giving on the idea (see Lewis 1986d).
Nevertheless, I do not think Lewis’s idea can bear the weight required of it.
Elga (2000) has shown that an asymmetry of overdetermination is not
something born out in fundamental physics. Any minimal set of jointly
sufficient conditions for a phenomenon would have to include information
about the Cauchy surface (in non-relativistic terms, a hypersurface of space
9Although Lewis introduces this idea in deterministic terms, he extends the idea to
indeterministic worlds (see Lewis 1986c, postscripts). Hence ‘overdetermination’ should not
be thought of as a logical entailment.
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at a time) cutting across the entire future or past lightcone of a phenomenon,
otherwise there could be some event in the past or future which might
ultimately collude to determine that the phenomenon does not occur (or
occurs differently). But by including the entire past or future lightcone, we
entirely preclude the possibility of an asymmetry of overdetermination in
time. In Lewis’s terminology, the Cauchy surface which cuts the past
lightcone of a phenomenon is no more and no less a ‘minimal set of jointly
sufficient conditions’ for an event than is the Cauchy surface which cuts
across the future lightcone (see Frisch 2005 for a more detailed version of this
criticism). If counterfactual asymmetries cannot be grounded in temporal
overdetermination relatiokns, this implies that the only asymmetries of
causal overdetermination supplied by physics that there could be must be
simultaneous ones. Strangely, Lewis’s criterion therefore can seem to be
limited in the way I suggested powers-based views are, only to an analysis of
simultaneous causation.
7.5.3 The nomological analysis and the
accommodation criterion
Unlike the previously considered approaches, the nomological analysis of
causation as inter-system causation is clearly able to accommodate both
purely simultaneous and purely sequential causation. Inter-system causation
has been defined as a chain of direct or inertial causal relations and whereas
direct Intra-system causation is defined as existing only between
simultaneous relata (the cause is entirely simultaneous with the effect),
inertial intra-system causation is defined as existing only between
non-simultaneous relata (where the cause entirely precedes the effect).
Admittedly, I suggested we would have to adjust the criteria for direct
intra-system causation to accommodate relativistic effects, but this would
not lead to a rejection of simultaneous causation altogether. Co-located
value-instances, like those referenced by Huemer and Kovitz (2003) would
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still be simultaneous under any such adjustment.
The success of the nomological analysis might suggest to powers theorists
and dependency theorists alike that incorporating some element of
nomological analysis would be beneficial. Indeed, some dispositionalists have
openly admitted a place for laws when it comes to analyses of causation (see
Cartwright and Pemberton 2013, Heil 2015), although they typically
maintain that the metaphysical priority lies with powers suggesting, for
instance, that laws derive from facts about powers essences (Bird 2007a) or
describe regularities among them (e.g. Tahko 2015, Demarest 2017).
However, the preceding points should lead us to question this priority. Not
only can laws handle a class of causal relations which dispositional analysis
seems to struggle with (viz. sequential causation), but it is consideration of
laws themselves which actually lent credence to the existence of such
causation. Moreover, laws seem to do a lot more than connect dispositions in
the way suggested by powers theorists. For instance, some laws
(e.g. Newton’s first and the law associated with the free-particle solution to
the Schro¨dinger equation) describe what something does when in an inertial
state, i.e. when it is exercising no power at all and no dispositions are acting
on it. Other laws, e.g. the second law of thermodynamics, seem to concern
what happens as a matter of the contingent orientation of its components,
i.e. nothing due to the intrinsic dispositional character of the system or its
components. Finally, in §6.1, I offered an analysis of dispositions which
suggests that when we look to describe the stimulus and manifestation
conditions of certain powers or dispositions, we do well to look to the laws.
One could, therefore, be forgiven for thinking that it is after all laws which
are the more basic analytical category, with powers and dispositions being
drawn from laws in specific cases.10
In the case of dependency views of causation, it is more common to invoke
10Although, strictly speaking the analysis provided in §6.1 does not imply a direction of
metaphysical priority between powers and laws.
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laws explicitly. For instance, Hall (2007) endorses Maudlin’s counterfactual
semantics which explicitly makes use of laws for his structural equations
account of token causation, and both Schaffer (2001) and Paul (2000)
introduce the idea of lawful entailment to support their respective
probability-raising and counterfactual dependency accounts, etc.
Nonetheless, given that we now have a perfectly workable analysis of
causation purely in terms of a laws (viz. my above proposal) I see no reason
for sticking with a general line of analysis in terms of dependency which
tends to accept the importance of laws anyway.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter I have developed nomological analysis of token causation
drawing on the causal-junctions account of laws developed throughout in §5
and §6 and the notion of a system that it brings with it. With the added
discussion on event-identity, I suggested we can link together such causal
relations by identifying the same event in different intra-system causal
relations. This gave us the notion of ‘inter-system causation’, which I
suggested generalises over all token causal relations. If the Humean
treatment I gave in §6 of robust causal junction laws is successful then the
nomological analysis of token causation presented in this chapter also
satisfies the Humean methodology.
But we can, I think, go further than this. For in §7.4 and §7.5 I have tried to
show how the nomological analysis has a natural ability to succeed where other
approaches have failed. The nomological analysis avoids certain formulations
of problems of preemption and negative causation which naive dependency
and process-based views respectively struggle with, and it accommodates both
simultaneous and sequential causation, which dependency and powers-based
views respectively struggle with. Admittedly, there are many complex variants
of the considered approaches which may fair better than the simplistic ones I
have drawn attention to. There are also, presumably, other kinds of approach
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entirely which I haven’t considered. But although these points will not amount
to the final word on the matter, I nonetheless believe I’ve presented enough
evidence to support a new and promising analysis of token causation in terms
of laws.
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8 Conclusion
For a Humean, causal relations and laws of nature are something to be
accounted for (assuming they are not to be eliminated) in terms of the
mosaic. But beyond that, there is a lot of scope as to how the accounts
should proceed. After defending the Humean methodology in §2, the
subsequent five chapters of this thesis have argued for a particularly novel
view of the relationship between laws and causation.
The first step in §3 was to establish a clear logical form for laws. I argued
that all laws are ‘system-laws’ which have the form of a conditional with an
antecedent which specifies a system-type and a consequent which specifies a
behavioural formula. This was also the first place where the idea of a law
describing an ‘embedded phenomenon’ was mooted in order to characterise
laws’ application in idealising contexts. I argued that a modification of
idealising laws’ behaviour-predicate could serve to reestablish their
universality by specifying that the idealising formula is a special case of
whichever laws’ formula actually applies.
In §4 I defended the view that laws are system-laws against a common trope
in philosophical explorations of laws: that laws mirror the structure of causal
relations. Laws, I argued, condition behaviour on properties of the very same
system at the very time at which the behaviour is predicted. Moreover, those
properties on which behaviour is conditioned are conditions of assembly, rather
343
344 CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
than behavioural properties themselves. Hence, the laws cannot be chained
together in the way the causation-mirroring conception suggests. This critique
allowed me to also criticise the best systems account of laws, which I argued
is implicitly committed to such a conception.
In §5 I set about offering an alternative ‘causal-junctions conception’ of laws,
pointing towards four causal features associated with many laws two of which
concern dispositionality, two of which concern causal asymmetry. I pointed
to a specific class of laws—the robust causal junction laws (RCJLs)—which
exhibit all these features in a way which is particularly informative for when
it comes to knowing how to intervene and control our environment. I then
propose a ‘causal-junctions account’ of laws which understands RCJLs as that
central class of laws from which all others get their lawhood derivatively.
In §6 I provided an analysis of the causal features in RCJLs consistent with the
Humean methodology. This involved an extensional analysis of the law-level
disposition of embeddability and a schema for extensional analysis (i.e. SysCA)
of component-level dispositions in terms of the very laws in which they feature.
I then proposed that we analys the asymmetries in causal junctions at both
the variable-level and law-level by means of probabilistic analysis in which the
effect-variable in each junction is revealed as an unshielded collider on the
set of causal paths which comprise the junction. The key consequence of these
analyses was that it enabled the ‘causal-junctions account’ of laws to be proven
consistent with the Humean methodology, thereby providing the means for a
fully Humean causal-junctions account.
Finally, in §7 I presented a nomological analysis of token causation. The
analysis drew on the fact that RCJLs are themselves grounded in type-level
causal relations. By showing where the system-types of these laws have
instances, we can simultaneously show where their type-level causal relations
have instances. Chaining together these instances via system-linking events
(which may be identified under different descriptions) gives us the concept of
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inter-system causation which, I argued, provides a competitive analysis of
causation.
Returning once more to the diagram presented in §1, it should be clear now
how the connections of analysis have been provided.
One might notice that I’ve added a further node to the diagram. For
although it was not addressed in the foregoing thesis, I think we have reason
to suspect the utility of this account of laws and token causation in providing
an analysis of type-level causation in general. For example, if it is a
type-level causal fact that smoking causes cancer then we might hope to
analyse such a fact by recourse to the token instances in which individuals’
acts of smoking causes them to contract cancer. These relations in turn will
be analysed by an understanding of the intra-system causal relations and
event-identities in such circumstances. Intra-system causal relations are
ultimately to be explained by RCJLs and their grounding in specific kinds of
type-level causation which occur in lawful systems (perhaps at a microscopic
cellular or even bio-chemical level). Hence very specific forms of type-level
causation which take place within laws’ system-types (which I have suggested
are analysable in terms of probabilistic dependencies) may ultimately serve
to analyse the rest of type-level causation.
Extending the framework to account for all type-level causation is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but the possibility of such an account confirms, I think,
the comprehensiveness and plausibility of what has already been provided: a
Humean account of laws and (token) causation.



































Type-level causation not in robust causal junc-
tions
Figure 8.1: Thesis structure from §5 onwards
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